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ABSTRACT 
 
This study seeks to examine the extent of forensic accounting services and to investigate the 
determinant factors on the intention to use the services to detect and prevent fraud within 
English local authorities. A validated instrument was employed to survey all 353 local 
authorities in England of Chief Executive Officers, Directors of Finance, and internal auditors. 
Concepts from institutional theory, and in particular institutional isomorphism, are used as the 
underlying theoretical framework. The results indicate that forensic accounting services have 
a place in local authorities’ counter-fraud work. Furthermore, both coercive and mimetic 
pressures were found to influence the intention to use forensic accounting services. In addition, 
the benefits and the costs of forensic accounting services and the strength of the in-house 
counter fraud resources were deemed to be associated. This study contributes to the body of 
knowledge of forensic accounting, fraud and management consultants and institutional theory 
in focusing on the utilisation of external resources to counter fraud particularly in the UK public 
sector. By understanding and examining the extent of forensic accounting, this study can 
inform the role and strategies of central government, local authorities, professional bodies, and 
forensic accounting providers on improving counter fraud work within local authorities. As 
this study used a self-administered survey, future studies could conduct interviews to explore 
possible explanations and interpretations to have richness of data besides include other 
participants from the regulators and the forensic accounting providers.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Introduction  
 
This study focuses on understanding the financial management and accountability in the public 
sector by utilising management consulting services. Specifically, this study proposed that the 
intention to use forensic accounting services of English local authorities to detect and prevent 
fraud is subject to institutional pressures based on the New Institutional Sociology (NIS) 
theory. This study, therefore, develops a conceptual framework to investigate the relationships 
between the multiple variables derived from institutional pressures, other salient factors and 
the intention to use forensic accounting services among English local authorities. 
 
This chapter provides the foundation for the research reported in this thesis. It begins with an 
introduction and background to the study, which outlines a brief history of the changes in the 
development of counter fraud in local authorities, and how the application of forensic 
accounting could be utilised. The research motivation is focusing on the importance for this 
study to be undertaken. The research aims describe the objectives of this study together with 
research questions. Followed is the summary of research design, outlining the phase undertaken 
and research contribution. Finally, the structure of the thesis is presented. 
 
1.2 Background to the Study 
 
The setting of the UK public sector has changed dramatically since the implementation of the 
New Public Management (NPM) (Hood, 1991, 1995, Lapsley & Oldfield, 2001). The NPM 
proponents can be seen as intent on making fundamental changes to management structures, 
18 
processes and practices on the public sector including financial management (Lapsley & Pallot, 
2000, p. 215). Public financial management refers to the ‘system by which financial 
management resources are planned, directed and controlled to enable and influence the 
efficient and effective delivery of public service goals’ (CIPFA 2010a, p.3). One of the key 
elements in the financial management reform process is the utilisation of accounting techniques 
previously applied in the private sector for planning and decision making in the new public 
sector environment (Mir & Sutiyono, 2013). The reform of local government can be seen as 
part of a wider set of public sector reform under the NPM (Lapsley & Oldfield, 2001). 
 
Under the NPM, public accountability has been a central component by focusing efficiency 
and effective management, protecting public funds and delivering services (Fatemi & 
Behmanesh, 2012), and  as a pre-requisite for good governance (Ferry, Eckersley, & Zakaria, 
2015). Accountability can be defined as ‘a relationship between an actor and a forum, in which 
the actor has an obligation to explain and to justify his or her conduct, the forum can pose 
questions and pass judgment, and the actor can be sanctioned’ (Bovens, 2007, p. 7). 
Responsibility for performance in the public sector is executed through a form of managerial 
accountability e.g. greater level of regulation and surveillance (Cooper & Pearce, 2011). As a 
result, there is increasing ‘regulation government’ as echoed in the number of national level 
regulatory bodies for the public sector (Hood, James, & Scott, 2000) and privatization reform 
(Lapsley & Oldfield, 2001). The current research focuses on one component of the NPM 
principles, which is the role of management consultants (forensic accounting services) in 
engaging their services within English local authorities that are subject to public accountability 
(detect and prevent fraud), in order to manage public funds. 
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As a result of the public sector reform, management consultants have been described as having 
a significant influence for the last few decades including in the UK (Lapsley & Oldfield, 2001). 
Among the reasons included: the public sector lack of the relevant skills and expertise required 
for the transformation (privatization reforms) (Lapsley & Oldfield, 2001). Therefore, 
government considered that external advice from the private sector was needed (Peet, 1998 as 
cited in Lapsley & Oldfield, 2001). In the context of the current research, management 
consulting refers to ‘advisory services contracted for and provided to organisations by 
specially trained and qualified persons who assist, in an objective and independent manner, 
the client organisation to identify management problems, analyse such problems, recommend 
solution to these problems, and, help, when requested, in the implementation of solutions’ 
(Greiner & Metzger (1983), as cited in Canback, 1998a, p. 4) 
 
There was a significant growth in use of management consultants since the mid-80s, in which 
the term ‘consultocracy’ has been used to describe the growing power of the consultants 
(Lapsley & Oldfield, 2001, p. 524). At the end of 1990s, the big accounting firms (Anderson 
Worldwide, PwC, KPMG, Deloitte and EY) became increasingly active by establishing 
management advisory groups to extend their core accounting practices (Canback, 1998a). For 
the period 2005-2006, the public sector in England spent around £2.8 billion on external 
consultants with central government accounting for £1.8 billion (House of Commons 
Committee of Public Accounts, 2007). However, it is difficult to quantify the benefits of the 
services engaged from management consultants in the public sector (Lapsley & Oldfield, 
2001). Some of the reasons include the appropriateness, effectiveness and underlying motives 
to have the services from external consultants (Corcoran & Mclean, 1998). Furthermore, the 
use of external consultants in the public sector may be ideologically driven (Roodhooft & 
Abbeele, 2006). As highlighted by Corcoran & Mclean (1998): Lapsley & Oldfield (2001) and 
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Roodhooft & Abbeele (2006), clearly, much is still not known about the role of management 
consultants in the public sector. This study, therefore, contributes in addressing this gap within 
the context of forensic accounting services and local authorities. 
 
1.2.1 Local Authorities in the National Context  
 
The public sector is composed of public organisations that were traditionally controlled and 
owned by the Government with responsibility to provide essential utilities and services to the 
community (Broadbent & Guthrie, 1992). Local authorities as part of the public sector are 
multifunctional organisations that deliver a whole variety of different public services such as 
education, planning and development, social care, housing and highways (Andrews & Boyne, 
2009). Local authorities are one way in which the country’s governance and administration are 
being executed and recognised as statutory bodies under Acts of Parliament (DCLG, 2014). 
There are 353 local authorities across England and these are divided in some areas into county 
councils (the upper tier) and district councils (the lower tier). A further description is provided 
in Section 4.3.1.2.  
 
The provision of the public utilities and services has been characterised by the heavy 
involvement of central government in either (or both) policy making and funding (Broadbent 
& Guthrie, 1992). In England, local authorities’ total expenditure was £154 billion in 2012-13 
with more than 60% received in the form of government grants (DCLG, 2014). Local 
authorities are collectively one of the largest employers in England, employing nearly 1.6 
million full time equivalent staff for the period 2012-13  (DCLG, 2014). These statistics 
indicated that local authorities are an important component of the public sector in the UK and 
the national economy. 
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1.2.2 Relationships between Forensic Accounting and Fraud Detection and Prevention 
in Local Authorities 
 
By definition, forensic accounting includes the use of accounting, auditing and investigative 
skills (Houck et al., 2006) which can be classified into two components: litigation services and 
investigative services (Gray & Moussalli, 2006). Under investigative services, which is the 
focus of this study, a forensic accountant can be seen as one who is specialist and qualified in 
fraud detection and prevention (Bologna & Lindquist, 1995). The terms ‘specialist’ and 
‘qualified’ also can be found in the definition of the management consultant described in 
Section 1.2. A forensic accountant has both quantitative skills in researching the numbers to 
discover fraud and qualitative skills in examining the strength of internal control systems 
(Christensen, Byington & Blalock, 2005; Muthusamy, 2011).  
 
Based on forensic accounting literature, substantial research on the supply of forensic 
accounting services and the promotion of forensic accounting services seems to have been 
through promoting the need of the appropriate skills in education (Boys, 2008; Carnes & 
Gierlasinski, 2001; Houck et al., 2006; Rezaee, Crumbley, & Ellmore, 2004). However, there 
is very little research on the application of forensic accounting services by organisation 
particularly in the public sector context. Forensic accounting services providers consist of large 
accounting firms and small firms or specialised boutique firms. The large accounting firms 
classified the services as part of their non-audit services. Although the supply of forensic 
accounting is considered to be growing, there is little on the demand for forensic services in 
the literature, hence the current study investigates what factors could contribute on the demand 
for the services.  
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Fraud is a diverse category of crime that encompasses the use of deception to gain some benefit 
and has technical definition set out in Fraud Act 2006 (HM Treasury, 2012). Fraud in local 
authorities takes many forms, ranging from benefit fraud to non-benefit fraud. With the total 
revenue expenditure budgeted at £98.4 billion in England for the year 2012/13 (DCLG, 2013b), 
there is a possibility that local authorities may be targeted by fraudsters. The National Fraud 
Authority (NFA) in 2012 indicated that local authorities’ fraud is estimated at £2.2 billion. 
According to Button (2011), the statistic of fraud published by the related bodies merely 
captures the tip of the iceberg as there are possibilities that many frauds are undiscovered, 
hence hidden from official reports. 
 
Fraud prevention and detection are related, but are not the same concept. In this study, 
prevention of fraud refers to the practices of an organisation in having policies, procedures, 
training and communication to avoid potential fraud risk, while detection of fraud refers to the 
focuses on activities and techniques that promptly recognize whether fraud has occurred or is 
occurring or when preventive measures have failed (The Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA), 
The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA), & Association of Certified 
Fraud Examiners (ACFE), 2008). 
  
The fraud investigation in English local authorities, however, had some strengths and 
weaknesses. Local authorities received direct and indirect support from central government 
both by establishing a formal inquiry committee and inspection bodies, and indirectly by setting 
up a national agency like the NFA. These supports gave impact on English local authorities’ 
capacity and commitment to address fraud (Doig, 2014). However, the inspection bodies were 
no longer in the structure as central government decided to close their operation, including the 
Audit Commission recently, as discussed in Section 2.2.5 According to Button, Johnston, 
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Frimpong, & Smith (2007), local authorities had specially trained civilian personnel who are 
responsible to prevent, investigate and secure sanctions on fraudsters known as the Counter 
Fraud Specialist (CFS). Although the structure and the operation of the CFS varies across local 
authorities, in some authorities e.g. London Borough and Birmingham City Council, their work 
has already been recognised.  
 
One of the weaknesses of fraud investigation in local authorities is the focus on using reactive 
approach to combat fraud (Audit Commission, 2013; Fraud Advisory Panel 2011 and Gee, 
Button, & Brooks, 2010). In some local authorities, internal auditors are responsible for fraud 
investigations (Levi, Burrows, Fleming, & Hopkins, 2007). The counter fraud work by the 
internal auditors may be at risk if the internal auditors do not have specialists’ investigation 
knowledge, training or skills in fraud investigation (Lane, 2011). The current study chose 
English local authorities due to the evidence that fraud risk is increasing in local authorities 
based on literature in the Section 2.2.3. Therefore, the current study focuses on fraud within 
local authorities’ context by developing a model to examine the factors that influence the 
decision to use forensic accounting services. 
 
The consequences of these situations highlight the concerns on the counter fraud such as unable 
to detect and prevent fraud effectively. As such, the forensic accounting can be seen to have a 
role in the context of fraud investigation within local authorities. Forensic accounting could 
offer what is still missing: providing services that focus on proactive approach (e.g. fraud risks’ 
management and digital forensic) or by giving training in order to enhance the skills and 
knowledge to the related staff in local authorities. Thus, this study could enhance the 
understanding on the role of forensic accounting in the public sector context. 
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1.2.3 The development of Counter Fraud in Local Authorities 
 
The UK central government has given a high priority to eradicate the fraud problem, including 
fraud in local authorities. For example, in response to the Fraud Review 2006, the UK central 
government allocated £29 million in increasing protection against fraud to the UK economy 
including the establishment of the NFA (formerly known as the National Strategic Fraud 
Authority). The NFA introduced ‘Fighting Fraud Locally’ in 2012, a strategic approach to 
address the need for greater prevention and smarter enforcement across local authorities such 
as developing a new ten point counter fraud blueprint (National Fraud Authority, 2012b) with 
£19 million given to 51 local authorities to counter tenancy fraud (DCLG, 2011). 
 
The early foundation on the counter fraud work in local authorities can be seen back in 1970s. 
Beginning with the revelation of John Poulson’s massive corruption scandals in 1972, central 
government announced two official enquiries to be set up: Prime Minister’s Committee on 
Local Government Rules of Conduct and the Royal Commission on Standards of Conduct in 
Public Life (the Salmon Commission) in 1976. Further, the Widdicombe inquiry was 
established in 1986, which led to the creation of the statutory role of monitoring officer in local 
authorities, known as Chief Financial Officer S.151 (Lawton & Macaulay, 2004). The outcome 
is not encouraging as ‘probity or its policing are not seen as a core function and considered 
neither essential nor delegable’ (Doig & Skelcher, 2001, p. 91) in which not being properly 
operationalised 
 
Then, in 1988, the administration of housing benefit was transferred to local authorities from 
the Department of Social Security (DSS). Following this, local authorities have issue in dealing 
with fraud as ‘the transfer of responsibility for the administration and payment of housing 
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benefit was not complemented with the transfer from the Benefits Agency or Department of 
computer resources or records for anti-fraud work, or arrangements for access to the 
information systems’ (Doig & Coles, 1997, p. 109). The Benefit Agency is responsible for fraud 
investigation under the previous administration of housing benefit. This situation raised 
concern to central government on the lack of investigation into housing benefit fraud.  
 
Five years later, the Audit Commission states that the risk of fraud is increased as a result of 
changes to the nature and operation of local authorities’ services with benefits fraud become a 
major concern (Audit Commission, 1994). The Audit Commission encourages local authorities 
to participate actively in data sharing and matching, known as the National Fraud Initiative 
(NFI) starting in 1996 (Audit Commission, 2012b; Doig & Coles, 1997). However, the counter 
fraud activities in local authorities are not encouraging: not enough effort to prevent and deter 
fraud (Audit Commission, 1999), the focus on detection and investigation has not been 
developed in terms of numbers, power, and competencies, and the investigative work carried 
out in local authorities is not standardised, such as the scope and technique used (Doig & Coles, 
1997).  
 
In response to the high risk of fraud in housing benefit and council tax, the government created 
the Benefit Fraud Inspectorate (BFI) in 1997 but the government decided to close their 
operation in 2008 (Davis, Downe, & Martin, 2001; The Benefit Fraud Inspectorate, 2007). The 
late 1990s evidenced a number of high profile cases in local authorities’ history including the 
case of Doncaster Metropolitan Council, known as ‘Donnygate scandal’ (Lawton & Macaulay, 
2004; The Guardian, 1999). The reputation of the council had a serious effect following the 
conviction of the council leaders in fraud, bribery and corruption (The Guardian, 1999). 
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Following this, for the period 2000 onwards, there are significant changes made by central 
government in counter fraud landscape that affects local authorities, including the formation of 
the Standards Board for England under the Local Government Act 2000 (Lawton & Macaulay, 
2004), the Comprehensive Performance Assessment (CPA) by the Audit Commission in 2002 
(Murphy, Greenhalgh & Jones, 2011), the Scampion report in 2000 (National Audit Office, 
2003), the NFA together with the National Reporting Centre in 2008 under the Fraud Review 
(Button, Johnston, & Frimpong, 2008). In 2010, the government announced the abolishment 
of the Audit Commission, which acts as an umbrella body to local authorities. Another major 
change is the plan to create the Single Fraud Investigation Services (SFIS), which is focusing 
on benefit fraud (Home Office, 2012). As the exercise takes place, local authorities need to be 
prepared to focus on non-benefit fraud.  
 
Moving into professionalism, Button et al. (2007) acknowledge the existence of around 2,000 
CFS in local authorities. In terms of structure, capabilities and performance, there are variances 
among CFSs in local authorities, refers to ‘hybrid’ policing (Button et al., 2008, 2007; Lane, 
2011). However, a recent research by the Local Authority Investigation Officers Group 
(LAIOG) finds that the number of the CFS (manager and investigators) in local authorities is 
decreasing at an increased rate due to the austerity measures (LAIOG, 2012). This is an 
example of impact that may affect all local authorities. The reduction of CFS is contrast to the 
increasing of fraud cases, which could lead to the undetected of fraud cases in 79 district local 
authorities (Audit Commission, 2013). 
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1.2.4 The Role of Forensic Accounting Services to Detect and Prevent Fraud 
 
Ashworth (1993) and Smith (2007) acknowledged the increasing demand of forensic 
accounting in the UK because of a growing number of fraud investigations and business 
disputes. This view is supported by Huber (2009) who stated that the top management of the 
NFA seeks assistance from forensic accountants, who have in-depth knowledge of new fraud 
threats in order to reduce fraud cases in the UK. The development of forensic accounting in the 
UK differs from the practice in the US. For instance, there is no professional body in forensic 
accounting except accreditation by the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and 
Wales (ICAEW) unlike in the US where there is a number of professional bodies such as the 
Institute of Certified Forensic Accountants (ICFA) and the Association of Certified Fraud 
Examiners (ACFE).  
 
In the UK, the Institute of Counter Fraud Specialist (ICFS) provides specialist qualifications in 
fraud known as CFS. The emergence of professionalization among fraud investigators across 
central and local authorities known as CFS is encouraging (Button et al., 2007). By profession, 
the core function of a CFS is to investigate fraud and related offences with knowledge in law 
(e.g. benefits law). The main difference between CFSs and traditional fraud investigators is 
that CFSs conduct more preventive work such as improving the development of anti-fraud 
culture within organisations, and focusing on using intelligence gathering and analysis (Button 
et al., 2008).  
 
In order to deter fraud effectively, proactive measures could produce the best outcomes (Smith, 
2005). Local government bodies, including local authorities, require strong counter-fraud 
cultures, and effective counter-fraud procedures (Audit Commission, 2012c). On the other 
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hand, Apostolou & Crumbley (2005) and Muthusamy (2011) mentioned that forensic 
accountants, who had expertise and specialised knowledge and skills, can perform either 
reactive to investigate fraud and proactive to deter fraud from occurring. The appropriate skills 
posed by forensic accountants could assist organisations in evaluating the internal control 
systems, setting up prevention systems, and investigating fraud (Ramaswamy, 2005).  
 
Additionally, a forensic accountant has both quantitative  skills   in researching the numbers to 
discover fraud and qualitative skills in examining the strength of internal control systems 
(Christensen et al., 2005; Muthusamy, 2011) besides taking a more proactive and sceptical 
approach against fraud (Crumbley & Apostolou, 2002; Muthusamy, 2011). For example, one 
of the forensic accounting services firms, Grant Thornton UK, provides forensic and 
investigation services to local authorities such as reviewing the current counter-fraud 
procedures and reducing the risk of financial loss (Grant Thornton, 2010). Therefore, forensic 
accounting could fill the gap and potential to be used relating to the issue that local authorities 
need to be more proactive towards fraud.  
 
The Audit Commission (2013) recommended local authorities focus more on non-benefit fraud 
including procurement, which requires a detailed examination of financial statements. Previous 
studies in local authorities’ fraud did not specifically address the issue in detecting financial 
statement fraud e.g. the responsibility to detect the fraud, either the internal auditors or the 
external auditors. The Chartered Institute of Public Finance & Accountancy (CIPFA) that 
governs the internal audit practice in English local authorities through its code of practice 
clearly indicates that internal audit is not responsible for prevention or detection of fraud (Lane, 
2011). The HM Treasury (2012) also states that ‘it is not a primary role of internal audit to 
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detect fraud. Internal audit’s role is to provide an independent opinion on an objective 
assessment of the framework of governance, risk management and control’ (p.7). 
Generally, the same principle applied to external auditors where the role of the external auditor 
is to issue an opinion to the financial statement within their scope of work, and not specifically 
looking for fraud (Albrecht, Albrecht & Albrecht, 2008). The forensic accounting involved the 
examination of financial analysis in detail compared to auditing process that conducted 
periodic audits (Apostolou & Crumbley, 2008; Ramaswamy, 2007). Forensic accountants are 
distinctively positioned to be able to uncover financial deceptions with prominent skills, in-
depth knowledge and ability to critically analyse the financial statements, and deep 
understanding of fraud schemes (Ramaswamy, 2005). In addition, data mining is a key element 
in forensic accounting investigations in financial statements fraud (Golden, Skousen, & 
Clayton, 2006). According to Wolosky (2004), forensic accountants viewed fraud from 
different perspectives such as sociology, criminology and legal matters, not just from 
accounting and auditing perspectives.  
 
1.3 Research Motivation 
 
Despite the rapid changes in regulatory regimes introduced by central government, ‘unethical 
activities have not been banished from local governments’ landscape’ (Lawton & Macaulay 
2004 p.628). The focus of central government to counter fraud in local authorities stressed, 
among others, the need for emphasis on preventive work (Audit Commission, 2012d; National 
Fraud Authority, 2010), and to focus more on detecting and recording non-benefit fraud 
particularly in district local authorities (Audit Commission, 2012c). The NFA also recommends 
that public sector bodies, including local authorities, adopt similar practice in the private sector, 
e.g. a new attitude to information management and using advance data analytics to strengthen 
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prevention and detection initiatives (Kemp, 2010). Forensic accounting is seen capable in 
providing the services by incorporating their specialist skills, knowledge, experiences, and 
resources. 
 
Many studies on forensic accounting were carried out in the United States (US) that 
emphasized on the examination of current coverage and the future role of forensic accounting 
education (Carnes & Gierlasinski, 2001; Curtis, 2008; Houck et al., 2006; Ibex & Grippo, 2011; 
Kranacher, Morris, Pearson, & Riley, 2008; Porter & Crumbley, 2012; Ramamoorti, 2008; 
Rezaee, 2002; Rezaee & Burton, 1997; Rezaee et al., 1992; Smith & Crumbley, 2009) and the 
investigation of relevant skills of forensic accountants (Bressler, 2012; Davis, Farrell, & 
Ogilby, 2010; Digabriele, 2008; Harris & Brown, 2000). The findings of those studies in the 
US found that the demand in forensic accounting is increasing due to the abilities to more 
effectively deter fraud. In the UK context, the counter-fraud studies mainly examined the use 
of internal counter-fraud specialists (e.g. Button et al. 2007; Lane 2011). However, studies on 
the use of external professional services were related to internal audit outsourcing (e.g. 
Rittenberg & Covaleski, 1999; Selim, Woodward, & Allegrini, 2009; Selim & Yiannakas, 
2000). To the best of the researcher knowledge, no prior research empirically examined the use 
of forensic accounting services within the UK public sector. 
 
Thus, considering the gap in the knowledge, the present study could contribute to the forensic 
accounting literature by empirically examining the utilisation of forensic accounting services 
to detect and prevent fraud, particularly in the UK public sector context. 
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1.4 Research Aims 
 
The main aim of this study is to examine the extent of forensic accounting services and the 
determinant factors on the intention to use the services to detect and prevent fraud among 
English local authorities. To achieve this aim, the research objectives and research questions 
are formulated below.  
 
1.4.1 Research Objectives and Research Questions  
 
Objective 1: To identify the extent of using forensic accounting services to detect and 
prevent fraud by English local authorities 
Based on this objective, this leads to the specific research questions: 
RQ1 (a): To what extent do local authorities utilise the services from forensic 
accounting providers? 
RQ1 (b): What types of forensic accounting services are used by English local 
authorities? 
RQ2: What types of forensic accounting services’ providers are used by 
English local authorities? 
RQ3 (a): How satisfied are local authorities with the services received from 
forensic accounting services providers? 
RQ3 (b): What is the level of intention to continue using the forensic accounting 
services? 
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Objective 2:  To examine the perceptions of English local authorities’ officers 
towards forensic accounting 
The second objective is to gather the perceptions of the respondents towards their 
understanding related to the core skills/essential traits of forensic accountants 
RQ4: How the core skills/essential traits of forensic accountants being 
perceived based on the perceptions of users or potential users of forensic 
accounting services? 
Objective 3: To investigate the factors that influence the intention to use forensic 
accounting services to detect and prevent fraud by English local 
authorities. 
Based on this objective, the next research questions are raised to investigate the dominant 
factors (institutional, internal control, fraud perceptions, and forensic accounting perceptions) 
that contribute to the intention to use forensic accounting services to detect and prevent fraud 
by English local authorities. 
RQ5: Which factors have significant influence on the intention to use forensic 
accounting services? 
RQ6: How strongly the significance of factors influences the intention to use 
forensic accounting services? 
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1.5 Research Contributions 
There are two aspects of research contributions which are theoretical perspective and practical 
perspective. 
 
1.5.1 Theoretical perspective 
 
Findings from this study are important to provide more conclusive empirical evidence on the 
role of the management consultants within the public sector in the case of forensic accounting 
services to detect and prevent fraud in English local authorities. Additionally, within the public 
sector financial management under the NPM, this study provides input on how local authorities 
respond towards protecting public funds at the time where there are spending cuts by central 
government to use external expertise. Finally, this study uses institutional theory as a lens and 
a framework through the development of a conceptual model comprising multiple variables of 
institutional isomorphism and other salient factors and to be tested empirically whether the 
proposed theoretical framework matches with the empirical data.  
 
1.5.2 Practical perspective 
 
As central government have a significant role in shaping the counter-fraud arrangement in local 
authorities and included as one of the independent variable (coercive pressures), the findings 
might be useful to central government bodies and related government agencies in 
understanding the need for local authority to be more effective to counter fraud. For example, 
central government could provide incentives or assist in providing the best practices or training 
or accreditation in the area such as digital forensic or computer forensic which some counter-
fraud teams in local authorities still lack as discussed in the literature.  
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The forensic accounting services provider could also benefit as this study empirically examines 
the demand of their services together with the reasons (determinant factors). The providers 
could analyse their strategy to have more market in the future. Finally, this study will be 
beneficial to the potential user of forensic accounting services by understanding how local 
authorities perceive forensic accounting services in terms of types of services, satisfaction level 
and the reasons to use the services.  
 
1.6 Thesis Outline 
 
The thesis of this study comprises six chapters. The description of each chapter is presented as 
follows: 
 
Chapter 1 is an introductory chapter that discusses the background of the study, research 
motivation, research aims, and research contributions. It outlines the potential gaps and why 
the current research is needed. 
 
Chapter 2 reviews existing literature on management consultants, forensic accounting, fraud, 
and the institutional theory. 
 
Chapter 3 discusses the theoretical framework, clarification and development of conceptual 
approach, conceptual framework and research hypothesis. 
 
Chapter 4 explains the undertaken research method and methodology. These include the 
research strategies, research and questionnaire design, rules of ethics and confidentiality, pilot 
survey, and data collection. 
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Chapter 5 presents the data analyses and results of this study. Particularly, this chapter provides 
the empirical findings on the extent of forensic accounting services together with the determinant 
factors on the intention to use the services. 
 
Chapter 6 discusses the findings, discussions, and interpretations from the outcome of the data 
analysis. 
 
Chapter 7 presents the conclusions of the study. Specifically, this chapter includes contributions 
of the study, limitations and suggestions for future research. 
 
1.7 Summary 
 
The supply of forensic accounting services was evidenced in the literature. However, there is 
limited research on the demand of forensic accounting services especially in the public sector 
context. The potential of forensic accounting to counter fraud also has been highlighted in the 
literature. As fraud keeps increasing, including in local authorities, the utilisation of forensic 
accounting services is the area that is still not being investigated. Thus, more research is needed 
to further examine the extent of forensic accounting services to detect and prevent fraud within 
organisation particularly in the public sector context. The next chapter will examine the related 
literature on forensic accounting, fraud and organisational theory. 
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2 CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
This chapter presents the relevant literature review of management consultants, forensic 
accounting, fraud and institutional theory. The literature review begins with discussions on the 
overview of the management consultants, the history of forensic accounting, definition of 
forensic accounting, forensic accounting in the UK landscape, selected themes of forensic 
accounting literature, types of forensic accounting services, and forensic accounting in the 
private and public sector perspective. The second part consists of a definition of fraud, nature 
and extent in local authorities, including the impacts of fraud, counter fraud development, and 
the concept of fraud triangle. Finally, the utilisation of forensic accounting from the perspective 
of institutional theory is discussed. The focus on the New Institutional Sociology (NIS) is 
examined as a goal of this study is to develop a conceptual framework from an institutional 
perspective. Subsequently, additional factors identified in the literature will be incorporated to 
provide a comprehensive conceptual framework. 
 
2.1 Forensic Accounting 
 
This section covers a brief history of forensic accounting followed by the definition of forensic 
accounting. Next, it describes the size, growth and development of the market followed by the 
literature of forensic accounting based on the identified main theme. Finally, a brief review of 
forensic accounting both in the private and public sector context is presented. 
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2.1.1 A Brief History  
 
The origin of forensic accounting practices cannot be traced precisely, but it was believed such 
practices existed a long time ago. Technically, different practices emerge as part of forensic 
accounting services. In ancient Egyptian times, a royal auditor is used to verify irregularities 
(Nurse, 2002) and a scribe acts as the ‘eyes and ears’ to record Pharaohs’ wealth, which is 
similar to the concept of detection and prevention practised nowadays (Wells, 2000). The 
paradigms of accounting practices in the Roman Empire were more concerned with controls 
rather than profits including misuse of public funds (Glautier, 1983). Further, in the Middle 
Ages, the Royal Courts of Justice in England combined the fields of accounting and law to 
administer central government’s operations (Glautier, 1983). Thus, forensic accounting 
services began to include the combination of accounting and law. 
 
The integration of accounting and law continued, where, it was a common practice to use 
accounting experts to give a testimony of disputes in the courtroom. In the UK, the 
development of accounting practices alongside legal aspects was larger. In 1824, a firm in 
Scotland provided various accounting services including investigating legal disputes and 
claims. The first official chartered accounting profession is believed to have been formed in 
Scotland (Crumbley et al., 2003). Thirty years later, the Edinburgh Society of Accountants 
applied for a royal charter, with one of the focuses to increase the relationship between 
accounting and law. Then, in 1856, the audit corporation was required in England (Crumbley 
et al., 2003). 
 
In addition to the accounting and law combination, there was literature on the role of 
accountants as an expert witness that emerged in the late nineteenth century. For example, the 
articles on arbitration are found in 1883, fraud in 1884, investigation-type articles in 1889, and 
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expert witness in 1898. However, the forensic accounting phrase is believed to have been used 
for the first time by Maurice E. Peloubet in his article in 1946 (Crumbley et al., 2003). 
 
In practice, the first high profile case that involved forensic accountants in the US was during 
the trial of a notorious gangster, Al Capone, in the 1930s. The investigating team, known as 
‘the silent investigators’, worked under the US Internal Revenue Service (IRS), and used their 
superior investigative and analytical skills to defeat Al Capone’s illegal activities (Nurse, 
2002). Later, in the 1940s, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) created Special Agents 
Accountants dealing with war accounting investigations but it was the 1960s that highlighted 
the role of forensic accounting to business and society. Following the collapse of a big finance 
firm in Canada, forensic accountants acted as expert witnesses to provide evidence in court, 
including preparing the complex financial documentation into understandable form (Nurse, 
2002). 
 
In the 1980s and 1990s onwards, the profession of forensic accounting became more developed 
in the US. This can be seen in the establishment of the ACFE in 1988, followed by the 
American College of Forensic Examiners International (AFFEI) in 1992, Association of 
Certified Fraud Specialists (ACFS), National Association of Certified Valuation Analysts 
(NAVCA) both in 1993, and Forensic CPA Society (FCPAS) in 2005. Higher education in the 
US also contributed to the development by actively offering degrees in forensic accounting 
(Huber, 2012). Since then, there is a significant amount of forensic accounting offered by 
accounting firms and specialists firms, with the Big Four accounting firms controlling around 
35% of the market share in the US (Tysiac, 2012). As such, it is not possible to identify when 
the term ‘forensic accounting’ was used as common practice in the UK. However, the term 
that has been used in the UK (e.g., counter fraud) may be applied to the same fundamental 
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techniques, skills, and objectivity that had been practised by forensic accounting specifically 
related to fraud.  
 
2.1.2 Forensic Accounting in the UK Landscape  
 
So far, little is known about the practices of forensic accounting in the UK as there was little 
empirical study in terms of the existence, and the extent of usage. However, a number of 
articles in newspapers, magazines, and websites provide some information on the forensic 
accounting practices. In his article in The Times, Ashworth (1993) wrote ‘Growing Demand 
for Forensic Accounting’. The author states that during the 1990s, forensic accounting services 
became important particularly in disputes arising from mergers and acquisitions and expert 
witness due to the increase in litigation. A number of accounting firms e.g. Touche Ross, BDO 
Binder Hamlyn, KPMG Peat Marwick, and Grant Thornton have developed specific 
departments of forensic accounting. The types of forensic accounting services range from 
disputes on mergers and acquisitions, loss of profits, professional negligence, and breach of 
contract to fraud investigations. 
 
The view on the use of forensic accounting services is supported by Hunt (1997) in 
Management Accounting magazine that acknowledged the existence of the largest body of 
trained and experienced forensic accountants in the UK government departments such as the 
Inland Revenue, Custom and Excise, Social Security, Ministry of Defence and the Serious 
Fraud Office. In addition, Barney (2006) in the Financial Times illustrates that KPMG rapidly 
increased their resources in forensic accounting services. The demand on forensic accounting 
services is very high as financial institutions, and telecommunications companies required 
advanced counter fraud techniques. The forensic accounting teams in KPMG claimed to use 
sophisticated software algorithms to gather data for anomalies related to false insurance claims, 
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forged expenses, and identity theft. Similarly, Levi et al. (2007) also highlighted that in the 
UK, many high value cases of criminal fraud treated as civil matters for litigation are being 
investigated by forensic accounting and law firms. 
 
In the same vein, Smith (2007) a member of NIFA, states that the demand for forensic 
accountants is increased following the growth of the number of fraud investigations and 
business disputes. This indicates that fraud detection and prevention is considered big business 
both in the public and private sectors in the UK. For example, Huber (2009) in Accountancy 
Age acknowledged that the NFA sought forensic accountants with their in-depth knowledge 
of new fraud threats and experiences in the public and private sectors to assist government in 
reducing fraud. In practice, the ICAEW introduced the accreditation scheme for the forensic 
accountants to enable potential employers such as lawyers, the National Audit Office (NAO) 
and Serious Fraud Office (SFO) to choose a good forensic accountant. As such, forensic 
accounting is becoming a niche area for professional accounting firms and supplies of the 
services. 
 
2.1.3 Defining Forensic Accounting 
 
Thornhill (1995) stated that the discipline of forensic accounting is relatively new; that, up to 
now, there has been no formal definition accepted as the standard. The Webster’s Dictionary 
defined forensic as ‘pertaining to, connected with, or used in the courts of law or public 
discussion and debate’. Accounting is referring to ‘the process of identifying, measuring, and 
communicating economic information to permit informed judgements and decisions by the 
users of the information’ (Sterling 1967, p. 104). Accordingly, forensic in the accounting 
profession deals with the relation and application of financial facts to legal problems (Bologna 
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& Lindquist 1995, p. 42). This reflects the integration of accounting practices and law both in 
the civil and criminal court since long times ago. 
 
Generally, forensic accounting services are applied in the legal system or in another adversarial 
context (Gray & Moussalli, 2006). Forensic accounting encompasses every branch of 
accounting knowledge (Heitger & Heitger, 2008), and consists of two major components: 
investigative services and litigation support services (Gray & Moussalli, 2006; Nunn, Mcguire, 
Whitcomb, & Jost, 2006; Chilvers, 2000; Fleming, Pearson, & Riley, 2008). For Bologna 
(1994), the term ‘fraud auditing, forensic accounting, litigation support, investigative 
accounting, and valuation analysis are often used interchangeably’ (as cited in Gray & 
Moussalli 2006, p. 16). Therefore, forensic accounting may cover a broader area than fraud 
auditing which might denote fraud auditing as a subset of forensic accounting (Smith & 
Crumbley, 2009). 
 
Conversely, Crumbley et al. (2003) stressed that forensic accounting needs to be distinguished 
from fraud auditing. The authors further stated that a forensic accountant ‘may take on fraud 
auditing engagements and may in fact be a fraud auditor, but he or she will also use other 
accounting, consulting, legal, communication, and quantitative analysis skills in broader 
engagements’. On the other hand, a fraud auditor ‘is an accountant, especially skilled in 
auditing who is generally engaged in auditing with a view toward fraud discovery, 
documentation, and prevention’ (p. 3). Hence, the work of a forensic accountant is considered 
beyond the scope of the work carried out by a forensic auditor. Table 2-1 below outlines 
various definitions of forensic accounting covered in the academic literature, professional 
bodies, and forensic accounting providers. 
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Table 2-1: A Comparison of Forensic Accounting Definition 
Author (Year) Definition 
Academic Literature 
Bologna, Lindquist and 
Wells (1993) 
(as cited in Vanasco, 
1998, p. 23) 
Forensic and investigative accounting is the application of financial skills 
and an investigative mentality to unresolved issues conducted within the 
context of rules of evidence. As a discipline, it encompasses financial 
expertise, fraud knowledge, and a strong knowledge and understanding 
of business reality and the working of the legal system. Its development 
has been primarily achieved through on-the-job training, as well as 
experience with investigating officers and legal counsel. 
 
Chilvers (2000, p. 38) Forensic accounting is the use of investigative techniques, integrated 
with accounting and business skills, to develop information and opinions 
for evidence in court and for use by expert witness. The resulting analysis 
can be used in law courts as well as for the discussion, debate, ultimately, 
for resolving disputes. It therefore involves both the fields of litigation 
support and investigative accounting. 
 
Grippo & Ibex (2003 
p.4) 
Forensic accounting is a science (i.e., a department of systemised 
knowledge) that deals with the application of accounting facts gathered 
through auditing methods and procedures to legal problems usually 
dealing with financial and valuation issues which is different from 
traditional auditing. Forensic accounting is the investigation of an 
allegation; the evidence is expected to be presented in a judicial forum. 
Forensic accounting integrates investigative, accounting and auditing 
skills. 
 
Mohay, Anderson, 
Collie, De Vel, & 
McKemmish (2003, p. 
175) 
Forensic accounting seeks to bring together investigative, accounting, 
and technology skills in investigating accounting activities with a view 
to getting the truth behind the numbers. 
 
Manning (2005, p. v) As the science of gathering and presenting financial information in a 
form that will be accepted by a court of jurisprudence against perpetrators 
of economic crimes. 
 
Rosen (2006, p. 257) Not easily defined, but it is associated with gathering and evaluating 
financial evidence for court, or court-like, proceedings.  
 
Gray & Moussalli 
(2006,p. 16) 
Forensic accounting services are used in the legal system or in another 
adversarial context. Litigation services and investigative accounting are 
the two main branches of forensic accounting. 
 
Houck et al. (2006, p. 
68) 
Forensic accounting is the application of accounting knowledge and 
investigative skills to identify and resolve legal issues. It is the science 
of using accounting as a tool to identify and develop proof of money 
flow. These tools and techniques can be invaluable for fraud and forensic 
accounting investigators. 
 
Nunn et al. (2006, p. 3)  Forensic accounting consists of a broad area of financial statement 
investigation and litigation support. Various positions including 
consultants, internal auditors, bankruptcy specialists, bank examiners, 
and valuators of closely held businesses, as well as lawyers and 
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professors, can be held by forensic accountants. Among the many 
services offered by forensic accountants are: litigation support, expert 
witness engagements, divorce business valuation, and lost earnings 
engagements. 
 
Crumbley et al. (2003, 
p. 103)  
Forensic accounting is the action of identifying, recording, settling, 
extracting, sorting, reporting, and verifying past financial data or other 
accounting activities for settling current or prospective legal disputes or 
using such past financial data for projecting future financial data to settle 
legal disputes. 
 
Gray (2008, p. 115) Forensic accountants are viewed as a combination of an auditor and 
private investigator. Knowledge and skills include investigation skills, 
research, law, quantitative methods, finance, auditing, accounting and 
law enforcement officer insights beside organisational behaviour and 
applied psychological knowledge and skills are essential. 
 
Owojori & Asaolu 
(2009, p. 184) 
Forensic accounting is the practice of utilising accounting; auditing and 
investigative skill to assist in legal matters and the application of a 
specialised body of knowledge of the evidence of economic transaction. 
In the wider sense, it can be said as the integration of accounting, auditing 
and investigative skill to obtain a particular result.  
 
Smith & Crumbley 
(2009a, p. 4)  
Forensic accounting integrates a variety of skills including accounting, 
criminology, computer forensics, litigation services and auditing 
investigative services. 
 
Singh (2011, p. 4) Forensic accounting is a discipline that deals with the relationship and 
application of financial facts to business problems, conducted in a legal 
setting. The professional skills and attributes of a forensic accountant 
include having sufficient knowledge of accounting, audit, fraud, 
information technology and law evidence besides good communication 
skills, an investigative mentality and critical scepticism, and an 
understanding of psychology and motivation. 
 
Fitzgerald (2011, p. 12) Forensic accounting is the science of gathering and presenting financial 
information, on perpetrators of economic crimes, in a form that will be 
accepted by a court of jurisprudence. It is considered to be the bridge that 
connects the world of accountancy with that of the law. 
 
Professional Bodies 
CICA (2006, p. 2) 
The Canadian Institute 
of Chartered 
Accountants (CICA) 
 
Investigative and forensic engagements are those that require the 
application of professional accounting skills, investigative skills, and 
investigative mindset and involve disputes or anticipated potential 
disputes, or where there are risks, concerns, or allegations of fraud or 
other illegal or unethical conduct. 
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AICPA Forensic and 
Valuation Services 
Executive Committee 
(2008, p. 1) 
The application of special skills in accounting, auditing, finance, 
quantitative methods, certain areas of the law, and research, and 
investigative skills to collect, analyse, and evaluate evidential matter and 
to interpret and communicate findings and may involve either an attest or 
consulting services. The AICPA further classifies forensic accounting 
services into two main categories; litigation services, and investigative 
services or non-litigation services. The litigation services refer to 
providing assistance for actual, pending, or potential legal or regulatory 
proceedings before a trier of fact in connection with the resolution of 
disputes between parties. Litigation services generally involve as an 
expert witness, consulting, and other services. The investigative services 
or non-litigation services include all forensic services not involving 
actual or threatened litigation such as performing analyses or 
investigations, that may require the same skills as used in litigation 
services, but do not involve  the litigation process. 
 
ACFE, 2008 (as cited in 
McKittrick, 2009, p. 1) 
The use of professional accounting skills in matters involving potential 
or actual civil or criminal litigation, including, but not limited to, 
generally acceptable accounting and audit principles; the determination 
of lost profits, income, assets, or damages; evaluation of internal controls; 
fraud; and any other matter involving accounting expertise in the legal 
system. Forensic accountants combine their accounting knowledge with 
investigative skills, using this unique combination in litigation support 
and investigative accounting settings.  
 
(ICAEW, 2013) Forensic accountants deal with civil, criminal and insurance matters. 
They use their accounting, information technology and investigation 
skills to help lawyers, insurance companies and other clients resolve legal 
and technical disputes as well divorce cases.  
 
 
Forensic Accounting Providers 
KPMG (1999, p. 40) Forensic accounting is defined as assistance in disputes which are likely 
to involve litigation, arbitration, expert determination, mediation or an 
inquiry by an appropriate regulatory authority, and investigations of 
suspected fraud, irregularity or impropriety which could potentially lead 
to civil, criminal or disciplinary proceedings. While focused primarily on 
accounting issues, the role of the forensic accountant may extend to more 
general evidence gathering, advice and document handling. 
 
PricewaterhouseCoopers 
(2008, p. 40) as cited in 
Muthusamy (2011, p.35) 
Forensic accounting is a specialised discipline that arose to deal with 
instances of financial misstatement, in terms of both prevention and 
detection and, ultimately, recovery and remedy. Forensic accounting 
means the investigation or analysis of accounting evidence relating to 
unusual transactions due to either error or fraud. Forensic accountants are 
generally used in two ways: 
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Academicians, professional bodies, and forensic accounting services providers might have 
different ways of looking at the term ‘forensic accounting’. For example, academicians viewed 
forensic accounting as a combination of knowledge and skills, including accounting, law, 
criminology, information technology, and finance. Both professional bodies and forensic 
accounting providers provide a broader definition with emphasis on the types of services 
provided e.g. involving disputes or potential disputes in claim, arbitration, expert 
determination, and mediation. Apart from that, the forensic accounting providers extend the 
definition by embedding the elements of prevention and detection. Alternatively, besides being 
involved in investigation process, forensic accounting could be used to proactively examine 
the control environment to recognise weaknesses and areas susceptible to fraud or loss. The 
definition of forensic accounting services used in the current research draws together the 
• to proactively investigate the control environment to identify 
weaknesses and areas susceptible to fraud or loss 
• to investigate a specific situation to ascertain the true financial 
position. 
 
NIFA (2011) Forensic accounting is the integration of an individual accounting and 
auditing knowledge with investigative skills that have been gained from 
years of practical experience. The forensic accountant will review the 
instructions given by the client, usually through a solicitor, thoroughly 
investigate those instructions and the underlying circumstances, examine 
the financial information and any relevant contracts and other 
agreements, obtain appropriate evidence, prepare any appropriate 
calculations, form a conclusion and publish the whole in the form of a 
report suitable for presentation to the court. 
 
Frenkels Forensics 
(2012) 
A forensic accountant uses a combination of accounting, investigative, 
and legal skills to provide an accounting analysis that is suitable to the 
court, and will form the basis for discussion, debate, and ultimate dispute 
resolution. As forensic accountants, we are usually instructed to analyse, 
interpret, summarise and present complex financial and business related 
issues in a manner, which is both readily understandable and properly 
supported.  
46 
common elements identified in the definitions mainly on the investigation services 
components. These elements can be identified as knowledge, skills, experiences, and services 
provided in Table 2-2 and Figure 2-1. In Table 2-2, the common elements of the definitions are 
identified. 
 
 
Table 2-2: Summary of Forensic Accounting Definition 
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Bologna, Lindquist and Wells 
(1993,as cited in Vanasco, 1998) 
  √ √  √ √    √         
Chilvers (2000) √  √ √  √           √ √  
Grippo & Ibex (2003) √ √ √   √              
Mohay et al., (2003) √    √ √              
Manning (2005) √  √   √              
Rosen (2006) √  √   √              
Gray & Moussalli (2006)   √                 
Houck et al. (2006) √  √   √              
Nunn et al. (2006) √ √ √   √           √ √ √ 
Fleming et al. (2008) √ √ √   √ √ √    √     √ √  
Crumbley et al. (2007) √ √ √                 
Gray (2008) √ √ √    √ √ √   √ √       
Owojori & Asaolu (2009) √ √ √   √              
Smith & Crumbley (2009) √    √         √   √ √  
Singh (2011) √ √ √ √ √  √  √ √ √    √ √    
Fitzgerald (2011) √ √ √                 
CICA (2004) √     √           √ √  
AICPA Forensic and Valuation 
Services Executive Committee 
(2008) 
√ √ √         √     √ √  
ACFE (2008) √ √ √              √ √ √ 
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Definition by:  
Academician, professional bodies, 
and forensic accounting providers 
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KPMG (1999) √ √ √   √           √ √ √ 
PricewaterhouseCoopers’ (2008) √ √ √        √      √ √ √ 
NIFA (2011) √ √    √           √ √ √ 
Frenkels Forensics (2012) √  √   √           √ √ √ 
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While the difference between definitions can be identified as either the components of forensic 
accountants focused on investigative services and litigation services, the knowledge, skills, and 
experiences across definitions are consistent. The knowledge, skills and experiences of forensic 
accountants are also reflected in the literature on the forensic accounting education (see, for 
example; Davis et al. 2010; Rezae; Ramamoorti 2008; Rezaee et al., 2004). The definition by 
the leading professional bodies, namely ACFE, AICPA, and CICA, provides more detailed 
explanation. The ACFE, for example, differentiates between the fraud examinations and 
forensic accounting, and the CICA applied the term investigative and forensic engagements.  
 
On the other hand, forensic accounting providers define forensic accounting including the types 
of services offered: prevention, detection, recovery and remedy (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 
2008). For example, prevention of fraud involves developing a consistent system of internal 
control, setting up fraud prevention systems, while detection of fraud relates to investigating 
existing fraud (Ramaswamy, 2005). Fraud detection is “an examination of the facts to identify 
the indicators of fraud sufficient to warrant recommending an investigation” (Seetharaman, 
Senthilvelmurugan and Periyanayagam, 2004, p. 1064). Fraud investigation “consists of 
performing extended procedures necessary to determine whether fraud, as suggested by the 
indicators has occurred” (Seetharaman et. al., 2004, p. 1065). While fraud prevention involved 
reviewing and improving internal control, that was considered the primary defence against 
fraud, in which the most effective method of fraud prevention is to have a strong system of 
internal control (Seetharaman et. al., 2004). Proactive measures to mitigate fraud, through 
methods such as fraud assessment questioning (Peterson & Zikmund, 2004) and digital analysis 
(Bierstaker, Brody, & Pacini, 2006) were examples of prevention method that required specific 
skills. Thus, the elements of both detection and prevention were inter related with investigation 
services as shown in Figure 2.1. 
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Figure 2-1: Definition of Forensic Accounting 
 
 
Most of the forensic accounting definition indicated the need to embrace interdisciplinary fields 
of accounting, auditing, law, and information technology besides additional skills in research, 
communication, psychological, and investigation. Figure 2.1 shows how the definition of 
forensic accounting is constructed. 
 
In the UK, research on fraud (e.g. Button et al., 2007; Button, 2011; Lane, 2011) indicated the 
existence of the CFS in local authorities. While the work of the CFS involved some elements 
of forensic accounting, this study is focusing on the services provided by the external party.  
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Interdisciplinary fields such as 
knowledge in accounting, 
auditing, law/legal, finance, 
psychology, fraud, information 
technology, organizational 
behaviour, criminology and 
finance 
Investigation services 
Act as an investigator 
to evaluate internal 
control (prevention), 
gather evidence 
(detection) and 
testimony to resolve 
allegations of 
improper activity such 
as fraud (investigation) 
 
Litigation support 
services 
Act as an expert 
witness, consultant, 
and mediator in a court 
room.  
With 
Role Characteristics 
Additional skills in research, 
quantitative, communication, 
investigation, scepticism, and 
motivation  
Related practical experiences 
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Thus, for the purpose of study, a generic definition of forensic accounting services will be used: 
Forensic accounting services refer to any external providers such as 
accounting firms, and specialised forensic accounting firms that applied special 
skills, investigative skills, techniques, and practical experiences in detecting 
and preventing fraud as part of their services to organisations. 
 
2.1.4 Size, Growth and Development of the Market 
 
It is found that previous forensic accounting studies focus a lot on education, specialised skills, 
and the role of forensic accountants (discussed in Section 2.1.5), little is known on demand of 
forensic accounting services – is it fictional and supply driven? Is it rebranding of other 
assurance services aligned to fraud to make it sound appealing e.g. fraud makes it an eye-
catching service. Taking a step back and taking a broad look at the management consultants’ 
literature, Kipping & Clark (2012) acknowledged the movement in traditional professions in 
accounting services that gradually loosened their previous professional obligations and moved 
to become a new type of organisation, known as professional service firms or business advisory 
firms or multi-disciplinary practices. The main difference between other services of 
management consultants and professional services firms is the latter focus on delivering 
services within the constraints of professional norms of conduct (Kipping & Kirkpatrick, 
2013). Management consultants were considered as one of the most significant and enduring 
types of services acquired by organisations over the last 60 years (Canback, 1998a). They have 
been referred to as ‘the shadow government in the US’ (Guttman & Willner, 1976) and the 
industry largely dominated by US-based firms (more than half of global market) (Saint-Martin, 
2012).  
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The Management Consultancies Association (MCA), which acts as the representative body in 
the UK defined management consulting as ‘the practice of creating value for organisations, 
through improved performance, achieved by providing objective advice and implementing 
business solutions’ (MCA, 2014). Organisations seek advice from external providers in order 
to solve problems, for which they think they lack expertise or capacity (Kipping & Clark, 2012; 
Lapsley & Oldfield, 2001). For instance, Lapsley & Oldfield (2001) pointed out that it is very 
interesting to know why management consultancy still is a booming industry particularly in 
the public sector. Despite the various possible reasons explained in the literature, two main 
reasons were; (i) lack of expertise within the organization which management consultants 
provide; (ii) the complexity of clients’ and consultants’ relationships where consultants provide 
reassurance at the time when the clients are insecure (Lapsley & Oldfield, 2001). A great 
number of consulting firms have developed worldwide to support management teams both in 
the private and public sector. Many of them, such as IBM, Deloitte, McKinsey, and Accenture, 
are in high demand with a strong presence in many countries (Engwall & Kipping, 2013). 
According to Greenwood, Li, Prakash, & Deephouse (2005), the Public Accounting Report 
outlines four services lines provided by the accounting firms; (i) audit and basic accounting 
services; (ii) provision of taxation advice; (iii) provision of management advisory services; (iv) 
other services including advice on executive compensation and outsourcing. During the 1960s, 
when accounting firms moved into consultancy due to low prospects for growth in audit and 
tax sectors, they expanded their services to non-audit based and played a major role in the 
professionalization and commercialization of management consulting. To put into context: in 
1989, Arthur Andersen divided into two business units of Arthur Andersen and Andersen 
Consulting which later that year competed with each other (McDougald & Greenwood, 2012). 
In the UK, management consulting has historically developed as the extension of the 
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institutionalized relationship in which accounting firms have established with their audit clients 
to shape their management consulting business (Saint-Martin, 1998). 
 
In the late 1990s, the major accounting firms dominated the management consulting market 
worldwide (Saint-Martin, 1998). The firms known as the Big Eight at that time included: 
Arthur Andersen; Coopers and Lybrand; Ernst and Whinney; Arthur Young; KPMG Peat 
Marwick; Deloitte, Haskins and Sells; Touche Ross; and Price Waterhouse (nowadays known 
as the Big Four: PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), EY, Deloitte and KPMG). Although all the 
accounting firms mentioned are now wholly American-owned, most of them were originally 
British and emerged during the mid-19th century when British accountants, following the trail 
of investment from the City, established offices in North America (Hussein and Ketz 1980, as 
cited in Saint-Martin, 1998). One of the major consequences of the provision of non-audit 
services was the increased potential conflict of interest when a firm delivered both auditing and 
consulting services to the same client (McDougald and Greenwood, 2012). For instance, more 
than 40% of management consultancy that was provided by big accounting firms in 2001 were 
for their own clients (Greenwood et al., 2005). According to Werr & Styhre (2002), there are 
two views of the consultant-client relationship as described in Table 2-3. 
 
The argument around management consultancy centres on it being a knowledge industry, and 
the translation of knowledge into practice. For example, based in Table 2-3, the functionalist 
image point of view, consultants provide independent judgement, expertise and knowledge to 
competent and perceptive clients. The critical image point of view, on the other hand stated 
that consultants act as manipulator whereby the clients were naive and exposed in danger of 
being exploited (Werr & Styhre, 2002).  
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Table 2-3: Consultant-client Relationship 
 Functionalist image:  
Client as buyer 
Critical image:  
client as victim 
Why use consultants? Knowledge or resource 
deficiencies, independent 
judgment 
Cognitive and socio- 
psychological needs emerging 
from the characteristics of the 
managerial task 
 
Nature of the client Competent buyer who hires 
and fires, critical evaluators of 
consulting advice 
 
Naive, anguished victim of 
consultant’s persuasive 
strategies 
Nature of the 
consultant 
Provider of a knowledge based 
service at the client’s 
request 
 
Manipulator of symbols in 
order to create impressions of 
value 
Nature of the 
client-consultant 
relationship 
Contractual, arm’s length 
relationship with the client in 
control 
 
Exploitive relationship with the 
consultant in control 
Limitations to the 
client-consultant 
relationship 
Consultant’s superior 
knowledge and expertise 
Dependence on repeat sales, 
character of inter-firm and 
managerial structures, client’s 
knowledge and expertise 
(Source:Werr & Styhre, 2002) 
 
It was estimated that the public sector accounted for over 30% of the global consulting market 
(The Economist, 2005). The public sector in England recorded approximately £2.8 billion in 
2005-06 (£2.1 billion on 2003-04) on external consultants (House of Commons Committee of 
Public Accounts, 2007). There is no figure available for local government, but central 
government spent £1.8 billion in 2005-06 on consultants to acquire core skills including project 
and program management and information technology. The expansion of management 
consultancy during the 1990s in the UK was motivated by central government that used a large 
scale of external consultancy during the privatization process (Deakins & Dillon, 2006). In the 
same view, Saint-Martin (1998) mentioned that the management consultants clearly played an 
important role in packaging, selling and implementing the NPM reforms to the UK public 
sector. 
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In the UK, the market of forensic accounting services should increase as the demand from 
organisations to counter fraud utilising the services is growing (Ashworth, 1993; Hunt, 1997; 
Smith, 2007). The providers of the forensic accounting services include the Big Four 
accounting firms (KPMG, EY, PwC and Deloitte), Grant Thornton, PKF, BDO Binder, and 
private investigation firms such as Kroll, and the Network of Independent of Forensic 
Accountants (NIFA). The types of forensic accounting services are provided for both the 
private and the public sector under different names or categories but mainly related to disputes 
resolution, claims in professional negligence or personal injury or insurance, criminal 
investigations, regulatory compliance monitoring such as Anti-Bribery & Corruption and Anti-
Money Laundering, fraud risk management, computer forensic examination including data 
analytics, valuations, and fraud prevention and detection. For instance, data analytics can 
provide detailed insights into individual behaviour and transaction patterns that quickly identify 
inconsistencies which could trigger fraud (Goodwin, 2012). 
 
According to Deakins & Dillon (2006) and Lapsley & Oldfield (2001), there remains a marked 
shortage of sound professional literature in the area of public sector use of professional services 
except studies by Corcoran & Mclean (1998); Kipping & Saint-Martin (2005); Lapsley & 
Oldfield (2001); Mclarty & Robinson (1998); Mitchell (1995); Saint-Martin (2012). According 
to Kipping & Saint-Martin (2005), local authorities were among the earliest public sector in 
Britain that used consultancy management based on the report published by the MCA in 1996. 
Examples of areas covered were on ‘economic studies’ concerned on feasibility studies, and 
better utilization of resources of manpower and materials and money. Peat Marwick, and 
Mitchel & Co. were the example of accounting firms that provided services such as on 
computer-based costing and accounting procedures (Kipping & Saint-Martin, 2005).  
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Mitchell (1993) used mainly secondary sources and a series of interviews in examining the 
appointment of planning consultants by English local authorities. The findings indicated that 
there was major influence by party politics (the elected councillor) and committee in the 
department in the decision to appoint the consultants beside strict actions in the selection 
process (risk-reducing strategies). For instance, the increasing use of planning consultants was 
due to central government being skeptical of the independence and market knowledge 
possessed by local authority officers and was more willing to release funds for the appointment 
of consultants than appoint additional officers to do work (p. 18). In a follow-up study, Mitchell 
(1995) conducted personal interviews and a short questionnaire on the attitudes of chief 
planning officers towards planning consultants in English local authorities and concluded that 
‘attitudes were significantly more favorable when decision makers had commissioned similar 
work previously, were currently using consultants, moved through the stages of the purchasing 
process and had been involved with consultants a number of times before’ (p. 32). The basis 
of his study was due to the involvement of political influence from central government, 
resulting in mixed attitudes towards consultants’ appointments.  
 
A survey by Deakins & Dillon (2006) in all local authorities in New Zealand on measuring 
performance of management consultants from both views; the clients and providers found that 
overall local authorities were satisfied with the performance by the consultants. However, in 
individual local authorities, there were significant gaps between the expectations, perceptions 
and what is being delivered by the consultants that would be justified by specifying more 
rigorous contracts and enabling specific remedial procedures to be put in place. The debate on 
the performance and effectiveness of management consultants not only concerned from the 
academic but also from central government (House of Commons Committee of Public 
Accounts, 2007).  
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There have been several high-profile value for money reviews of the government’s use of 
management consultants e.g. published by the Efficiency Unit in 1994, the Comptroller and 
Auditor General (C&AG) in 2001 and Committee on Public Accounts in 2002 Report ‘Better 
value for money from professional service’. Generally, the recommendations made from the 
three reports mentioned either still unfulfilled or limited progress in implementing it. For 
example, the 1994 Report recognized the need to transfer skills from consultants to civil 
servants, the investigation on the five case study departments reviewed indicated that three had 
made minimal progress and the other two still ‘some’ progress. Another finding based on the 
report by the Committee on Public Accounts in 2002 mentioned that the capability of 
departments to be intelligent users/clients is reduced by insufficient sharing of information on 
consultants’ performance. As such, appropriate communication channels such as online 
customer forums could be developed to share information and experience (House of Commons 
Committee of Public Accounts, 2007). 
 
Overall, there seems to be evidence indicating the benefits of management consultancy while 
to some extent the need to carefully assess and measure on the use of their services. In the 
public sector, for example, there is concern from the public over the use and cost of 
management consultants in the public sector (ACCA, 2010), which reflects the principles of 
public accountability and value for money. Within the scope of the current study, local 
authorities that had a duty to protect public funds by preventing fraud could use the professional 
firms; however, may have constraints in achieving effectively the objectives considering 
current government policy to reduce the costs of public services while continuing to improve 
outcomes and value for money.  
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A report by the NAO (2006) stressed that: 
Management consultant, when used correctly and in the appropriate 
circumstances, can provide great benefits to clients-achieving things that clients 
do not have the capacity or capability to do themselves. On the other hand, when 
used incorrectly, management consultants can drain budgets very quickly, with 
little or no productive results. 
(as cited in ACCA, 2010, p. 7) 
 
The focus of this study is to investigate the use of forensic accounting services in English local 
authorities as an early adopter of professional services within public sector. The literature on 
utilising and demand for forensic accounting services broadly, however, is very limited. 
Despite no direct statement to classify forensic accounting services under management 
consultancy, the diversity of services provided particularly by larger accounting firms indicated 
the services could be one of the consulting services within the services provided. This study 
examined the website of the forensic accounting providers in the UK; the Big Four accounting 
firms, Grant Thornton, PKF, Kroll, and the NIFA to identify the services provided. There was 
evidence that local authorities are users of forensic accounting services; for example, Grant 
Thornton stated that their forensic and investigation services team works with local authorities 
to review existing counter-fraud procedures and reduce the risk of financial loss (Grant 
Thornton, 2012). Since a significant issue for local authorities is fraud, a focus for local 
authorities seems to be in relation to counter fraud to mitigate the financial loss.  
 
Appendix 1 outlined the most common types of forensic accounting services offered by the 
providers. The Big Four for instance, extend the services to sub-specialisations such as 
corporate compliances framework related to the current regulation’s requirement. Overall, the 
common services provided by both accounting firms and private investigation firms include 
fraud detection and prevention, expert witness and dispute resolution, computer forensics, and 
fraud risk management, which could potentially be used by local authorities.  
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In the UK, the market of forensic accounting services should increase as the demand from 
organisations to counter fraud utilising the services is growing (Ashworth, 1993; Hunt, 1997; 
Smith, 2007). The providers of the forensic accounting services include the Big Four 
accounting firms (KPMG, EY, PwC and Deloitte), Grant Thornton, PKF, BDO Binder, and 
private investigation firms such as Kroll, and the Network of Independent of Forensic 
Accountants (NIFA). The types of forensic accounting services are provided for both the 
private and the public sector under different names or categories but mainly related to disputes 
resolution, claims in professional negligence or personal injury or insurance, criminal 
investigations, regulatory compliance monitoring such as Anti-Bribery & Corruption and Anti-
Money Laundering, fraud risk management, computer forensic examination including data 
analytics, valuations, and fraud prevention and detection.  
 
The professionalism of forensic accounting in the UK differs from the practice in the US. For 
instance, there is no professional body in forensic accounting except accreditation by the 
ICAEW unlike in the US where there are a few professional bodies such as the Institute of 
Certified Forensic Accountants (ICFA) and the ACFE. The ICAEW introduced a Forensic 
Special Interest Group (FSIG), now changed to a Forensic and Expert Witness Group (FEWG), 
and a voluntary accreditation scheme for qualified accountants working in both areas of 
forensic and litigation (ICAEW, 2012a). 
 
2.1.5 The Literature: Main Themes are Forensic Accounting Education, Specialised 
Skills and Technical Abilities of Forensic Accountants and the Role of Forensic 
Accountants 
 
The body of literature on forensic accounting provides some information on the demand of 
forensic accounting services due to the need to counter fraud effectively, changes in 
regulations, and increase of litigation cases (e.g. Rezaee & Burton, 1997; Rezaee et al., 2004). 
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Generally, forensic accounting literature that has surfaced since the 1990s includes research on 
forensic accounting education (e.g. Rezaee et al., 1992; Rezaee et al., 2004); specialised skills 
and technical abilities of forensic accountants (e.g Davis et al., 2010; Digabriele, 2008; Nunn 
et al., 2006; Rosen, 2006); and the role of forensic accountants (e.g. Apostolou & Crumbley, 
2005; Messmer, 2004; Ramaswamy, 2005). Generally, much of the literature is conducted in 
the US and little has been conducted elsewhere (refer to Appendix 2). It is evident that the 
focus is on the supply side of forensic accounting services with little literature on its utilisation 
and demand. 
 
In addition, the literature that focuses on the role of forensic accountants, including the need to 
have specialists’ skills, indicated that forensic accountants are different from auditors (e.g. 
Apostolou & Crumbley, 2008; Crumbley, 2009). Despite the evident supply for forensic 
accounting, empirical studies on the utilisation of forensic accounting particularly in the public 
sector context, however, is very limited. Practically, forensic accounting services in the UK 
were said to be growing (Ashworth, 1993), but no empirical study has been conducted either 
in the private sector or public sector in the UK. Realising the gap in the literature and given the 
context outlined in Chapter 1, this study attempts to fill the gap by examining the utilisation of 
forensic accounting in English local authorities’ context and determining the factors that 
influence the intention to use forensic accounting services.  
2.1.5.1 Forensic Accounting Education 
 
A considerable amount of literature has been conducted in the US on the adoption of forensic 
accounting in accounting and fraud curriculum. According to Carnes & Gierlasinski (2001) 
regulators and organisations expected accountants or auditors to increase their ability to 
understand the nature of fraud and to detect fraud. As the responsibility to prevent and detect 
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fraud lies with management, and statutory auditors plan their work to have a reasonable 
expectation by discovering material fraud, then the supply demand for forensic accounting 
services in detection and prevention emerges. However, it is still unclear whether the higher 
education provides sufficient knowledge and skills particularly in forensic accounting and 
fraud courses. Rezaee & Burton (1997) listed several factors why universities are not able to 
provide a proper forensic accounting curriculum: lack of faculty interest; lack of resources; and 
lack of flexibility in curriculum content. Similarly, Groomer & Heintz (1994) stressed that only 
31% of universities covered fraud-related topics in internal auditing courses.  
 
Rezaee (2002) agreed that, generally, forensic accounting education is not having proper 
attention in colleges and universities. Additionally, studies by Buckhoff & Schrader (2000) and 
Peterson & Reider (2001) reported similar findings where very few universities in the US offer 
courses in forensic accounting. Thus, the forensic accounting services proliferation as a service 
is supply-driven by professional firms. Carnes & Gierlasinski (2001) acknowledged that there 
is little coverage on the skills needed by auditors to understand fraud in accounting and audit 
courses. However, a ‘Higher Education Program’ was launched by Joseph T. Wells, the 
chairman and founder of the ACFE in 2002 (Peterson, 2004). The objective of the program was 
to have at least half of the universities in the US provide courses in fraud within five years by 
giving free educational materials including videos, textbook, and examination. Response from 
the universities was encouraging as around 130 universities joined the program (Peterson, 
2004).  
 
A later study by Rezaee et al. (2004) found that forensic accounting education had increased 
as more universities in the US offered forensic accounting courses both at undergraduate and 
post-graduate level. In view of the mentioned literature, it is interesting to seek why forensic 
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accounting services were predominant in education literature of fraud investigation. Is that 
because the term forensic accounting was used as a mere appealing title or to establish and 
promote forensic accounting more? 
 
2.1.5.2 Specialised Skills and Technical Abilities of Forensic Accountants 
 
Literature has been published on the importance of specialised skills and technical abilities of 
forensic accountants (Cohen, Crain, & Sanders, 1996; Digabriele, 2008; Houck et al., 2006; 
McMullen & Sanchez, 2010; Messmer, 2004), and experience levels (e.g. Grippo & Ibex, 2003; 
Nunn et al., 2006). The findings of most of the studies consistently conclude deductive analysis, 
critical thinking, unstructured problem solving, investigative flexibility, analytical 
proficiency/capabilities (e.g. Davis et al., 2010; Digabriele, 2008; Messmer, 2004), 
independence, objectivity, strong written and verbal communication (Harris & Brown, 2000; 
Messmer, 2004; Rosen, 2006) as the importance skills and abilities for a forensic accountant. 
 
However, analytical characteristics are the most important skills that forensic accountants are 
expected to possess (Davis et al., 2010; Digabriele, 2008; Smith & Crumbley, 2009). Davis et 
al. (2010) on a survey of attorney, academics, and Certified Public Accountants (CPAs) in the 
US find that all the three groups of respondents choose analytical traits as the most essential 
skills for a forensic accountant. Similarly, a study by Digabriele (2008) on 1,500 accounting 
academics, forensic accounting practitioners, and users of forensic accounting services reveals 
that analytical proficiency is among the highest ranking as the most important skill in forensic 
accounting besides deductive analysis. The findings of both studies are consistent with the 
suggestion by Messmer (2004) that analytical abilities are important in forensic accounting 
practice. Good analytical characteristics or skills are important as a forensic accountant needs 
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‘to seek out all relevant information for an engagement besides be able to execute and solve 
the problems effectively’ (Davis et al., 2010). Analytical and critical thinking suggest that the 
forensic accountant will have to make some intellectual leaps to pull the various pieces of 
evidence and the answer to the questions (who, what, where, how and why) into a compelling 
case (Kranacher, Riley, & Wells, 2011, p. 202). 
 
According to Ramaswamy (2005), forensic accountants are distinctively positioned to be able 
to uncover financial deceptions, their prominent skills being an in-depth knowledge and the 
ability to critically analyse the financial statements, and a thorough understanding of fraud 
schemes. The author further states that the ability to comprehend the internal control systems 
of corporations and be able to assess their risks is also important. For Nunn et al. (2006), the 
most important skill of a forensic accountant is experience that can be gained through natural 
maturing in the profession. Additionally, technical expertise is essential for a forensic 
accountant, for instance, the ability to use information system and financial applications for 
data mining purposes (Messmer, 2004).  
 
2.1.5.3 The Role of Forensic Accountants 
 
Given the magnitude of the fraud problem, business failure, loss of public confidence in the 
credibility of financial reporting, lack of responsible corporate governance, and public 
dissatisfaction regarding audits that were not designed to detect fraud, these contribute to the 
increased emphasis on fraud investigation within the accounting profession. As a result, fraud 
detection specialists, including forensic accounting services, were anticipated to be in high 
demand (Gray & Moussalli, 2006; Kahan, 2006; Rezaee et al., 1992).  
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Apostolou & Crumbley (2005) highlighted the importance to understand the differences 
between the role of a forensic accountant and an auditor. They argued that an auditor 
determines compliance with auditing standards and considers the possibility of fraud compared 
to a forensic accountant that has a single-minded focus on the detection and deterrence of fraud. 
Additionally, forensic accounting normally engages ‘an exhaustive, detailed effort to penetrate 
concealment tactics’ (Apostolou & Crumbley, 2005, p. 41). This can be illustrated briefly by 
looking at the costs, efforts, time, and labour required to conduct a specific forensic 
investigation case which significantly differs to audit a set of financial statements (Krell, 2002).  
 
The role of the external auditor is to issue an opinion on the financial statements, and not 
specifically look for fraud (Albrecht et al., 2008), and therefore the auditor cannot be relied 
upon to detect fraud as they are not designed or executed to detect fraud (Pearson & Singleton, 
2008, p. 547). Thus, the forensic accountants can be used as a tool in dealing with fraud 
detection and investigation due to the limitation in fraud detection by the auditor (Apostolou 
& Crumbley, 2005; Ramaswamy, 2005; Digabriele, 2008). The AICPA Forensic and Litigation 
Services Committee and Fraud Task Force (2004) stated that a forensic accountant can play a 
key role in bridging the gap between an audit and an investigation of fraud. 
 
According to Ramaswamy (2005), a forensic accountant can make a significant contribution in 
the following areas; corporate governance, preventing fraud, creating a positive working 
environment, establishing effective lines of communication, vigilant oversight, establishing 
consequences, and fraud investigations. Newman (2009) claims that a forensic accountant with 
knowledge and skills in computer forensic techniques can investigate financial crimes and 
illegal activities including identity theft and fraud cases. A recent study by Muehlmann, 
Burnaby, & Howe (2012) finds that the use of forensic accountants as an expert testimony for 
tax litigation cases in the US has increased with 80% reported cases using the expertise from 
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the year 2001-2010. The study used the actual cases in court and assessed the effectiveness of 
forensic accountants in giving their testimony. Specifically, three types of assignments for 
forensic accountants used in the tax cases are fraud investigation, regulatory/governmental 
compliance, and commercial damage determination. Overall, the study concludes that more 
than half of the forensic accountants was evaluated effective by the judges (Muehlmann & 
Burnaby, 2012). 
 
A survey of accountants, internal auditors, and certified fraud examiners on the perceptions 
toward fraud detection and prevention methods by Bierstaker et al. (2006) indicates that 
firewalls, virus and password protection, and internal control review are widely used to combat 
fraud. However, the use of forensic accountants received the highest rating of effectiveness 
among the fraud procedures. Based on the firm revenue analysis, it is found that the firms with 
revenues exceeding $1 billion often used forensic accountants besides data mining, digital 
analysis, and continuous auditing. Data mining is a technique with an objective to examine 
large amounts of data to discover previously unknown, action oriented, hidden trends, patterns 
and complex relationships. Discovery, predictive modelling and deviation analysis are three 
major activities of data mining techniques. The authors conclude that the larger firms are more 
likely to invest more to combat fraud while the smaller firms may have constraints with regards 
to the resources (Bierstaker et al., 2006). The results confirm the views that forensic 
accountants are able to detect and prevent fraud more effectively (Apostolou & Crumbley, 
2005; Digabriele, 2008; Ramaswamy, 2005). 
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Gray & Moussalli (2006) described the relationship between forensic accounting and auditing 
from an historical point of view. The authors categorise into four eras; classical auditing, neo-
classical auditing, new era auditing, and the union of forensic accounting and auditing. During 
the classical auditing, Albrecht et al. (2006) indicated that in the early 20th century, auditors 
were expected as a matter of course to find fraud (as cited in Gray & Moussalli, 2006, p. 16). 
Back in 1905 and 1909, Lawrence Dicksee and Robert Montgomery state that the three 
objectives of an audit are detection of fraud, detection of technical errors, and detection of 
errors in principle, in which the fraud detection is the most important objective (DiGabriele, 
2009). Conversely in 1895, an English Court ruled in the London and General Bank case that 
auditors are not expected to detect all fraud occurring in an audit but should conduct their audits 
with reasonable care (Zikmund & O’Reilly-Allen, 2007). According to Coenen (2006), the gap 
between the auditors that perform audits with reasonable care standard and the public that rely 
auditors to discover any potential fraud, remains until now.  
 
In the second era, Gray & Moussalli (2006) mentioned that the auditing profession started to 
issue professional pronouncements to reduce their responsibility for fraud discovery and to 
avoid professional liability. For example, the term ‘fraud’ is changed to ‘irregularities’, which 
led to the concept of expectation gap. In the new era auditing (mid-20th century), there is 
considerable concern towards fraud detection as the fraud cases become more serious that 
indirectly indicated the audit failures. A well-known example of this includes the creation of 
the Treadway Commission, a new standard of Statement of Auditing Standard (SAS) 99 
‘Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit’, the establishment of Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act (2002), and the role of the Public Companies Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) as 
the regulator for auditors of public companies in the US.  
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According to the ICAEW (2012b) the establishment of the Bribery Act in the UK and the 2010 
Dodd-Frank in the US signifies the governments’ intentions to combat unethical business 
practices. The Bribery Act requires organisations to consider proactively and take preventive 
measures against fraud by setting up systems and processes within their business model. 
However, the whistle-blowing provision implemented within the U.S model gave more impact 
in practice (ICAEW, 2012b). 
 
Finally, in the fourth era, Gray & Moussalli (2006) suggest that auditors need to equip with 
additional skills and knowledge of forensic accounting such as the evidence gathering and 
critical thinking to discover fraud. The interconnection between forensic accounting and 
auditing is dynamic, and has changed over time due to regulatory, social, political and standard 
setting processes (National Institute of Justice, 2005). However, Gray & Moussalli (2006) point 
out that auditors should not do a forensic audit as it may not be realistic to conduct a true 
forensic audit in a normal audit routine and could be expensive and time consuming.  
 
In his analysis of the differences between forensic accounting and auditing, Gray (2008) 
identifies three main differences which are the role, knowledge, and skills. Auditors and 
forensic accountants may have similar objectives but might use different approaches. For 
example, the forensic accountants as a combination of auditors and private investigators have 
skills and knowledge in investigative, research, law, quantitative methods, finance, law, 
organisational behaviour, psychology. Skalak, Alas & Sellitto (2005) analyse the differences 
between auditing of General Accepted Auditing Standards (GAAS) and forensic accounting as 
described in Table 2-4. 
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Table 2-4: Differences between GAAS Audit and Forensic Accounting Investigation  
 GAAS Audit Forensic Accounting 
Investigation 
Objective Form an opinion on the overall 
financial statements taken as a whole 
Determine the likelihood and/or 
magnitude of fraud occurring 
 
Purpose Usually required by third-party users 
of financial statements  
Sufficient prediction that a fraud has 
or may have occurred 
 
Value Adds credibility to reported financial 
information 
 
Resolves suspicions and 
accusations; determines the fact 
Sources of 
evidence 
Inquiry, observation, examination, 
and re-performance of accounting 
transactions to support financial 
statement assertions 
Review detailed financial and non-
financial data, search public records, 
conduct fact-finding as well as 
admission-seeking interviews, 
including third-party inquiries 
 
Sufficiency 
of evidence 
Reasonable assurance Establish facts to support or refute 
suspicious or accusations 
(Source: Adapted  from Skalak et al., 2005) 
 
Overall, Table 2-4 shows that audit and forensic accounting investigations are different. A 
forensic accountant seeks to discover the full methods and extend the investigation process on 
suspected or known fraud or error (Skalak et al., 2005). In addition, forensic accountants with 
their skills, training, education, knowledge, and experience use different procedures compared 
to auditors. For example, a forensic accountant takes a more proactive, sceptical approach and 
is not limited to GAAS in doing their job (Crumbley & Apostolou, 2002). Similarly, the UK 
public sector including local authorities is recommended to use proactive approach such as data 
analytics in countering fraud (National Fraud Authority, 2012b). Thus, forensic accounting has 
more advantages than financial auditing in fraud prevention and detection. In other words, the 
issues of audit expectation gap may be resolved by utilising the specialist investigators such as 
forensic accounting services. 
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2.1.6 Forensic Accounting in the Private Sector 
 
Globally, forensic accounting has been a fast growing specialisation in accounting profession. 
D’Ath (2008) identifies several factors on the growth of forensic accounting: a complexity of 
accounting, increase in using new technology, changes in the current litigious environment and 
regulatory requirements, emergence of sophisticated commercial crime, significant number of 
business failures lead to ‘loss of public confidence in financial statements and the audit 
expectation gap, globalisation, and changes in the economy, recessions’ (Muthusamy, 2011, 
p. 11) and cost reduction. Despite various types of forensic accounting services in the market, 
fraud investigation is one of the services most needed by companies (Crumbley & Apostolou, 
2002; D’Ath, 2008).  
 
Notably, all highly regulated and systems based such as insurance industry, financial services 
and communication industry are among the highest level of fraud compared to others 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2009). According to Messmer (2004), forensic accounting services 
can determine irregularities within a company’s financial records, misstatement of earnings 
and embezzlement. Further, forensic accounting services can assist in developing fraud 
prevention strategies and evaluate internal controls system (Messmer, 2004; Ramaswamy, 
2005). As stressed by Apostolou & Crumbley (2005), a forensic investigation can be proactive 
or reactive. Thus, a good forensic accountant could effectively do their work on fraud 
prevention and detection.  
 
The implementation of Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002 in the US increased the need for a forensic 
accountant on the audit team (Conway & Rouse, 2002). The author further states that the 
forensic accountant’s overall objective is to assess the potentially fraudulent situation. A 
forensic accountant may also provide services to the companies such as counteractive action to 
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examine financial statements, and address the concerns of regulators and stock exchange. In 
the case of the UK, the establishment of the Bribery Act means that the UK has one of the most 
stringent anti-corruption in the world (Deloitte, 2011). As a result, companies in the UK need 
to enhance the existing policy framework by having a policy for anti-bribery and corruption. 
The forensic accountant may play their role by providing services on effective fraud risk 
assessment or internal control systems.  
 
Based on the worldwide fraud survey, EY (2003) report that 20% of organisations, mainly in 
the private sector, used forensic accounting services in fraud investigations with 88% of the 
users satisfied with the services delivered. The report also indicates that the number is higher 
than previous years. The findings of the report show that organisations will continue to use 
fraud specialist and independent skills on complex cases such as forensic accounting services. 
Another report by EY (2016) based on a survey of over 2,800 senior executives in 62 countries 
found that 50% of the respondents are using new technologies such as forensic data analytic 
and specialist monitoring software to identify fraud risks. Identifying and mitigating fraud at 
an early stage could help an organisation to make an informed decision before an acquisition 
or investment is made (EY, 2016). However, to date, no empirical study examines the factors 
that influence the organisations to use forensic accounting services. 
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2.1.7 Forensic Accounting in the Public Sector 
 
So far there has been little empirical discussion about the application of forensic accounting in 
the public sector. In the UK, Smith (2007) states that a large number of financial investigators 
are working within the Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA) currently merged to become 
the National Crime Agency, the SFO, local police forces, and the NHS. Although the author 
does not specifically states the term ‘forensic accountants’, the financial investigators may 
applied some knowledge and skills in forensic accounting discipline.  
 
Gordon Brown, the former Prime Minister says that ‘What the use of fingerprints was to the 
19th Century, and DNA analysis was to the 20th Century, so financial information and forensic 
accounting has come to be one of today's most powerful investigative and intelligence tools 
available in the fight against crime and terrorism’ (as cited in Smith, 2007). Similar to practice 
in the private sector, the use of forensic accounting services in the public sector ranges from 
fraud investigations to dispute in contracts. For example, one of the forensic accounting 
services firms, Grant Thornton UK, provides forensic and investigation services to the public 
sector such as reviewing the current counter-fraud procedures and reducing the risk of financial 
loss (Grant Thornton, 2010). The NAO rendered services from PwC to conduct a forensic audit 
related to contract disputes (National Audit Office, 2013). 
 
The role of forensic accounting is indeed important within the UK public sector context as part 
of the public accountability. According to Huber (2009), the NFA acknowledges the role of 
forensic accountants to help the government in reducing fraud. The forensic accountants have 
in-depth knowledge of new fraud threats besides vast experience in civil recovery cases, which 
is valuable for the public sector to detect and prevent fraud effectively. Forensic accounting 
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also provides a proactive approach that can be used in the current counter fraud in the public 
sector, which focuses more on a reactive approach (Fraud Advisory Panel, 2011). 
 
According to PricewaterhouseCoopers (2011), data analytics applied in forensic accounting 
could help to achieve significant results in a case of benefit fraud by identifying duplicate 
payments and unusual patterns. In 2016, EY reported that although 38% of respondents think 
efforts by governments and enforcement authorities to combat mismanagement including fraud 
have increased, 70% felt that although there was a willingness to prosecute cases, authorities 
are not effective in securing convictions (EY, 2016). 
 
Therefore, forensic accounting can be used both in the private and the public sector, including 
local authorities, in dealing with fraud. As, to date, no study empirically investigated the use 
of forensic accounting services in the public sector, this study attempted to examine the 
utilisation of forensic accounting services within local authorities’ context. Moreover, it is 
important to do so as it may differ to private sector but be increasingly in demand. 
 
 
2.2 Fraud and Local Authorities 
 
The purpose of this section is to describe the extent of fraud in local authorities. It begins by 
defining fraud and the concept of fraud triangle. Secondly, it discusses the level, types of fraud 
in English local authorities, followed by explaining the impact of fraud. Finally, the current 
and previous counter fraud work within local authorities is discussed. 
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2.2.1 Defining Fraud and the Fraud Triangle 
 
In the literature, the definition of fraud varies. The Merriam-Webster Dictionary (n.d.) online 
dictionary defines fraud as ‘deceit’ and ‘trickery’, ‘the intentional perversion of truth in order 
to induce another to part with something of value or to surrender a legal right’. In other words, 
fraud ‘encompasses a wide range of behaviours that are linked by trickery or deceit with the 
intention it will culminate in some form of gain’ (Button, Lewis, & Tapley, 2009, p. 6). Doig 
& Levi (2009, p. 2) further extend the definition of fraud as ‘a deceptively simple term that 
covers a heterogeneous set of activities, involving a very mixed set of offenders (insiders and 
outsiders, majority and minority ethnicities) and set of victims (powerful corporations and 
governments, and individuals)’.  According to CIMA (2009, p. 7), the term ‘fraud’ commonly 
includes activities such as theft, corruption, conspiracy, embezzlement, money laundering, 
bribery, and extortion. 
 
Levi & Burrows (2007, p. 299) use the term ‘fraud’ to refer to ‘the obtaining of financial 
advantage or causing of loss by implicit or explicit deception; it is the mechanism through 
which the fraudster gains an unlawful advantage or causes unlawful loss’. The passage of the 
Fraud Act 2006 has provided a statutory definition of fraud outlining that fraud can be 
committed by: (1) false representations; (2) failing to disclose information; and (3) abuse of 
position, where in each case of fraud, the conduct of the person must be dishonest and their 
intention must be to make a gain, or causes loss or the risk of a loss to another (Griffith & 
Tengnah, 2011, p. 508).  
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Similar to the above definitions, the Audit Commission (2011, p. 5) defines fraud as;  
‘any intentional false representation, including failure to declare information or 
abuse of position which is carried out to make gain, causes loss or expose another 
to the risk of loss’ 
 
While a variety of definitions of the term ‘fraud’ is suggested, the present research will use the 
definition suggested by the Audit Commission (2011), which reflects the nature of fraud in 
English local authorities. The definition of fraud used in this study reflected the definition of 
forensic accounting services discussed in Section 2.1.3. 
 
2.2.2 The Concept of Fraud Triangle 
 
Much of the current understanding of why perpetrators commit fraud is grounded in the fraud 
triangle developed by Donald Cressey in 1953 (Dominey, Fleming, Kranacher, & Riley, 2010). 
The fraud triangle is a model for explaining the factors that cause someone to commit fraud. 
The three elements of the fraud triangle are: (1) Pressure/Incentive: (2) Opportunity: and (3) 
Rationalisation, as depicted in Figure 2-2. 
 
Figure 2-2: Fraud Triangle 
 
 
(Source: Adapted from Dominey et al., 2010) 
The Fraud 
Triangle 
Opportunity Rationalisation 
Pressure/Incentive 
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2.2.2.1 Pressure/Incentive 
 
The first element of the fraud triangle is pressure/incentives, which motivates to commit fraud 
in the first place. Perceived pressure can begin from either financial or non-financial need 
(Albrecht et al., 2008; Muthusamy, 2011, p. 26)) and unable to solve through legitimate means 
(ACFE, 2011). The common financial pressures on an individual include personal financial 
problems, gambling or drugs (Albrecht et al., 2008; Ramaswamy, 2007), and inability to pay 
bills (ACFE, 2011). Non-financial pressure may relate to certain behaviour such as greed, 
egoistic (Albrecht et al., 2008), work related pressures where an employee feels overworked 
and underpaid and unrecognised (Ramaswamy, 2007), and afraid of losing a job (ACFE, 2011). 
A fraudster may begin to consider committing an illegal act such as stealing asset or cash and 
falsifying a financial statement (ACFE, 2011). 
 
A survey of over 170 senior representatives of government/state-owned enterprises from 35 
countries including UK conducted by PricewaterhouseCoopers (2009) reported that 71% 
attributed greater risk of fraud to increased pressure/incentive. The remainder attributed to 
opportunity (15%) and rationalisation (12%) as the fraud risk factor. The most commonly 
reported factors contributing to pressure/incentive are fear of losing jobs (41%), and inability 
to meet targets (37%). The pressure of losing jobs arises in the situation when employees are 
terminated; those who remain employed are pressured where they feel that their own jobs are 
under threat. As a result, the likelihood of fraud being committed is higher. The survey 
concluded that the pressure of losing jobs is expected to increase, e.g. with austerity measures 
planned by central government in the UK across the public sector including in local authorities.  
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2.2.2.2 Opportunity 
 
Opportunity refers to the situations or conditions that allow a person to commit a fraud. For 
employees, the opportunity exists when  they believe they can override anti-fraud control 
(Apostolou & Crumbley, 2005; Muthusamy, 2011) without being detected (Dominey et al., 
2010). The opportunity takes place when there are: poor internal controls, poor training, lack 
of prosecution of perpetrators, ineffective anti-fraud programs, policies and procedures, weak 
ethical culture (Dominey et al., 2010), little fear of exposure, and lower likelihood of detection 
(CIMA, 2009). Opportunity may also be inherent in the nature, size or structure of the 
organisations’ operations (Golden et al., 2006). For instance, certain structure in departments 
of organisations may be more susceptible to misuse, and certain types of asset are more prone 
to misappropriation. 
 
A report on the resilience of the UK local government to fraud by Gee, Button, & Brooks 
(2012) surveyed 72 local authorities using the Self-Assessment Fraud Resilience (SAFR) tool. 
Some findings of the report stated that local authorities still lack in: evaluating the strength of 
anti-fraud cultures (22%); arrangements to evaluate the extent to which a real anti-fraud and 
corruption culture exists (22%); using estimates of losses to make informed judgments about 
levels of budgetary investment in their work countering fraud and corruption (13.9%); 
estimating the total economic cost of fraud; regularly reviewing the effectiveness of the counter 
fraud work (51.4%); and formal and informal relationships in place with relevant external 
agencies or companies such as the police, and specialist legal firms (44%). While there are 
areas, e.g. established counter fraud policies, in which local authorities are considered to be 
doing well, certain areas as highlighted by the report (Gee et al., 2012) need to be improved. 
For instance, it is important for local authorities to develop relations with related bodies such 
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as forensic accounting services which can enhance the effectiveness of countering fraud to 
reduce the fraud risk. 
 
2.2.2.3 Rationalisation 
 
The final element of the fraud triangle is rationalisation. According to Cressey (1953), a 
morally acceptable rationalisation is necessary before the crime takes place (as cited in 
Dominey et al., 2010, p. 19). Rationalisation makes the perpetrator claim illegal behaviour as 
acceptable allowing their self-image as a trustworthy person. In other words, the perpetrators 
justify their action when committing fraud (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2010). Similarly, CIMA 
(2009, p. 13) states that perpetrators may be able to rationalise their actions ‘as: necessary 
(especially when done for business), harmless (because the victim is large enough to absorb 
the impact), and justified (because the victim deserved it or because the perpetrators were 
mistreated)’. 
 
A report entitled ‘Global Economic Crime Survey’ by PricewaterhouseCoopers (2007a) on 
5,400 organisations worldwide examine the driver of fraud based on self-rationalisations. The 
result indicated that the most common reasons of self-rationalisations are fraudsters’ low 
temptation threshold (44%), apparent lack of awareness regarding the nature of their 
wrongdoing (40%), and denial of the financial consequences of fraudulent act (26%). In a 
recent survey, ACFE (2012) finds that most occupational fraudsters are first-time offenders 
with clean employment history. Among the three elements of fraud triangle, rationalisation is 
more difficult to discover but a strong ethical culture and clear values in organisations are 
required (CIMA, 2009). 
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The concept of fraud triangle is generally accepted by criminologists and fraud investigators to 
understand the reasons why fraud is committed within organisations (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 
2007b). For example, the fraud triangle has been embedded in the professional standards of 
professional associations worldwide such as the International Auditing and Assurance 
Standards Board (IIASB) and PCAOB including the US in SAS no.99, Australia in Australian 
Auditing Standards (ASA) no. 240 and International Standard on Auditing (ISA) 240 (Free & 
Murphy, 2015). Additionally, the fraud triangle was extensively discussed in academic 
textbooks such as by Singleton, Bologna, & Lindquist (2006) and Albrecht, Albrecht, Albrecht 
& Zimbelman (2011), and, gradually in academic research (e.g. Dominey et. al. 2010; Free & 
Murphy, 2015; Hogan, Rezaee, Riley, & Velury, 2008; Murphy & Dacin, 2011; Skousen, 
Smith, & Wright, 2009). 
 
The three elements of the fraud triangle are interactive (Albrecht et al., 2008). The authors 
stressed that because fraud is difficult to predict, the likelihood of a fraudulent act could be 
examined by evaluating the elements of pressure, opportunity and personal rationalisation. 
According to Dominey et al. (2010), the fraud triangle is a solid explanatory model that initiates 
the important elements that make ‘a fraudulent act appear benign to the fraudster’ (p. 19). As 
a result, the fraud triangle could enhance anti-fraud professionals to understand the motivations 
and actions of the fraudsters. Additionally, Singleton et al. (2006) argued that the fraud triangle 
advocated that the most effective activities to prevent or detect fraud should be centralised on 
opportunity, which indicated the strengths and weakness of internal controls. According to the 
Fraud Advisory Panel (2011), the landscape in local authorities changed considerably a few 
years ago. New austerity measures introduced by central government saw a reduction of 
funding that led to cost-cutting measures’ action in most local authorities. As a result, some 
local authorities had to reduce the number of staff, including critical areas such as counter fraud 
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(LAIOG, 2012). Thus, it could provide more opportunity for fraudsters to commit fraud 
because of fewer counter fraud staff as a result of austerity measures. In addition, the changes 
to traditional delivery mechanisms, e.g. greater reliance on third parties, could create 
opportunities or motivations for beneficiaries, staff and contractors to commit fraud. Thus, 
reducing fraud is an option for local authorities to make a real saving and protect public services 
(Fraud Advisory Panel, 2011).  
 
2.2.3 Fraud: The Case of Local Authorities  
 
Public sector bodies, including local authorities, are not immune to fraud. The NFA estimated 
that fraud costs the public sector in the UK around £20.6 billion a year, representing 55% of 
the overall national total fraud loss (National Fraud Authority, 2013). The report indicated that 
the huge amount of fraud loss is due to fraud against the tax benefit systems, but procurement 
fraud and grant fraud are increasing at a significant level. Thus, local government, including 
local authorities, is considered under significant threat (Cabinet Office & National Fraud 
Authority, 2012), with loss to fraud estimated at £2.1 billion (National Fraud Authority, 2013). 
In a similar pattern, a report in 2016 estimated that public sector fraud in the UK accounted for 
£37.5 billion (Experian, PKF Littlejohn, & Centre for Counter-Fraud Studies, 2016). For local 
government fraud, including local authorities, the total estimated fraud loss was £7.3 billion 
for non-benefits fraud and £2.370 million for benefits fraud. The details of the types and the 
loss to fraud in local authorities are shown in Table 2.5. 
 
The National Fraud Authority (2013) suggested that many frauds are not detected or being 
prevented and there is a gap between the level of reported fraud and those pursued through the 
criminal justice system. In local authorities’ context, the report by the Audit Commission 
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(2013) reveals that 124,000 cases of fraud totalling £178 million were detected in 2012/13. As 
expected, housing and council tax benefit accounted for more than half (£120 million), but 
procurement fraud is detected around £1.9 million. The latter figure suggests that local 
authorities should give greater attention to counter procurement fraud as it is the single largest 
area of financial loss to fraud, estimated at £876 million (Audit Commission, 2013).  
 
Table 2-5: Types of fraud and loss to fraud in local authorities (2013 and 2016) 
  
(Source: National Fraud Authority, 2013 and Experian et al., 2016)  
 
Note: Procurement fraud is fraud in the purchasing process, including price-fixing rings, abuse of inside 
information during tender application or process, and financial statement (Levi & Burrows, 2007). For 2013, 
council tax is under non-benefits fraud but for 2016, the estimation referred as council tax reduction under 
benefits fraud categories. 
 
 
Table 2-5 revealed that the problem of fraud was not going away and currently fraud was on 
an ‘industrial scale’ (Experian et al., 2016). There was significant increase of housing tenancy 
and procurement fraud for the year 2013 and 2016 as both housing tenancy and procurement 
fraud represented more than 80% of the total fraud loss in local authorities. Examples of 
housing tenancy fraud: in a case where a woman was found guilty after producing false papers 
and identity to prove she was homeless in Ealing Council for more than 18 years to live in 
council property. The woman was prosecuted by the council’s Audit and Investigation team 
and will have to pay £373,280 (National Fraud Authority, 2010). The statistics indicate that 
local authorities not only have to focus on benefit fraud but critically require attention to 
counter non-benefit fraud, including procurement fraud. The current changes in counter 
Types of fraud 2013  
Amount in £Millions  
2016  
Amount in £Millions 
Housing tenancy  845 1,755 
Procurement  876 4,131 
Payroll and recruitment  154 1,108 
Council tax/council tax reduction  133 60 
Blue Badge Scheme abuse 46 48 
Grant  35 198 
Pension 7.1 79 
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arrangement, e.g. the austerity measures action by central government, and the creation of the 
SFIS, may affect the capacity to counter non-benefit fraud (LAIOG, 2012). For example, the 
Audit Commission (2013, p. 5) stressed that local authorities, except in London boroughs, need 
more effort such as maintaining the resources and acquiring appropriate skills to counter non-
benefit fraud due to impact on the SFIS. 
 
In their latest report, the Audit Commission (2013) highlighted that there is significant 
variability in detected non-benefit fraud levels among local authorities. For instance, most of 
non-benefit fraud (76%) is detected by one quarter of local authorities, whilst 79 local 
authorities (particularly district councils) did not detect any single fraud. There are two 
possibilities in a case when no fraud is detected: a good indicator that the preventive measures 
are working, or a warning that capability of resources is insufficient to detect any fraud. 
Considering the possibility of a ‘time lag’ between reducing counter fraud staff and the amount 
detected of fraud, the Audit Commission (2013) suggested that it is too early to identify any 
relationship between changes in investigative capacity and levels of detected fraud. The 
recommendation is that local authorities need to find ways to ensure their organisations have 
adequate resources to counter fraud and to review their fraud policy.  
 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (2011) in their survey of 110 senior representatives in the UK public 
sector (including local authorities) indicate that the austerity measures’ action in 2010 could 
increase risk of fraud. The findings show that the number of organisations experiencing fraud 
rose to 60% in the past 12 months. Interestingly, the most common type of fraud suffered is 
accounting fraud (68%) instead of asset misappropriation (60%) as the latter, traditionally, is 
the highest. Other types of fraud include bribery and corruption (19%), tax fraud (3%), and 
other (including benefit fraud) 29%. The report concluded that despite the increase of fraud 
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risk, nearly half of organisations stated that there would be no change in their fraud prevention 
and detection methods. In the case of local authorities, budgetary pressures, large spending 
cuts and difficult decisions over priorities may weaken controls and increase the likelihood of 
fraud.  
 
Interestingly, the PricewaterhouseCoopers report (2011) shows that the majority of frauds in 
2011 were committed by employees, compared to 2009 where external fraudsters were the 
most. The statistic for 2011 indicated that internal fraudsters (53%), external fraudsters (43%) 
committed the most serious fraud. The common types of fraud that involved employees (senior 
management to lower level staff) include accounting fraud, which is consistent with the 
findings by the National Fraud Authority (2013) on the increase of procurement fraud. 
Historically, the prevention of internal fraud has not been considered a priority for government 
but the result of the report (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2011) suggested the risk of internal fraud 
cannot be ignored.  
 
2.2.4 The Impact of Fraud on Local Authorities 
 
Fraud can have a pervasive impact on the organisations. Specifically, fraud in local authorities 
not just affects the financial losses but could also impact the quality of public services (Gee et 
al., 2010). Additionally, Gee, Button, & Cook (2011, p. 1) stress that fraud in the public sector, 
including local authorities, ‘often has the sort of direct, negative impact on human life that is 
not found elsewhere’. For instance, tenancy fraud not only costs taxpayers £900 million a year 
but denies the right to the people who are eligible to receive the benefit, which can lead to 
social and psychological effects (CIMA, 2009). Ultimately, fraud has direct and indirect impact 
on: 
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i. Central government: reduction of public fund, negative impact on national economy 
and spending power. 
ii. Local authorities: negative impact on staff morale, loss of public confidence, loss of 
revenue and/or ability to fund certain services of staff positions, reputational damage to 
council and/or elected members. 
iii. Local taxpayers: reduction and/or loss of public services.  
iv. Beneficiaries: reduction and/or loss of services, inability to access necessary services 
and support (financial, physical and emotional), difficulty to cover basic standard of 
living. 
(Fraud Advisory Panel, 2011) 
 
Generally, the costs due to fraud can be differentiated into several categories. Levi & Burrows 
(2007) indicate three categories of costs: direct financial/fraud costs, costs of preventing fraud 
before the event, and costs of responding to fraud after the event (cost of internal or outsourced 
private sector investigations). For example, in response to the Fraud Review 2006, the UK 
central government allocated £29 million in increasing protection against fraud to the UK 
economy including the establishment of the NFA (formerly known as the National Strategic 
Fraud Authority).  
 
The NFA introduced ‘Fighting Fraud Locally’ in 2012, a strategic approach to address the need 
for greater prevention and smarter enforcement across local authorities such as developing a 
new ten point counter fraud blueprint (National Fraud Authority, 2012b) with £19 million given 
to 51 local authorities to counter tenancy fraud (DCLG, 2011). Thus, the essential funds needed 
such as for educational and public services purposes are diverted to fight fraud (Levi & 
Burrows, 2007). 
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Apart from that, organisations have to deal with management costs involved after the event of 
fraud, such as reallocation of management time and possible costs of litigation 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2007b). Additionally, the investigation costs involved after fraud 
happens could be significant. In a fraud case of HealthSouth, the largest healthcare service 
providers in the US, Apostolou & Crumbley (2008) and Muthusamy (2011) state that the total 
professional fees associated to investigations is nearly $280 million. Therefore, it is important 
to have effective systems in counter fraud arrangement as prevention is the most cost-effective 
way to deal with fraud (Adams, Campbell, Campbell, & Rose, 2006). 
 
2.2.5 Counter Fraud in Local Authorities  
 
According to Button (2011), there were many entities involved to fight against fraud in the UK. 
The police, various government departments, the SFO, specialist private investigation firms, 
numerous entities in private companies and local authorities play a significant role to counter 
fraud. In addition, numerous initiatives have emerged, ranging from high profile publicity 
campaigns against benefit fraud and tax evasion to the establishment of specialist bodies e.g. 
the CFS (Button et al., 2007). The literature on public sector fraud in the UK is outlined in 
Appendix 3. 
 
However, Button et al. (2007) argued that the state of counter fraud infrastructure, or known as 
‘hybrid policing’ particularly in the public sector, is subject to very limited research (Doig & 
Coles, 1997). The term ‘hybrid policing’ refers to ‘those public and private bodies that are 
neither the public police, private security nor some form of voluntary initiative’ (Button, 2002, 
p. 12). According to Jones and Newburn (1998), benefit fraud investigators were the example 
of hybrid policing in local authorities (as cited in Button, 2002, p. 12). The antecedents of the 
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counter fraud, including benefit fraud, investigators in local authorities can be found in a range 
of initiatives by central government (Table 2-6). 
 
Table 2-6: A Brief History of Counter Fraud Arrangements in Local Authorities  
Year Major effect 
 
1974 
Establishment of the Prime Minister’s Committee on Local Government Rules of 
Conduct (the Redcliffe-Maud Committee) as a result of massive corruption scandals 
in 1972 (Doig, 1996). 
 
1975 
Establishment of the Royal Commission on Standards of Conduct in Public Life (the 
Salmon Commission) as a result of massive corruption scandals in 1972 (Doig, 
1996). 
1986 Establishment of the Widdicombe inquiry that led to the creation of the statutory role 
of monitoring officer in local authorities (Lawton & Macaulay, 2004). 
1988 Counter fraud assist by the Benefit Agency by the DWP as a result of the 
administration of housing benefit transferred to local authorities (Lane, 2011) 
 
1993 
Implementation of the Weekly Benefit Savings (WBS) target as the DWP changed 
the arrangement to counter fraud (Audit Commission, 2014). 
Protecting the Public Purse Report, the first comprehensive report by the Audit 
Commission (Audit Commission, 1994). 
1996 The Audit Commission created the NFI that led to data sharing and matching 
program (Bellamy & Raab, 2005). 
1997 Establishment of the BFI in response to the high risk of fraud (Hood, James, & Scott, 
2000). 
 
 
2000 
Establishment of the Standards Board for England under the Local Government Act 
2000 as a corporate body (Lawton & Macaulay, 2004). 
Establishment of the Scampion report to co-ordinate strategic approach with 
Benefits Agency (Doig & Levi, 2009). 
Establishment of the Grabiner Report to develop partnership between the DWP and 
local authorities (Doig & Levi, 2009) 
 
2008 
Abolishment of the BFI and the Audit Commission took over the function (The 
Benefit Fraud Inspectorate, 2007). 
Establishment of the National Fraud Authority (Fraud Advisory Panel, 2011). 
 
2010 
Announcement to abolish the Audit Commission in 2014 (GOV.UK, 2012a). 
Announcement to create the SFIS in 2014 (DWP, 2011). 
Established a cross-Whitehall taskforce focusing on tackling fraud, error and debt in 
public services (National Fraud Authority, 2012b). 
2012 Establishment of the ‘Fighting Fraud Locally’, as a strategic approach (blueprint) 
under the NFA (Fraud Advisory Panel, 2011). 
2013 Announcement of the closure of the NFA (GOV.UK, 2013). 
2014 Establishment of the National Crime Agency (GOV.UK, 2013). 
2015 Abolishment of the Audit Commission and replaced by Public Sector Audit 
Appointments Ltd., National Audit Office, Financial Reporting Council and Cabinet 
Office (GOV.UK, 2015). 
Source: Compiled by author 
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Table 2-6 indicated that central government has given a high priority to eradicate the fraud 
problem including fraud in local authorities. However, little is known if they have utilised 
forensic accounting services as part of the aim to eradicate fraud. The early foundation of 
counter fraud effort began when two government enquiries had been set up in a response to the 
revelation of massive corruption scandals of local authorities in 1972 (Doig & Coles, 1977). 
The counter fraud activities became a major concern as fraud was one of the major election 
issues during 1980s (Button et al., 2007). The authors argued that during the election campaign, 
instead of the commitment to reduce the number of civil servants, the central government 
increased the number of counter fraud staff. However, at that time, the focus to counter fraud 
was mainly on capacity rather than effectiveness of the investigative resources, which led to 
various ranges of new initiatives being implemented until today (Button et al., 2007). 
 
Lawton & Macaulay (2004, p. 628) state that despite the rapid changes in regulatory regimes 
introduced by the government, ‘unethical activities have not been banished from local 
governments’ landscape’. Some of the major concerns on the counter fraud initiatives in local 
authorities include the lack of professionalism, e.g. no minimum standard of training, and no 
standard to carry out investigations (Button et al., 2007). Following on the model of the NHS 
Counter Fraud Services, the professionalism of countering fraud in local authorities, emerged 
when the CFS qualification was introduced in 1998 (Button et al., 2007; Lane, 2011). However, 
in terms of structure, capabilities and performance, there are variances among CFS in local 
authorities (Button et al., 2008, 2007; Lane, 2011). 
 
In the face of growing concern towards the prevalence of fraud, little has been written on the 
development of the counter fraud work in local authorities (Button & Brooks, 2009; Button et 
al., 2007; Doig, 2006; Lane, 2011). Previous research indicated the existence of investigators 
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in housing benefit fraud (Doig & Coles, 1997); the role of internal auditors in benefits and 
councils tax fraud (Levi et al., 2007); the emergence of the CFS towards professionalism to 
combat fraud (Button et al., 2007); and the role of specialist counter fraud teams (Lane, 2011). 
The mentioned studies, however, raised a number of concerns on the overall impact on the 
effectiveness of fraud investigations and if there is a demand for external services such as 
forensic accounting services. 
 
The role of internal auditors to detect and prevent fraud has been widely discussed (e.g. 
Humphrey, Turley, & Moizer (1993); Burnaby, Howe, & Muehlmann (2009); Zikmund (2008); 
Wells (2000). Despite the discussion on the expectation gap more focus on the financial 
statement fraud within the private sector, a similar situation happened in the public sector. Lane 
(2011) stated that the CIPFA which governs, the internal audit practice in English local 
authorities, clearly stressed that internal audit may assist with the fraud investigation and not 
responsible to prevent and detect fraud. The CIPFA is a body that governs the internal audit in 
English local authorities through the CIPFA’s code of practice. 
 
The counter fraud work by the internal auditors may be at risk if the internal auditors do not 
have specialists’ investigation knowledge, training or skills in fraud investigation (Lane, 2011). 
In general, there is not enough support for internal auditors to carry out fraud investigation and 
the big accountancy firms already provide forensic specialist or forensic accounting services 
(Button et al., 2008; Doig, 2006; DWP, 2011). On the other hand, using forensic accounting 
services could support the internal audit’s work to be more effective in fraud investigations 
such as reviewing the current fraud risk management. 
 
 88 
A survey by PricewaterhouseCoopers (2011), ‘Economic crime in the public sector’, of over 
110 senior representatives from the public sector in the UK, including local authorities, 
indicated that informal tip offs (40%) remain to be the main means of detecting fraud in the 
public sector. Other methods of detecting fraud include external tip off (28%), whistle blowing 
(26%), internal audit (26%), and fraud risk management (18%). While it is encouraging that 
whistle blowing plays an important role as a formal process of fraud detection, both tip off 
from external and internal relies upon a series of coincidences that might not involve systematic 
process. The fraud risk management or assessments are essential to identify potential fraud 
threats and weakness in controls that create opportunities to commit fraud.  
 
By profession, the core function of a CFS is to investigate fraud and related offences with 
knowledge in law (e.g. benefits law). The main difference between CFSs and traditional fraud 
investigators is that CFSs conduct more preventive work such as improving the development 
of anti-fraud culture within organisations, and focus on using intelligence gathering and 
analysis (Button et al., 2008). The reality is that there is resistance to the operations of CFSs in 
local authorities. According to Button (2011), the organisational structure of CFS teams in local 
authorities is subjected to regular reform and change; for instance, the closure of the BFI in 
2008 and the creation of the SFIS announced in 2013. In the earlier years, a London Organised 
Fraud Investigation Team (LOFIT) piloted between 1996 and 1998 to counter organised fraud 
was disbanded (Lane, 2011). The changes in organisational structure ‘can often frustrate the 
ability of entities to counter fraud as resources are diverted or lost in the reforms’ (Button, 
2011, p. 261). This might lead to the issues of effectiveness in fraud investigation. 
 
Unlike practice by the NHS, the local CFS is not a legal requirement in local authorities (Button 
et al., 2007). Therefore, there is no single standard on how the CFSs team or in-house unit is 
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organised in each local authority. The CFSs team in local authorities is situated in either a 
specialist department, section of department or as a resource in department e.g. housing benefit, 
audit, and council tax. The questions of adequate resources and independence of CFSs arise as 
their work is under jurisdiction of top management such as Chief Executive, Director of 
Finance, boards and councillors. To illustrate, in one local authority, there is a case where a 
manager of a CFS team was forced to resign due to fraud investigations involving fraud 
committed by a senior officer (Button, 2011). Although the case did not occur in all local 
authorities, the interference from management is a fundamental issue that leads the fraud 
investigations to be closed without further actions. The use of forensic accounting services 
could address the issues of resources, which act as specialist investigators and as independent 
investigators. 
 
There is a limited number of empirical studies that discussed the effectiveness of counter fraud 
work in all English local authorities. Some studies e.g. Lane (2010, 2011) have only been 
carried out in a specific area, which is London local authorities. Thus, to generalise the findings 
to represent the overall local authorities is limited and future research is needed in other areas 
of local authorities (Lane, 2011). Other studies by Button et al. (2007), Lane (2011) and 
publications made by the related government agencies (Audit Commission, 2012c; National 
Fraud Authority, 2010, 2012b) indicated some of the large local authorities such as 
Birmingham City Council and London local authorities are excellent in counter fraud work, 
which sometimes are referred to as benchmarks to other local authorities. Others include: 
setting up a separate single unit or in-house of benefit fraud and corporate fraud, large number 
of resources (e.g. Birmingham City Council has around 40 staff), join resources with other 
local resources (e.g. Greenwich and Bromley Council), and adopting a corporate model by 
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having a dedicated corporate counter fraud resource with qualified investigators, highly trained 
and experienced in a forensic computing function (e.g. Brent Council).  
 
2.3 Organisational Intention  
 
The purpose of this section is to describe the principal theoretical perspective related to 
organisational intention in using professional services from outside such as forensic accounting 
services. First, an overview of the theories that are applicable in an organisation’s intention 
studies. Then, the choice to use institutional theory is explained. Finally, the operationalization 
of variables of institutional theory is presented. 
 
2.3.1 Organisational Intention to Use Forensic Accounting Services 
 
Previous research on the organisational intention or decision to adopt in accounting studies had 
used theories such as Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) by Coase (1937) (e.g. Ahmed & 
Scapens, 2000; Balakrishnan, Eldenburg, Krishnan, & Soderstrom, 2010; Roberts & 
Greenwood, 1997), agency theory by Watts & Zimmerman (1983) (e.g. Adams, 1994; Caplan 
& Kirschenheiter, 2000; Seal, 2006), positive accounting theory by Watts & Zimmerman 
(1986) (e.g. Collin, Tagesson, & Andersson, 2004; Collin, Tagesson, Andersson, Cato, & 
Hansson, 2009; Falkman & Tagesson, 2008), contingency theory by Woodward (1958) (e.g. 
Collier & Woods, 2011; Geiger & Ittner, 1996), and institutional theory by DiMaggio & Powell 
(1983) (e.g. Ahrens & Ferry, 2016; Ashworth, Boyne, & Delbridge, 2005; Carpenter & Feroz, 
2001; Henderson, Sheetz, & Trinkle, 2011; Ugrin, 2009).  
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At the individual level decision-making, much of the research has used theory of planned 
behaviour by Ajzen (1991), derived from the theory of reasoned action (Fishbein & Ajzen, 
1975). For example, study on whistleblowing intentions among external auditors (Alleyne, 
Hudaib, & Pike, 2013), managers’ perception on decision on outsourcing (Gewald, 
Wüllenweber, & Weitzel, 2006), and corporate managers’ decision making related to 
fraudulent financial reporting (Carpenter & Reimers, 2005). Other studies that applied 
technology acceptance model by (Davis, Bagozzi, & Warshaw, 1989) included managers’ 
adoption on Extensible Business Reporting Language (XBRL) (Felden, 2011); consumers’ 
adoption of e-services (Featherman & Fuller, 2003), and individual differences to the 
acceptance of new information systems (Agarwal & Prasad, 1999). A study by Muthusamy 
(2011) combined the theory of reason action, theory of planned behaviour, health believe model 
and hierarchy of effects model on the use forensic accounting services by large companies. 
 
One of the most important considerations in determining the appropriate theoretical framework 
is the locus of adoption or intention (Fichman, 1992). According to Fichman (1992), the locus 
of adoption refers to whether the adoption or intention decision is made at the individual level 
(e.g., an individual decides to use accounting software) or at the organisational level (e.g., top 
management decides whether to use accounting services). Although individual decision-
making is also the basis of organisational intention or adoption, the determinants of individual 
intention or adoption differ from those of organisational intention or adoption (Khalifa & 
Davison, 2006).  
 
Howlett & Migone (2013) argued that there was numerous research on the role and use of 
consultants in the public sector dated back in the 1970s (e.g. Kline & Buntz, 1979; Meredith & 
Martin, 1970) and more studies continued later (e.g. Bloomfield & Danieli, 1995; Christensen, 
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2005; Lapsley & Oldfield, 2001; Saint-Martin, 1998), but very few, if any, research had 
developed or tested theories to provide empirical evidence on the role of consultants (Lapsley 
& Oldfield, 2001; Mitchell, 1994). Similarly, an analysis of 33 articles from the three specialist 
accounting history journals up to 2009 revealed that investigations on local government mainly 
adopted ‘a traditional conception of accounting, where the focus was on the technical aspects 
of accounting practices’ with a few articles adopting a theoretical framework to interpret the 
findings, particularly in accounting and accountability areas (Sargiacomo & Gomes, 2011, p. 
268).  Canback (1998b) claimed that the TCE may help to ‘explain the existence of management 
consultant as the TCE deals with the real costs of allocating resources in an imperfect world 
of misunderstanding, misaligned, goals and uncertainty’ (p. 9) that aligned with the issues 
within management consultant environment. The increase in demand for management 
consulting services can be explained by fundamental shifts in the economy that are a very 
complex environment and require high transaction costs in order to function (Canback, 1998b). 
The argument by Canback (1998b), however, did not mention the applicability of the TCE in 
the public sector context.  
 
On the other hand, Lapsley & Pallot (2000) proposed that ‘new institutionalism’ can be used 
as a theoretical framework to examine the impacts of the reforms under the NPM within local 
authorities in Scotland. The use of management consultant is the example that impacts the 
public sector as a result of the NPM (Lapsley & Oldfield, 2001). The new institutionalism 
asserted formal organisation structures reliant on institutional rules to give legitimacy to the 
organisation activities, for example accounting can form an important part of the rule-making 
within organisations as described by Meyer and Scott (1983, p. 235, as cited in Lapsley & 
Pallot, 2000). 
. . . accounting structures are myths . . . (which) describe the organisation as 
bounded and unified, as rational in technology, as well-controlled and as 
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attaining clear purposes. The myths are important: they help to hold the 
organisation together with their justifications...they legitimate the organisation 
with the controlling external environment. 
 
As such, local authorities seek to incorporate externally legitimated formal structures to 
increase the commitment of external constituents. This would potentially adopt forensic 
accounting services to show they are ‘doing something’ from a legitimate source in their 
counter fraud activities. Additionally, the reflection of isomorphism seems ideal within this 
context as local authorities comprise a large number of similar organisations (in terms of 
function, duties, legal, financing and activities); there is possibility for local government to not 
only reflect their external environment but to seek institutional isomorphism through mimetic 
process (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). In other words, local authorities would seek legitimation 
by approaching other local authorities in terms of procedures, structures and external initiatives 
(Lapsley & Pallot, 2000). At the end, the authors concluded that the application of institutional 
theory may fit in the UK considering the significant and complex range of services in local 
authorities. In this case, forensic accounting services' providers may target sectors based on 
their publicised success with one provider. 
 
The current research begins by referring to the related studies on decision-making in accounting 
context in both the private and public sector literature at the organisational level. A number of 
studies had investigated the intention, adoption or decision in accounting research by 
organisations (Ashworth et al., 2005; Ashworth, Boyne, & Delbridge, 2007; Blaskovich & 
Mintchik, 2011; Burns & Scapens, 2000; Caplan & Kirschenheiter, 2000; Carpenter & Feroz, 
2001; Collier & Woods, 2011; Falkman & Tagesson, 2008; James, 2009; Johnsen, Meklin, & 
Oulasvirta, 2001; Johnson, 2012; Kent, 2011; Lander, Koene, & Linssen, 2013; Qian, Burritt, 
& Monroe, 2011; Son & Benbasat, 2007; Teo, Wei, & Benbasat, 2003; Widener & Selto, 1999; 
Woods, 2009). For example, a study by Widener & Selto (1999) examined the level of 
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outsourcing of the internal audit function based on the TCE. The authors identified that the 
variables of asset specificity and frequency of transactions are the major driver to outsource 
internal audit. However, the authors stated that the TCE does not view the external 
environmental, which could influence the organisational decision to outsource. This is because 
the TCE focuses on the efficiency or economics factors (Granovetter, 1985) and is unable to 
consider the influence of institutional environments (Balakrishnan et al., 2010). In contrast to 
the TCE, the NIS of institutional theory is mainly driven by external factors and not cost-
minimising objectives (Moll, Burns, Major, & Hoque, 2006). 
 
In another study, Ashworth et al. (2007) used institutional theory to evaluate whether 
organisational change in UK local authorities is consistent with institutional perspective. The 
finding of the study indicated that institutional pressures strongly exist in a centralised state 
such as the UK and on a highly structured organisation such as local authorities. For example, 
the three isomorphic pressures of coercive, normative, and mimetic do influence the 
transformation in English local authorities such as from central government, professional and 
other local authorities. Previously, a study by Carpenter & Feroz (2001) confirmed that 
institutional pressures provide better insights into understanding the decision to adopt 
accounting practices rather than economics variables in the public sector environment. 
 
In the UK context, the management techniques and practices in the private sector are widely 
being institutionalised by the UK’s public sector under the NPM reforms movement 
(Khadaroo, 2005). Some of the techniques and practices include Best Value, Private Finance 
Initiative (PFI), and Resource Accounting and Budgeting. In the case of reducing fraud in the 
UK public sector, the National Fraud Authority was posed by the government to identify and 
recommend the best practice within the private sector (National Fraud Authority, 2010).  
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2.3.2 Institutional Theory 
 
Given the local authorities’ context and factors in the previous section and that over the years, 
institutional theory has become one of the most prominent theories in organisational analysis 
toward understanding organisational change (Walsh, Meyer, & Schoonhoven, 2006). It has 
been extensively used by researchers to analyse the relationship between organisations and 
their environment (related to the conformity with the external environment) (Ashworth et al., 
2007; Macfarlane, Barton-Sweeney, Woodard, & Greenhalgh, 2013; Oliver, 1991; Scott, 1987) 
Thus, based on that premise, the present study documented a frame of reference to direct the 
research with relevant concepts, theories and a model. Institutional theory finds its most 
traditional roots in the social sciences ranging from studies in ethnography, phenomenology, 
anthropology, political science, and organisational studies. According to DiMaggio & Powell 
(1991) institutional analysis is ‘neither to expose the inefficiency of organisational practices 
nor to celebrate the non-optimality of institutional arrangements….but to develop robust 
explanations of the ways in which institutions incorporate historical experiences into their 
rules and organising logics’ (p. 33). 
 
Institutional theory explains organisational change as driven by ‘formal legitimacy’, or the need 
to ‘conform to expectations of key stakeholders in their environment’ (Ashworth et al., 2005). 
Institutional studies recognised that social values affect organisations and that organisations 
adopt structures for legitimation purposes (Greenwood, Oliver, Sahlin, & Suddaby, 2008). In 
addition, rather than focusing on the technical elements that tend to separate and identify 
variation among organisations with regard to change, institutional theory emphasises on the 
social and cultural elements that attempt to understand the similarity and stability with regard 
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to organisational change (Ashworth et al., 2005). An institution is defined as a social structure 
consisting of a group of individuals or organisations within which collectives exercise action 
or orientations in a constrained environment that will continuously be changed over time 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Scott, 1987). 
 
2.3.2.1 Variants of Institutional Theory 
 
Moll et al. (2006) discussed the variants of institutional theory namely: (1) old institutional 
economics (OIE); (2) new institutional economics (NIE); and (3) new institutional sociology 
(NIS). The authors focussed on the three strands of institutionalism as, to date, those strands 
were considered to have had most influence on accounting research. According to Moll et al. 
(2006) the root of OIE dated back over a century, in mainly examined institutions at the society 
(or macro-economy) level. The fundamental of OIE conceptualized on ‘why/how particular 
behaviors or structures emerge, sustain and/or change over time rather than merely structures 
exists at any given point in time’ (p. 184). Furthermore, OIE focuses the importance of power 
and politics, learning and innovation for shaping cumulative process over time.  
 
NIE emerged following the concern amongst economists during the 1960s and proposed that 
institutions should be studied within the economics framework (Moll et al., 2006). Some 
notable studies in accounting research under NIE branch included (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 
1981, 1998) known as TCE. The fundamental elements of NIE suggested rational-optimizing 
behaviour where the existence of institutions depends on the benefits over costs or cost-
minimizing/efficiency concepts, for institutions to be established and maintained (Moll et al., 
2006). 
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On the other hand, NIS significantly had been seen in sociological fields (e.g. DiMaggio & 
Powell , 1991; Scott, 2005) that integrated institutional approaches within organisational 
studies (Moll et al., 2006). A key principle of NIS studies is ‘an assumption that intra-
organisational structures and procedures, including accounting, are largely shaped by 
external factors rather than cost-minimising objectives’  (Moll et al., 2006, p. 186). In other 
words, NIS provides lens to researchers to explain the adoption in accounting systems that can 
be understood in terms of a need to conform to external pressures as opposed to a prevailing 
(rational-optimising) drive for increased internal efficiency (Carpenter & Feroz, 2001; 
Covaleski, Dirsmith, & Michelman, 1993; Modell, 2001). Given the differences of the variants 
of institutional theory, the present study focused on NIS which was deemed to be appropriate 
in the context of this study. 
 
Institutional theory is multifaceted (Scott, 1987). Traditionally, there are two main streams of 
institutional theory; old and new or neo-institutionalism. While there are many differences 
between old and new institutionalism, both streams agreed that institutionalisation constrains 
organisational rationality, but it is the sources of the constraints on which they differ (DiMaggio 
& Powell, 1991). The classic or old institutionalism is a theoretical paradigm that focuses on 
roles, structures, process and norms of organisations; or the internal environment of the 
organisation. However, the new institutionalism switches the focus to the interaction of the 
organisation with others in the field, or the external environments (Fleck, 2007).  
 
Old and new institutionalists “identify different sources of constraint, with the former 
emphasising the vesting of interest within the organisation as a result of political trade-offs 
and alliances and the new stressing the relationship between stability and legitimacy and the 
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power of common understandings that are seldom explicitly articulated” (DiMaggio & Powell, 
1991, p. 12) as shown in Table 2-7. 
 
Table 2-7: The Old and New Institutionalism 
 Old New 
Conflict of interest Central Peripheral 
Source of inertia Vested interest Legitimacy imperative 
Structural emphasis Informal structure Symbolic role of formal 
structure 
Organisation embedded in Local community Field, sector, society 
Nature of embeddedness Co-optation Constitutive 
Locus of institutionalisation Organisation Field or society 
Organisational dynamics Change Persistence 
Basis of critique of 
utilitarianism 
Theory of interest 
aggregation 
Theory of action 
Evidence of critique of 
utilitarianism 
Unanticipated consequences Unreflective activity 
Key form of cognition Value, norms, attitudes Classification, routines, 
scripts, schema 
Cognitive basis of order Commitment Habit, practical action 
Goals Displaced Ambiguous 
Agenda Policy relevance Disciplinary  
 (Source: DiMaggio & Powell, 1991; Zucker, 1987) 
 
In his synthesis of institutional theories of organisation, Zucker (1987) identified two distinct 
theoretical approaches as shown in Table 2-7. The old institutionalism views organisation as 
institution while the new institutionalism focuses on the environment as institution. Both the 
old and new institutionalism propounds a counter-intuitive conception that institutionalisation 
processes increase chances of survival while reducing efficiency. Institutionalised fields 
produce isomorphism and organisational compliance to institutionalised rules and practices 
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(Fleck, 2007) as indicated in Table 2-8. According to Greenwood & Suddaby (2006), 
institutional fields structure the identities and interactions of the agents (individuals or 
organisations) who operate in those fields. For the current study, the agents in the institutional 
fields are organisations rather than individuals. 
 
According to DiMaggio & Powell (1983, p. 148), organisational field refers to “those 
organisations that, in the aggregate, constitute a recognised area of institutional life: key 
suppliers, resource and product consumers, regulatory agencies, and other organizations that 
produce similar services or products”. For example, the sources of organisational practices in 
a field are regulation and technology (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). They further state that new 
organisational practices come into being by superiority of technical or economic requirements 
of the task. Over the time when such practices gain legitimacy, others in the field imitate the 
practices and uncritically accept the validity and value (Fleck, 2007). Accordingly, as practices 
widen throughout a field, it will become isomorphic (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Hence, 
forensic accounting services may be such organisational practices. 
 
Table 2-8: Institutional Processes of Organisations 
 Organisation Environment 
Institutionalisation 
process 
Value infusion 
Elaboration of socially integrating myths 
Elite formation, nurture and renewal 
 
Coercion 
Mimetism 
Normatism 
Institutionalisation 
outcomes 
Non expandability 
Character formation: distinctive inadequacy 
Stability and inflexibility 
Sub-optimal performance 
Isomorphism 
Inertia 
Sub-optimal 
performance 
 (Source: Fleck, 2007) 
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The institutional theory recognises cultural and institutional pressures that intervene in the 
widening of management practices (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Scott 1987, 2005). Therefore, 
it is useful to study how institutional pressures interact in decision-making processes within 
organisations like English local authorities. Changes in organisations often reflect “myth in the 
institutional environment rather than the detached calculus of costs and benefits” (Frumkin & 
Galaskiewicz, 2004). Organisations are bound to be institutionalised by the institutions around 
them (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Zucker, 1987). These institutions 
could be in the form of internal sources such as the organisation itself, and external pressures 
like central government, suppliers, and other organisations (Zucker, 1987). Pressures can be 
either applied formally by the institutions through written laws, regulations and standards, or 
informally through the intervention of norms, schemas, and routines (DiMaggio & Powell, 
1983; Scott, 2005). Members of the organisation will respond to these pressures by acting in 
accordance with the rules that have been set out by the institutions (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; 
Tolbert & Zucker, 1983). For example, Ahrens & Ferry (2016) suggested that in the field of 
English local authorities budgeting, central government executing the budget practices through 
their agencies such as Her Majesty’s Treasury, the Department for Communities and Local 
Government (DCLG), the parliamentary Communities and Local Government Committee, the 
Local Government Association (LGA), and the CIPFA. 
 
2.3.2.2 New Institutional Sociology (NIS) 
 
NIS proposed the behaviour of organisation as motivated by forces in wider society. 
Organisations will seek legitimacy by adhering to rules and norms that are valued by society 
and, more specifically, by certain institutions in society. The mechanism through which 
organisations adopt similar procedures is termed institutional isomorphism. Isomorphism is ‘a 
 101 
constraining process that forces one unit in a population to resemble other units that face the 
same set of environmental conditions’ (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, p. 149). In accounting 
literature, NIS perspective on institutional theory is ‘primarily concerned with an 
organisation’s interaction with the institutional environment, the effects of social expectations 
on the organisation, and the incorporation of these expectations as reflected in organisational 
practices and characteristics’’ or ‘a way of thinking about formal organisation structures and 
the nature of the historically grounded social pressures through which these structures 
develop‘ (Dillard, Rigsby, & Goodman, 2004, p. 508). According to Mulligan (2012), the three 
common themes of early NIS based research were legitimacy, isomorphism, and decoupling. 
 
Legitimacy 
Legitimacy is a fundamental concept in NIS (Mulligan, 2012), which refers to ‘a symbolic 
value to be displayed in a manner such that it is visible to outsiders’ (Scott, 2001, as cited in 
Mulligan, 2012). The terms ‘symbol’, ‘value’, and ‘display’ indicate how an organisation is 
perceived by various constituents within its extent environment in order to survive and not 
necessarily reflect the reality (Mulligan, 2012). According to Scott (1987), the need to establish 
legitimacy may be greater among organisations whose processes have a degree of arbitrariness, 
which makes them more vulnerable to attacks on their work arrangements and procedures. 
Covaleski, Dirsmith, & Samuel (1996) suggested that ‘an organisation’s survival requires it 
to conform to social norms of acceptable behaviour as much as to achieve levels of production 
efficiency’ (p. 7). 
  
Institutional isomorphism 
The second theme within NIS literature that related to legitimacy is institutional isomorphism. 
Isomorphism is a process that causes one unit in a population to resemble other units in the 
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population that face the same set of environmental conditions (Carpenter & Feroz, 2001). 
According to Hannan & Freeman (1997), isomorphism arose due to the distinguishable 
differences in organisation environment that tend to lead to different optimal organisation 
structures and practices. Therefore, organisations could have similar organisational 
configurations in similar environments. However, the proposition by Hannan & Freeman 
(1997) tends to more focus on competitive isomorphism, which is mainly concerned with 
organisational adaptation due to competitive pressures. Contrasting with this, DiMaggio & 
Powell (1983) provided different views by focusing on institutional isomorphism, which 
considered a domain of NIS theory. Organisations which operate in similar environments are 
assumed to have comparable demand regarding what is generally regarded as acceptable 
behaviour and consequently will have a similar structure and process. 
 
Institutional isomorphism is based on the premise that environments are collective and 
interconnected and it is important for organisations to respond to external demands and 
expectations in order to survive (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). As a result of isomorphic 
pressures, organisations will become increasingly homogeneous within given domains and 
conform to expectations of the wider institutional environment (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). 
The two types of isomorphism that were mentioned above consist of competitive and 
institutional. Competitive isomorphism is not the scope of the present research as it more 
focuses on the free and open market competition setting, and, therefore, is not applicable to 
analyse the public sector organisations (Carpenter & Feroz, 2001). Thus, the present research 
will focus on the concept of institutional isomorphism, which relates to organisational 
competition for political power, social fitness, and institutional legitimacy.  
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The institutional environments of organisations consist of a group of exogenous pressures that 
influence their structure and process (Carpenter & Feroz, 2001). Generally, there were three 
mechanisms of institutional isomorphism; coercive pressures (response to external pressure), 
mimetic pressures (organisations imitating other organisations), and normative pressures 
(stems from the professionalism of education, and professional networking) though the three 
mechanisms are not always empirically distinct from each other (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). 
The three mechanisms of institutional isomorphism were further explained in Section 3.2. 
 
Decoupling  
Decoupling denotes the situation ‘…in which the formal organisational structures or practice 
is separate and distinct from actual organisational practice‘ (Dillard et al., 2004, p. 509). For 
instance, institutionalised rules or behaviours may be adopted for ceremonial (legitimacy) 
reasons apart from efficiency reasons, particularly within an institutional environment 
dominated by market capitalism (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Within institutional context, 
decoupling behaviour suggested that, under certain pressures, actual organisational behaviour 
can be made to differ significantly from the perceived image through legitimising actions 
(Lapsley & Mussari, 2008). According to Scott (2001) despite decoupling being an important 
element of institutional theory, this concept required more empirical investigation to determine 
under which circumstances decoupling is more likely to occur. In the context of this study, 
decoupling behaviour can only be distinguished through an investigation of the actual practices 
and the reported behaviour of individual organisations particularly in market capitalism 
environment, which is not the objective of this study. Hence, the concept of decoupling is not 
the central focus of this study. 
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2.3.2.3 Deinstitutionalisation  
 
Two new additional concepts that appeared within the institutional theory literature were the 
concepts of deinstitutionalisation and reinstitutionalisation. Deinstitutionalisation is ‘the 
erosion or discontinuity of an institutionalized organizational activity or practice’ (Oliver, 
1992, p. 563), and reinstitutionalisation represents an ‘exit from one institutionalization, and 
entry into another institutional form, organized around different principles or rules’ 
(Jepperson, 1991, as cited in Currie & Swanson, 2009, p. 283). Organisations, at some point, 
instead of conforming to and adopting the institutionalised practices, need to challenge and 
eliminate the established institutionalised practices (Barley & Tolbert, 1997). As suggested by 
Greenwood, Suddaby, & Hinings (2002) isomorphic convergence, moving from one status to 
another, may come from a non-isomorphic change. Similarly, the increasing parallel between 
organisations could originate from deinstitutionalising a current practice and 
reinstitutionalising a new practice. In order to deinstitutionalise, the organisation’s 
environment needs a major shift in environment towards practices that have been widely 
diffused in the organisation, (e.g. long-lasting alterations in market, radical change in 
technologies) (Tolbert & Zucker, 1996, p. 184). The indicators of deinstitutionalisation arose 
when there was a significant reduction in either frequency or discontinuity in total of the 
established activity (Oliver, 1992). 
 
2.4 Operationalisation of Institutional Theory 
 
Previous research used institutional theory to study organisational change both in the private 
and public sector. For example, studies on the intention to adopt information 
system/technology in the private sector included (e.g. Henderson et al., 2011; Teo et al., 2003; 
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Tsamenyi, Cullen, & González, 2006; Khalifa & Davison, 2006; Yoon & George, 2013), and 
in the public sector (e.g. Currie, 2012; Currie & Guah, 2007; Jensen, Kjærgaard, & Svejvig, 
2009; Nurdin, Stockdale, & Scheepers, 2012; Zheng, Chen, Huang, & Zhang, 2012). 
Specifically, previous studies also examined the influence of institutional theory in accounting 
domain in the private sector (e.g. Guerreiro, Rodrigues, & Craig, 2012; Hussain & 
Gunasekaran, 2002; Touron, 2005), and in the public sector (e.g. Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006; 
Hyvönen, Oulasvirta, Järvinen, & Pellinen, 2012; Johnsen et al., 2001; Van Peursem & Balme, 
2010; Carpenter & Feroz, 2001; Falkman & Tagesson, 2008). A summary of some of these 
studies was shown in Table 2.9. 
 
The aforementioned studies noticeably suggested the importance of institutional theory in 
understanding organisational behaviour, and also demonstrated the applicability in a number 
of disciplines. Weerakkody, Dwivedi, & Irani (2009) suggested that some of the most 
noteworthy studies on the understanding of adoption and diffusion in information 
system/technology within institutional theory included Teo et al. (2003) (electronic 
data/information interchange-EDI-adoption), Liang, Saraf, Hu, & Xue (2007) (Enterprise 
Resource Planning-ERP-adoption), Currie & Guah (2007) and Mark (2007) (on information 
technology-enabled process transformation). For instance, Teo et al. (2003) used institutional 
theory as a conceptual lense to examine the factors that influence the adoption of inter-
organisational systems within companies in Singapore by empirically examining the 
institutional pressures (coercive, mimetic and normative) faced by Chief Executive Officers 
(CEO), Chief Information Officers (CIO) and Chief Financial Officers (CFO).  
 
Similarly, Currie & Guah (2007) and Mark (2007) used institutional theory to evaluate the 
world’s largest public sector IT programme in the UK NHS, known as National Programme of 
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Information Technology (NPfIT). For this purpose, Currie & Guah (2007) incorporated 
institutional theory to evaluate the wider organisational factors (political, social, regulatory, 
normative and cultural-cognitive) that influence the NPfIT programme within six UK NHS 
entities, while Mark (2007) followed up the Currie & Guah (2007) study by examining the 
appropriateness and applicability of institutional theory related to transformation of the UK 
NHS. 
 
Continuing the public sector theme, the application of institutional theory also can be seen 
within local authorities’ context (e.g. Ahrens & Ferry, 2016; Ashworth et al., 2007; Bovaird & 
Downe, 2006; Bowerman, 2002; Gomes, 2004; Lapsley & Pallot, 2000; Murphy, Greenhalgh, 
& Jones, 2011; Modell, 2012; Pouder, 1996; Reginato, Fadda, & Pavan, 2010; Seal, 1999). The 
study by Bowerman (2002) used concept of isomorphism to explain the initial adoption of the 
Business Excellence Model in English local government. A comparative study on management 
accounting between New Zealand and the UK local government (Scotland) conducted by 
Lapsley & Pallot (2000) used new institutionalist perspectives, in which there is evidence of 
institutional isomorphism within local authorities in Scotland compared in New Zealand. 
Reginato et al. (2012) combined NIS (isomorphism) and OIE (internal dynamics) to explore 
and analyse the reasons for accounting changes (NPM) within Italian local government. 
Another NPM related study by Bovaird & Downe (2006) examined the role of institutional 
isomorphism within English local authorities towards the Local Government Modernization 
Agenda (LGMA). Ahrens & Ferry (2016) adopted institutional entrepreneurship in analysing 
the roles of practice memory and cultural memory in institutional change of local authority 
budgets in England.  
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Within public sector context, institutional theory provides a good conceptual basis for studying 
transformational change (Weerakkody et al., 2009). This view is supported by Ashworth et al. 
(2007) who stated that institutional theory “provides a useful complement to managerial and 
technical perspectives on organisational change in the public sector” (p. 184). Accordingly, 
central government may view local authorities as a mechanism to achieve their policies rather 
than separate institutions that represent local citizens (Wollmann, 2000).  
 
In this study, the organisation refers to local authorities in England. The institutional 
environments of local authorities included central government, the Audit Commission, media, 
other local authorities, professional bodies, associations, external auditors, and stakeholders as 
stated in Figure 2-3. An alternative to detect and prevent fraud in local authorities is by utilising 
forensic accounting services, which can be regarded as a new organisational practice.  
 
The intention to use the forensic accounting services to detect and prevent fraud by local 
authorities may come from external pressures within their environment. Thus, the present study 
relies on the New Institutional Sociology (NIS) (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, 1991) approach in 
order to explain and understand how the intention or decision process to use forensic 
accounting services by local authorities to detect and prevent fraud is shaped by the external 
pressures at organisational level as described in Figure 2-3. As argued by Moll et al. (2006, p. 
187), researchers had used NIS insight to explain how the adoption of particular accounting 
systems can be understood in terms of a need to conform to external pressures as opposed to 
an overriding (rational-optimising) drive for increased internal efficiency. Furthermore, 
Ashworth et al. (2007) stated that the influences of institutional pressures are strong in a highly 
structured organisation such as English local authorities.  
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To be more comprehensive in developing the theoretical framework, the current research 
believes that additional salient factors from the literature can be incorporated into the 
conceptual framework. Guided by a conceptual framework adapted from Muthusamy (2011), 
the additional factors are forensic accounting perception factors (perceived benefits of forensic 
accounting, perceived risks of forensic accounting, transaction costs), fraud perception factors 
(perceived severity of fraud, perceived susceptibility of fraud), and internal control factors 
(audit committee, strength of internal control system). The combination of institutional theory 
and the additional factors are expected to provide valuable information as direct antecedents of 
organisational intention. 
 
Figure 2-3: Operationalization of Institutional Theory 
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bodies and 
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Stakeholders 
 
(Source: Adopted from Moll et al., 2006) 
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This study decided to use the institutional theory based on the following arguments. First, the 
subject of the present research which is local authorities is normally influenced by the other 
organisations in its environment such as central government, related government entities and 
professional bodies, particularly regarding the implementation of certain policies, regulations, 
processes and practices, which align with the principles of the institutional theory (Ashworth 
et al., 2007). Based on the fraud literature discussed in Section 2.2.6, indications are that central 
government, and other governmental bodies such as the Audit Commission, play roles in 
counter fraud arrangement in local authorities. In the context of this study, coercive pressures 
could derive from central government and other related government bodies. The role of 
professional bodies such as the CIPFA and the ICAEW could act as normative pressures while 
among local authorities could act as mimetic pressures. Further discussions were highlighted 
in Section 3.2.  
 
Secondly, previous studies demonstrate that the institutional theory is appropriate to be used 
in the public sector context including the state and local government. For example, Carpenter 
& Feroz (2001) investigated the decisions to adopt generally accepted accounting principles 
by the state government in the US; Hyvönen et al. (2012) examined the emergence of the 
accounting shared service centres of local government in Finland; Falkman & Tagesson (2008) 
analysed the compliance with accounting standards by the local government in Sweden; 
Pouder (1996) explored the decision to privatise services by the local government in the US; 
Bowerman (2002) examined the initial adoption of the Business Excellence Model in English 
local government; Lapsley & Pallot (2000) analysed accounting and management 
organisational change within local authorities in Scotland and New Zealand; Reginato et al. 
(2012) combined the used of NIS and OIE to explore and analyse the reasons for accounting 
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changes (NPM) within Italian local government;  and Ashworth et al. (2007) investigated the 
implementation of new statutory framework for management of local government in England.  
 
The above-mentioned studies concluded that the coercive pressures, mimetic pressures, and 
normative pressures were significant factors for the organisational adoption and intention. 
Carpenter & Feroz (2001) reported that the federal government (coercive pressures) and 
professional bodies (normative pressures) influence the decision to adopt accounting 
principles; Ashworth et al. (2007) posited that isomorphic pressures influence the changes in 
organisations. Finally, the research methodology that will be applied in the present research 
using a survey is appropriate within the institutional theory context. For instance, previous 
studies that used a questionnaire and interviews included Carpenter & Feroz (2001); Teo et al., 
(2003) Henderson et al. (2011); Falkman & Tagesson (2008); Pouder (1996) and Ashworth et 
al. (2007). The salient factors on the forensic accounting perception factors, fraud perception 
factors, and internal control factors are based on a study by Muthusamy (2011). The 
development of questionnaire is discussed in Section 4.3.3. 
 
2.4.1 Research on Organisation Intention Using Institutional Theory 
 
This section describes the application of institutional theory in both the public and private 
sector.  
 
2.4.1.1 Public sector 
 
Carpenter & Feroz (2001) explored how institutional pressures influence the decision to adopt 
or resist the use of generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) by the state government 
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in the US. The coercive, normative and mimetic pressures were found to be significant on both 
the early decision and late decision to adopt the GAAP. The authors further clarified that it is 
empirically difficult to distinguish the three forms of isomorphic pressures especially on how 
to operationalize the mimetic pressures. However, as stated by DiMaggio & Powell (1983), 
the three mechanisms are not always empirically distinct from each other. At the end of the 
study, the authors further stated that future studies may extend the institutional theory variables 
and incorporate a statistical model of decision-making process. 
 
Khadaroo (2005) applied institutional theory to examine the Private Finance Initiative (PFI) 
accounting standard process by reviewing documents of Accounting Standard Boards (ASB) 
of UK. The findings indicated that all the three institutional pressures exist in the standard 
setting process. For example, Treasury used the coercive power to urge public sector bodies to 
voice their opposition towards ASB’s exposure draft. The public sector bodies imitate decision 
making from one another, which refers to mimetic pressures. The study, however, only 
depends on the available information in deciding the variables beside no specific theoretical 
framework and empirical analysis to support the findings.  
 
Bovaird & Downe (2006) conducted a study to examine the choice or decision in local 
government modernisation agenda (LGMA) in the UK. The study revealed that the institutional 
isomorphism tended to influence the decision and the resistance to adopt LGMA by the local 
government. Central government through coercive pressures influenced the process of decision 
to make or buy in service provision. At the same time, the mimetic pressures existed when 
organisations within the field of local government shared and communicated to either adopt or 
reject such policies and practices. The study, however which used case studies and interview 
approach, was not empirically supported by statistical analysis. 
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2.4.1.2 Private sector 
 
Teo et al. (2003) used institutional theory to study the adoption of inter-organisational linkages 
in Singapore. The results showed that institutional theory explains adoption in terms of 
pressures exerted on the organisation to adopt, pressures that come variously from customers, 
suppliers, and competitors. The normative pressures consist of extent of adoption among 
customers, and participation in business, industry and associations are the strongest predictors 
among the institutional pressures. The authors claim that their study is the first that conducted 
systematic tests of a fundamental linkage between institutional theory and adoption studies. 
The theoretical model of the study (Figure 2-4) shows the operationalization of the institutional 
pressures. 
 
Figure 2-4: Theoretical Model by Teo et al. (2003) 
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Khalifa & Davison (2006) investigated the intention to adopt electronic trading systems by the 
small-medium enterprise (SME) in Hong Kong. The study used a survey and semi-structured 
interview towards brokerages and managers. All the three institutional pressures of customers 
(coercive), employees (normative), and competitors (mimetic) were significant on the intention 
to adopt. The use of employees in their study is categorised both as internal pressures and 
normative pressures as shown in Figure 2.5. 
 
 
Figure 2-5: Theoretical Model by Khalifa & Davison (2006) 
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A study by Henderson et al. (2011) investigated the influence of environmental factors on 
organisation’s intention to adopt the XBRL in the US as depicted in Figure 2-6.. The study 
employed a survey to Chief Information Officer and Chief Financial Officer in 52 companies. 
The instrument measurement is adapted from Teo et al. (2003) and analysed using Partial Least 
Squares regression. The findings showed that mimetic and normative pressures were 
significant to the intention to use XBRL. The coercive pressure, however, is not significant 
due to the low adaption of XBRL by the trading partner at the time of data collection.  
 
Figure 2-6: Theoretical Model by Henderson et al. (2011) 
 
 
The selection of organisational intention studies on the institutional theory based was derived 
from both the public sector and private sector within the accounting and information systems 
context. It is found that the studies particularly in the private sector did provide a diagram of 
their conceptual/theoretical framework as compared to the public sector particularly in 
information systems disciplines. Additionally, the studies in the private sector had more 
advanced statistical test for data analysis. However, both studies in the private and public sector 
were able to distinguish the variables related to isomorphism which was very important in 
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Mimetic 
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guiding this study. In particular, studies from the private sector were examined as depicted in 
Table 2.9 due to the following reasons: 
i. similar practical focus in terms of how to operationalise institutional theory 
ii. particularly good or important paper theoretically or methodology as a foundation of 
this study 
 
2.5 Summary 
 
Like other types of organisation, it is important to counter fraud, particularly in the public sector 
context. The current detection and prevention method could be improved by utilising truly 
professional and specialist skills such as forensic accounting services. Within English local 
authorities’ context, institutional environment plays an important role towards eradicating 
fraud problems. Thus, the application of institutional theory could provide an understanding on 
the organisational change towards using external forensic accounting services. In order to 
investigate the factors that contribute to the intention to use forensic accounting services, the 
current research attempts to develop a comprehensive theoretical framework which will be 
discussed in Chapter 3. The next chapter will describe the development of hypotheses and 
identify the individual constructs in the proposed conceptual framework. 
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Table 2-9: Selected Institutional Theory Studies 
No  Authors/Title/Publication/ 
Country/Sector 
Objectives of the Study and 
the Related Variables  
Methodology Analysis 
Techniques  
Result  Comments / Gaps  
   
Res. design  Sample  Instrument  
   
1 Lawrence (1999) 
 
Institutional strategy 
 
Canada  
 
Private sector 
 
 
 
 
Objectives: To describe 
patterns of organizational 
action directed toward 
managing the institutional 
structures  
Variables: IV-Coercive 
pressures: Customers, 
Normative pressures: 
Employees, Mimetic 
pressures: Competitors  
Others: Feasibility and 
desirability  
DV: The intention to adopt 
electronic trading systems 
(ETS)  
Semi- 
structured 
interview 
22 
practitioners 
in forensic 
accounting 
industry 
Chewos, 
Benbasat 
and Dexter 
(2001), 
Shapero 
and Sokol 
(1982) 
 
Using a 7 
point Likert 
scale 
Quantitative 
NUD*IST 
Coercive, 
normative and 
mimetic pressures 
are significant 
Future studies could 
distinguish between 
internal normative 
pressures and 
external normative 
pressures 
 
Future studies could 
enhance by 
examining the 
benefits of adoption 
2 Carpenter & Feroz (2001) 
 
Institutional theory and 
accounting rule choice: an 
analysis of four US state 
governments' decisions to 
adopt generally accepted 
accounting principles 
 
US 
 
Public sector 
Objectives: To explore how 
institutional pressures, 
influence the decision to adopt 
or resist the use of generally 
accepted accounting principles 
(GAAP) 
Variables: IV-Coercive 
pressures: Representatives of 
credit markets, federal 
government, organizational 
politics, Normative pressures: 
participation of key accounting 
bureaucrats in professional 
accounting organisations 
Professional body (GFOA), 
Mimetic pressures: Other state 
government, Others: Fiscal 
stress, support of key 
appointed and/or elected 
Cross analysis 
study 
Structured and 
unstructured 
interview 
Archival 
documents 
Four state 
government: 
New York, 
Michigan, 
Ohio, 
Delaware 
Adapted 
from the 
validated 
instruments 
of Meyer 
and Rowan 
(1977), 
DiMaggio 
and Powell 
(1983), 
Yin (1984)  
Replication 
logic  
Quantitative  
Coercive pressure 
effect in the early 
decision to adopt 
GAAP 
 
Normative and 
mimetic pressure 
(no compelling 
evidence) affects 
the late adoption 
of GAAP 
 
Institutional 
variables provide 
better insights 
rather than 
economic 
variables  
Empirically, difficult 
to distinguish the 
three forms of 
isomorphic pressures  
 
 
Future studies may 
be aware of how to 
operationalize 
mimetic pressures 
variables 
 
Future studies may 
extend the 
institutional theory 
variables and have a 
statistical model of 
decision-making 
process 
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No  Authors/Title/Publication/ 
Country/Sector 
Objectives of the Study and 
the Related Variables  
Methodology Analysis 
Techniques  
Result  Comments / Gaps  
   
Res. design  Sample  Instrument  
   
officials, change in elected 
leadership, size, DV: Decision 
to adopt GAAP 
 
. 
 
3 Hussain & Gunasekaran 
(2002) 
 
An institutional perspective 
of non-financial 
management accounting 
measures: a review of the 
financial services industry 
 
US 
 
Private and public sector 
Objectives: To investigate the 
practice of non-financial 
performance measurement 
(NPFM) using institutional 
theory 
 Variables:IV-Coercive 
pressures: Association and 
Central Bank’s regulation and 
control, 
Socioeconomic/political 
institution’s requirement, 
regulation and condition, 
Normative pressures: 
Management’s competence 
Management’s strategic 
orientation 
Mimetic pressures: Integration 
of management accounting 
system and copying best 
practice performance 
measurement system, Others: 
Economic condition., political 
regulatory, organisational 
characteristics: Competition 
DV: Non-financial 
management accounting 
practices 
 
Case study 
Asemi 
structured 
interview 
Archival 
document 
review: 
Corporate 
plans, annual 
reports, 
booklets, 
relevant 
official 
publication 
 
Four banks 
and financial 
institutions 
 
Senior 
managers and 
executives in 
accounting 
departments 
Basic 
conceptual 
framework 
drawn from 
Di Maggio 
and Powell 
(1991), 
Meyer and 
Rowan 
(1977) 
 
Not stated 
Descriptive 
All the 
institutional 
pressures had an 
impact on NPFM 
Suggest to test the 
model in other types 
of service 
organisations 
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No  Authors/Title/Publication/ 
Country/Sector 
Objectives of the Study and 
the Related Variables  
Methodology Analysis 
Techniques  
Result  Comments / Gaps  
   
Res. design  Sample  Instrument  
   
4 Teo et. al. (2003) 
 
Predicting intention to 
adopt inter-organizational 
linkages: an institutional 
perspective 
 
Singapore 
 
Private sector 
Objectives: To examine the 
factors on the intention to 
adopt 
Inter-organisational systems -
financial electronic data 
interchange (FEDI) 
Variables: IV- Coercive 
pressures: Perceived 
dominance of supplier 
adopters, perceived dominance 
of customer's adopters, 
conformity with the parent 
corporation’s practices, 
Normative pressures: extent of 
adoption among suppliers, 
extent of adoption among 
customers, participation in 
industry, business, and trade 
associations 
Others: Organization size, IT 
department size, float 
management practice, extent 
of EDI applications 
implementation, DV: Intention 
to adopt FEDI 
A survey  
 
Short 
interviews 
3,6063 of top 
level 
executives 
(CEO, CIO, 
CFO) 
 
15 finance 
managers for 
interview 
Adapted 
from the 
validated 
instruments 
of 
Palmer et 
al. (1993) , 
Pfeffer and 
Salancik 
(1978), 
DiMaggio 
and Powell 
(1983), 
Azjen and 
Fishbein 
(1980)  
Using a 7 
point Likert 
scale 
Confirmatory 
factor 
analyses 
(LISREL) 
Partial least 
squares 
All three 
institutional 
pressures had a 
very significant 
influence except 
perceived extent 
of adoption 
among suppliers 
sub construct 
 
Normative 
pressures is the 
strongest factor 
The first study that 
conducts systematic 
tests of a 
fundamental linkage 
between institutional 
theory and adoption 
studies. 
 
Be able to clearly 
distinguish the three 
institutional 
pressures 
conceptually and 
empirically on their 
influence on 
intention to adopt. 
 
Support the 
applicability of 
institutional theory 
for early stage of 
diffusion. 
5 Khadaroo ( 2005) 
 
An institutional theory 
perspective on the UK's 
Private Finance Initiative 
(PFI) 
accounting standard setting 
process 
 
UK 
 
Public sector 
Objectives: To examine the 
PFI accounting standard 
setting process from an 
institutional theory perspective 
Variables: IV-Coercive 
pressures: Treasury, Audit 
Commission 
National Audit Office, 
Normative pressures: Public 
accounting firms, trade 
associations, academicians, 
professional bodies, Mimetic 
Reviewing 
comments 
made by the 
various 
interest groups 
of the 
Accounting 
Standard 
Boards (ASB) 
5 interest 
groups: 
Public sector 
Private sector  
contractors 
and investor 
Consultants 
Professional 
bodies and 
academia 
 
 
DiMaggio 
and Powell 
(1983), 
Oliver 
(1991) 
 
 
 
 
Not stated All pressures exist 
in the standard 
setting process 
 
Treasury used the 
coercive power to 
urge public sector 
bodies to voice 
their opposition to 
ASB’s ED 
 
Variables used 
limited to the ones 
that are publicly 
available 
 
Need to develop a 
specific theoretical 
framework and 
empirical analysis to 
enhance the findings 
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No  Authors/Title/Publication/ 
Country/Sector 
Objectives of the Study and 
the Related Variables  
Methodology Analysis 
Techniques  
Result  Comments / Gaps  
   
Res. design  Sample  Instrument  
   
pressures: Among the 
participants (groups), DV: 
Decision to adopt GAAP 
Public sector 
bodies done 
through 
plagiarizing from 
one another 
(mimetic) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6 Touron (2005) 
 
An analysis in the decision 
to adopt US GAAP by 
French firms before the 
creation of the International 
Accounting Standard 
Committee  
 
France 
 
Private sector 
Objectives: To explain why 
US GAAP was adopted by 
French firms  
 
Variables: IV- Coercive 
pressures: The State, capital 
supplier, Normative pressures: 
Auditors, the Stock exchanges, 
Mimetic pressures: 
Multinational firms, DV: The 
decision to adopt US GAAP 
Comparative 
case studies 
 
3 companies 
 
 Eisenhardt 
(1989), Yin 
(1994) 
 
Descriptive  Normative 
pressures of 
auditors and 
mimetic pressure 
of imitation 
contribute to the 
adoption 
 
Coercive pressure is 
not significant due to 
the environment that 
is not regulated by 
the law 
7 Bovaird & Downe (2006) 
 
N Generations of Reform in 
UK Local Government: 
Compliance and Resistance 
to Institutional Pressures 
 
UK 
 
Public sector 
Objectives:To examine the 
choice in local government 
modernisation agenda 
(LGMA) 
 
Variables: IV: Isomorphism 
pressures, DV: Compliance 
and resistance of reform in UK 
local government 
Case studies 
Archival 
document 
review 
Semi-
structured 
interviews 
Leading 
politician, the 
chief 
executive, and 
other 
directors, 
heads of 
strategy and 
policy, senior 
staff leading 
Basic 
conceptual 
framework 
drawn from 
Di Maggio 
and Powell 
(1983) 
 
Not stated 
Qualitative 
and 
descriptive 
Evidence of a 
trend to 
isomorphism in 
English local 
government by 
central 
government to 
create change in 
make-buy 
The institutional 
isomorphism tends 
to influence on the 
decision and the 
resistance to adapt 
LGMA 
 
Demonstrate that the 
organisational 
resistance can be 
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No  Authors/Title/Publication/ 
Country/Sector 
Objectives of the Study and 
the Related Variables  
Methodology Analysis 
Techniques  
Result  Comments / Gaps  
   
Res. design  Sample  Instrument  
   
innovation 
activities, and 
a range of 
external 
stakeholders 
such as 
police, 
voluntary 
groups, and 
community 
groups 
decisions in 
service provision 
 
Organisations 
within the field of 
English local 
government 
shared and 
communicated 
such as resistance 
to adopt policies 
and practices 
examined not only in 
‘old institutionalism’ 
but also using ‘new 
institutionalism’/neo-
institutionalist  
8 Tsamenyi et. al. (2006) 
 
Changes in accounting and 
financial information 
system in a Spanish 
electricity company: A new 
institutional theory analysis  
 
Spain 
 
Private sector 
Objectives: To investigate 
changes in the accounting and 
financial 
information system of a large 
Spanish electricity company  
Variables:IV-Coercive 
pressures: Regulatory bodies 
and Head Office 
Normative pressures: 
Professional group, Others: 
Market forces 
Intra-organisational power 
relations, 
DV: Changes in the 
accounting and financial 
information systems 
A longitudinal 
case study  
Semi 
structured 
interviews 
Analysis of 
documents 
such as 
internal 
bulletin, 
annual reports 
Triangulation 
approach 
 
Sevillana 
Company 
 
Otley and 
Berry 
(1994), 
Bonache 
(1999), Yin 
(1989), 
Zilber 
(2002) 
 
Descriptive  Focus on the 
interplay between 
institutional 
factors, market 
forces and intra-
organisational 
power relations 
 
Coercive pressure 
of the regulatory 
environment, 
normative group 
of professional 
group and market 
forces may affect 
the decision to 
change  
Limited to a single 
case study 
 
Future studies may 
include more 
company for 
generalizability  
9 Khalifa & Davison (2006) 
 
SME Adoption of IT: The 
Case of 
Electronic Trading Systems 
 
Hong Kong  
Objectives: To explain the 
intention of small medium-
sized enterprise (SME) 
brokerages to adopt electronic 
trading systems (ETS)  
Variables:IV-Coercive 
pressures: Customers, 
Semi- 
structured 
interview 
 
A survey 
20 managers 
 
500 
brokerages 
Chewos, 
Benbasat 
and Dexter 
(2001), 
Shapero 
and Sokol 
(1982) 
Partial Least 
Squares 
regression 
Coercive, 
normative and 
mimetic pressures 
are significant 
Future studies could 
distinguish between 
internal normative 
pressures and 
external normative 
pressures 
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No  Authors/Title/Publication/ 
Country/Sector 
Objectives of the Study and 
the Related Variables  
Methodology Analysis 
Techniques  
Result  Comments / Gaps  
   
Res. design  Sample  Instrument  
   
 
Private sector 
Normative pressures: 
Employees, Mimetic 
pressures: Competitors, 
Others: Feasibility, 
desirability, DV- The intention 
to adopt electronic trading 
systems (ETS)  
 
Using a 7 
point Likert 
scale 
Future studies could 
enhance by 
examining the 
benefits of adoption 
 
 
 
10 Ashworth et. al. (2007) 
 
Escape from the Iron Cage? 
Organizational Change and 
Isomorphic Pressures in the 
Public Sector 
 
UK 
 
Public sector 
Objectives: To evaluate 
whether organizational change 
in the public sector is 
consistent with institutional 
perspective 
Variables: IV- Coercive 
pressures: Central government, 
Normative pressures: Audit 
Commission and  
Improvement and 
Development Agency (IDeA), 
Mimetic pressures: Local 
councils, DV- Organisational 
change 
An electronic 
survey 
 
 
 
101 local 
councils 
 
Total 
respondents 
are 1,245 
(2002) and 
1,245 (2004) 
of Chief 
Executive, 
Head of Paid 
Service  
Boyne, 
Martin and 
Walker 
(2004), 
Boyne and 
Walker 
(2004) 
 
Using a 7 
point Likert 
scale 
 
Mean, 
coefficient 
 
Descriptive 
Institutional 
pressures may be 
strong in a 
centralized state 
such as the UK 
and on a set 
highly structured 
organisation such 
as local 
authorities 
Be able to 
distinguish between 
two definitions of 
conformity 
(compliance and 
convergence) 
 
Future studies could 
empirically test on 
the other practices 
 
Not supported with 
extensive statistical 
test 
11 Falkman & Tagesson 
(2008) 
 
Accrual accounting does 
not necessarily mean 
accrual accounting: Factors 
that counteract compliance 
with accounting standards 
in Swedish municipal 
accounting 
 
Sweden 
 
Public sector 
Objectives:To describe and 
explain the impact of the 
legislation and standard setting 
in the Swedish municipal 
sector 
Variables:IV- Coercive 
pressures: Central government 
and political majority, 
Normative pressures: Auditing 
firm, Mimetic pressures: 
Auditing firms, Others: Size, 
time, turnover ,total of 
government grant 
DV- Decision to adopt GAAP 
Triangulation 
approach 
An online 
survey 
Documentary 
study 
Interviews 
290 of 
financial 
directors of 
the 
municipalities 
 
12 financial 
managers for 
interviews 
 
DiMaggio 
and Powell 
(1983), 
Oliver 
(1991) 
 
Correlation 
matrix 
t-Test  
Pearson Chi-
square test 
Bivariate test 
Multiple and 
linear 
regression 
Compliance with 
accounting 
standards is low 
 
Institutional 
variables (audit 
firms) explain that 
large 
municipalities 
perform better 
than medium and 
small 
municipalities 
 
More research is 
needed in order to 
develop a theoretical 
framework that 
focuses on municipal 
accounting 
 
The need for more 
process-oriented 
research about 
standard setting and 
implementation of 
accounting practices 
in a municipal 
context 
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No  Authors/Title/Publication/ 
Country/Sector 
Objectives of the Study and 
the Related Variables  
Methodology Analysis 
Techniques  
Result  Comments / Gaps  
   
Res. design  Sample  Instrument  
   
Government 
grants and 
political majority 
not significant 
 
 
 
12 Williams, Lueg, Taylor, & 
Cook (2009) 
 
Why all the changes?: An 
institutional theory 
approach to exploring the 
drivers of supply chain 
security (SCS) 
 
US 
Private sector 
Objectives: To identify and 
explore the environmental 
drivers that motivate firms to 
engage in supply chain 
security 
Variables: IV-Coercive 
pressures: Government and 
customers 
Normative pressures: Society 
Mimetic pressures: 
Competitors 
DV-The decision to engage in 
supply chain security, Others: 
Industry types 
A semi 
structured 
interview 
17 managers 
worked in a 
supply chain 
management 
environment  
Not stated Qualitative  All the variables 
create pressures 
for firms to 
engage in supply 
chain security  
Suggested to have 
empirical testing for 
enhanced analysis 
part 
13 Ugrin ( 2009) 
 
The Effect of System 
Characteristics, Stage of 
Adoption, and Experience 
on Institutional 
Explanations for ERP 
Systems Choice 
 
US 
 
Private sector 
Objectives: To examine the 
intention to adopt Enterprise 
Resource Planning (ERP) 
Variables: IV- Coercive 
pressures: Dominance of 
supplier adopters, dominance 
of customer's adopters and 
parent companies, Normative 
pressures: Extent of adoption 
among suppliers and extent of 
adoption among customers 
Mimetic pressures: Extent of 
adoption among competitors 
and success of competitor 
adopters 
DV: Intention to adopt ERP 
system 
A survey 83 CIOS, 
CEOs, CFOs, 
and materials 
managers 
Adapted 
from the 
validated 
instruments 
of 
Teo et al 
(2003) and 
Azjen & 
Fishbein 
(1980) 
Using a 7 
point Likert 
scale 
Regression 
analyses 
 
Correlation 
matrix 
Mimetic and 
normative 
pressures 
influence ERP 
adoption 
decisions 
Coercive 
pressures not 
significant due to 
respondents 
worked in their 
parent companies  
Future studies can 
include other factors 
within an 
organisation that 
may influence 
adoption decisions. 
 
Only focus on 
adoption intention 
not adoption 
decisions. 
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No  Authors/Title/Publication/ 
Country/Sector 
Objectives of the Study and 
the Related Variables  
Methodology Analysis 
Techniques  
Result  Comments / Gaps  
   
Res. design  Sample  Instrument  
   
14 Henderson et.al. ( 2011) 
 
Understanding the Intention 
to Adopt XBRL: An 
Environmental 
Perspective 
 
US 
 
Private sector 
Objectives: To investigate the 
influence of perceptions of 
environmental factors on an 
organisation’s intention to 
adopt Extensible Business 
Reporting Language (XBRL)  
Variables: IV- Coercive 
pressures: Trading partners, 
Normative pressures: Auditors, 
Professional bodies, Mimetic 
pressures: Multinational firms, 
Others: Network externalities, 
Related technologies, DV: The 
decision to adopt XBRL 
A survey 
 
52 companies 
of CIO and 
CFO 
 
 Netemeyer 
et al. 
(2003), Teo 
et al. 
(2003), 
Ugrin 
(2009) 
 
Partial Least 
Squares 
regression 
Mimetic pressures 
and normative 
pressures are 
significant 
 
Coercive pressure 
of trading partner 
is not significant 
due to the practice 
of XBRL not at 
the peak at the 
time of data 
collection 
Future studies could 
use the model to 
investigate other 
adoption practices 
and focus on the lack 
of adoption 
15 Zheng et. al. (2012) 
 
E-government adoption in 
public administration 
organizations: integrating 
institutional theory 
perspective and resource-
based view 
 
China 
 
Public sector 
Objectives: To investigate the 
adoption of government-to 
government (G2G) 
information system public 
administration organisations 
by top management committee 
(TMC) 
Variables: IV- Coercive 
pressures: Superior 
organisations, Normative 
pressures: User, Mimetic 
pressures: Peer organisations, 
Other: 
Top management commitment, 
financial resources and IT 
human resources, DV: 
Adoption intention of G2G 
A survey 148 senior 
executives of 
public 
administration 
organisations 
Adapted 
from the 
validated 
instruments 
of 
Teo et al 
(2003) and 
Azjen & 
Fishbein 
(1980) 
Using a 7 
point Likert 
scale 
Structural 
equation 
modelling 
Partial least 
squares 
Coercive and 
normative 
pressures 
influence TMC 
and internal 
resources to adopt 
G2G 
 
Mimetic pressures 
do not influence 
TMC but 
indirectly 
influence TMC 
via coercive 
pressures 
Developed 
measurements for the 
three institutional 
pressures as 
formative constructs 
and suggested future 
studies to advance 
the measurement 
16 Ramakrishnan, Jones, & 
Sidorova (2012) 
 
Factors influencing 
business intelligence (BI) 
Objectives: 
To examine external pressures 
that influence the relationship 
between an organisation’s 
business intelligence (IB) data 
A survey 
document 
review 
63 
information 
technology 
professionals 
Adapted 
from the 
validated 
instruments 
of 
Exploratory 
and 
confirmatory 
factor 
analyses 
Isomorphism 
pressures 
influence 
organisations to 
adopt BI to 
Extend existing 
research on how 
organisations 
approach data-
related decisions in 
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No  Authors/Title/Publication/ 
Country/Sector 
Objectives of the Study and 
the Related Variables  
Methodology Analysis 
Techniques  
Result  Comments / Gaps  
   
Res. design  Sample  Instrument  
   
data collection strategies: 
An empirical investigation 
 
US 
 
Private sector 
collection strategy and the 
purpose for which BI is 
implemented. 
Variables: 
IV: Isomorphism pressures 
and competitive pressures 
DV: Adoption of BI 
Semi-
structured 
interviews 
and top level 
managers 
Liang et al. 
(2007) –
institutional 
theory 
Hwang, Ku 
and Yen 
(2004), 
Zhu, Dong 
et al. 
(2006) and 
Thong 
(1999)-
competitive 
pressures  
 
Partial least 
squares 
achieve 
consistency of 
data 
system 
implementations. 
 
Future studies can 
include internal 
factors such as 
technical issues, 
organizational 
infrastructure, and 
resource constraints. 
 
 
17 Yoon & George ( 2013) 
 
US 
Private sector 
Objectives: To identify the 
factors that influence 
organizational intent to adopt 
virtual worlds 
Variables: IV- Coercive 
pressures: Customers, 
Normative pressures: 
Suppliers, Associations and 
Professional bodies, Mimetic 
pressures: Competitors, 
Others: 
Top management support, 
organizational size, 
organizational readiness, firm 
scope, competition, 
compatibility, security concern 
and relative advantage, DV: 
Organizations’ intention to 
adopt  
An online 
survey 
A secondary 
data (Hoovers 
Company 
Information 
Database)  
Members of 
information 
system 
professional 
associations 
 
Adapted 
from the 
validated 
instruments 
of 
Son and 
Benbasat, 
(2007), 
Khalifa & 
Davidson 
(2006)  
Partial least 
squares 
approach 
(confirmatory 
factor 
analysis) to 
structural 
equation 
modelling 
Relates to 
institutional 
theory factors 
Mimetic pressure 
and normative 
pressures were 
significant 
 
Both mimetic and 
normative pressures 
are key predictors on 
the intention to adopt 
as had a stronger 
effect compared to 
other variables. 
Future studies may 
use additional 
variables to further 
explain the 
organisation’s 
intention 
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No  Authors/Title/Publication/ 
Country/Sector 
Objectives of the Study and 
the Related Variables  
Methodology Analysis 
Techniques  
Result  Comments / Gaps  
   
Res. design  Sample  Instrument  
   
18.  Ahrens & Ferry (2016) 
 
UK 
Public sector 
Objectives: To explore how 
local government act as an 
institutional entrepreneur 
Variables: IV- Rules, 
teleoaffective structure, 
practice memory and cultural 
memory 
DV: Changes of organisational 
practices 
A field study 
of budgeting 
of Newcastle 
City Council 
Interviews of 
50 officers, 
observation 
and 
documentation 
review 
Officers of 
Newcastle 
City Council 
N/A N/A Teleoaffective 
structures and 
practice memory 
were significant 
factors in 
institutional 
change 
Agents in this case a 
local government can 
be both agents and 
marginal at the same 
time. 
Future studies could 
relate the impacts on 
the austerity 
measures taken by 
central government 
19. Modell (2012) 
 
Sweden 
Public Sector 
Objectives: To understand 
how management control is 
implicated in the 
institutionalisation of the 
notion of strategy 
Variables: IV- Coercive 
pressures: Political regulation 
and Normative pressures: 
Management control practices 
DV: Strategy formation 
Extant 
empirical 
research and 
archival data  
 
Interviews of 
19 
respondents 
Swedish 
central 
government 
of the 
Swedish 
National 
Board of 
Student Aid 
(SNBSA) 
N/A A systematic 
for 
respondents 
validation 
Thematic 
coding and 
pattern 
matching 
Regulatory 
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CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH MODEL AND HYPHOTHESES 
 
This chapter develops the research conceptual framework, hypotheses and theoretical issues 
related to the factors that influence the decision to use forensic accounting services to detect 
and prevent fraud within English local authorities. In the first section, an overview of an initial 
model of organisational intention to use forensic accounting services is described. The 
following sections explore the key factors identified that represent variables in the model. In 
order to address the research questions, fourteen hypotheses both on institutional theory based 
and other salient factors are developed. Then, the operationalisation of the control variables for 
this study is discussed. Thereafter, a conclusion of the chapter is presented.  
 
3.1 Research Model  
 
The literature reveals that institutional theory has a significant insight regarding the importance 
of institutional environments to organisational structures and actions (e.g. Ahrens & Ferry, 
2016; Arroyo, 2012; Ashworth et al., 2007; Baker, Bédard, & Prat, 2014; Brammer, Jackson, 
& Matten, 2011; Carpenter & Feroz, 2001; Currie, 2012; Currie & Guah, 2007; Griffith, 
Hammersley, & Kadous, 2015; Heikkilä, 2013; Henderson et al., 2011; Jensen et al., 2009; 
Kipping & Kirkpatrick, 2013; Lapsley & Pallot, 2000; Macfarlane et al., 2013; Messerschmidt 
& Hinz, 2013; Petracci & Rammal, 2014; Pilcher, 2011; Sharma, Lawrence, & Lowe, 2010; 
Tolbert & Zucker, 1983; Villadsen, Hansen, & Mols, 2010). The intention of the decision to 
use forensic accounting services refers to an organisational innovation. According to Carpenter 
& Feroz (2001), organisational innovation concerns the adoption or intention of process that is 
considered new in terms of being different from the organisation’s own tradition. Thus, the 
intention of utilising forensic accounting services to detect and prevent fraud by English local 
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authorities that had previously employed traditional methods represents an organisational 
innovation. However, to the researcher’s knowledge, there is no research on the investigation 
of institutional variables and the intention to use forensic accounting services to detect and 
prevent fraud by local authorities. 
 
The central tenet of institutional theory posits that organisations encounter face pressures to 
compete for resources, political power, economic and social fitness, and customers with other 
organisations as avoiding the pressures may lead into question the organisation’s legitimacy 
and thus affect its ability to secure resources and social support (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; 
Tolbert & Zucker, 1996; Muthusamy, 2011). According to Burt (1987), organisations’ response 
to those pressures is to be isomorphic with their environment, which includes both 
interconnectedness and structural equivalence. Interconnectedness refers to inter-
organisational relations characterised by the existence of transactions tying organisations to 
one another, while structural equivalence refers to the occupying of a similar position in an 
inter-organisational network. The result to become similar in structure, forms, and process 
among the organisations’ field is defined as ‘institutional isomorphism’ (Ashworth et al., 
2005). Accordingly, as explained by DiMaggio & Powell (1983), the three types of isomorphic 
pressures referred to as coercive, mimetic, and normative can be distinguished in which 
coercive and normative pressures refer to the interconnected relations while mimetic pressures 
operate through structural equivalence listed as below: 
i. Coercive isomorphism- whereby impinging external factors (e.g. government policy, 
regulation, supplier relationship) exert force on organisations to adopt specific internal 
structure and procedures) 
ii. Mimetic isomorphism- whereby organisations emulate the internal structures and 
procedures adopted by other organisations 
iii. Normative isomorphism- whereby organisations adopt the structures and procedures 
advocated by particular dominant professions, professional bodies and/or consultants 
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(Moll et al., 2006) 
Additionally, the literature on fraud in English local authorities indicated that central 
government and other agencies such as the Audit Commission, the DWP, and the National 
Fraud Authority play a major role to provide assistance in reducing fraud (Audit Commission, 
2012b; Button, 2011; Home Office, 2012; Lane, 2011). The seriousness of fraud and the ability 
of forensic accounting to uncover and prevent fraud cases has been highlighted by e.g. 
Crumbley & Apostolou (2002); Gray (2008); Muthusamy (2011); Stanbury & Paley-Menzies 
(2010). Thus, the current research will integrate institutional variables, fraud perception 
variables, forensic accounting perception variables and internal control variables as underlying 
factors as shown in Figure 3-1. 
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Figure 3-1: Initial Research Model 
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The initial research model, illustrated in Figure 3-1, depicts an organisational intention model 
with utilisation or intention to use forensic accounting services. As highlighted in Teo et al. 
(2003, p. 27), most of the measures developed in empirical studies on institutional-based 
theories are too idiosyncratic to fit in the current research. Thus, conceptual definitions from 
the literature is analysed to develop the foundation of the research model. The variables drawn 
from the institutional theory represent the isomorphic pressures for change; coercive, mimetic, 
and normative: specifically, coercive pressures represented by central government, the Audit 
Commission, and media. Mimetic pressures are based on how a local authority perceived the 
used and the success in used forensic accounting by other local authorities, while normative 
pressures consist of professional bodies, associations, and stakeholders. In addition, other 
organisational factors identified include variables from studies on fraud and forensic 
accounting. The present research believes that combining organisational variables within the 
institutional framework and other salient factors can enhance the proposed model. The 
following describes a discussion of the related variables used in the initial research model.  
 
3.2 Variables in the Research Model 
 
This section examines the variables used in the research model. First, factors from coercive 
pressures were discussed, followed by mimetic pressures and normative pressures. Next, 
factors within forensic accounting perception, fraud perception, internal control, and control 
variables were highlighted. 
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3.2.1 Coercive Pressures 
 
Coercive pressures can be defined as ‘both formal and informal pressures exerted on 
organisations by other organisations upon which they are dependent and by the cultural 
expectations in the society within which organisation function’ (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, p. 
150). Empirical evidence revealed that coercive pressures on organisations may stem from a 
range of sources including resource-dominant organisations, and regulatory bodies. In other 
words, the role of central government might influence local authorities in the decision-making 
process either through legal coercion or voluntary diffusion (Oliver, 1991). According to 
Pfeffer & Salancik (1978), a dominant factor that controls scarce and vital resources may 
demand that organisations dependent on its adopt structures or programs that serve its interests, 
and these resource-dependent organisations may comply with the demands to secure their own 
survival. Local authorities, like firms, need resources from the environment to survive, for 
instance central government as a resource provider can impose power over the particular 
entities (Carpenter & Feroz, 2001).  
 
3.2.1.1 Central government and related agencies 
 
In the current research context, coercive pressures may primarily relate to the form of certain 
legislations, namely, Local Government Act (1999), Improvement and Development Agency 
(IDeA), and Best Value (Ashworth et al., 2007). The IDeA is a body under the LGA to support 
improvement and innovation in local government. The introduction of the Local Government 
Act (1999) and Best Value regime by central government entails a clear indication of changes 
in organisational structure, culture, strategy formulation processes, and strategy content: Boyne 
& Walker (2004); Vincent-Jones (2000), and emphasise the local governments’ statutory 
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obligations: Ashworth et al. (2007). Specifically, Button et.al (2007) acknowledged that the 
emergence of Counter Fraud Specialists (CFSs) in local governments is due to a range of 
initiatives by central government to counter social security fraud back in 1979 (p. 196).  
 
Recently, central government, through the DCLG, appointed PwC to carry out investigations 
on the allegations of poor governance and possible fraud of Tower Hamlets authority in 2014 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2014a). The findings of the report by PwC, among others, suggested 
that the authority ‘failed to comply with its best value duty’. As a result of the investigations, 
central government instructed commissioners to take control of grant making powers and to 
appoint key officers. In this scenario, the instructions by central government for the case to be 
investigated are referred to as coercive pressures. 
 
Additionally, the passage of the Fraud Act 2006, and the updated publication of the Fraud 
Review 2006 by central government needed a response from organisations to adopt strategies 
for detecting, investigating, and prosecuting fraud (Frimpong & Baker, 2007). At the same 
time, central government established the NFA as an executive agency. The NFA is responsible 
for increasing protection for the UK economy from consequences caused by fraud. Local 
authorities were among the partners working together with the NFA in order to prevent fraud. 
Since the establishment of the NFA, the estimation cost of fraud through a report ‘Annual 
Fraud Indicator’ was published in 2011 and 2012. The report contains data regarding the nature 
and extent of fraud across public and private sector including local authorities. Another 
government body that produced the estimation costs of fraud is the Department for Work and 
Pensions (DWP) particularly for benefit fraud such as housing benefit (National Fraud 
Authority, 2012a). Both reports of fraud by the NFA and the DWP indicated the extent of fraud 
within local authorities was significant and responses to counter fraud issues are vital.  
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As such, local authorities have intent to use forensic accounting services when there are 
pressures from central government either through implementation of certain policies or 
produced reports on the extent of fraud that require local authorities to combat fraud effectively. 
 
Thus, it is posited that; 
H1: Directives, rules, and policies (including initiatives and action plan) from central 
government and reports on fraud by the related government agencies will positively influence 
the intention of English local authorities to use forensic accounting services 
  
3.2.1.2 Audit Commission 
 
The role of the Audit Commission in the local government is governed by the Local 
Government Finance Act 1982 where the main responsibilities are as an external auditor, and 
appointing auditors from accounting firms to conduct audits (Audit Commission, 2012a). Apart 
from being an external auditor, the Audit Commission is also empowered by legal requirements 
to conduct inspection and assessment under Local Government Act 1999 (Gomes, 2006), and 
to perform the value for money (economy, efficiency, and effectiveness) of operational 
arrangements and accomplishments (McSweeney, 1988). The Audit Commission is recognised 
as the leading body working with local government to combat fraud and corruption (Audit 
Commission, 2012b). This can be evidenced through establishing the NFI, reporting on 
Protecting the Public Purse, and promoting best practice to counter fraud (Audit Commission, 
2012b). Under the Best Value regime, the Audit Commission is identified as being able to 
exercise influence in local government decision making (Gomes, 2006). Although the Audit 
Commission ceased their office in April 2015, its legacy to influence can be assured to 
continue. 
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Thus, it is posited that; 
H2: Reports on fraud and recommendations by the Audit Commission will positively influence 
the intention of English local authorities to use forensic accounting services 
 
3.2.1.3 Media 
 
The news media are one of the primary ways that the public learns about organisations, their 
activities and their connections to matters of public interest (Einwiller, Carroll, & Korn, 2010). 
In democratic systems (such as in the UK), media play a role as informal forum for political 
accountability (Bovens, 2007). According to Reiner (2007) media and crime analysts examine 
three correlated issues which are the content, consequences and cause of media representation 
of crime. Levi, 2006 stated that ‘crimes of deception treated by the mass media as extensions 
of infotainment’, such as individual and corporate celebrities in trouble, short fraud events 
(like identity fraud) connected to organized crime or terrorism or long-term concealment or 
fraud or business people/politicians to be hypocrites’ (p. 187).  
 
There are various key players in media coverage of financial crimes such as fraud; the victims, 
offenders, institutions of formal governance (police, prosecutors, regulators, and trials) but also 
third parties. The third parties include business pressure groups and trade associations, local 
and global corporates, NGOs, or even forensic accounting firms (Levi, 2006). Previous studies 
suggested that messages disseminated using mass media, such as television and newspaper, are 
likely to influence an adopter’s intention (Rogers, 1995). A study by Van Peursem & Balme 
(2010) analysed the role of the media towards the practice of quality and threat of 
disestablishment of the New Zealand Serious Fraud Office based on the institutional 
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perspective. The findings of the study show that media could be a powerful social and 
functional pressure for change. For example, the media in the UK highlighted news of fraud 
with the headline ‘Councils lose £7 million in false bank account scam’ (BBC News, 2016), 
‘Local taxpayers are being ripped off by fraud’, ‘Councils battle fraud deception’ and 
‘Councils battle fake housing and tax fraud’ (ITV News, 2012).  
 
In a case of allegations of poor governance that led to fraud investigations of Tower Hamlet 
authority, the intervention of central government and the findings of the investigations had 
been highlighted by media such as the Daily Mail, Telegraph, ITV, and BBC. The mentioned 
news headlines could provide a negative perception among the public or taxpayers toward the 
issues of fraud in a local authority. Hence, local authorities that are accountable to protect the 
public funds need to take a proactive measure to avoid the negative perception such as 
acquiring professional services of forensic accounting services. 
 
Thus, it is posited that; 
H3: News of fraud highlighted by the media will positively influence the intention of English 
local authorities to use forensic accounting services  
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3.2.2 Mimetic Pressures 
According to DiMaggio & Powell (1983), the mimetic pressures may result organisations to 
have similar practices of other organisations within their environment that they perceive to be 
more legitimate or successful. Cyert and March (1982) explain that ’the advantages of mimetic 
behaviour in the economy of human action are considerable; when an organisation faces a 
problem with ambiguous causes or unclear solutions, problematic search may yield a viable 
solution with little expense’ (as cited in DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, p. 151) or can result from 
efficient response to uncertainty (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). The actions to become like other 
organisations can be categorised into: imitating the organisations which have similar structure, 
strategy, resources, and constraints within the population, and imitating that refers to the 
perceived success of similar organisation that already adopted the practice (Haveman, 1993). 
3.2.2.1 Other local authorities 
A number of studies have found the evidence of mimetic change in examining the adoption of 
new forms, structures, and practices of organisations (Carpenter & Feroz, 2001; Khadaroo, 
2005; Teo et al., 2003; Tolbert & Zucker, 1983). In the context of the current research, the 
intention of local government to use forensic accounting services can be influenced by the 
extent of using forensic accounting services by other local authorities, and perceived success 
of other local authorities that had used forensic accounting services.  
Thus, it is posited that; 
H4: The extent and perceived success of using forensic accounting services by other local 
authorities will positively influence the intention of English local authorities to use forensic 
accounting services  
 
3.2.3 Normative Pressures 
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According to DiMaggio & Powell (1983), normative pressures stem ‘primarily from 
professionalisation’ leading to a similar form. Professionals initiate changes in the 
organisations ‘which are a direct result of what they believe are accepted modes and rules of 
behaviour’ (James, 2009, p. 366). The modes and rules of behaviour are being promulgated to 
the professional through education and/or through membership of professional societies 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Similarly, Maingot (2006) acknowledged that normative pressure 
represents the influence of normal standards of professionalism, the adoption of up to date, and 
effective techniques by a professional community. Thus, the diffusion of new practices and 
information exchange within organisations may be facilitated by the professional networks 
within an organisational environment (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Accounting studies 
advocate that the normative pressure of professional roles is a determinant of accounting 
system developments in the public sector (Järvinen, 2006; Kurunmaki, Lapsley, & Melia, 
2003). 
 
3.2.3.1 Professional bodies and associations 
 
In the current research context, the CIPFA, and the Public Risk Management Association 
(Alarm) are among the professional bodies and associations which had a direct relationship 
with local government, respectively (Lane, 2011). The CIPFA which specialised in the public 
services has the responsibility to set the accounting standard for local government (CIPFA, 
2008a), and has established a good practice for local government to counter fraud strategies 
together with the Audit Commission (Lane, 2011). Alarm is the public risk management 
association providing the best practice for the UK public services including local government 
(Alarm, 2012). Both the CIPFA and Alarm also highlight the importance of sufficient 
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investments in counter fraud function, professionalising investigators, and intelligence 
development and sharing (Lane, 2011). 
 
Another professional body, the ICFS is one of the first qualification based counter fraud 
professional bodies in the UK which gave the CFS accreditation (Frimpong & Baker, 2007). 
The ICAEW is the only professional body in the UK catering for Forensic Accountant 
Accreditation on voluntarily basis (ICAEW, 2012a). Apart from this, a number of related 
associations within local authorities include the LGA, the Society of Local Authority Chief 
Executives (SOLACE), Alarm, and LAIOG. Accordingly, institutional theory suggested that 
the normative pressures to use forensic accounting services by the local government may stem 
from the professional education or membership, the existence of associations in the network 
environment, and the interaction of organisation-supplier (Teo et al., 2003) that ‘span 
government organisations and promote specific financial management practices’ (Carpenter 
& Feroz, 2001, p. 570). 
 
Thus, it is posited that; 
H5: Recommendations by the professional bodies and associations to effectively detect and 
prevent fraud will positively influence the intention of English local authorities to use forensic 
accounting services. 
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3.2.3.2 Forensic accounting services providers 
 
Previous institutional theory studies e.g., Teo et al. (2003) and Yoon & George (2013) found 
that pressures from supplier were a significant predictor of innovation adoption. For the 
purposes of this study, forensic accounting providers, which act as a potential supplier to local 
authorities, published articles and reports on the extent of fraud, promoted their services, and 
had the expertise and capabilities to detect and prevent fraud. For example, the Big Four 
accounting firms of KPMG, PricewaterhouseCoopers, Deloitte and EY frequently promoted 
their services through seminar/courses, news and articles in journals/magazines, and reports of 
fraud based on their survey. Additionally, accounting firms like PKF collaborated with the 
University of Portsmouth to publish fraud report specifically in local authorities context (Gee 
et al., 2012). 
 
Thus, it is posited that; 
H6: The reports on frauds and the promotion of forensic accounting services in the market by 
the forensic accounting services providers together with their expertise and capabilities to 
perform forensic accounting will positively influence the intention of English local authorities 
to use forensic accounting services. 
 
3.2.3.3 Stakeholders 
 
Stakeholders can be defined as ‘any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the 
achievement of an organisation’s purpose’ (Freeman, 1984, p. 46). The definition of 
stakeholder by Freeman (1984) was the most classic and commonly used in various studies 
(Clement, 2005). Later, Freeman defined stakeholders as ‘those groups who are vital to the 
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survival and success of the corporation’ (Freeman, 2002, p. 41). Within the institutional theory, 
it is argued that stakeholder engagement is important for organisations to seek social legitimacy 
(Sarkis, Gonzalez-Torre, & Adenso-Diaz, 2010). In the context of English local government, 
the stakeholders include the management, councillors, local business, and local residents 
(Gomes, 2006). For example, the taxpayers or local residents may find information on the 
seriousness of fraud from news and the consequences of fraud might affect the public services 
received. Hence, this group of stakeholders could pressure their respective local authority 
accountable to protect taxpayers’ money by having forensic accounting services to detect and 
prevent fraud. 
 
Thus, it is posited that; 
H7: Pressures from stakeholders will positively influence the intention of English local 
authorities to use forensic accounting services 
 
3.2.4 Forensic Accounting Perception Factors 
 
This section describes factors related to the forensic accounting perception consisting of 
perceived benefits, costs to acquire the services, and perceived risk of using forensic accounting 
services. 
3.2.4.1 Perceived benefits of forensic accounting services 
 
Perceived benefits of forensic accounting refer to the perceived foreseeable benefits that drive 
local government in using forensic accounting services to detect and prevent fraud. Forensic 
accountants can be used as a tool in dealing with fraud detection and investigation due to the 
limitation in fraud detection by the auditor (Apostolou & Crumbley, 2005; Digabriele, 2008), 
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and providing expertise in computer forensic to counter computer based fraud or cybercrime 
(Pearson & Singleton, 2008). The examples of benefits of forensic accounting include being 
able to effectively evaluate the internal control systems, setting up fraud prevention systems, 
investigating forms of fraud (Ramaswamy, 2005). As suggested by Gee et al. (2011), Smith 
(2005) and Apostolou & Crumbley (2005), fraud risk assessments are essential to identify 
potential fraud threats and weaknesses in controls or can act as a first line defence, although 
preventive measures cannot guarantee that fraud will not be committed. As such, the use of 
forensic accounting services will considerably deter fraud within organisations (Muthusamy, 
2011).  
 
The UK central government emphasized among others, to improve asset tracing or recovery in 
the event of fraud (Home Office, 2011) which can be a difficult and lengthy process. A 
qualified fraud investigator that possesses skills and knowledge and adopts good practice could 
have impact on the identification, detection and recovery rates (Audit Commission, 2012b). 
According to Ibex & Grippo (2011), fraud investigation by forensic accounting services often 
involves fund or money tracing, asset identification and recovery. The providers of forensic 
accounting services such as PKF (UK) LLP claim that their staff had substantial experience in 
fraud investigations and considerable experience working with related bodies such as the 
Serious Fraud Office, National Crime Squad, Financial Services Authority and the Crown 
Prosecution Services.  
 
Thus, similar to a study by Muthusamy (2011), it is posited that; 
 H8: Perceived benefits of forensic accounting will positively influence the intention of English 
local authorities to use forensic accounting services  
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3.2.4.2 Costs to acquire forensic accounting services 
 
A related forensic audit is not only time consuming but includes significantly higher costs 
compared to normal audit (Apostolou & Crumbley, 2008; Muthusamy, 2011). This is due to 
the extent of the forensic audit that determines the expense to be incurred, which can be 
exorbitant (Grippo & Ibex, 2003, Muthusamy, 2011). For example, the 2001 and 2002 financial 
statement fraud of HealthSouth, the leading providers of healthcare in the US incurred a total 
of $276.8 million for the total forensic accounting services fees (Apostolou & Crumbley, 2008; 
Muthusamy, 2011). Previous studies on the decision to outsource ( e.g. Gewald & Dibbern, 
2009; Speklé, van Elten, & Kruis 2007; and Balakrishnan et al., 2010), and the organisational 
intention to adopt (Wymer & Regan, 2005) found that financial costs are a significant factor 
that influences the decision. Recently, when central government decided to use services from 
external provider PricewaterhouseCoopers to investigate mismanagement in Tower Hamlet 
authority, the total cost involved was more than £1 million (The Telegraph, 2014). 
 
In the public sector, under the NPM, a standard to measure performances and managing by 
results refers to concept of value for money (Goddard, 2005). Within management consultants’ 
perspectives in the UK public sector, Corcoran & Mclean (1998) expressed that value for 
money was concerned with balancing conflicting elements (product or services with costs, and 
the risk) to achieve the best deal. The authors claimed that the principle of value for money is 
applicable to the procurement of management consultancy but the assessment of value for 
money can be challenging (prior to the appointment of consultants and post completion of 
project). The main objective of applying the principle of value for money is to ensure the 
taxpayer’s money is well spent but more urgently, it was an imperative directing them to keep 
their costs down, e.g. to operate efficiently, effectively and economically. 
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Thus, similar to a study by Muthusamy (2011), it is posited that; 
H9: The costs of forensic accounting services will negatively influence the intention of English 
local authorities to use forensic accounting services  
 
3.2.4.3 Perceived risks of forensic accounting 
 
Risks refer to ‘the measurable probability of the negative deviation of a target value from a 
reference value’ (Gewald & Hinz 2004, p. 988). Perceived risk is often used variable to explain 
the risk perception and risk deduction methods by consumers (Mitra, Reiss, & Capella, 1999). 
The implications of perceived risk have been examined in outsourcing information systems 
studies (e.g. Currie, 2012; Gewald et al., 2006; Gonzalez, Gasco, & Llopis, 2010) and 
outsourcing in internal audit services (e.g. Caplan & Kirschenheiter, 2000; Peursem & Jiang, 
2008; Selim & Yiannakas, 2000). The purchase of professional services (forensic accounting) 
can involve significant investments of time, money and personnel without any guarantee of a 
successful outcome (Mitchell, 1994). Jacoby & Kaplan (1972) have classified five types of 
risk: financial, performance, physical, psychological and social risks. However, there is ‘no 
consensus regarding the common set of risk facets (types) applicable across situation’ 
(Dowling 1986, p. 195).  
 
According to Corcoran & Mclean (1998), one of the major problems in purchasing 
management consultancy services within the public sector, is related to buyer’s difficulty in 
judging what is being offered in which the services often appear ‘intellectually intangible’ to 
the potential buyers (Corcoran & Mclean, 1998). Additionally, the degree of confidentiality of 
the potential buyers is also impacted by: 
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i. their degree of previous experience. The public sector still considered lack of 
experience partly due to staff movement policies and concern of sources.  
ii. the multi-diversified business of management consultants e.g. from planning, advice to 
review. 
iii. the potential impact of the services itself. The nature of management consultancy work 
(e.g. strategic planning, organizational restructures) often affects the very core of an 
organisation including its reputation. 
(Corcoran & Mclean, 1998) 
 
Perceived risks in this study refer to the uncertainty faced by local authorities, where the 
consequences of the decision cannot be anticipated when acquiring forensic accounting 
services. Financial risk is ‘the risk that the actual costs may exceed the planned/budgeted costs 
of the outsourcing engagement’ (Gewald et al. 2006, p. 82). Similarly, for the purposes of this 
study, financial risk refers to the financial costs of acquiring forensic accounting services. Thus, 
the financial risk was considered separately as individual constructs known as costs to acquire 
forensic accounting services within the forensic accounting perception factors (Muthusamy, 
2011). The type of perceived risk operationalized in this study was performance risk, which is 
the risk that the service provided by the forensic accounting providers will not be delivered as 
expected by local authorities (adapted from Gewald et al. (2006). For example, as a credence 
based service, the pre-purchase information and knowledge on the services to be acquired are 
naturally difficult to realize (Mitra et al., 1999). As such, the potential buyers of the services 
have to manage the risk before considering using the services. Additionally in the detection of 
fraud, there are possibilities that the forensic accountants might miss something or not be able 
to find anything. Therefore, ‘the perceived risks of forensic accounting services will negatively 
influence the intention to acquire forensic accounting services’ (Muthusamy, 2011, p. 92).  
 145 
Thus, similar to a study by Muthusamy (2011), it is posited that; 
H10: Perceived risks of forensic accounting will negatively influence the intention of English 
local authorities to use forensic accounting services  
 
3.2.5 Fraud Perception Factors  
 
This section describes the fraud perception factors of perceived severity of fraud and perceived 
susceptibility to fraud. 
 
3.2.5.1 Perceived Severity of Fraud 
 
Perceived severity of fraud refers to the serious consequences if the local government is 
victimised by fraud. For example, the financial costs (loss of fraud, the costs of preventing 
before the event, costs of responding to fraud after the event), ‘management costs (distracted 
management time due to the diversion of focus to fraud, dealing with litigation issues)’ 
(Muthusamy, 2011, p. 116), and unquantifiable consequences (image and reputation). 
According to Bierstaker et al. (2006), organisations should consider investing in highly 
effective fraud prevention and detection methods to avoid potential loss. In order to avoid the 
serious consequences of fraud, local government can take proactive measures such as using 
forensic accounting services.  
Thus, it is posited that; 
H11: Perceived severity of fraud will positively influence the intention of English local 
authorities to use forensic accounting services 
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3.2.5.2 Perceived Susceptibility to Fraud 
 
Perceived susceptibility of fraud refers to the local government’s perception towards the 
likelihood of fraud that might occur. The evidences of fraud in local government as reported in 
the Annual Fraud Indicator (National Fraud Authority, 2012a) is estimated at £2.2 billion in 
2012. If local government believes that they are not victimised by fraud, then the ‘perceived 
susceptibility of fraud is low’ (Muthusamy, 2011, p. 117). Hence, if there is a perceived 
susceptibility, then local government may use proactive measures to counter the risk of fraud 
such as employing the forensic accounting services (Muthusamy, 2011). 
 
Thus, similar to a study by Muthusamy (2011), it is posited that; 
H12: Perceived susceptibility to fraud will positively influence the intention of English local 
authorities to use forensic accounting services 
 
3.2.6 Internal Control Factors 
 
This section discusses internal control factors comprising the audit committee and the strength 
of internal control system. 
 
3.2.6.1 Audit Committee 
 
As a subcommittee of the governing body, an audit committee’s objectives are to provide 
assurance on financial and compliance issues through increased scrutiny, accountability, the 
efficient use of resources, and as an advisory function (Magrane & Malthus, 2010). According 
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to Vanasco (1994), the UK’s Cadbury Committee report is the most significant world-wide 
pertaining to the corporate governance that stressed audit committee oversight as a significant 
factor in implementing appropriate corporate accountability. A strong, independent audit 
committee has increasingly become an essential part of an organisation’s governance (Harrast 
& Mason-Olsen, 2007). However, audit committee of local government in England is not 
mandatory like the private sector (CIPFA, 2005). In 2005, CIPFA published ‘Audit Committees 
Practical Guidance for Local Authorities’, outlining that audit committees are a key component 
in the overall corporate governance process. A good audit committee is characterised by a 
strong chairman, independence, the ability to challenge the executive, and a membership that 
is balanced, objective and knowledgeable (CIPFA, 2005). Therefore, audit committees can 
have influence in relation to the fraud detection and prevention such as give recommendation 
to the management of local government to use forensic accounting services.  
 
Thus, it is posited that; 
H13: The existence and the effectiveness of the Audit Committee will positively influence the 
intention of English local authorities to use forensic accounting services 
 
3.2.6.2 Strength of Internal Control System 
 
Internal controls in the organisations are the front line defence in fraud prevention and detection 
(Ryan & Gerry, 2011). The authors further state that a well-designed and effective internal 
control can help deter fraudulent activities. The governance reforms such as the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act in the US, the Basel II Capital Accord and the revised Combined Code (2003) in the 
UK have required to reduce the risk of major corporate failures via tighter regulation of internal 
control systems (Woods, 2009).  Ryan & Gerry (2011) argue that internal controls are not a 
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guarantee in which organisations will operate perfectly. Nevertheless, if local government 
perceives their internal control systems are effective, the level of intention to use forensic 
accounting services is expected to be low. However, if the strength of internal control system 
is weak, an alternative to use proactive measure such as employing forensic accounting services 
could counter the weakness (Muthusamy, 2011).  
 
Thus, similar to a study by Muthusamy (2011), it is posited that; 
H14: Perceptions of the strength of internal control will negatively influence the intention of 
English local authorities to use forensic accounting services 
 
3.2.7 Control Variables 
 
This section describes a group of factors that were classified as control variables. First, the 
types and size of local authorities are explained followed by the size of internal audit 
department and the existence of counter fraud team/unit. 
 
3.2.7.1 Types and size of local authorities 
 
Based on the previous studies on organisational adoption (Falkman & Tagesson, 2008; Teo et 
al., 2003), a number of additional factors that are potentially influencing the organisational 
intention will be included. In England, the district councils are the most (in number) compared 
to other types of councils. Different types of councils reflect different responsibilities or 
autonomy with regard to the services. For example, the unitary councils may have more 
activities than district or county councils. The number of activities may affect how the counter 
fraud is taking place. Local governments are responsible for deciding their own counter fraud 
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strategies (Lane, 2011). Thus, there can be considerable variation between local governments 
in relation to how fraud is addressed such as the size and the available resources (Fraud 
Advisory Panel, 2011). For the current research context, the intention to use forensic 
accounting may relate to the type and size of the local governments.  
 
3.2.7.2 Size of internal audit department and the existence of counter fraud unit/team 
 
The establishment of corporate anti-fraud teams in local government refers to the ‘collocating 
or creating a single investigation/counter fraud service’ (National Fraud Authority, 2011, p. 
15). Some local authorities have separate teams for different types of fraud investigation and 
some local authorities do not investigate all types of fraud. For example, the London borough 
councils which are unitary services had two main approaches of counter fraud: corporate teams 
responsible for all fraud, and separate teams responsible for internal fraud and housing benefit 
fraud (Lane, 2011). Another example is Birmingham City Council, that established two 
specialist teams known as the Benefit Counter Fraud Team (BCFT) dealing with housing and 
council tax benefit fraud, and the Corporate Fraud Team (CFT) dealing with internal fraud, 
corruption, and non-benefit fraud (Birmingham City Council, 2011).  
 
In general, the responsibility for fraud risk management of local authority includes the anti-
fraud team, section 151 officer (a statutory role), and the internal audit department (Fraud 
Advisory Panel, 2011). Central government takes a more proactive approach to counter fraud 
against the public purse by setting up a counter-fraud task force, and plans for a local 
government counter fraud strategy since 2010 (Fraud Advisory Panel, 2011). Other ways are 
developing a new local government counter-fraud strategy ‘Fighting Fraud Locally’ which 
outlines the need for a specialist team to tackle high risk frauds such as housing tenancy fraud, 
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and council tax exemptions. Another significant proposal of central government is to create a 
single integrated fraud investigation service with statutory power to investigate and sanction 
all benefit and tax credit offences (DWP, 2011). The service known as the SFIS is 
operationalised in 2014, combining resources from local governments, DWP, and HMRC 
(DWP, 2011). 
 
However, there are some concerns about the impact to the individual local government’s 
investigative capacity, especially to the small fraud team, which may affect their capacity to 
investigate the fraud, and ‘the knock-on effect due to reductions in local policing numbers and 
the low priority typically given to fraud offences’ (Fraud Advisory Panel, 2011, p. 6). For the 
current research context, the varying structure, capabilities, and resources in the internal audit 
department, and/or anti-fraud team may associate to the intention to use forensic accounting. 
 
 
3.3 Summary 
 
The initial research model is developed in this chapter after considering the earlier studies. 
Each variable derived from institutional theory is described beside other important constructs 
to have a comprehensive research model. The background of each construct in the model is 
clarified within the conceptual model. Then, the model is supported by a number of hypotheses 
to demonstrate the relationship between the variables in the framework. The following chapter 
will justify the research methodology for this study. 
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4 CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
This chapter describes the underlying research methodology that has been utilised and the 
procedures that have been carried out for data collection and data analysis. This chapter is 
organised as follows: it begins with the discussion related to the research philosophy and 
methodology applied in the present research. Then, the following sections outlined a 
description of the research design model including the participants in the present research, 
purpose and justification, research setting and time horizon, instrument design of the 
questionnaire and a brief of data analysis employed. The reasons for these choices are 
explained. Ethics and other issues are also discussed. 
 
4.1 Research Methodology and Research Method 
 
According to Saunders, Lewis, & Thornhill (2009), the term ‘research methodology’ refers to 
the theory on how research should be conducted, including the assumptions on the theoretical, 
philosophical feature, and implications for the methods used in a particular study. The authors 
define the term ‘research method’ as the techniques and procedures used to obtain and analyse 
research data. Simply put, methodology is concerned with several issues including: why one 
collected certain data, what data and from where the researcher collected the data, when and 
how the data is collected, and how it would be analysed (Hussey & Hussey, 2003). The 
theoretical perspective influences the choice of the research methodology and the ways in 
which the data will be used (deductive or inductive approach) (Gray, 2004). Grounded theory, 
experimental study, survey, and archival study are examples of research methodology. On the 
other hand, research method outlines the tools and techniques used to gather and compile 
empirical evidence to answer research questions or hypothesis (Bryman & Bell, 2011). For 
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instance, a structured interview, observation, and a self-completion questionnaire are specific 
instruments under the research method. The present research will use a survey as a research 
methodology and a self-completion questionnaire as a research method to reach the overall aim 
of the research. The justifications for the selection of survey methodology and the research 
methods are explained in detail in the following subsections. 
 
4.2 Research Strategy and Design 
 
According to Saunders et al. (2009), in selecting a research strategy, among the important 
issues that need to be considered are the nature of the perceived connections between theory 
and research implied by the research questions, as well as the dimensions of research 
philosophies such as epistemological, axiological, and ontological. The considerations are 
influential, as quantitative and qualitative research strategies differ greatly in each of these 
respects. For example, quantitative research takes a deductive approach in which research is 
used to test the theory, as opposed to the inductive approach in qualitative research, in which 
theory and a model are generated from data. The two strategies represent different 
epistemological positions. Quantitative research comes from a positivistic approach while 
qualitative research is associated with an interpretivist perspective (Saunders et al., 2009). 
 
Bryman & Bell (2011) define positivism as ‘an epistemological position that advocates the 
application of the methods of the natural sciences to study of social reality and beyond’ (p.15). 
Additionally, Myers (1997) states that positivists refer to who consider that reality is 
objectively given and explained by measurable properties, in which independent of the 
researcher and their instruments. Orlikowski & Baroudi (1991) posits a study can be 
categorised as positivist in the existence of formal propositions, measureable of variables, 
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hypothesis testing, and the inference from the sample to a stated population. The assumption 
under the positivist approach normally accept the existence of true answers. The process begins 
when the researcher develops the hypothesis relating to the investigation of the study in order 
to confirm the outcomes based on the data, or the researcher uses some hypotheses and analyses 
data for confirmation (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe, & Jackson, 2008). 
 
On the other hand, interpretive studies focus on the understanding a phenomena or daily social 
roles through the meanings that people assign to those roles (Myers, 1997; Saunders et al., 
2009). Interpretive researchers start out with the assumption that access to reality (given or 
socially constructed) is only through social constructions such as language, consciousness and 
shared meanings (Myers, 1997). According to Bryman & Bell (2011), interpretivism differed 
from positivism approach. For example, interpretivism refers to the strategy used to discover 
the differences between people and the objects of the natural sciences, which required the 
researchers to understand the meaning of social action. Hussey & Hussey (2003) outline the 
main differences between positivism and intepretivism philosophy, which involves the 
characteristics of quantitative and qualitative method as shown in Table 4-1. 
 
Table 4-1: Positivism vs. Interpretivism 
Positivism philosophy (Deductive) Interpretivism philosophy (Inductive) 
Tends to produce quantitative data Tends to produce qualitative data 
Uses large samples Uses small samples 
Concerned with hypothesis testing Concerned with generating theories 
Data is highly specific and precise Data is rich and subjective 
Generalises from sample to population Generalises from one context to another 
(Source: Hussey & Hussey, 2003) 
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Given the considerations of the difference between quantitative research under positivism 
philosophy and qualitative research under interpretivism philosophy, a quantitative research 
strategy was selected for the present research. The nature of the current research is to test the 
identified variables using a theory rather than emphasising to generate a theory. In addition, a 
positivist view is adopted in the current research based on its assumption of particular social 
reality, such as attitudes to detect and prevent fraud, and the intention to use forensic accounting 
services. The use of scientific method based on the facts and observation (quantitative in 
nature) is used to measure the social reality objectively. For example, quantitative strategy 
adopted in the questionnaires is always associated with positivist research (Henn, Weinstein, 
& Foard, 2006).  
 
Furthermore, the deductive approach represents the positivism philosophy emphasis on the 
relationship between theory and research Bryman & Bell (2011). For example, under the 
quantitative method, the deductive approach is used by testing the theory. Based on the 
researcher knowledge in a particular domain and theoretical consideration, hypothesis will be 
developed followed by designing research strategy to test the hypothesis (Bryman & Bell, 
2011; Saunders et al., 2009). Thus, the justifications to use positivism philosophy are outlined 
below: 
i. Generalisation: a survey-based research seeks to identify relationships that are common 
across organisations, which provide a general statement or theory about the 
phenomenon being researched (Bryman & Bell, 2011). 
ii. Saving in time and effort: adopting a cross-sectional survey methodology leads to 
saving time, effort and resources required compared to other methodologies such as 
experimental and longitudinal (Creswell, 2003) 
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iii. Previous studies provide the basis for developing a model and research constructs to 
use (Carpenter & Feroz 2001; Teo et al. 2003). 
iv. The sample size used in the present research is considered large as suggested under the 
positivism paradigm (Hussey & Hussey, 2003). 
 
The present study will undertake a cross-sectional approach in data collection. The objective is 
to collect quantitative data using a survey. The closed-ended type questions provide an 
understanding about what is happening towards the use of forensic accounting services such 
as, the extent, the level of intention, and the perception of the core skills and essential traits of 
forensic accounting. A survey is considered the most common method utilised in the field of 
business research compared to other techniques such as lab experiments and interviews (Ford 
& Richardson, 1994; Randal & Gibson, 1990). Additionally, previous studies within 
institutional theory (Teo et al., 2003; Henderson et al., 2011) employed a cross sectional 
approach. Hussey & Hussey (1997) stated that individual’s perspective can be examined by 
utilising either questionnaire survey or interviews. The advantage of a questionnaire survey is 
that it enables a researcher to cover a wide range of area compared to the interview approach. 
Thus, the present research applied the elements based on institutional theory to frame part of 
the research methodology as discussed below. 
 
The present research believed that a survey approach is appropriate to be used based on the 
following justifications. First, align with the research philosophy of positivism, and to achieve 
the research aims such as generalisation, identifying associations between research variables 
and carrying out multivariate variables, the survey method is considered appropriate (Bryman 
& Bell, 2011; Saunders et al., 2009). Second, the survey method has been widely used as a 
primary data collection in business research (Bryman & Bell, 2011; Saunders et al., 2009) and 
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institutional theory (e.g. Ashworth et al., 2007; Teo et al., 2003; Henderson et al., 2011). Third, 
a survey method is useful for the sample accessibility with respect to the number of respondents 
identified (Cooper & Schindler, 2011). Finally, due to constraints of time and resources 
available to the researcher, a survey is considered the best method to collect information needed 
within the current research context. The mail survey was used as it is the most effective way to 
collect data to reach a significant number of respondents across a wide area or large-scale 
quantitative research (Sekaran, 2003). 
 
The research design of a study should also stem from the research question. According to Vaus 
(2001), the function of research design is ‘to ensure that evidence obtained enables us to 
answer the initial question as unambiguously as possible’ (p. 9). The essential research design 
as suggested by Cooper and Schindler (2011) includes: 
i. The design is an activity and time-based plan 
ii. The design is always based on the research questions 
iii. The design is a framework for specifying the relationships among the study variables 
iv. The design outlines procedures for every research activity 
 
In the present research, the research design will form the basis to conduct the research, the plan 
for the data collection, measurement and analysis. The research objectives and research 
questions that are addressed in the present research are related to the extent of using forensic 
accounting services, the factors that influence the intention to use the services, and the 
perceptions of local authorities’ officers towards the core skills and essential traits of forensic 
accounting.  
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More specific research questions are outlined below: 
1. To what extent do local authorities utilise the services from forensic accounting 
providers? 
2. What types of forensic accounting services are used by English local authorities?  
3. What types of forensic accounting services providers are used by English local 
authorities? 
4. How satisfied are local authorities with the services received from forensic accounting 
services providers? 
5. What is the level of intention to continue using the forensic accounting services? 
6. How the core skills/essential traits of forensic accountants are perceived based on the 
perceptions of users or potential users of forensic accounting services? 
7. Which factors have significant influence on the intention to use forensic accounting 
services? 
8. How strongly the significance of factors influence the intention to use forensic 
accounting services? 
 
4.3 Modelling the current research design 
 
Figure 4-1 below outlines the current research related to research design. The design initiates 
by posing the research questions to be analysed, identifying the participants, setting of the study 
and the time horizon, purpose and justification of the research, and research paradigm and 
approach. 
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Figure 4-1: Research Design Model 
 
(Source: Adapted  from Cavana, Delahaye, & Sekaran,  2001) 
 
4.3.1 Participants in the Present Research 
 
The participants in the present research were local authority officers involved in the decision-
making process, risk management, internal control including counter fraud activities. 
 
4.3.1.1 Population and Sample Size 
 
The population and sample size of the present research was senior officers in all 353 local 
authorities across England. Specifically, the three groups of participants are Chief Executive, 
Director of Finance, and internal auditors. The selected participants used in the present research 
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expected to gather views from three different roles. Additionally, they are believed to represent 
the major counter fraud activities within local authorities and could be expected to have a better 
understanding of the issues in their organisation. For example, the Chief Executives involved 
in daily operations, including decision-making, knew their organisational culture, and had a 
direct contact with the organisation’s partner. Directors of Finance are responsible for the area 
of internal audit and risk management, while internal auditors are directly involved in counter 
fraud activities and arrangements. Internal auditors also may support decision-making 
processes such as giving recommendations on counter fraud arrangements for the top 
management. At the early stages, the present research tried to obtain names of the respondents 
wherever possible to be included in the survey. However, in order to ensure a good response 
rate, the remaining respondents without name were also included to participate in the survey. 
 
4.3.1.2 Local Authorities in England 
 
In total there are 353 local authorities in England (GOV.UK, 2012b). According to GOV.UK 
(2012b), local authorities in England operate under either a one tier system or a two tier system. 
Overall, there are five different types of local authorities in England: metropolitan boroughs 
(36), London boroughs (32), unitary authorities (125), county councils (27) and district 
councils (201). In addition to the 353 local authorities in England, there are some 10,000 parish 
and town councils, which were not included in the present research because of the complexity 
and diversity of the structure (Abu Hasan, Frecknall-Hughes, Heald, & Hodges, 2013; Worthy, 
Amos, Hazell, & Bourke, 2011). A parish may be represented by a parish council, a town 
council or community council which characterized as the most local level of government in 
England or known as the third tier of local government (DCLG, 2013a). The types of local 
authority indeed differ in each area and whilst there are no particular criteria to determine which 
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types in a particular area, the general pattern is that urban areas are more likely to be represented 
by single tier authorities whilst two tier authorities are more likely covered in rural areas 
(DCLG, 2013a). An important feature of local authorities from other local services providers 
is that most local authorities are elected and have the ability to collect tax locally (DCLG, 
2014). Table 4-2 below summarised the responsibilities based on the types of local authorities. 
 
Table 4-2: Responsibility areas based on types of local authorities 
Services Unitary County District Metropolitan 
London 
boroughs 
Greater 
London 
Authority 
(GLA) 
Education x x  x x  
Highways x x  x x x 
Transport and 
Planning 
x x  x x x 
Passenger and 
Transport 
x x    x 
Social Care x x  x x  
Housing x x x x x  
Libraries x x x x x  
Leisure and 
Recreation 
x  x x x  
Environmental 
Health 
x  x x x  
Waste 
Collection 
x  x x x  
Waste Disposal  x x  x x  
Planning 
Applications 
x  x x x  
Strategic 
Planning 
x x  x x x 
Local tax 
collection 
x  x x x  
(Source: The Local Democracy Think Tank (LGiU), 2013) 
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4.3.1.3 Local Authorities under a One Tier System 
 
i. Metropolitan boroughs 
Metropolitan boroughs which are unitary authorities can be referred also as 
metropolitan district councils, metropolitan borough councils or metropolitan city 
councils. Metropolitan boroughs are responsible for services in education, highways, 
transport planning, passenger transport, social care, housing, libraries, leisure and 
recreation, environmental health, waste collection, waste disposal, planning 
applications, strategic planning and local tax collection.  
 
ii. London boroughs 
Each London borough is a unitary authority. London boroughs are responsible for 
education, highways, transport planning, social care, housing, leisure and recreation, 
environmental health, waste collection, waste disposal, planning applications, strategic 
planning, and local tax collection. Apart from that, some services are provided through 
‘joint authorities’ or share responsibility governed by the Greater London Authority 
(GLA). The GLA is responsible for providing services like fire, police and public 
transport.  
 
iii. Unitary authorities 
Many large towns and cities and some small counties are unitary authorities, e.g., city 
councils, borough councils, county councils, or district councils. Unitary authorities are 
responsible for education, highways, transport and planning, passenger transport, social 
care, housing, libraries, leisure and recreation, environmental health, waste collection, 
waste disposal, planning applications, strategic planning and local tax collection. In 
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some metropolitan areas, some services such as fire, police and public transport are 
provided through ‘joint authorities’. 
 
4.3.1.4 Local Authorities under a Two Tier System 
 
i. County Councils 
County councils cover the whole of the county and provide the majority of public 
services in their particular area. They are responsible for education, highways, transport 
planning, passenger transport, social care, libraries, fire and safety, trading standards, 
waste disposal and strategic planning. 
 
ii. District councils 
Each county is divided into several districts; also, can be known as borough councils or 
city councils if the district has borough or city status. District councils cover a smaller 
area than county councils and provide more local services including housing, leisure 
and recreation, environmental health, waste collection, planning applications, and local 
tax collections. 
 
4.3.1.5 Decision-making Process in Local Authorities 
Under the Local Government Act 2000, local authorities in England are structured in three 
different ways:  
i. A leader and cabinet 
ii. An executive mayor and a cabinet 
iii. Older structure of committees (population below 85,000) 
(Local Government Association, 2011) 
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The leader of a local authority, elected by the majority of the council, is responsible to set up 
the vision and direction of authorities. The cabinet member is an executive member appointed 
by the leader and is responsible for a particular portfolio. In some authorities, a mayor will be 
appointed directly supported by a cabinet. The executive is required to set out ‘the forward 
plan’ consisting of all key decisions to be made by the executive that have to be made available 
to public, relevant party and scrutiny committees. The supreme body is the full council meeting 
in which all councillors may vote. For example, the decisions on approving the budget, setting 
up the policy framework, appointing chief officers, and making constitutional decisions. In 
other words, councillors, through decisions of the full council and the executive, set the overall 
policy of a local authority. On the other hand, senior officers, led by the Chief Executive and 
chief officers, are responsible for advising the cabinet and scrutiny committees on policy, 
implementing councillors’ decisions and service performance, and giving unbiased 
professional advice (Local Government Association, 2011). 
 
4.3.1.6 The Role of Chief Officers in Local Authorities used in this study 
 
This section describes the role of senior officers as participants of the survey. The three groups 
of the chief officers are Chief Executive, Director of Finance and internal auditor. 
 
4.3.1.6.1 Chief Executive 
 
The Chief Executive is the head of the paid services that is responsible to oversee the overall 
performance of local authorities. Specifically, the three main functions of Chief Executive are 
to advice councillors regarding the policy and other matters, lead the management of the 
organisation to ensure implementation of policies agreed by councillors, and act as executive 
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decision-making based on the authority given by councillors (Harbour & Wilson, 2003). The 
present study conducted a simple survey in some local authorities’ websites that provides 
additional information on the role of Chief Executive. For example, the operational 
management tasks involved overseeing financial and performance management, risk 
management, and people management besides managing the local government on a day-to-day 
basis. 
 
4.3.1.6.2 Director of Finance 
 
The Director of Finance in local authorities known as Chief Financial Officer (CFO) is 
appointed under Section 151. The responsibility of financial officer governed by the Local 
Government Act 1972 required every local authority in England to ‘...make arrangements for 
the proper administration of financial affairs and shall secure that one of their officers has 
responsibility for the administration of those affairs’ (CIPFA, 2010b, p. 3). Example of the 
main responsibility of financial officer is to support the effective governance of the authority 
through development of: 
i. corporate governance arrangements, risk management and reporting framework; and 
ii. corporate decision making arrangements 
(CIPFA, 2010, p. 7) 
 
4.3.1.6.3 Internal Auditor 
 
Internal audit in English local authorities exists originally under section 151 of the Local 
Government Act 1972 and subsequently the Accounts and Audit (England) Regulations 2011. 
The act and regulations required local authorities to “make arrangements for the proper 
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administration of their financial affairs” and to “maintain an adequate and effective internal 
audit of its accounting records and of its system of internal control in accordance with the 
proper practices in relation to internal control” (CIPFA, 2013). Internal audit plays an 
important role in advising the councils and working with management to improve systems to 
achieve the objectives.  
 
The appointment of internal auditors in English local authorities can be in the forms of: 
i. appointing a local individual or a member of a panel of individuals administered by a 
County Association of Local Councils or Branch of the Society of Local Councils 
Clerks. 
ii. employing a competent internal auditor with sufficient organisational  
iii. independence and status to undertake 
iv. purchasing an internal audit service from the principal authority 
v. purchasing internal audit service from a local firm or specialist internal audit practice 
(Joint Practitioners’ Advisory Group (JPAG), 2010)  
 
4.3.1.7 Gathering Information of Respondents 
 
In order to identify and collect the details of the participants in the present research, the official 
website of the UK government, GOV.UK (2012b) was visited. The full list of local authorities 
is shown in Appendix 4. Based on the list, local authorities were identified in order to gather 
personal details from their website. For example, the names, job roles, office address and email 
address were identified from the web pages. The detailed information of respondents was 
available in the ‘About the Council’ web page besides information on the management 
structure. However, it was found that not all local authorities publicly disclosed the contact 
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details of the types of respondents. Therefore, an email addressed to customer services asking 
for the details of their respective Chief Executive, Director of Finance and internal auditors 
was sent. In total 50 emails were sent to local authorities and 40 local authorities responded by 
giving the details of respondents. Then, the details were incorporated to Microsoft Excel as a 
mailing list database including the 10 local authorities that did not respond for record purposes. 
Some of the difficulties in gathering information of the participants are described below: 
i. Some local authorities do not provide full details of each potential respondent on their 
website. For example, most information is available for Chief Executive but not for 
Director of Finance and internal auditors. 
ii. At the point of gathering the information, the appointment of Chief Executive in some 
local authorities was not finalised yet. Therefore, Assistant Chief Executive acting as 
Chief Executive was used. 
iii. There are some local authorities that shared a senior management team or joint 
management, such as Adur District with Worthing Borough Council. By right, this will 
reduce the number of respondents like Chief Executive and Director of Finance. 
However, it was decided to send the survey to each of the local authorities. 
iv. In some local authorities, the arrangement of internal audit is through shared or joint 
services or partnership with other authorities. For example, Hertfordshire County 
Council led the partnership of Shared Internal Audit Services (SIAS) with another four 
districts/borough councils. Thus, the number of internal auditors is less than it should 
be. To counter the problem, the current research sent the survey to each of the local 
authorities regardless of the arrangement of their internal audit services. 
v. Some local authorities outsourced the internal audit services, such as North Yorkshire 
District Councils that used a firm named Veritau. In this case, the questionnaire was 
sent directly to the provider and to the respective local authorities. 
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Table 4-3 shows the total number of contacts by type of local authorities (with their name and 
total) according to their positions that participated in the survey. 
 
Table 4-3: Total Number of Contacts  
Types of Local 
Authorities 
Chief Executive 
Director of 
Finance/ 
S 151 
Internal Auditor 
Total 
Named Unnamed Named Unnamed Named Unnamed 
English County Council  20  7 16 11 8 19 81 
Metropolitan Borough 
Council  
26 10 20 16 11 25 108 
English Unitary Council 40 16 36 20 10 46 168 
London Borough Council 28 5 24 9 13 20 99 
English District Council 160 41 130 71 77 124 603 
Total 274 79 226 127 119 234 1,059 
 
From Table 4-3, the Chief Executive is the highest targeted by name at 274, followed by 
Director of Finance/ Section 151 officers with 226, and internal auditors is the least with 119. 
For those without a name, the questionnaire was sent based on their job title to their respective 
office addresses. During the observation of the websites and after receiving feedback from the 
customer services of local authorities, 22 respondents with email address were selected as a 
web based survey. The reason is due to their preferences to be contacted. Based on the email 
of the respondents, an email invitation was sent to each respondent. In total, 1,037 
questionnaires were sent through mail and the remaining used web based survey (Bristol online 
survey). 
 
4.3.2 Purpose and Justification 
 
This study examined the extent of using forensic accounting services to detect and prevent 
fraud within local government in England. The extent of using forensic accounting services is 
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expected to be impacted upon by several factors, such as institutional factors, internal control 
factors, fraud perception factors, and forensic perception factors. Additionally, the views of 
forensic accounting from the local government officers’ perspective will be examined. The 
present research attempts to fill gaps, as there is very little published research in using forensic 
accounting services to detect and prevent fraud specifically in local authorities’ context.  
 
4.3.3 Questionnaire Design 
 
The design of questionnaire provides a framework for the data collection and analysis (Bryman 
& Bell, 2011). Using the questionnaire is considered the most common data collection 
instrument in business research (Cooper & Schindler, 2011). There are two main objectives in 
designing a questionnaire: to maximise the proportion of subjects answering the questionnaire 
(response rate) and to obtain accurate relevant information in a survey (Leung, 2001). 
Consideration was given to increase the response rate, including how to administer the 
questionnaire, state the purpose of the survey, appropriate length of the questionnaire, and send 
a reminder for the non-response respondents. To get relevant information, the researcher 
carefully considered the way such questions were asked, the order of the questions, and the 
general layout of the questionnaire. 
 
Literature related to institutional variables in the public sector, fraud and forensic accounting 
were used as guidance in designing the questionnaire. The design of the questionnaire of the 
current research adopted several sources of data, including previous instruments developed by 
other researchers and the research framework developed from the relevant literature. Several 
types of closed-ended questions are employed in the present research. Saunders et al. (2009) 
recommended five types of closed questions: a) list questions, which offer the participants a 
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list answer to choose from; b) category questions, which participants can answer in only one 
category; c) ranking questions, which ask participants to place things in order; d) rating 
questions, which are used to obtain participants’ opinions (Likert-scale); and e) quantity 
questions, in which the participants are required to provide a number, giving the amount of 
features on behaviour or attribute. Closed-ended questions were used as they give respondents’ 
specific limited-alternative responses and require them to choose the one closest to their own 
viewpoints, in contrast to open-ended questions which require respondents to answer in their 
own words (Zikmund, Babin, Carr, & Griffin, 2010). 
 
All five types of closed questions are used to achieve the aims of the current research. Firstly, 
most of the questions adopted are the rating question in the form of Likert-type scale. Easterby-
Smith et al. (2008) stated that the rating question is easy and quick to answer, does not need 
much space, and enables a variety of statistical techniques. Adopting a five-point scale is 
considered appropriate compared to five or nine points as it does not improve the reliability of 
the ratings (Sekaran, 2003). The extent of using forensic accounting services and factors 
influencing local authorities' intention to use forensic accounting services used a five-point 
numerical scale from 1= strongly disagree to 5= strongly agree within the Section 3, Section 4, 
Section 5, Section 6. Others, a five-point numerical scale used are 1= very dissatisfied to 5= 
very satisfied in question 2.3 (b) of Section 2, 1 = no intent to use to 5 = definite intent to use 
in question 7.1 of Section 7, and 1= less than 6 months to 5 = more than 24 months in question 
7.2, 7.3 and 7.4 of Section 7.  
 
Secondly, the category type question is used in Section 1 and Section 8 for the profile 
information or demographic questions. Thirdly, question 2.1 in Section 2 used ranking type 
question. Fourthly, questions 2.3 (a) in Section 2 used the list type of question. Finally, the 
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quantity type question is related to question 1.3 of Section 1. At the end of the questionnaire, 
an open-ended question is provided for the respondents to express their own views or opinion. 
The questionnaire also states whether the respondents are willing to be interviewed and to 
receive a summary of the report findings. The objectives of having a short interview were to 
engage the participants more to allow for sharing further in-depth responses compared to the 
closed-ended questions (Zikmund et al., 2010). However, due to a low response rate, 
constraints of time and costs, interviews were not conducted in the current research. Finally, 
respondents had opportunity to provide comments or information related to the utilisation of 
forensic accounting services in their organisations.  
 
4.3.3.1 Sections of Questionnaire 
 
Table 4-4 summarised the category of sections in the questionnaire with the total number of 
questions used.  
Table 4-4: Sections in the Questionnaire 
Section Title Number of Questions 
1 Local Government Characteristics  6 
2 
3 
4 
5 
Forensic Accounting Services 
Forensic Accounting Perception Factors 
Fraud Perception Factors  
Internal Control Factors 
6 
12 
8 
11 
6 Coercive Pressures 12 
7 Mimetic Pressures 2 
8 Normative Pressures 16 
9 Internal Control Factors 11 
10 
11 
Intention to Use Forensic Accounting Services 
Personal Profile 
2 
4 
12 Others (Descriptive) 15 
 Total  105 
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4.3.3.2 Categories and variables in questionnaire 
 
Throughout designing the instrument, identified variables were classified into six categories: 
characteristics of local government, the extent of using forensic accounting services, factors 
that influence the intention to use forensic accounting services, understanding the 
characteristics of forensic accounting, the level of intention to use forensic accounting services, 
and profile of respondents. Additionally, the questions seeking to understand who is answering, 
what the local authority does or intends to do and what factors could influence their decision 
to use forensic accounting services in their organisations. As shown in Table 4-5, the first 
category focuses on the characteristics of local authorities such as the types, size, and political 
majority.  
 
The objective of collecting this information is to analyse against the extent of using forensic 
accounting services and considered as control variables. The second category examined the 
views towards the core skills and essential traits posed by a forensic accountant. The items are 
adopted from Davis et al. (2010), Muthusamy (2011) and Rezaee et al. (2004). The third 
category aimed to examine the extent of using forensic accounting services. Initially, the 
respondents will be asked if their local authorities already use the forensic accounting services. 
If the answer is yes, the respondents will continue to answer on the types of services used, and 
types of forensic accounting services providers. 
 
The fourth category lists the factors/reasons believed to influence local government to use 
forensic accounting services to detect and prevent fraud. These factors are institutional factors 
(Ashworth et al., 2007; Carpenter & Feroz, 2001; Teo et al., 2003), forensic accounting 
perception factors (Apostolou & Crumbley, 2008; Muthusamy, 2011; Ramaswamy, 2005), 
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fraud perception factors (Gee et al., 2012; Muthusamy, 2011; National Fraud Authority, 2012a) 
and control factors (Henderson et al., 2011; Teo et al., 2003). The fifth category asked the level 
of intention to use forensic accounting services (Muthusamy, 2011). Finally, the six category 
describes demographic information about the respondents (job title, age group, academic 
qualification, and professional membership).  
Table 4-5: Categories and Variables in the Questionnaire 
Category Variables identified in a questionnaire 
 
 
1. Characteristics of local 
authorities 
 Type of local authority 
 Political majority 
 Internal audit arrangement and number of staff 
 Annual net revenue 
 A dedicated counter fraud team/unit  
 Number of staff in counter fraud team/unit 
 
2. Understanding the 
characteristics of 
forensic accounting 
 
Core skills and essential traits of forensic accountants 
 
3. The extent of using 
forensic accounting 
services 
The forensic accounting services utilisation 
Types of forensic accounting services used, the providers, 
satisfaction and intention to use in future 
 
 
 
 
4. Factors that influence 
the intention to use 
forensic accounting 
services and others 
Forensic accounting perception factors of perceived benefit, 
perceived risk, and costs to acquire the services 
Fraud perception factors of perceived severity and perceived 
susceptibility of fraud 
Internal control factors of Audit Committee and strength of 
internal control system  
Coercive pressures of central government, Audit Commission, 
and media, mimetic pressures of the extent of using forensic 
accounting services among local authorities and perceived 
success of using forensic accounting services by other local 
authorities and normative pressures of professional bodies and 
associations, forensic accounting services providers, and 
stakeholders 
 
5. Intention to use  Level of intention to use 
 
 
6. Profile of respondents 
Job title 
Age 
Academic qualifications 
Professional membership 
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4.3.3.3 Construct, Measurement, and Research Question to the Questionnaire 
 
The Table 4-6 lists the groups of factors, constructs, measures, number of questions in the 
questionnaire, research questions, and item coding for data analysis. 
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Table 4-6: Summary of Questionnaire Description 
Construct Statements Total 
Number of 
Items 
Items in 
Questionnaire 
Research 
Questions 
Item Code 
Coercive Pressures      
1. Central Government 
and related agencies 
Directive, rules and policies of central government 
Initiatives and action plan by central government 
Report on fraud issued by government bodies: the 
NFA and the DWP 
 
4 
6.1 
6.2 
6.3 (ii and iii) 
 
 
 
 
RQ 5 & RQ 6 
CGT1 
CGT2 
CGT3 
CGT4 
2. Audit Commission  Report on fraud issued by the Audit Commission 
Recommendations by the external auditors 
Recommendations by the Audit Commission 
 
3 
6.3 (i) 
6.9 
6.11 
ACM1 
ACM3 
ACM2 
3. Media News, publications and discussion on from 
television, radio, newspapers, magazines, online 
news, and online social networking 
 
5 
6.13 (i-v) MDN1 
MDN2 
MDN3 
MDN4 
MDN5 
Mimetic Pressures 
4.  Other local 
authorities 
Used to detect and prevent fraud 
The rate of success received 
 
2 
6.4 
6.5 
RQ 5 & RQ 6 LAM1 
LAM2 
Normative Pressures      
5. Professional bodies 
and associations 
Recommendations by the CIPFA, the ICAEW, and 
the ICFS 
Recommendations by employees that hold 
professional membership 
Recommendations by the Local Government 
Association (LGA) 
Recommendations by the Society of Local 
Authority Chief Executives (SOLACE) 
Recommendations by the Public Risk Management 
Association (Alarm) 
Recommendations by the Local Authority 
Investigation Officers Group (LAIOG) 
 
 
 
 
 
8 
6.6 (i-iii) 
 
 
6.12 
 
 
 
6.7 (i-iv) 
 
 
 
 
 
RQ 5 & RQ 6 
 
 
 
 
NBP1 
NPB2 
NBP3 
NBP4 
ASC1 
 
ASC2 
 
 
ASC3 
 
ASC4 
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Construct Statements Total 
Number of 
Items 
Items in 
Questionnaire 
Research 
Questions 
Item Code 
6. Forensic accounting 
services providers 
The presence of forensic accounting market  
Perception is positive 
The promotion of forensic accounting services 
 
3 
3.18 
3.19 
3.16 
FSB1 
FSB2 
FSB3 
7. Stakeholders Pressures from elected councillors, taxpayers/local 
residents/voters, top management, business partners 
 
 
5 
6.8 (i-v) SHT1 
SHT2 
SHT3 
SHT4 
SHT5 
Internal Control Factors 
8. Audit Committee Oversees risk management, governance and counter 
fraud arrangements 
Significant number of independent members 
At least a member is a financial expert 
Regular meeting with internal auditors 
Recommend to use forensic accounting 
 
 
5 
5.3 
 
5.4 
5.5 
5.6 
5.7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
RQ 5 & RQ 6 
ACT1 
 
ACT2 
ACT3 
ACT4 
ACT5 
9. Strength of Internal 
Control Factors 
Organisational structure supports effective internal 
control 
Management and employees are assigned 
appropriate levels of authority and responsibilities 
Effective and up-to-date counter fraud strategy  
Adequate resources to counter fraud 
Specialized professional training and accreditation 
Effectiveness of in-house fraud investigation is very 
high 
 
 
 
 
6 
5.1 
 
5.2 
 
5.8 
5.9 
5.10 
5.11 
ICO1 
 
ICO2 
 
ICO3 
ICO4 
ICO5 
ICO6 
Fraud Perception Factors 
10. Perceived severity Financial loss 
Bad reputation/image 
Low employee morale 
Reduce efficiency and productivity 
Higher cost of fraud investigation 
 
 
5 
 
 
4.1 (i-v) 
 
 
 
 
 
RQ 5 & RQ 6 
SVF1 
SVF2 
SVF3 
SVF4 
SVF5 
11. Perceived 
susceptibility 
Often worries being a victim of fraud 
Probability being a victim of fraud is lower 
 
 
4.2 
4.3 
PSF1 
PSF2 
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Construct Statements Total 
Number of 
Items 
Items in 
Questionnaire 
Research 
Questions 
Item Code 
Risk of fraud is lower compared to other local 
authorities 
3 4.4 PSF3 
Forensic accounting Perception Factors 
12. Perceived benefits Helps to deter fraud 
Enhance the image  
Recovery of cash and assets 
More objectivity and credibility than internal 
auditors 
Expertise and knowledge 
Improve internal control system 
 
 
 
 
6 
3.1 
3.2 
3.3 
3.4 
 
3.5 
3.6 
 
 
 
RQ 5 & RQ 6 
BFT1 
BFT2 
BFT3 
BFT4 
 
BFT5 
BFT6 
13. Perceived risks Confidentiality issues 
Cannot guarantee  
Difficult to evaluate the effectiveness 
 
3 
 
3.7 
3.11 
3.12 
 
RQ 5 & RQ 6 
RIS1 
RIS2 
RIS3 
14. Costs to acquire the 
services 
Very costly 
The cost of using would influence decision to use 
Cannot afford the cost of acquiring  
 
3 
3.8 
3.9 
3.10 
 
RQ 5 & RQ 6 
COF1 
COF2 
COF3 
Intention to use Forensic Accounting Services 
15. Intention to use Intends to use for fraud detection and prevention 
How soon it will operationally implement? 
 
2 
7.1 
7.2 
RQ 5 & RQ 6 INT1 
INT2 
Control Factors 
16. Types 
17. Size of local 
authorities 
18. Size of internal 
audit/counter fraud 
Type of local authorities 
Total annual expenditure 
 
Size of internal audit/anti-fraud team (Number of 
staff) 
1 
1 
 
4 
1.1 
1.4 
 
1.3,1.5,1.6 
 
 
RQ 5 & RQ 6 
T_NameAuthorities 
LAS 
 
IAT and CFR 
Others 
19. Extent of use ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ 1 2.2 RQ 1(a) 
RQ 1(b) 
 
RQ 3(b) 
 
 
 
 
  
 
19. Types of services  List of services 1 2.3(a) 
20. Intention to use in 
future 
Decrease 
Decrease Slightly 
Increase Slightly 
1 2.3 (c ) 
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Construct Statements Total 
Number of 
Items 
Items in 
Questionnaire 
Research 
Questions 
Item Code 
Increase Significantly  
 
     
21. Services’ providers 
      and 
      satisfaction level 
Big Accounting Firms  
Others 
Very Dissatisfied 
Dissatisfied 
Uncertain 
Satisfied 
Very Satisfied 
1 
 
 
1 
2.3(b) RQ 2 
 
RQ 3(a) 
22. Understanding 
towards forensic 
accounting 
List of core skills and essential traits  1 2.1 RQ 4 
23. Political majority Political party 1 1.2     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
N/A 
 
24. Awareness of 
forensic accounting 
services 
Aware of the role of forensic accounting services in 
fraud detection and prevention 
Knowledgeable about the benefits of using forensic 
accounting services 
Knowledgeable about the risks of using forensic 
accounting services 
Perception of forensic accounting services is 
positive 
 
 
 
4 
3.13 
 
3.14 
 
3.15 
 
3.19 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      
N/A 
25. Perceptions towards 
the Government 
actions related to 
fraud 
The creation of the SFIS provides benefits to 
counter fraud activities in my local authority 
The abolishment of the Audit Commission has had 
a negative impact on counter fraud activities in my 
local authority 
A standard definition of fraud that can be used by 
all local authorities needs to be developed to 
establish a more reliable picture of fraud and to 
make an appropriate allocation of counter fraud 
resources in my local authority 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 
4.5 
 
4.7 
 
 
4.9 
 
 
 
 
4.11 
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Construct Statements Total 
Number of 
Items 
Items in 
Questionnaire 
Research 
Questions 
Item Code 
The austerity measures introduced by central 
government have had a negative impact on the 
resources available for counter fraud activities in 
my local authority 
Lack of counter fraud standards at national level 
affects my local authority to detect and prevent 
fraud 
 
 
 
4.12 
26. Fraud within local 
authorities 
A fraud awareness campaign is an important tool to 
prevent and deter fraud in my local authority 
My local authority shares data and fraud 
intelligence with other local authorities 
Other local bodies such as the NHS and the DWP 
that are considered effective in how they tackle 
fraud led my local authority to use forensic 
accounting services 
It is difficult to estimate the total economic cost of 
fraud in my local authority 
My local authority is able to retain (or recruit) 
people with the necessary skills 
My local authority evaluates the strength of anti-
fraud cultures regularly 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6 
4.8 
 
4.6 
 
4.10 
 
 
 
5.12 
 
5.13 
 
5.14 
 
 
 
 
 
N/A 
 
 
 
 
 
N/A 
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4.4 Construct Reliability, and Validity of the Instrument 
 
An assessment of the reliability of the constructs and the validity of the instrument was 
conducted to establish the reliability and validity of the instrument. Good measurement is 
fundamental for a quantitative research (Bryman & Bell, 2011). For example, in measuring the 
construct, testing and assessment procedures must be reliable and valid. According to Bryman 
& Bell (2011), validity and reliability are different in relation to the evaluation of measures of 
concepts. Reliability is only a necessary condition but insufficient condition for validity. To 
obtain validity, the measurement needs to be reliable, but reliability in itself is not enough to 
ensure validity. In other words, an instrument can be reliable without being valid. Reliability 
refers to the questions whether the outcomes of a research are repeatable. The reliability of an 
instrument is also concerned with the consistency or stability of test/measure scores. In 
statistical terms, reliability is determined by correlation coefficients. For example, when using 
a Likert-scale questionnaire, internal reliability can be measured using Rasch Item Response 
Theory and Cronbach’s alpha (Bryman & Bell, 2011).  
 
According to Cooper & Schindler (2011), two major forms of validity are internal and external 
validity. Internal validity refers to the fact that the instrument actually measures what it claims 
to measure, while external validity refers to the ability of research findings to be generalised 
across setting and time. The validity of a research refers to the accuracy of the inferences, 
interpretations or actions made based on quantitative data. The term ‘validity’ in quantitative 
research is classified into various types such as construct validity, content validity, and 
criterion-related validity. For example, the content validity can be measured by the expert 
judgment in the field (Kimberlin & Winterstein, 2008). In order to ensure validity of the 
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instruments, the current research carried out pre-testing and empirical pilot study to measure 
reliability. 
 
4.4.1 Pre-testing 
 
To identify any remaining issues with the test instrument, pre-testing was carried out. The aim 
of the pre-testing is to identify whether there were any ambiguous or unanswerable questions, 
to identify whether the wording of both questionnaire instructions and questions (Oppenheim, 
1992) or layout could be improved, and whether the meaning the researcher believed is 
associated with a question was how others perceived it. A draft of the questionnaire was given 
to academicians, and postgraduate students in the University of Huddersfield. The 
academicians include a group of lecturers and professors in the Department of Accountancy 
and Finance and a lecturer with vast experiences in local authorities’ environment in the role 
of finance director. 
 
Comments and suggestions from the academicians and fellow postgraduate students were used 
to revise the instrument in term of presentation, readability, validity, grammar, and to reduce 
the number of items. It also validated the estimated time required as fair and that the questions 
were suitable for the intended participants.  
 
The appropriate changes and refinement of the instruments are considered including: 
i. Refining some of the questions to increase clarity and remove ambiguities 
ii. Reducing items that are redundant to achieve conciseness and precision 
iii. Adjustment to some of the measurement scales 
iv. Changes to the cover page of the questionnaire 
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4.4.2 Empirical Pilot Study  
 
According to van Teijlingen & Hundley (1998), the term ‘pilot study’ refers to mini versions 
of a full-scale study (also called feasibility studies), as well as the specific pre-testing of a 
particular instrument such as a questionnaire or interview schedule. The pilot study should be 
undertaken on the population from which the sample is drawn. Some of the advantages of 
conducting a pilot study included developing and testing adequacy of research instruments, 
assessing the feasibility of a full scale study/survey, and collecting preliminary data (van 
Teijlingen & Hundley, 1998). According to Billingham, Whitehead, & Julious (2013), there is 
little published guidance to determine the sample size required for a pilot study. However, the 
authors stated that a sample size justification should give a minimum number of participants 
needed in order to meet the objectives of the pilot study. On the other hand, Hertzog (2008) 
states that general guidelines to determine the sample size is 10% of the final study size.  
 
4.4.2.1 Results of Pilot Study 
 
Overall, 50 respondents of Chief Executive (20), Director of Finance (18), and Head of Internal 
Auditor (12) in Yorkshire and the Humber, and North West England County were selected 
based on the convenience sampling method. The chosen respondents for the pilot study 
represented 4.7% of the overall sample size of the present research. The questionnaire was 
mailed in April 2014, including a cover letter stating the aim of the research, time to complete 
the questionnaire, and expected date to return the questionnaire. The respondents ‘were 
encouraged to give feedback and comments on the comprehensibility and complexity of the 
items and instructions in the survey’ (Muthusamy, 2011, p. 137) such as the length of times, 
and the number of questions.  
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A total of 12 questionnaires was returned after a period of 3 weeks. The responses received 
consisted of 8 internal auditors and 4 financial directors. None of the chief executives returned 
the questionnaire. The data analysis of the pilot study included a reliability test, descriptive 
analysis and reviewing feedback from the respondents. To evaluate the reliability of a multi-
item measurement scale, the Cronbach’s alpha was used, with 0.7 as a cut-off point. (Hair, 
Black, Babin, & Anderson, 2009). However, in the initial stages of research, Nunnally (1978) 
suggested that a coefficient of 0.50 or 0.60 is good enough. Descriptive analysis was carried 
out to determine the common misunderstanding or any items not answered (Verma & Mallick, 
1999). Most of the respondents stated that the time allocated to complete the questionnaire was 
sufficient for them to answer all the questions. 
 
The demographic of the pilot study samples are outlined in Table 4-7 based on the current 
position of the respondents, types of local authority, political majority, the current provision of 
internal audit services, net revenue, existence of in-house counter fraud team/unit, and 
utilisation of forensic accounting services. The analysis showed that the data for type of local 
authority, political majority, the current provision of the internal audit services, existence of 
in-house counter fraud team/unit, and utilisation of forensic accounting services are almost 
equally distributed.  
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Table 4-7: Demographic analysis of pilot study 
Profile  Frequency 
Current position/Job title Chief Executive 0 
 Director of Finance  4 
 Head of Internal Auditor 8 
 Total 12 
Type of Local Authority English County Council 1 
 Metropolitan Borough Council 4 
 English Unitary Council 2 
 English District Council 5 
 Total 12 
Political Majority Conservative 5 
 Labour 4 
 Liberal Democrat 0 
 Independent Group 0 
 Other/ Hung 3 
 Total 12 
Current provision of internal audit Maintained in-house 9 
 Fully outsourced 1 
 Joint/shared services 1 
 Partially outsourced 1 
 No internal audit function  0 
 Total 12 
Net Revenue Less than £100 million 5 
 £101 million - £400 million 6 
 £401 million - £700 million 1 
 £701 million - £1,000 million 0 
 £1,001 million - £1,300 million 0 
 £1,301 million - £1,600 million 0 
 £1,601 million - £1,900 million 0 
 More than £1,900 million 0 
 Total 12 
In-house counter fraud team/unit Has an in-house counter fraud 10 
 No in-house counter fraud 2 
 Total 12 
Utilisation of forensic accounting 
services 
Currently using or had used 2 
 Not using 10 
 Total 12 
 
The reliability test involved items from the factors that influence the decision to use forensic 
accounting services as shown in Table 4-8. All other items and demographic variables were 
excluded. The results indicated that the highest coefficient (Cronbach’s alpha) was 0.993 and 
the lowest was 0.555. Two variables had Cronbach’s alpha above 0.90 (media and associations), 
five variables between 0.80 and 0.90 (central government, other local authorities, professional 
bodies, perceived benefits of forensic accounting and intention to use forensic accounting 
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services), four variables between 0.70 and 0.80 (stakeholders, transaction costs, perceived 
severity and strength of internal control), three variables between 0.60 and 0.70 (Audit 
Commission, perceived risks and perceived susceptibility) and only one below 0.60 (Audit 
Committee). According to Hair et al. (2009), the coefficient of 0.7 should be used as a cut-off 
point as a standard measure of reliability. However, in the initial stages of a research, a 
coefficient of 0.50 or 0.60 is acceptable (Nunnally, 1978). The acceptable value of Cronbach’s 
alpha for all variables implied that they were internally consistent and measuring the same 
content universe (Sekaran, 2003).  
 
Table 4-8: Reliability analysis of pilot study 
Constructs Cronbach’s Alpha No. of Items 
Coercive pressures   
Central government 0.819 4 
Audit Commission 0.622 3 
Media 0.993 5 
Mimetic pressures   
Other Local Authorities 0.814 2 
Normative pressures   
Professional bodies 0.803 3 
Associations 0.901 4 
Stakeholders 0.704 4 
Forensic accounting perception factors   
Perceived benefits of forensic accounting  0.871 7 
Perceived risks 0.624 4 
Costs to acquire the services 0.716 2 
Fraud perception factors   
Perceived susceptibility  0.626 5 
Perceived severity  0.705 3 
Internal Control    
Strength of Internal control 0.719 6 
Audit Committee 0.550 5 
Intention to use forensic accounting services 0.820 2 
 
To recapitulate, as the results and analysis process of the pilot study were considered acceptable, 
it was suggested that the survey instrument did not require any modification and was appropriate 
for the final survey. It is worth mentioning that while a high value for Cronbach’s alpha indicates 
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good internal consistency of the items in the scale, it does not mean that the scale is 
unidimensional (Gliem & Gliem, 2003). For example, factor analysis can be used to determine 
the dimensionality of a scale. The present research did not analyse the dimensionality of a scale 
for the pilot study due to the insufficient number of responses. However, the analysis of the final 
survey employed factor analysis, both exploratory factor analysis and confirmatory factor 
analysis. 
 
4.5 Rules Ethic and Confidentiality  
 
Before conducting the questionnaire survey, the approval of the Ethics Committee of the 
University of Huddersfield was obtained to preserve the rights, liberties and safety of the 
participants. In addition, an information sheet, including the name of the University of 
Huddersfield and the name of the school, were prepared to explain the purpose of the study and 
the ethical rules and given to each participant, attached to the questionnaires. The participants 
were informed that under the ethical rules, they were participating voluntarily and no risks, 
such as psychological, moral, legal or other risks, would occur with them. It advised the 
respondent to refer to any queries or complaints they may have about the way the study is 
conducted to the appropriate officer of the University of Huddersfield Research Ethics 
Committee. A telephone number and email contact were provided in the cover letter to that 
effect. 
 
As for the confidentiality and security of the questionnaire received, all the hardcopies of the 
questionnaire (including printed version from a web-based survey) were stored in the locked 
cabinet in the postgraduate office of the Business School which only the researcher and 
supervisor had access to look and to review. Similarly, after data had been keyed in and 
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analysed into the computer, a protected password was used to ensure that only the researcher 
had access to it. 
 
4.6 Data Collection 
 
A self-administered survey-based research is adopted as a primary method in the current 
research by utilising a mail and an electronic survey. The current research decided to use both 
mail and electronic survey to provide a fruitful and cost effective research methodology 
(Enticott, 2003). For example, Enticott (2003) compared response rates and preferences from 
three different survey methods, which are internet, email, and mail among local authorities 
officers in the UK. The results show that electronic based surveys demonstrated to be effective 
research tools. Overall, the officers in local authorities preferred to use an email survey, 
followed by an online survey, and lastly by post. Ashworth et al. (2007) also used the same 
approach in their study related to institutional pressures in the UK local authorities. In addition, 
the authors mention that an electronic survey is useful when the aim of the research is to 
examine the attributes of a large number of organisations and to perform a comprehensive field-
level test of isomorphism. Thus, the present research believes that by employing both mail and 
electronic survey, the respondents have the options to give their responses. One of the 
advantages of mail survey method is that respondents have time to review the questions and 
respond within their own time with little pressure. In this way it was hoped more thoughtful 
responses would be made. 
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4.6.1 Final Survey  
 
The population of the current research consists of all local authorities in England; 353 entities. 
The present research used all the 353 local authorities as a sample size chosen consisting of 
1,059 senior officers, namely, Chief Executive, Director of Finance, and internal auditor. Based 
on the contact details (those with name) and the job titles (as shown in Table 4-3), an invitation 
letter was sent to each respondent. The respondents were assured of confidentiality concerning 
their personal and organisational information. Neither local authority’s name nor identification 
of individuals was included in the survey. For an online survey, an invitation letter was sent to 
their respective email address indicating information in the same way as conducting the mail 
survey with additional information on the website address of the Bristol online survey page. 
 
The survey packages included a cover letter stating the invitation to participate in the survey 
(Appendix 5), a postage-paid return envelope, and a copy of the questionnaire (Appendix 6). 
The cover letter explained the objectives of the study, a guarantee of the confidentiality of the 
respondent, and estimate of time to be completed and the expected date for the respondents to 
return the completed questionnaire. It also stated appreciation to respondents for their time and 
effort in completing the survey. The cover letter used the University of Huddersfield letterhead. 
It included the name and contact information of the researcher and primary supervisor. 
Additionally, a definition of forensic accounting services and fraud were included in the 
questionnaire to improve the validity of the responses. Given the various definitions of forensic 
accounting and fraud in the literature, the current study narrowed down those definitions based 
on prevention and detection of fraud techniques by external party, and fraud within the context 
of English local authorities as defined by Audit Commission (2011) discussed in Section 2.1.2 
and 2.2.1, respectively. 
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In total 1,037 of a mail survey was sent to the respective respondents with an online survey 
used to the remaining 22 respondents as was their preference established during gathering 
personal details (as discussed in the Section 4.3.1). The mail survey was used as it is the most 
effective way to collect data to reach a significant number of respondents across a wide area or 
large-scale quantitative research (Sekaran, 2003). Thus, the online survey was employed to 
increase the size of the sample and to minimise costs (Muthusamy, 2011). The demographic of 
the sampling both mail survey and an online survey is detailed in Table 4-9 below. 
Table 4-9: Demographic of distributing questionnaires 
Types of Local Authorities Mail Survey Online Survey Total Sample Size 
English County Council  79 2 81 
Metropolitan Borough Council  102 6 108 
English Unitary Council 166 2 168 
London Borough Council 95 4 99 
English District Council 595 8 603 
Total 1,037 22 1,059 
 
The final survey was conducted between June and November 2014. Personalised contact details 
and emails were used to increase the response rate apart from unnamed participants. The first 
stage of distributing the questionnaire, both mail survey and an online survey, started on 26 
June 2014. Two stage reminder letters followed after the period of three weeks and September 
as detailed in Table 4-10. The reminder served as both a thank you to those who had responded 
and as a gentle reminder for those who had not.  
Table 4-10: Mailing Pattern 
Mailing Pattern 
Mailing Date 
Named Unnamed 
First stage 26 June 2014 24 October 2014 
Reminder 1 18 July 2014 17 November 2014 
Reminder 2 17 September 2014 30 November 2014 
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The distribution of the questionnaire to the unnamed respondents was carried out on 24 October 
2014 followed by a reminder on 17 November 2014 and final reminder after two weeks. 
According to Dillman, (2007), multiple reminders to respondents were carried out as a way to 
improve postal survey response rates and for lead-time as recommended by Evans, Ritchie, 
Tran-Nam & Walpole (1996).  
4.6.2 Response rate 
In total, out of 1,059 distributed questionnaires, 143 were returned (excluding one respondent 
who stated they were unable to participate), yielding a response rate of 13.5% as depicted in 
Table 4-11. As suggested by Schirmer (2009), it is common for response rates for a postal 
survey to be as low as 10% to 15%. Additionally, there is evidence that willingness to respond 
to survey has fallen over time in many cultures (Porter, 2004). Thus, considering the present 
research utilised a mail survey (most questionnaires sent compared to an online survey), the 
response rate of the present research fell within common expectations.  
 
The 143 individual returns received were further screened with four questionnaires discarded. 
There were two incomplete questionnaires based on the online survey (not answered at all) and 
two questionnaires for the mailed survey (either half of the questionnaire or part of the 
questionnaire). The remaining balances of 139 responses or 13.1% were used for further 
analysis. Table 4-11 below shows the summary of percentages of responses. 
Table 4-11: Percentage of Responses Rate 
Individual Reponses Total Sent Total Received Response Rate 
(%) 
Mail survey 1,037 137 13.2 
Online survey 22 6 0.6 
Total usable responses 1,059 1431 13.5 
Incomplete  (4)  
Total response for data analysis  139 13.1 
                                                 
1 Excluded one response: An email received from one respondent stated that his local authority is not able to 
participate at this time.  
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One of the common debates within the quantitative method was whether data from the pilot 
study could be included in the final research sample. Among the reasons not included was when 
there were problems with the research tools and modifications had to be made from the findings 
of the pilot study, hence data could be flawed and inaccurate (van Teijlingen & Hundley, 1998). 
However, where an established and validated tool is being used, data from the pilot study may 
be of value (van Teijlingen & Hundley, 1998, p. 2). In addition, if there is no change or 
improvement in the instrument after the pilot study was carried out whereby the same 
instrument is used for the final research sample, then it is considered appropriate to combine 
both the pilot data and final data together for data analysis. Arguably, if the pilot study methods 
and same characteristics are very close, it is recommended to include the sample of the pilot 
study into the main study (Thabane et al., 2010). Thus, based on the arguments whether to 
include data from the pilot study into final analysis, the present research combined data from 
the pilot study and the final survey in order to strengthen the findings of the main study and 
provided the justification as follows: 
i. Out of 353 local authorities, 50 local authorities were chosen for the pilot study and the 
remaining for the final survey. In other words, respondents from the pilot study were 
excluded from the final survey. 
ii. The samples from the pilot study were the same as samples from the final survey, which 
was local government officers (Chief Executive, Director of Finance and internal 
auditors). 
iii. The same methodology was applied for both the pilot study and the final survey such 
as using a mail and a web-based survey followed by the reminders. 
iv. After conducting the pilot study, the instruments used remained the same as the final 
survey as no significant changes had been made except the section on the suggestions 
to improve the questionnaire which was removed for the final survey. 
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v. The data based on the pilot study was processed in the same way as the data from the 
final survey including data cleaning, reliability and factor analysis. 
 
Table 4-12 presented the total number of questionnaires sent to each local authority and the 
usable response received based on the types of local authority and based on the job title of the 
respondents. For each local authority, three questionnaires were sent according to their 
positions. The results indicated that responses received from English County are the most with 
70.4%, with the rest of local authorities in the range of 33.3% to 39.4%. Based on the individual 
responses, internal auditor is the most with 91 responses, followed by Director of Finance with 
23 responses. Both Chief Executive and Managing Director were the least with two responses 
received each. 
 
This study emphasized the confidentiality of the name of local authorities. Thus, any responses 
received were anonymous. The disadvantage of unknown responses meant that it was difficult 
to ensure the representative of each local authority. For example, there is a possibility that at 
least two responses came from the same local authority for any responses received from all the 
groups (Chief Executives, Directors of Finance and internal auditors). However, there was 
some feedback from Chief Executives and Directors of Finance that the questionnaire had been 
given to their internal auditors on their behalf. As the low responses received from the top 
management; Chief Executive and Managing Director, there is tendency that individual 
(internal auditors on their behalf), that did response may represent Chief Executives and 
Directors of Finance. Additionally, the main data analysis used was based on the perceptions 
of individuals that act as a proxy to their organisation. There is limited analysis on the types of 
local authority except for control variables.  
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Table 4-12: Usable response rate based on types of local authorities and respondent 
Local Authority 
Number of 
Local 
Authority 
Number of 
Questionnaires 
Sent 
Number of Questionnaires Received 
Percentage 
(%) of Response 
Rate 
 
  
Type of 
Local 
Authority 
Chief 
Executive 
Managing 
Director 
Director of 
Corporate 
Resources 
Director 
of 
Finance 
Internal 
Auditor 
Counter 
Fraud 
Manager 
Overall/Based 
on 
Questionnaires 
Sent 
English 
County  
27 81 19 0 0 0 2 14 3 23.5 
Metropolitan 
Borough 
36 108 12 0 0 0 1 11 0 11.1 
English 
Unitary 
56 168 22 0 0 3 1 14 4 13.11 
London 
Borough 
33 99 12 1 0 1 2 7 1 12.1 
English 
District 
201 603 74 1 2 1 17 45 8 12.3 
Total 353 1,059 139 2 2 5 23 91 16 13.1 
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4.6.3 Non-Response Bias 
 
In any large survey, the problem of non-response bias must be addressed since not all of the 
participants give responses (Collis, Jarvis, & Skerratt, 2004). The non-response participants 
were normally not random and in turn may bias survey results such as raised issues to draw a 
conclusion due to unrepresentative data (Porter, 2004). However, appropriate measures could 
be taken in order to outcome non-response bias outlined below. 
  
Although the individual response rate was only 13.1%, the overall response received covered 
all types of English local authorities. As stressed by Fisher & Herrick (2013,p. 150), ‘low 
response rates may be a problem but what is equally important is the representativeness of the 
respondents’. According to Harbaugh (2002, p. 70), ‘response rates for traditional mail 
surveys have continued to decline to a point where the average is below 20%’. For example, a 
study by Ahmi & Kent (2013) on the statutory auditors in the UK received a 6.57 % response 
rate. Specifically, studies on fraud in the UK by Button et al. (2007) distributed 1,866 
questionnaires to the NHS Counter Fraud Specialist, the London Fraud Investigator Group, and 
local authority fraud investigation teams, yielding a 22.9 % response rate. In a recent survey 
on fraud, Gee et al. (2012) stated that only 72 local authorities participated in their study, 
however the response rate was not mentioned in their report. A report by the Audit Commission 
(2014), expressed their disappointment as only three out five local authorities participated in a 
fraud briefing by their external auditor without charge. The report mentioned that 62% from 
the 353 local authorities invited to participate in the briefing. The expression of the Audit 
Commission seems valid, as the umbrella body to the local government, including local 
authorities, should not have a problem to have satisfactory participants among local authorities. 
On the other hand, there is a possibility that other outside researchers might get less 
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participation from local authorities. Thus, considering a mixed result of response rate in the 
previous studies, the response rate of 13.1% was reasonable.  
 
The two main reasons for not responding to the survey include failure to deliver the 
questionnaire to the target population (e.g. absent from work) and the reluctance of people to 
respond (Baruch, 2001). In the present research, the contact details of the respondents were 
carefully collected through local authorities’ websites and information received via email from 
members of the information department in local authorities. Additionally, Klassen & Jacobs 
(2001) stated that low response rates could be explicated by survey fatigue due to the 
respondents having had too many requests and therefore refusing to respond to non-essential 
questionnaires. Another view asserted that the low response occurred for unsolicited surveys 
and if it involved senior management. As the respondents for the current study are key persons 
in the organisation, they are known to be less likely to respond to mailed questionnaires than 
people in the general population (Hunt & Chonko, 1987).  
 
Utilising a mailed survey to representatives of organisations such as Chief Executive Officer, 
Managing Director, Human Resource Director and others were typically characterised by a 
lower response rate compared to populations of individuals (Baruch, 1999). According to 
Fenton-O’Creevy (1996), the low responses rate are due to not have time to answer, not 
considered relevant and organisational policy not to complete surveys (as cited in Baruch, 
1999). For instance, the current research received an email from one participant to request 
exempt information under Section 3(2) and Section 40 of the Freedom of Information Act.  
 
Some researchers argued that the low response rates could cause problems such as creating 
unacceptable reduction of sample size which may cause bias (Vaus, 2001). Generally, a 
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quantitative study that used a survey method, the sample will implicate the population of the 
study. However, this study did not sample but used the total population by inviting all local 
authorities to participate. Hence, the present research considered the potential impact of non-
response on the ability of surveys to describe large populations. In order to minimize the issues 
of sample not representing the targeted population, the current study used the non-response 
bias method as suggested by Armstrong & Overton (1977).  
 
Armstrong & Overton (1977) suggested that to estimate non-response bias, a researcher could 
use the exploration method. This method indicated that based on the assumption, the 
participants who respond less readily are more like non-respondents, where less readily referred 
‘as answering later or as requiring more prodding to answer’ (Armstrong & Overton, 1977, 
p. 397). The wave analysis method with the t-test was used as the next best approach to compare 
between the early and late responses received (after the reminder) as suggested by Armstrong 
& Overton (1977). ‘Wave’ was defined as ‘the responses generated by a stimulus, such as a 
follow-up or reminder’ (Armstrong & Overton, 1977, p. 397). In other words, the respondents 
who answered in later waves were assumed to have responded because of the increased 
stimulus and were expected to be similar to non-respondents. Armstrong & Overton (1977) 
suggested using the t-test procedure under the assumptions of both equal and unequal group 
variances. In the present research, prior to the t-test analysis, 61 responses were identified as 
early response and 78 responses were grouped as late response. The first group is labelled as 
‘1’ and the latter is labelled as ‘2’. In the t-test analysis for two sample proportions and a 95% 
confidence level, it was found that there were no significant differences between early and late 
responses for items in the questionnaire at the 0.05 level. Thus, it may be concluded that non-
response bias was not of particular influence in the present research (Skarmeas & Bodo, 2002). 
The key characteristics of the demographic analysis are summarised in Table 5.1 in Chapter 5. 
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4.7 Data Analysis 
 
The data was exported and analysed using the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences 
(SPSS) version 21 and SmartPLS 3.0. A range of statistical procedures was adopted to explore 
the research questions posed and to test the hypotheses. First, it involved the descriptive 
analysis to explore the results in the form of frequency tables such as the characteristics of the 
local government and demographic data. Second, in order to identify the factors that influence 
the intention to use forensic accounting services, the current research used advanced statistical 
analysis such as factor analysis techniques and multiple regression. Factor analysis can reduce 
a large set of variables or scale items down into a smaller and more manageable number of 
factors (Pallant, 2011). The expected results from the factor analysis together with the 
characteristics of local government will then be tested in the Structured Equation Modelling 
(SEM). 
 
4.7.1 Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) 
 
EFA is used to investigate the underlying variable structure of a psychometric instrument 
(Osborne & Fitzpatrick, 2012). Furthermore, the main objective of conducting EFA is to reduce 
a number of observed variables to fewer unobserved factors in order to explore the construct 
dimensions (Treiblmaier & Filzmoser, 2010). The requirement and measurement of testing 
EFA were followed guidelines suggested by Hair et al. (2009) outlined below: 
i. the general requirement of sample size for exploratory factor analysis is that 
sample sizes should be 100 or greater. 
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ii. the Bartlett test of sphericity, statistically testing the significance of correlations 
among variables indicated by the value of chi-square and p-value.  
iii. the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measures the sampling adequacy indicated by the 
value in a range from 0 to 1. The recommendation KMO’s value suggested: 0.80 
or above as meritorious; 0.70 above as middling; 0.60 above as mediocre; 0.50 
above as miserable, and below 0.50 as unacceptable. 
iv. retained the factors with eigenvalues greater than 1.0 by considering the 
theoretical considerations and the scree plot. 
v. the method of factors’ extraction is based on the Principal Component Analysis 
(PCA) that indicated the communalities should be more than 0.50. PCA approach 
is selected as it is the preferable method for a data reduction (Costello & Osborne, 
2005).  
vi. the method of factors’ rotation is based on Varimax method (orthogonal approach) 
with factor loading more than 0.50. Varimax method is preferable as it is the most 
common method used that minimises the number of variables based on the high 
factor loadings (Pallant, 2011).  
 
4.7.2 Structured Equation Modelling (SEM) 
 
Structured Equation Modelling (SEM) was used for confirmatory factor analysis and hypothesis 
testing. SEM known as a second generation multivariate data analysis technique simultaneously 
testing the measurement model and the structural model (Hair, Thomas, Ringle, & Sastedt, 
2014; Lowry & Gaskin, 2014). SEM has been used both in the field of psychology and the 
social sciences, including business studies such as marketing, information system and 
accounting (Lee, Petter, Fayard, & Robinson, 2011). Furthermore, previous studies that applied 
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institutional theory (e.g. Teo et al., 2003; Henderson et al., 2011; Son & Benbasat, 2007) used 
SEM in the data analysis. Some of the advantages of using SEM are ‘to; 
i. permit the assessment of the measurement properties of constructs within different 
theoretical contexts in which they are embedded 
ii. deal explicitly with measurement error 
iii. provide other benefits to researchers not available with first generation statistical 
techniques such as multiple regressions, principal component analysis and cluster 
analysis’ 
(Barclay, Thompson, & Higgins, 1995, p. 288) 
The first generation statistical techniques such as regression-based approaches (such as 
multiple regression, discriminant analysis, logistic regression, analysis of variance) and factor 
or cluster analysis, belong to the core set of statistical instruments which can be used to either 
identify or confirm theoretical hypothesis based on the analysis of empirical data (Haenlein & 
Kaplan, 2004, p. 283). The first generation statistical techniques had been applied successfully 
by many researches previously. On the other hand, the second generation statistical techniques 
such as SEM involved generalisations and extensions of the first generation procedures (Chin 
& Newsted, 1999). For example, the regression-based approaches analyse only one layer of 
linkages between independent and dependent variables at the same time while SEM, as a 
second generation technique, allows the stimulus modelling of relationships among multiple 
independent and dependent constructs (Gefen, Straub, & Boudreau, 2000). Additionally, the 
second generation techniques provide measurement of error for variables unlike the first 
generation techniques (Haenlein & Kaplan, 2004). Moreover, the central advantages of SEM 
to the first generation statistical analysis technique is the ability to include latent (unobserved) 
variables in the causal model (Lowry & Gaskin, 2014). In order to overcome the limitations of 
first generation techniques, many researchers began using SEM as an alternative (Haenlein & 
Kaplan, 2004). 
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There are several distinct approaches to SEM: the first approach is Covariance-based SEM 
(CB-SEM) using software packages such as AMOS and LISREL. The second approach is 
Partial Least squares (PLS) or component-based, which focuses on the analysis of variance and 
can be carried out using PLS-Graph and SmartPLS (Hair et al., 2014). Some of the advantages 
of PLS over CB-SEM; PLS have as a feature several statistical techniques such as principal 
component analysis, multiple regression, and redundancy analysis and for preliminary theory 
building (Lowry & Gaskin, 2014). PLS uses available data to estimate the path relationships in 
the model with the objective of minimizing the error terms (i.e. the residual variance) of the 
endogenous constructs. In other words, PLS-SEM estimates coefficients (i.e., path model 
relationships) that maximize the R2 values of the (target) endogenous constructs. A summary 
of recommendations on when to use PLS versus CB-SEM is outlined as Table 4-13 below: 
 
Table 4-13: Recommendations on when to use PLS versus CB-SEM 
Model Requirement PLS CB-SEM 
Includes interaction effects Preferable, as it is designed 
for easy interactions 
Difficult with small models 
(not too complex), nearly 
impossible with large ones 
Testing alternative models Can use Preferable, as it provides 
model fit statistics for 
comparison 
Include more than 40-50 
variables 
Preferable Sometimes unreliable if it 
does converge; sometimes 
will not converge 
Non-normal distributions Preferable (although it will 
still affect results, just to a 
lesser extent) 
Should not be used; results 
in unreliable findings 
Non-homogeneity of 
variance 
Preferable (although it will 
still affect results, just to a 
lesser extent) 
Should not be used; results 
in unreliable findings 
Small sample size It will run (although it will 
still affect results negatively) 
Minimal recommendations 
30 to 100 cases 
 
Unreliable if it does 
converge 
Minimal recommendations 
range from 200 to 800 
(Source: Lowry & Gaskin, 2014; Chin & Newsted, 1999) 
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Acknowledging the advantages and disadvantages between CB-SEM and PLS, the choice to 
employ PLS was driven by several factors. First, PLS is ‘more forgiving in terms of the 
structure of the data and the measurement qualities’ (Lee et al., 2011, p. 307). Despite that 
PLS makes minimal distribution assumptions, this study reports the data normality as 
presented in EFA and potential outliers. Secondly, this study is investigating and testing the 
factors that could influence the intention to use forensic accounting services among English 
local authorities. Thus, PLS is chosen as it is ideal for the early stages of theory development, 
and, as in the case of this study, the determinant factors (institutional lens together with 
literature on other important factors) of intention to use forensic accounting services is applied, 
tested and extended in the new context. Based on the current literature, there is no prior study 
that investigates the determinant factors to use forensic accounting services among local 
authorities in England. Finally, PLS requirement on sample size is lower than the other CB-
SEM based (Chin, 1998a). For example, the minimal recommendations of sample size for PLS 
was from 30 to 100 cases while CB-SEM based ranged from 300 to 800 cases (Chin & 
Newsted, 1999). Additionally, the minimum sample required in PLS was discussed in Section 
5.7.1. 
 
The data analysis for SEM in the present research was run using the SmartPLS 3.0 build by 
Ringle, Wende, & Will (2005). In relation to the indicators (items) used to form each of the 
constructs of the research model, the criteria established by Chin (1998b) indicated that all 
latent variable indicators were reflective. The latent variables consisted of central government, 
Audit Commission, Media, other local authorities, professional bodies and associations, 
forensic accounting services providers, stakeholders, Audit Committee, strength of internal 
control, perceived severity, perceived susceptibility, perceived benefits, perceived risks, costs 
to acquire the services, and intention to use as described in Table 4-6. The details of the 
 201 
observed variables for each latent variable were also listed in Table 4-6. The analysis followed 
two stages: (i) the assessment of the measurement model (outer model), and (ii) the assessment 
of the structural model (inner model) for the reflective constructs as demonstrated in Table 4-
14. 
 
Table 4-14: Stages of SEM 
Stage 
Type of 
Measurement 
Technique Minimum Requirement 
Stage 1 
Assessment 
of 
Measurement 
Model 
Construct validity: convergent validity and discriminant validity 
Convergent 
validity 
Item reliability-
Cronbach’s coefficient 
Above 0.7 (Nunnally, 1978) 
Internal consistency-
Composite reliability 
Average Variance 
Extracted (AVE) 
Above 0.50 (Fornell & Larcker, 
1981) indicates 50% or more 
variance of the indicators is 
accounted for (Chin, 1998b) 
Discriminant 
validity 
AVE analysis Square root of the AVE of a 
construct is larger than its correlation 
with other constructs (Barclay et al., 
1995) 
Cross loading matrix- 
Correlation between the 
latent variable 
component score and 
other indicators 
Above 0.70 (Hair et al., 2009) where 
each item should load more highly 
on its assigned construct than on 
other constructs (Chin, 1998b) 
Stage 2 
Assessment 
of the 
Structural 
Model 
Coefficient 
determination 
Exploratory power of 
the model  
R2 value should be more than 0.10 
(Falk & Miller, 1992) or weak (0.25), 
moderate (0.50), substantial (0.75) 
(Hair et al., 2009) 
 
Test of 
hypotheses 
Size and significance of 
path coefficients 
Bootstrapping  
5000 subsamples (Hair et 
al., 2014) 
Standardized path coefficient 
Critical t-value for a two-tailed 
significant test is equal to 1.96 
(p=0.05) 
 
 
(Source: Chin, 1998; Hair et al., 2014) 
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The measurement model designates the relationship between the indicators and the respective 
latent variables. Evaluation of the measurement model is undertaken by confirming the 
construct validity through convergent validity and discriminant validity. In addition, the 
measurement model is assessed and adjusted by eliminating (Muthusamy, 2011) any item that 
does not meet the criteria e.g., below 0.70 for factor loading until the criteria of construct 
validity is met. The structural model assesses the exploratory power of the model by estimating 
the variance associated with the endogenous constructs. Next, the path coefficients and the 
directions (positive or negative) of the hypotheses relationships were determined (Muthusamy, 
2011).  
 
4.8 Summary  
 
The alternative philosophical and methodological approaches in conducting research have been 
explored. It is concluded that the current study adopted within the positivism paradigm. A 
deductive approach was the focus of this study using a cross-section in data collection. The 
three groups of participants were Chief of Executive Officer, Director of Finance and internal 
auditors. The response rate for the final survey was considered reasonable compared to 
previous studies. Additionally, concerns about non-response bias; no difference was found for 
early and late respondents. Thus, data collected was considered sufficient for data analysis. The 
next chapter centres on the analysis of the questionnaire and the results obtainable therefrom.  
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5 CHAPTER 5: DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter examines the findings of the study. Both descriptive and inferential statistics were 
conducted in the data analyses. Prior to the inferential statistic, a descriptive analysis was 
performed to provide a general overview and clear picture of demographic profile both 
organisational and individual responses. At the same time, some part of the descriptive analysis 
was used to answer the research questions. The data collected were entered, checked and 
analysed using the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) version 20. This is followed 
by the relevant data analysis and assessment. Structural equation modelling (SEM) was adopted 
for data analysis. The validation of the measurement and structural model were achieved using 
SmartPLS 3.0. In SEM, the research model is analysed and interpreted into two stages 
sequentially. The first stage is the assessment and refinement of the adequacy of the 
measurement model (confirmatory factor analysis) and followed by the assessment and 
evaluation of the structural model. Prior to that, exploratory factor analysis was conducted to 
explore the dimensions of constructs. Finally, the results of the hypotheses testing were 
explained. 
 
5.2 Sample Profile 
 
This section provides a description on the results of the profiles of local authorities surveyed 
and the profile of the respondents that participated in the survey. 
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5.2.1 Profile of Local Authorities Surveyed 
 
As described in Section 4.6.2, 139 usable responses for analysis were generated. The 
demographics of the respondents at organisational level and individual level were analysed to 
have a clear picture of the sample. This section outlines the information on local authorities’ 
type, political majority, provision of internal audit, net revenue, in-house counter fraud 
team/unit and utilisation of forensic accounting services. Furthermore, descriptive analysis was 
carried out on the perceptions towards forensic accounting services, changes of policy and 
action taken by central government, and the perceptions towards counter-fraud within local 
authorities. Finally, the profile of individual respondents is described based on the current job 
title, age, academic qualification, and professional membership.  
 
5.2.1.1 Profile of Local Authorities 
 
The data as depicted in Table 5-1 represents the respondents’ types of local authorities. The 
results show that all types of local authorities represented in the sample. English district 
councils have the highest percentage of 53.2%, followed by both English unitary councils of 
15.8% and English county councils of 13.7%. Both London borough councils and Metropolitan 
borough councils accounted for almost 9%. Overall, the highest percentage of responses from 
English district councils is similar to the data provided by GOV.UK (2012b) that indicated 
English district councils are the most significant type. The details of the total number of 
questionnaires sent and response rate were discussed in Section 4.6. 
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Table 5-1: Profile of Local Authorities 
Profile  Frequency Percentage (%)  
Types of Local Authority English County Council 19 13.7 
 Metropolitan Borough Council 12 8.6 
 English Unitary Council 22 15.8 
 London Borough Council 12 8.6 
 English District Council 74 53.2 
 Total 139 100.0 
Political Majority Conservative 64 46.0 
 Labour 44 31.7 
 Liberal Democrat 6 4.3 
 Independent Group 3 2.2 
 Other/ Hung 22 15.8 
 Total 139 100.0 
Net Revenue Less than £100 million 66 47.5 
 £101 million - £400 million 36 25.9 
 £401 million - £700 million 18 12.9 
 £701 million - £1,000 million 9 6.5 
 £1,001 million - £1,300 million 2 1.4 
 £1,301 million - £1,600 million 0 0.0 
 £1,601 million - £1,900 million 0 0.0 
 More than £1,900 million 8 5.8 
 Total 139 100.0 
Current provision of  Maintained in-house 82 59.3 
internal audit services Fully outsourced 22 15.8 
 Joint/shared services 27 19.4 
 Partially outsourced 8 5.8 
 Total 139 100.0 
Current provision of  Has an in-house counter fraud 98 70.5 
in-house counter fraud No in-house counter fraud 41 29.5 
 Total 139 100.0 
Number of staff in-house Less than 10 88 89.8 
counter fraud 10- 15 staff 7 7.2 
 15-20 staff 0 0 
 21-25 staff 1 1 
 Sub-Total 96 98.0 
 Missing 2 2.0 
 Total 98 100.0 
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The breakdown data indicated a satisfactory range of representation among local authorities. 
The three main parties in England; Conservative, Labour, and the Liberal Democrats account 
for 46.0%, 31.7%, and 4.3% respectively. The remaining was either Independent Group of 
2.2% and hung with no control of 15.8%. The results were aligned with the current political 
make-up of local authorities in England.  
 
It is apparent from this table that the majority of local authorities surveyed (59.3%) reported 
the existence of an internal audit function in-house in their organisations. Furthermore, 15.8% 
local authorities fully outsourced their audit activities and 5.8% partially outsourced their 
internal audit function. Similarly, a study by Selim & Yiannakas, (2000) found that most of the 
organisations (public and private sector) had internal audit in-house (160 organisations). 
 
The majority of local authorities surveyed have net revenue less than £100 million with 47.5%. 
This was followed by net revenue between £101 million to £400 million and £401 million to 
£700 million with 25.9% and 12.9% respectively. A total of 11 local authorities had net revenue 
more than £1 billion, with each representing 1.4% of net revenue between £1 billion to £1.3 
billion and 5.8% of net revenue more than £1.9 billion. The results suggest that local authorities 
with various level of net revenue participated in the current research.. 
 
The data also revealed that more than 70.5% of local authorities do have an in-house counter 
fraud team/unit. However, majority of local authorities surveyed indicated that the number of 
staff in their counter fraud unit/team was less than 10 staff. As expected, only a council in 
London Borough had more than 20 staff in the counter fraud team/unit, which supported the 
claim by Lane (2011) that London boroughs were no less competent or effective in countering 
fraud. The remainder of almost 30% stated no in-house counter fraud arrangement in place. 
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Table 5-2 depicted the cross tabulation against types of local authorities and the number of staff 
in-house counter fraud team/unit. 
Table 5-2: Number of Staff vs. Types of Local Authorities 
Types of Local 
Authorities 
Number of 
local 
authorities 
with counter 
fraud 
team/unit 
Percentage 
(%) 
Number of staff in counter 
fraud team/unit 
Less 
Than 10 
10-15 
staff 
21-25 
staff 
English County  11 11.2 10 1 0 
Metropolitan Borough  12 12.2 10 2 0 
English Unitary  19 19.4 17 1 0 
London Borough 11 11.2 9 1 1 
English District Council 45 45.9 42 2 0 
Total 98 100.0 88 7 1 
Note: An English Unitary and an English District Council did not answer for the number of staff in 
counter fraud team/unit; resulted total with number of staff was 96 (88+7+1). 
 
5.2.2 Profile of the Respondents Surveyed 
 
This section describes the demographic characteristics of the respondents at the individual level 
as depicted in Table 5-3. Within the sample, the majority of responses were internal auditors 
with more than 65.5%. Director of Finance or Section 151 officers contributed 16.5%, followed 
by Corporate Fraud officers with 11.5%. Meanwhile, the responses received from Director of 
Corporate Resources were 3.6% with the least received from the Chief Executive and 
Managing Director of 1.4% each. The majority of respondents were in the range 41 to 50 years 
old and held a bachelor degree with 45.3% and 53.2%, respectively. In terms of professional 
bodies, the data revealed that most of the respondents were a member of the CIPFA; more than 
51.8%. Only 5.8% of respondents surveyed held a membership in the ICFS, which is a specific 
professional body in fraud in the UK. Overall, the respondents that participated in the survey 
of the present research were sufficiently knowledgeable in fraud prevention and detection 
activities, which was vital in giving meaningful answers in the questionnaire.  
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Table 5-3: Demographic Profile 
Profile    Category Frequency 
(n=139) 
Percentage 
(%) 
 
 
 
Current Job 
Title 
Chief Executive 2 1.4 
Managing Director 2 1.4 
Director of Corporate Resources 5 3.6 
Director of Finance/S 151 Officer 23 16.5 
Chief/Head/Manager of Internal Audit 91 65.5 
Chief/Head/Manager of Corporate Fraud  16 11.5 
  Total 139 100 
 
 
 
Age Group 
Less than 30 years 3 2.2 
31-35 years 8 5.8 
36-40 years 9 6.5 
41-45 years 32 23.0 
46-50 years 31 22.3 
51-55 years 19 13.7 
56-60 years 25 18.0 
Above 60 years 6 4.3 
Missing 6 4.3 
 Total 139 100 
 
 
Academic 
qualification 
BA/BSc 74 53.2 
MA/MSc/MBA 32 23.0 
PhD/DBA 3 2.2 
Other 22 15.8 
Missing 8 5.8 
 Total 139 100 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Professional 
membership 
The Association of Chartered Certified 
Accountant (ACCA) 
11 7.9 
The Institute of Chartered Accountants in 
England and Wales (ICAEW) 
7 5.0 
The Chartered Institute of management 
Accountant (CIMA) 
1 0.7 
The Chartered Institute of Public Finance and 
Accountancy (CIPFA) 
72 51.8 
The Chartered Institute of Internal Auditors 
(CIIA) 
26 18.7 
The Institute of Counter Fraud Specialists (ICFS) 8 5.8 
The Association of Certified Fraud Examiners 
(ACFE) 
1 0.7 
Other 4 2.9 
Missing (Not answered)  9 6.5 
 Total 139 100 
 209 
5.2.2.1 Membership of the Professional Bodies 
 
Additionally, Table 5-4 shows a cross tabulation of the respondents against their professional 
membership. The CIPFA membership was held by most of the group of respondents except for 
the Chief Executive. The breakdown of the numbers was Managing Director (2), Director of 
Corporate Resources (5), Director of Finance (18), internal auditors (43), and counter fraud 
officers (4). The counter fraud officers were the majority that held membership in the ICFS 
with six respondents followed by two internal auditors. 
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Table 5-4: Job Title and Professional Memberships 
Job Title/Professional bodies 
Chief 
Executive 
Managing 
Director 
Director of 
Corporate 
Resources 
Director of 
Finance/S 
151 Officer 
Chief /Head 
/Manager of 
Internal 
Audit 
Chief /Head 
/Manager of 
Corporate 
Fraud Team 
Missing Total 
The Association of Chartered 
Certified Accountant (ACCA 
0 0 0 2 9 0  11 
The Institute of Chartered 
Accountants in England and 
Wales (ICAEW) 
0 0 0 3 4 0  7 
The Chartered Institute 
Management Accountant 
(CIMA) 
0 0 0 0 1 0  1 
The Chartered Institute of 
Public Finance and 
Accountancy (CIPFA) 
0 2 5 18 43 4  72 
The Chartered Institute of 
Internal Auditors (CIIA) 
0 0 0 0 25 1  26 
The Institute of Counter Fraud 
Specialists (ICFS) 
0 0 0 0 2 6  8 
The Association of Certified 
Fraud Examiner (ACFE) 
0 0 0 0 0 1  1 
Other 1 0 0 0 2 1  4 
Missing       9 9 
Total 1 2 5 23 86 13 9 139 
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5.3 The Use of Forensic Accounting Services 
 
This section covers the results of utilisation of forensic accounting services, forensic 
accounting services providers, types of forensic accounting services used, level of satisfaction 
and level of intention to continue use the services. 
 
5.3.1 Utilisation of Forensic Accounting Services 
 
Table 5-5: Use of Forensic Accounting Services 
Utilisation of forensic accounting 
services 
Number of Local 
Authorities 
Percentage (%) 
Currently using or had used 26 18.7 
Not using 113 81.3 
Total 139 100.0 
 
As shown in Table 5-5, only 18.7% of local authorities that responded to the survey either 
currently use or had used forensic accounting services. The results show the state of utilising 
forensic accounting services by English local authorities as little is known on the use of forensic 
accounting services, especially in English local authorities. Therefore, the result highlights the 
importance to conduct the present research on the use of forensic accounting services by local 
authorities in England.  
Table 5-6: Cross Tabulation: The use of forensic accounting services  
 
Local Authorities Type Number of Local Authorities Currently 
Using or Had Used Forensic Accounting 
Services 
Percentage 
(%) 
English County Council 7 26.9 
Metropolitan Borough Council 2 7.7 
English Unitary Council 3 11.5 
London Borough Council 4 15.4 
English District Council 10 38.5 
Total 26 100.0 
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Cross tabulation analysis is used to determine the types of local authorities that have utilised 
forensic accounting services. The result from the survey as shown in Table 5-6 revealed that 
all types of local authorities surveyed have utilised forensic accounting services, with English 
district councils the highest with 38.5%, followed by county councils of 26.9%. 
 
5.3.2 Forensic Accounting Services Providers 
 
This section describes the results of the providers used by local authorities that utilised the 
forensic accounting services. 
 
Table 5-7: Forensic Accounting Services Providers 
Category of Providers Number of Local 
Authorities 
Percentage (%) 
Big Four Accounting Firms 10 33.3 
Other Than Big Four Accounting Firms 20 66.7 
Total2 30 100.0 
Local Authorities 
Types 
Big Four 
Accounting Firms 
Other Than Big Four 
Accounting Firms 
Total 
Number of 
Local 
Authorities 
(%) Number of 
Local 
Authorities 
(%) Number of 
Local 
Authorities 
(%) 
English County 
Council 
2 20.0 5 26.3 7 24.1 
Metropolitan 
Borough Council 
2 20.0 2 10.5 4 13.8 
English Unitary 
Council 
0 0 3 15.8 3 10.3 
London Borough 
Council 
2 20.0 3 15.8 5 17.2 
English District 
Council 
4 40.0 7 31.6 10 34.5 
Total 10 100.0 20 100.0 30 100.0 
 
                                                 
2 Total number of local authorities currently using or had used forensic accounting services was higher than figure 
in Table 5-7, as there were local authorities that used both ‘Big Four’ and other than ‘Big Four’ accounting firms. 
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Table 5-7 provides information on the providers of forensic accounting services used by local 
authorities that responded to the survey. The data shows that most of local authorities surveyed 
choose other than the Big Four accounting firms with 66.7%. For example, some of the service 
providers stated by the respondents include other local authorities with specialist staff, and part 
of outsourced service provided by other local authorities. The questionnaire in the present 
research made note that the Big Four accounting firms are KPMG, PwC, Deloitte, and EY. 
 
Cross tabulation of types of local authorities and forensic accounting services providers 
indicated that 40% of English district councils sought forensic accounting services from the 
Big Four accounting firms. English unitary councils, however, acquired forensic accounting 
services from other than the Big Four accounting firms only with 15.8%.  
 
5.3.3 Types of Forensic Accounting Services Used  
 
This section explains the results on the types of services used by local authorities that utilised 
forensic accounting services.  
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Table 5-8: Types of Forensic Accounting Services Used 
Types of Forensic Accounting 
Services and Nature 
Detection (D) Investigation (I) 
Prevention (P) 
Use 
Within Year 
Used More Than a 
year Ago Occurrence 
n % n % 
Digital forensic including 
data mining, data 
imaging and recovery 
I 6 23 10 28 16 
Asset tracing and 
recovery 
I 7 27 5 14 12 
Fraud investigations I 7 27 5 14 12 
Fraud detection D 7 27 4 11 11 
Fraud risk management P 8 31 3 12 11 
Fraud training P 5 14 5 14 10 
Fraud prevention system P 5 14 4 14 9 
Reviewing current 
counter-fraud procedures 
P 5 14 4 14 9 
Litigation support and 
expert witness 
I 2 7 4 14 6 
Assessing and improving 
internal control system 
P 5 14 1 4 6 
Developing regulatory 
compliance strategies 
P 4 11 0 0 4 
 Prosecution cases I 3 12 1 4 4 
 Damage or loss 
quantification 
I 2 7 1 4 3 
 
As shown in Table 5-8, types of forensic accounting utilised by the surveyed local authorities 
were also analysed. The types of forensic accounting services are divided into three categories 
based on the nature of the services: Detection (D), Investigation (I) and Prevention (P). The 
results indicated that fraud investigation was the most type of services used by local authorities 
with digital forensic, asset tracing and fraud investigations were in the top three. Under fraud 
prevention, some of the services highly used were fraud risk management, fraud training, fraud 
prevention system and reviewing counter-fraud procedures. The results also show that digital 
forensic was the most used type of forensic accounting services utilised, with 23% local 
authorities using this within year and 28% used more than a year ago. This followed by asset 
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tracing and recovery and fraud investigations which both represent 27% used within year. 
Additionally, fraud prevention system and fraud detection were utilised by 14% (within year) 
and 27% (within year) of local authorities, respectively. The least type of services used were 
damage or loss quantification and prosecution cases with 7% of local authorities acquiring the 
services within year. 
 
5.3.4 Level of Satisfaction towards the Forensic Accounting Services Providers 
 
This section describes the results on the level of satisfaction perceived by local authorities 
towards the forensic accounting services providers. 
 
Table 5-9: Satisfaction of Using Forensic Accounting Services 
Satisfaction 
level / 
Types of 
providers 
Number of local authorities 
Very 
dissatisfied 
Dissatisfied Uncertain Satisfied 
Very 
satisfied 
Total 
Big Four 
accounting 
firms3 
1 1 3 3 2 10 
Other than Big 
Four accounting 
firms 
2 0 4 8 6 20 
Total 3 1 7 10 8 304 
 
Table 5-9 outlined the level of satisfaction on the quality of services provided by both the Big 
Four accounting and other accounting firms. The results indicated that the majority of local 
authorities surveyed that used the forensic accounting services sought the services from other 
than the Big Four accounting firms. A total of ten local authorities that used the Big Four 
                                                 
3 Big four accounting firms refer to KPMG, PwC, Deloitte, and EY 
4 Same as footnote 1 
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accounting firms and 20 local authorities that used other accounting firms stated that they were 
satisfied with the level of services by the accounting firms.  
5.3.5 Level of Intention to Continue Using Forensic Accounting Services 
 
This section covers a description on the results on the level of intention to continue using 
forensic accounting services. 
 
Table 5-10: Intention to Continue Forensic Accounting Services 
Intention to 
continue 
Decrease 
Decrease 
slightly 
Uncertain 
Increase 
slightly 
Increase 
significantly 
Total 
Number of 
local 
authorities 
3 2 16 4 1 26 
 
Table 5-10 describes the level of intention to continue using forensic accounting services. The 
results show that most of local authorities surveyed were uncertain about the decision. 
However, the remaining local authorities responded that their intention either decreased or 
increased in using forensic accounting services in the future. 
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5.4 Perceptions about Core Skills/Essential Traits of Forensic Accountants 
 
This section describes the results on the perceptions on the core skills/essentials traits of 
forensic accountants. 
 
Table 5-11: Perceptions toward Forensic Accountants 
Core skills/ Essential 
traits of forensic 
accountants 
Rank 
Total 
Percentage 
(%) 
(n=139) 
1 2 3 4 5 
Auditing skills 29 16 12 13 7 77 55.4 
Analytical/critical thinking 57 24 13 7 9 110 79.1 
Effective oral 
communication 
1 2 5 8 7 23 16.5 
Effective written 
communication 
4 4 4 16 20 48 34.5 
Identifying key issues 5 14 18 13 4 54 38.8 
Investigative ability 29 25 32 16 7 109 78.4 
Investigative intuition 4 17 5 14 7 47 33.8 
Motivation 1 1 4 5 15 26 18.7 
Problem solving skills 2 8 18 10 10 48 34.5 
Research skills 1 8 8 6 11 34 24.5 
Scepticism  5 6 4 4 19 13.7 
Simplifying the 
information 
1 4 4 10 6 25 18.0 
Think like the wrongdoer 1 1 2 4 14 22 15.8 
Understand the goals of 
the case 
4 6 2 7 3 22 15.8 
Synthesise results of 
investigations 
1 4 6 8 13 31 22.3 
 
Table 5-11 outlined the results of perceptions of local authority’s officers towards the core 
skills and essential traits posed by a forensic accountant. Overall, analytical/critical thinking 
was ranked first with 110 respondents, followed by investigative ability with 109 respondents. 
Based on the overall percentage, analytical/critical thinking was 79.1%, investigative ability 
was 78.4%, auditing skills was 55.4%, and identifying key issues was 38.8%, respectively.  
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Table 5-12: Perceptions toward Forensic Accountants by Group 
 Group 
1 
% 
(n=32) 
Rank 
Group 
2 
% 
(n=32) 
Rank 
Group 
3 
% 
(n=32) 
Rank 
Auditing skills 3 2.2 2 14 10.4 3 60 43.0 4 
Analytical/critical 
thinking 
2 1.5 3 17 12.6 2 91 63.0 1 
Effective oral 
communication 
0 0  5 3.7  18 12.6  
Effective written 
communication 
1 0.7  10 7.4  37 25.9  
Identifying key 
issues 
0 0  7 5.2  45 33.3 5 
Investigative ability 4 3.0 1 22 16.3 1 84 60.0 2 
Investigative 
intuition 
2 1.5 3 7 5.2  37 26.7  
Motivation 0 0  4 3.0  22 48.8 3 
Problem solving 
skills 
2 1.5 3 13 9.6 4 33 23.0  
Research skills 2 1.5 3 11 8.1 5 21 15.6  
Scepticism 1 0.7  7 5.2  11 7.4  
Simplifying the 
information 
0 0  4 3.0  21 15.6  
Think like the 
wrongdoer 
1 0.7  5 3.7  16 10.4  
Understand the 
goals of the case 
0 0  5 3.7  17 11.9  
Synthesise results 
of investigations 
2 1.5 3 9 6.7  20 14.1  
 
Table 5-12 revealed the perceptions of core skills and essential traits of forensic accountants, 
according to the group of respondents. Both Group 1 (Chief Executive and Managing Director) 
and Group 2 (Director of Corporate Resources and Director of Finance) agreed that 
investigative ability is the most important, but Group 1 ranked auditing skills, while Group 2 
ranked analytical/critical as the second most important. Group 3 (internal auditors and counter 
fraud managers), however, ranked analytical/critical thinking as the most important, followed 
by investigative ability while auditing skills as the fourth most important. The results show that 
there are different views among the groups of respondents on the importance of core skills and 
essential traits of forensic accountants. Further discussion on the findings and implications 
were discussed on Section 6.2.2. 
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5.5 Descriptive Statistics 
 
This section describes the results of descriptive analysis on the awareness of forensic 
accounting services, perceptions towards the government actions related to fraud and fraud 
within local authorities. 
 
Table 5-13: Descriptive Statistics 
Statements 
 
Agreement (By number of responses) 
Descriptive 
Statistics 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
M (SD) 
Awareness of forensic accounting services 
My local authority is aware of the role 
of forensic accounting services in fraud 
detection and prevention 
2 29 34 68 6 3.34(0.91) 
My local authority is knowledgeable 
about the benefits of using forensic 
accounting services 
4 
 
41 44 48 2 3.02(0.91) 
My local authority is knowledgeable 
about the risks of using forensic 
accounting services 
4 41 51 41 2 2.97(0.88) 
Overall, my local authority’s 
perception of forensic accounting 
services is positive 
1 17 89 27 5 3.13(0.70) 
Perceptions towards the Government actions related to fraud 
The creation of the Single Fraud 
Investigation Service (SFIS) provides 
benefits to counter fraud activities in 
my local authority 
46 31 43 17 2 2.28 (1.09) 
The abolishment of the Audit 
Commission has had a negative impact 
on counter fraud activities in my local 
authority 
17 
 
46 45 23 8 2.71 (1.066) 
A standard definition of fraud that can 
be used by all local authorities needs to 
be developed to establish a more 
reliable picture of fraud and to make an 
appropriate allocation of counter fraud 
resources in my local authority 
4 36 51 39 9 3.09 (0.96) 
The austerity measures introduced by 
central government have had a negative 
impact on the resources available for 
counter fraud activities in my local 
authority 
5 13 29 65 27 3.70 (1.01) 
Lack of counter fraud standards at 
national level affects my local authority 
to detect and prevent fraud 
 
 
 
8 51 57 19 4 2.71 (0.88) 
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Statements 
 
Agreement (By number of responses) 
Descriptive 
Statistics 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
M (SD) 
Fraud within local authorities 
A fraud awareness campaign is an 
important tool to prevent and deter 
fraud in my local authority 
0 0 9 83 47 4.27(0.58) 
My local authority shares data and 
fraud intelligence with other local 
authorities 
3 5 12 78 41 4.07(0.85) 
Other local bodies such as the NHS and 
the DWP that are considered effective 
in how they tackle fraud led my local 
authority to use forensic accounting 
services 
41 64 26 8 0 2.00(0.85) 
It is difficult to estimate the total 
economic cost of fraud in my local 
authority 
10 0 38 67 24 3.76(0.82) 
My local authority is able to retain (or 
recruit) people with the necessary skills 
3 15 51 61 9 3.42(0.85) 
My local authority evaluates the 
strength of anti-fraud cultures regularly 
6 31 46 51 5 3.13(0.95) 
 
The final part of the descriptive analysis examines the awareness of forensic accounting 
services, perceptions towards the government actions related to fraud, and perceptions of fraud 
within local authorities. Some of the results will be used to support the findings on the related 
factors that influence local authorities' intention to utilise forensic accounting services in 
Chapter 6 (Findings and Interpretations). Table 5-13 provides the results on the perceptions 
towards the forensic accounting services, changes on the policy or action taken by central 
government, and counter fraud activities within local authorities.  
 
In order to examine the awareness of forensic accounting services, the respondents were asked 
the following questions as depicted in Table 5-13. Most local authorities surveyed indicated 
that they were aware of the role of forensic accounting services (M= 3.32, SD=0.91). However, 
the majority of local authorities surveyed were neutral on the overall perception of forensic 
accounting services (M= 3.13, SD= 0.67). Overall, the majority of local authorities surveyed 
were aware of the existence of forensic accounting services, which shows their ability to 
respond to the survey of the present research.  
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In recent years, central government made some changes in the counter fraud arrangement for 
local authorities (Audit Commission, 2014). The majority of local authorities surveyed 
disagreed that the creation of the SFIS provides benefits to counter fraud activities in their local 
authority (M=2.27, SD= 1.09). However, the austerity measures introduced by central 
government have had a negative impact on the resources available for counter fraud activities 
in local authorities surveyed (M=3.70, SD = 1.01).  
 
The descriptive analysis on the fraud within local authorities revealed that most local 
authorities surveyed indicated an agreement for all the statements except the role of other local 
bodies, the NHS, and the DWP that are considered effective in tackling fraud influence their 
intention to use forensic accounting services (M=2.01, SD=0.85). The statement is derived 
from the argument stated in the Fraud Review by The Attorney General’s Office (2008, p. 96) 
stating that local authorities were ‘less well equipped’ than some government departments.  
  
5.6 Data Analysis Techniques 
 
The data analysis process for the current thesis involved two main stages: 
i.  Carrying out factor analysis, both exploratory factor analysis (using SPSS 20) and 
confirmatory factor analysis based on the measurement model of Structural Equation 
Modelling (SEM) (using SmartPLS 3.0)  
ii.  Carrying out a regression analysis for testing the proposed hypotheses based on the 
structural model of SEM (using SmartPLS 3.0) 
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5.6.1 Factor Analysis  
Factor analysis refers to ‘an interdependence technique whose primary purpose is to identify 
the underlying structure among the variables in the analysis’ (Hair et al., 2010, p.93). There 
are two methods for factor analysis: Exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis (Thompson, 
2004). In order to determine the dimensionality of the items used to measure variables, 
exploratory factor analysis is used to meet the objective. Then, confirmatory factor analysis is 
carried out to confirm the factor structure based on the loadings for each item measured. 
 
5.6.2 Data Screening  
Hair et al. (2010) suggested data examination before carrying out further data analysis. After 
data had been entered into SPSS Version 20, a further assessment of the data case by case is 
done to identify any errors such as missing or incomplete data. As a result, four questionnaires 
were identified as incomplete. In line with the recommendations by  Hair et al. (2010), the 
incomplete responses were removed, in  which a total of 139 responses were considered valid 
for further analysis.  
 
5.6.2.1 Detection of Outliers 
Outliers are atypical, infrequent observations that appear to be inconsistent with the majority 
of the observations in a data set (Hair et al., 2009). In other words, data points that fall outside 
the range may then be identified as potential outliers. Univariate outliers are outliers that occur 
within a single variable, and multivariate outliers could exist in a combination of scores on two 
or more variables (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). Outliers in a dataset most likely derived from: 
i. Data errors: a source of outlying observations is a data entry error 
ii. Rare event syndrome: extreme observations that for some legitimate reason do not fit 
within the typical range of other data values.  
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(Hair et al., 2009) 
5.6.2.2 Univariate Outliers 
The present study used outlier labelling rule introduced by Tukey (1997) to determine the 
potential of univariate outliers (as cited in Hoaglin & Iglewicz, 1987, p. 1147). The outlier 
labelling rule identifies any observations that are considered having extreme value (outliers) 
within a parameter shown below: 
Y < [Q1 –k (Q3-Q1) or Y> Q3+k (Q3-Q1)] 
Where Y is the observation, Q1 is the first quartile and Q3 is the third quartile in a dataset, and k is a 
fixed constant value (2.2) 
 
In order to select the potential outliers for the present dataset, a descriptive analysis using SPSS 
V.20 is conducted that produced the box plots and the value for Q1 and Q3. Using the formula 
above, the value of Y (the lower value and the upper value) will be compared to the extreme 
value (lowest and highest) in the dataset. The results as shown in Table 5-14 indicate that the 
lowest value and the highest value for each construct were within the range of the value of Y 
(the lower value and the upper value). Thus, the univariate outliers in the current research 
dataset are tolerable. 
Table 5-14: Univariate Outlier-Labelling rule 
Constructs Q1 Q3 
Y 
(Lower 
value) 
Y 
(Upper 
Value) 
Lowest 
Value in 
the 
Dataset 
Highest 
Value in 
the 
Dataset 
1.Central government & agencies (CGT) 15 20 4 31 6 24 
2.Audit Commission (ACM) 10 12 5.6 16.4 4 15 
3.Media (MDN) 11 15 2.2 23.8 5 20 
4.Other local authorities (LAM)  5 8 -1.6 14.6 2 10 
5.Prof.bodies &assoc. (NBP) 8 11 1.4 17.6 3 13 
6.Stakeholder (STH) 9 11 4.6 15.4 5 15 
7.Forensic accounting providers (FSB) 7 9 2.6 13.4 3 14 
8.Benefits of forensic accounting (BFT) 7 11 -1.8 19.8 3 15 
9.Costs (COF) 8 11 1.4 17.6 3 14 
10.Risk (RISK) 6 8 1.6 12.4 2 10 
11.Perceived severity (SVF) 14 18 5.2 26.8 9 25 
12.Perceived susceptibility (PSF) 6 10 -2.8 18.8 3 15 
13.Audit Committee (ACT) 15 20 4 31 12 24 
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14.Internal control (ICON) 12 14 7.6 18.4 8 15 
15.Intention to use (INT) 3 5 -1.4 9.4 2 10 
5.6.2.3 Multivariate Outliers 
 
The current research employed Mahalanobis distance score approach of handling multivariate 
outliers. Mahalanobis distance ‘is the distance of a case from the centroid of the remaining 
cases where the centroid is the point created at the intersection of the means of all the 
variables’ (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007, p. 74). In order to determine the value of Mahalanobis 
distance, a liner regression is conducted. The results yielded the residual statistic including the 
maximum value of Mahalanobis distance which is 31.939. The next step is to refer the upper 
critical values of chi-square distribution with 15 variables (number of variables used in the 
linear regression) degrees of freedom with levels of significance of 0.001 (Hair et al., 2009). 
The critical value for 15 variables at a critical alpha of 0.001 is 36.123. Therefore, the highest 
value of Mahalanobis distance of 31.939 is within the range of the critical value of 36.123, 
suggested tolerable outliers in the dataset.  
 
5.6.3 Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) 
 
EFA is used to investigate the underlying variable structure of a psychometric instrument 
(Osborne & Fitzpatrick, 2012). Furthermore, the main objective conducting EFA is to reduce 
a number of observed variables to fewer unobserved factors in order to explore the construct 
dimensions (Treiblmaier & Filzmoser, 2010). As a guideline, this study adopted approach by 
Hoban, Lawson, Mazmanian, Best, & Seibel (2005) in reporting the results of EFA. 
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5.6.3.1 Sample Size Requirement 
 
The requirement of sample size for exploratory factor analysis was highlighted by (Hair et al., 
2009). The general guide is that sample sizes should be 100 or greater. Based on the guideline, 
the sample size of 139 is sufficient to conduct exploratory factor analysis. The total items in 
the model were 63.  
 
5.6.3.2 Method of EFA 
 
This study employed Principal Component Analysis (PCA) to extract factors and Varimax 
method based on orthogonal rotation (Pallant, 2011) with factor loading greater than 0.50 (Hair 
et al., 2009). Extracted factors were examined and named based on the analysis of the items 
loading on the proposed factors. Descriptive statistics on the proposed factors were carried out. 
Additionally, Cronbach alpha was used to determine the internal consistency and skewness and 
kurtosis value to examine data normality.  
 
5.6.3.3 Results of EFA 
 
The Kasier-Meter-Olkin (KMO) measure of sampling adequacy was 0.685 with N= 139 
indicating that the sample is adequate enough to detect factors (Hoban et al., 2005). The result 
for the communalities confirmed that high variation ranging from 0.571 to 0.904 indicated high 
variance among the variables (Hair et al., 2010). The Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity (BTOS) 
revealed a significant chi square of (p < 0.05). Based on eigenvalue, the 15 factors solution, 
which explained 78.034% of the variance, was preferred because of theoretical support similar 
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to the expected number of variables in the proposed model. The report on the results of KMO, 
BTOS, communalities, eigenvalue and scree plot is provided as per Appendix 7. 
 
After the process of refining EFA, 47 items with factor loading more than 0.50 were retained. 
However, 16 items were eliminated as shown in Table 5-15 due to not contributing to a simple 
structure and failed to meet a minimum criteria of having a primary factor loading of 0.5 above, 
and no cross-loading of 0.3 or above (Neill, 2008). Further analyses found that some items 
(ACM1, ICON4, ICON5, BFT4 and BFT5) emerged as new constructs. A detailed examination 
on the questionnaire was carried out to check the statements used, whether the items shared the 
common themes to be as a factor. In the questionnaire, ACM1 was asking about the reports on 
fraud issued by the Audit Commission, which have a similar question to item CGT3 and CGT4 
as outlined in Table 4-6. 
Table 5-15: Items Eliminated 
Item Code 
Below 
0.5 
Cross loading between 
more than 3 factors 
with 0.3 differences 
Cross loadings between more 
than 3 factors with 0.2 
differences 
1.  ACM2 √ √  
2.  ACM3  √  
3.  NBP1 √  √ 
4.  NBP4   √ 
5.  ASC 1 √ √  
6.  ASC 2 √   
7.  ASC 4  √  
8.  ACT1 √  √ 
9.  ACT2 √ √  
10.  ACT3 √  √ 
11.  ACT4  √  
12.  BFT6 √   
13.  BFT7  √  
14.  RIS1 √  √ 
15.  SHT2 √ √  
16.  SHT5 √   
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ICO4, ICO5, and ICO6 was related to counter fraud in local authorities, which differs from the 
theme in questions about the strength of internal control systems for item ICO1, ICO2, and 
ICO3 as depicted in Table 5-16 below: 
Table 5-16: New constructs-Counter fraud resources 
Item Code Statements in the questionnaire 
ICO4 In my local authority, the number of staff and resources allocated are 
adequate to counter fraud 
ICO5 In my local authority, those working to counter fraud have received 
specialist professional training and accreditation 
ICO6 The effectiveness of in-house fraud investigation in my local authority is 
very high 
  
Finally, BFT4 and BFT5 directly related to differences between forensic accountants and both 
internal and external auditors compared to items BFT1, BFT2, and BFT3 which focused more 
on the benefits of forensic accounting services as shown in Table 5-17 below: 
 
Table 5-17: New constructs: Perceptions towards forensic accountants 
Item Code Statements in the questionnaire 
BFT4 Forensic accountants have more objectivity and credibility in fraud 
detection and prevention than internal auditors 
BFT5 Forensic accountants have more objectivity and credibility in fraud 
detection and prevention than external auditors 
 
Based on a qualitative assessment of the loadings, the new constructs were named counter fraud 
resources (CTF) and perceptions towards forensic accountants (PFA). Additionally, item of 
ACM1 merged into central government and related agencies (CGT) while eliminating the 
Audit Committee (ACT) and Audit Commission (ACM) constructs as shown in Table 5-18. 
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Table 5-18: Emerging and Eliminating Constructs 
Item Code Eliminated/Separated/Merged 
Constructs  
Proposed factor based on a 
common theme 
1. ACM1 Merged with CGT1, CGT2, 
CGT3, CGT4 
Central government and 
related agencies (CGT) 
2. ICO4, ICO5 and 
ICO6 
Separated with ICO1, ICO2, 
ICO3 
Counter fraud resources 
(CTF) 
3. BFT4 and BFT5 Separated with BFT1, BFT2, 
BFT3 
Perceptions towards forensic 
accountants (PFA) 
4. ACT1, ACT2, ACT3, 
ACT4 
Eliminated (Audit Committee) None 
5. ACM2 and ACM3 Eliminated (Audit Commission) None 
 
Thus, the summary of the results after several iterations and the removal of weaker items: an 
empirically validated 15-factor solution emerged as depicted in Table 5-19.  
Table 5-19: Rotated Component Matrix 
 Component 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
MDN2 .908               
MDN4 .892               
MDN1 .878               
MDN3 .860               
MDN5 .769               
CGT2  .841              
CGT3  .821              
ACM1  .817              
CGT4  .807              
CGT1  .797              
SVF3   .855             
SVF2   .790             
SVF4   .723             
SVF1   .658             
SVF5   .587             
BFT1    .881            
BFT2    .824            
BFT3    .812            
PSF2     .901           
PSF3     .883           
PSF1     .864           
COF2      .866          
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 Component 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
COF1      .849          
COF3      .814          
ICO6       .832         
ICO4       .830         
ICO5       .807         
NBP3        .867        
NBP2        .803        
ASC3        .765        
SHT1         .864       
SHT3         .836       
SHT4         .679       
ICO2          .866      
ICO1          .807      
ICO3          .717      
FSB2           .821     
FSB1           .731     
FSB4           .685     
LAM2            .857    
LAM1            .837    
BFT5             .855   
BFT4             .824   
RIS3              .907  
RIS2              .791  
INT2               .635 
INT1               .548 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
Factor loadings <0.5 are suppressed 
 
Overall, the results of exploratory factor analysis indicated 15 distinct factors. The factors 
within the institutional theory suited the extracted factors; Central government and related 
agencies (Coercive), perceived used and success by other local authorities (Mimetic), and 
professional and association bodies, forensic accounting providers and stakeholders 
(Normative). Internal consistency for each of the scales was examined using Cronbach’s alpha. 
The alphas range from 0.701 to 0.935, which is greater than 0.60 (Hair et al., 2010). Descriptive 
statistics are presented in Table 5-20. Examinations of a normal distribution revealed that the 
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skewness and kurtosis were well within a tolerable range. Data is considered normal if both the 
value of the skewness and kurtosis fall within a range of -1 to 1(Hair et al., 2014).  
 
Table 5-20: Descriptive Statistic after EFA (N=139) 
Constructs 
Initial 
no. of 
items 
No. of 
items 
After 
EFA 
M (SD) Skewness Kurtosis 
Cronbach 
Alpha 
1.CGT 4 5 17.34(3.80) -1.066 .739 0.900 
2.MDN 5 5 14.10(3.01) -.200 -.019 0.935 
3.LAM 2 2 6.30(1.80) -.375 -.220 0.755 
4.NBP 8 3 9.14(2.39) -.603 .077 0.845 
5.STH 5 3 10.59(1.91) -.224 .122 0.779 
6.FSB 3 3 7.87(1.74) -.031 1.143 0.701 
7.BFT 7 3 9.01(2.38) -.224 -.172 0.876 
8.PFA 0 2 5.76(1.90) -.016 -.306 0.759 
9.COF 3 3 9.55(2.25) -.353 -.525 0.846 
10.RIS 3 2 7.19(1.68) -.794 .873 0.731 
11.SVF 5 5 16.16(3.30) .300 .358 0.792 
12.PSF 3 3 8.43(2.46) .291 .118 0.876 
13.CFT 0 3 12.41(1.60) -.204 -.164 0.754 
14.ICO 6 3 10.94(2.33) -.836 .564 0.812 
15.INT 2 2 3.86(1.70) .999 .563 0.909 
16.ACM 3 - Factors 
eliminated 
   
17.ACT 4 -    
Total items 63 47     
M=Mean, SD= Standard Deviation 
 
5.6.4 Arrangement of Proposed Hypotheses after EFA 
Based on the EFA, the results indicated that the Hypothesis 2 (Audit Commission) and 
Hypothesis 13 (Audit Committee) as described in Chapter 3 be removed from the proposed 
model. However, two new hypotheses are generated; the perceptions of the objectivity and 
credibility between forensic accountants and auditors would positively influence the intention 
of English local authorities to use forensic accounting services, and the strength of in-house 
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counter fraud will negatively influence the intention of English local authorities to use forensic 
accounting services as outlined below in Table 5-21: 
 
Table 5-21: List of Revised Hypotheses 
New Arrangement of Hypotheses Construct 
H1: Directives, rules, and policies (including initiatives and action plan) from 
central government and reports on fraud by the related government 
agencies will positively influence the intention of English local authorities 
to use forensic accounting services 
CGT 
H2: News of fraud highlighted by the media will positively influence the 
intention of English local authorities to use forensic accounting services 
MDN 
H3: Extent and perceived success of using forensic accounting services by 
other local authorities will positively influence the intention of English 
local authorities to use forensic accounting services 
LAM 
H4: Recommendations to effectively detect and prevent fraud by the 
professional bodies and associations will positively influence the 
intention of English local authorities to use forensic accounting services. 
NBP 
H5: Forensic accounting services providers through published report on frauds, 
promoted to market their services, and had expertise and capabilities 
which will positively influence the intention of English local authorities 
to use forensic accounting services 
FSB 
H6: Pressure from the stakeholders will positively influence the intention of 
English local authorities to use forensic accounting services 
STH 
H7: Perceived benefits of forensic accounting will positively influence the 
intention of English local authorities to use forensic accounting services  
BFT 
H8: Perceptions of the objectivity and credibility between forensic accountants 
and auditors will positively influence the intention of English local 
authorities to use forensic accounting services  
PFA 
H9: The costs of forensic accounting services will negatively influence the 
intention of English local authorities to use forensic accounting services  
COF 
H10: Perceived risks of forensic accounting will negatively influence the 
intention of English local authorities to use forensic accounting services  
RIS 
H11: Perceived severity of fraud will positively influence the intention of 
English local authorities to use forensic accounting services 
SVF 
H12: Perceived susceptibility of fraud will positively influence the intention of 
English local authorities to use forensic accounting services 
PSF 
H13: Strength of internal control will negatively influence the intention of 
English local authorities to use forensic accounting services 
ICO 
H14: Strength of the in-house counter fraud resources will negatively influence 
the intention of English local authorities to use forensic accounting 
services 
CFT 
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5.7 Data Analysis Using Structured Equation Modelling (SEM) and Partial Least 
Square (PLS) 
 
Structured Equation Modelling (SEM) was used for confirmatory factor analysis and 
hypothesis testing in this study. SEM known as a second generation multivariate data analysis 
technique simultaneously testing the measurement model and the structural model (Hair et al., 
2014). SEM had been utilised by studies within business research including accounting (Lee et 
al., 2011) and within institutional context (e.g. Teo et al., 2003; Henderson et al., 2011; Son & 
Benbasat, 2007). SEM provides extensive, scalable, and flexible causal-modelling capabilities 
beyond those offered by first generation statistic techniques particularly in determining the 
conclusion of validity (Lowry & Gaskin, 2014, p. 125).  
 
SEM assesses the properties of the scales employed to measure the theoretical constructs and 
estimates the hypothesized relationships among the constructs (Barclay et al., 1995). In other 
words, SEM is able to answer a set of interrelated research questions simultaneously through 
measurement and structural model. While other SEM methods present, the choice to use PLS 
was driven by several factors as outlined in Chapter 4 Section 4.7.2. Unlike the SEM techniques 
of LISREL and AMOS, PLS does not make the assumption of multivariate normality as non-
parametric procedures is employed.  
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5.7.1 Sample size 
 
Although PLS-SEM has flexibility on sample size requirement, Hair et al., (2014) suggested 
that the rule of thumb initiated by Barclay et al. (1995) can be considered. Based on the 
recommendation by Barclay et al. (1995, p. 292), the sample required will be based on the 
assumption below: 
i. ‘10 times the largest number of predictors of the formative construct (the most complex) 
or 
ii. 10 times the largest number of predictors of the antecedent construct lead to 
endogenous construct in the structural model (regression)’ 
 
The current thesis does not apply any formative constructs in the model as all indicators were 
considered as reflective constructs. Based on the second rule of thumb, the largest number of 
paths (theoretical model) in the structural model is 14, whilst the minimum sample size required 
is 140. Accordingly, the sample size of 139 nearly met the minimum requirement as per rule 
of thumb.  
 
5.7.2 Model Assessment 
 
In PLS, model estimation provides empirical measures of the relationships between the 
indicators and the constructs known as measurement model as well as between the constructs 
known as structural model (Hair et al., 2014). The empirical measures enable a comparison 
between the theoretical represented through measurement and structural model, and the reality 
represented by the sample data. Thus, the model assessment could determine how well the 
theory fits the data. 
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5.7.2.1 Assessment of the Measurement Model 
According to Hair et al. (2014), ‘the outer model or the measurement model identifies the 
relationships between the indicator variables and their corresponding construct (latent 
variable)’ (p. 110).  The assessment of the measurement model for reflective constructs 
includes composite reliability, convergent validity and discriminant validity (Hair et al., 2014). 
In other words, the assessment of the measurement model is conducted before the assessment 
of the measurement model to indicate whether the characteristics of constructs were reliable 
and valid. As PLS-SEM does not provide an overall goodness of fit index, thus nonparametric 
evaluation criteria based on bootstrapping was used in the structural model (Hair et al., 2014). 
The 47 reflective indicators in the theoretical model were run using the SmartPLS 3.0 (Ringle 
et al., 2005). The output of the measurement model is shown in Appendix 8. 
 
5.7.2.1.1 Convergent validity 
 
Evaluating the convergent validity is conducted by analysing the indicator reliability, 
composite reliability (CR), item reliability of Cronbach’s Alpha (CA) and Average Variance 
Extracted (AVE) (Chin, 1998; Fornell and Lacker, 1981; Hair et al., 2014). Table 5-22 presents 
the breakdown of the convergent validity’s analysis. First, the indicator reliability based on the 
factor loading specifies the total variances that can be explained by the latent variable. The 
factor loading indicates the items loaded from a lower bound of 0.603 to an upper bound of 
0.966. The loading specifies the correlation of the items with their respective construct 
(Nunnally, 1978), and at the same time determines the rate of random error in a particular 
construct. (Fornell & Larcker, 1981). Any factor loading less than 0.6 will be eliminated to 
maintain a high factor loading that will reduce the level of random error and to achieve 
convergent validity.  
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Table 5-22: Measurement of Convergent Validity 
Constructs  Item Loadings AVE CR CA 
1.Central government and related 
agencies (CGT) 
ACM1 0.839 0.713 0.925 0.901 
CGT1 0.800    
CGT2 0.879    
CGT3 0.878    
CGT4 0.821    
2.Media (MDN) MDN1 0.938 0.796 0.951 0.935 
MDN2 0.946    
MDN3 0.907    
MDN4 0.935    
MDN5 0.714    
3.Other local authorities (LAM)  LAM1 0.895 0.803 0.891 0.755 
LAM2 0.898    
4.Assoc. & prof. bodies (NBP) NBP2 0.957 0.891 0.942 0.879 
NBP3 0.931    
5.Stakeholders (SHT) SHT1 0.847 0.825 0.904 0.810 
SHT3 0.966    
6.Forensic accounting providers (FSB) FSB1 0.794 0.630 0.836 0.710 
FSB2 0.907    
FSB4 0.793    
7.Benefits of forensic accounting (BFT) BFT1 0.949 0.803 0.924 0.877 
BFT2 0.871    
BFT3 0.867    
8.Perceptions of forensic accountants 
(PFA) 
BFT4 0.940 0.800 0.889 0.761 
BFT5 0.847    
9.Costs to acquire the services (COF) COF1 0.914 0.764 0.906 0.845 
COF2 0.907    
COF3 0.797    
10. Risk (RIS) RIS2 0.955 0.774 0.872 0.736 
RIS3 0.797    
11. Perceived severity of fraud (SVF) SVF1 0.603 0.798 0.854 0.794 
SVF2 0.791    
SVF3 0.828    
SVF4 0.712    
SVF5 0.730    
12.Perceived fraud susceptibility (PSF) PSF1 0.888 0.848 0.922 0.876 
PSF2 0.940    
PSF3 0.849    
13.Internal control (ICO) ICO1 0.961 0.720 0.918 0.821 
ICO2 0.954    
14. Counter fraud resources (CTF) ICO4 0.811 0.824 0.885 0.813 
ICO5 0.889    
ICO6 0.845    
15. Intention to use (INT) INT1 0.961 0.916 0.956 0.909 
INT2 0.954    
 236 
 
The process of removal or elimination for items that is considered weak (based on factor 
loading) is standard procedure in social science studies particularly when newly developed 
scales are used (Hulland, 1999). The general recommendation for items removal is if the factor 
loading is below 0.70 (Hair et al., 2014). However, Hair et al. (2014) reiterate that factor 
loading between 0.40 to 0.70 can be retained if the removal of the factor loading does not affect 
the suggested threshold value of the composite reliability or the AVE. Initially, the first testing 
of PLS resulted in elimination of items: ASC3 (loading = 0.371), SHT4 (loading = 0.391), and 
ICON3 (loading = 0.530). When discarding the lower factor loadings, each construct had at 
least two minimum items that met the criteria suggested by Kline (1998). The refined 
measurement model was re-run and resulted in all factor loadings above 0.70 cut-off point 
except for SVF1 (loading=0.603). However, as suggested by Hair et al. (2014), item SVF1 is 
retained as the deletion of the item did not significantly increase either the composite reliability 
or the AVE.  
 
The next measurement of the convergent validity is internal consistency reliability measured 
by the composite reliability (CR) and Cronbach’s alpha (CA). Internal consistency, or the CR, 
refers as ‘a second-generation procedure that measures reliability’ (Muthusamy, 2011, p.265). 
Compared to the traditional CA, the CR is more appropriate to be used as the CA tends to 
underestimate the internal consistency reliability (Hair et al., 2014). However, for the purposes 
of determining the internal consistency reliability, both the CR and the CA were used in this 
study. As indicated in Table 5-22, the CRs and CAs are greater than 0.70 indicating that they 
satisfied the requirement suggested by (Nunnally, 1978). Thus, these results indicate that all of 
the constructs had high internal consistency reliability to ensure the reliability of the 
measurement model. 
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Finally, the AVE, which measured the variance in a particular item explained by a particular  
construct (Fornell & Larcker, 1981), is presented. Hair et al. (2014) argue that the AVE is 
similar to the concept of communality of a construct. The minimum value of the AVE 
according to the rule of thumb is 0.50 (Fornell & Larcker, 1981; Nunnally, 1978). Table 5-22 
indicates that the value of AVE is from the lowest 0.543 for Severity (SVF) to the highest 0.916 
for Intention (INT) that indicated it met the minimum requirement of the AVE. In summary, 
the reflective constructs satisfied all criteria for indicator reliability, internal consistency, and 
the AVE, in support of convergent validity.  
5.7.2.1.2 Discriminant Validity  
According to Hair et al. (2014) discriminant validity correspond  to ‘the extent to which a 
construct is empirically distinct from other constructs or, in other words, the construct 
measures what it is intended to measure’ (p. 112). By achieving the requirement of the 
discriminant validity, a construct is considered unique and captures phenomena not represented 
by other constructs in the model. Barclay et al. (1995) suggested two measures of discriminant 
validity for the reflective constructs: average variances extracted (AVE) analysis, and cross 
loading matrix evaluation. 
The AVE analysis based on the Fornell-Lacker criterion (Hair et al., 2014) compares the square 
root of the AVE values with the latent variable correlations. In order to satisfy the requirement 
of the discriminant validity, Fornell & Larcker (1981) recommend to compare the square root 
of AVE with the squared correlations between the latent constructs, in which the value of the 
square root of AVE is higher than the squared correlations. As a result, a construct is considered 
to share more variance with its associated indicators than with any other construct (Hair et al., 
2014). The results obtained from the AVE analysis are shown in Table 5-23. From this analysis, 
all the reflective constructs are more strongly related to their own measures than to other 
constructs.  
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Table 5-23: AVE Analysis and the Correlation between the Constructs 
 Construct  BFT PFA CGT COF FSB ICO CTF INT MDN LAM NBP PSF RIS SHT SVF 
BFT 0.896                             
PFA 0.204 0.895                           
CGT 0.337 0.307 0.844                         
COF -0.302 -0.140 -0.227 0.874                       
FSB 0.279 0.104 0.163 -0.138 0.794                     
ICO -0.104 -0.284 -0.110 0.174 -0.051 0.921                   
CTF -0.099 -0.218 -0.068 -0.083 0.063 -0.131 0.849                 
INT 0.465 0.372 0.481 -0.395 0.210 -0.224 -0.222 0.957               
MDN 0.166 0.173 0.182 -0.055 0.325 -0.025 -0.074 0.228 0.892             
LAM 0.234 0.181 0.279 -0.099 0.182 -0.088 -0.007 0.394 0.179 0.896           
NBP 0.035 0.168 0.211 0.064 0.171 -0.055 -0.002 0.088 0.447 0.110 0.944         
PSF 0.170 -0.021 0.113 -0.089 0.071 0.107 0.014 0.210 0.086 0.138 0.056 0.893       
RIS -0.004 -0.094 -0.023 0.026 0.014 0.059 0.159 -0.112 -0.129 0.051 -0.047 0.040 0.880     
SHT -0.074 0.055 0.053 0.123 0.160 0.058 -0.031 0.050 0.192 0.040 0.197 -0.017 0.120 0.909   
SVF -0.136 -0.150 -0.125 -0.035 -0.084 0.112 0.169 -0.096 -0.028 0.027 0.023 0.026 0.278 -0.116 0.737 
(The square roots of the AVEs are displayed on the diagonal in bold and italics)  
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The final measurement of discriminant validity is examining the cross loading matrix. To meet 
the criteria, the loading value of a particular construct need to be higher than their loading value 
in a different set of constructs or the cross loadings, providing further evidence of discriminant 
validity (Hair et al., 2014). Table 5-24 indicates that the loading value for all items measured 
(within the construct) were higher than the loading items measured (in other constructs). Thus, 
overall discriminant validity was achieved with the PLS-SEM analysis. 
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Table 5-24: Cross Loading Matrix 
  BFT PFA CGT COF FSB ICO CTF INT MDN LAM NBP PSF RIS SHT SVF 
ACM1 0.326 0.279 0.839 -0.251 0.189 -0.121 0.005 0.336 0.210 0.224 0.224 0.049 0.034 0.046 -0.088 
BFT1 0.949 0.120 0.356 -0.294 0.263 -0.082 -0.060 0.457 0.154 0.234 -0.011 0.177 0.014 -0.028 -0.157 
BFT2 0.871 0.208 0.259 -0.227 0.188 -0.083 -0.116 0.407 0.078 0.239 0.064 0.177 0.040 -0.104 -0.071 
BFT3 0.867 0.233 0.284 -0.289 0.303 -0.119 -0.094 0.382 0.220 0.151 0.048 0.097 -0.072 -0.073 -0.135 
BFT4 0.245 0.940 0.326 -0.147 0.168 -0.246 -0.197 0.391 0.184 0.192 0.146 -0.026 -0.085 0.019 -0.135 
BFT5 0.091 0.847 0.202 -0.095 -0.021 -0.273 -0.197 0.251 0.114 0.120 0.161 -0.009 -0.084 0.097 -0.136 
CGT1 0.297 0.289 0.800 -0.234 0.164 -0.085 0.054 0.310 0.110 0.306 0.135 0.021 0.019 0.000 -0.067 
CGT2 0.270 0.242 0.879 -0.170 0.114 -0.104 -0.130 0.498 0.168 0.202 0.151 0.133 -0.086 0.098 -0.147 
CGT3 0.296 0.300 0.878 -0.199 0.092 -0.133 -0.067 0.465 0.135 0.208 0.190 0.181 -0.052 -0.016 -0.145 
CGT4 0.247 0.196 0.821 -0.128 0.165 -0.008 -0.100 0.365 0.149 0.274 0.201 0.043 0.029 0.089 -0.054 
COF1 -0.307 -0.118 -0.249 0.914 -0.158 0.215 -0.063 -0.391 -0.092 -0.141 0.032 -0.108 0.036 0.088 0.035 
COF2 -0.306 -0.168 -0.204 0.907 -0.136 0.105 -0.068 -0.340 -0.029 -0.113 0.131 -0.039 0.001 0.096 -0.047 
COF3 -0.162 -0.078 -0.129 0.797 -0.054 0.124 -0.092 -0.298 -0.012 0.012 0.003 -0.084 0.030 0.147 -0.098 
FSB1 0.260 0.018 0.126 -0.153 0.794 -0.036 0.081 0.163 0.270 0.154 0.136 0.114 0.041 0.022 -0.100 
FSB2 0.215 0.044 0.062 -0.080 0.795 -0.072 0.049 0.139 0.228 0.178 0.105 0.097 0.041 0.182 -0.059 
FSB4 0.193 0.166 0.182 -0.092 0.793 -0.021 0.024 0.190 0.270 0.112 0.158 -0.022 -0.036 0.176 -0.045 
ICO1 -0.094 -0.336 -0.106 0.132 -0.042 0.916 -0.115 -0.200 -0.019 -0.098 -0.060 0.051 0.065 0.042 0.150 
ICO2 -0.098 -0.192 -0.097 0.187 -0.052 0.926 -0.126 -0.212 -0.027 -0.066 -0.043 0.144 0.043 0.064 0.060 
ICO4 -0.138 -0.128 -0.017 -0.063 0.082 -0.162 0.811 -0.129 -0.064 0.051 -0.018 -0.030 0.120 0.054 0.101 
ICO5 -0.036 -0.193 -0.065 -0.090 0.032 -0.146 0.889 -0.235 -0.077 -0.072 -0.035 0.055 0.160 -0.148 0.125 
ICO6 -0.110 -0.222 -0.079 -0.052 0.062 -0.030 0.845 -0.174 -0.043 0.040 0.054 -0.015 0.116 0.077 0.203 
INT1 0.447 0.390 0.455 -0.416 0.187 -0.257 -0.232 0.961 0.194 0.399 0.048 0.171 -0.088 0.042 -0.090 
INT2 0.443 0.319 0.467 -0.338 0.216 -0.169 -0.191 0.954 0.245 0.353 0.123 0.233 -0.128 0.055 -0.094 
LAM1 0.220 0.170 0.256 -0.140 0.193 -0.103 0.005 0.350 0.128 0.895 0.119 0.193 0.112 -0.012 0.085 
LAM2 0.200 0.155 0.244 -0.038 0.134 -0.056 -0.018 0.356 0.192 0.898 0.079 0.056 -0.020 0.083 -0.036 
MDN1 0.161 0.182 0.138 -0.081 0.310 -0.073 -0.086 0.238 0.938 0.176 0.433 0.069 -0.150 0.230 -0.065 
MDN2 0.191 0.193 0.208 -0.031 0.285 -0.016 -0.112 0.230 0.946 0.165 0.391 0.058 -0.081 0.187 -0.085 
MDN3 0.119 0.132 0.139 -0.085 0.321 -0.022 -0.027 0.195 0.907 0.196 0.453 0.096 -0.178 0.196 0.007 
MDN4 0.159 0.180 0.207 -0.013 0.357 -0.045 -0.041 0.206 0.935 0.129 0.434 0.044 -0.113 0.133 -0.008 
MDN5 0.091 0.038 0.108 -0.028 0.132 0.102 -0.049 0.120 0.714 0.132 0.249 0.163 -0.028 0.075 0.087 
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  BFT PFA CGT COF FSB ICO CTF INT MDN LAM NBP PSF RIS SHT SVF 
NBP2 0.030 0.140 0.175 0.044 0.226 -0.038 -0.038 0.091 0.442 0.067 0.957 0.089 -0.054 0.193 0.054 
NBP3 0.038 0.183 0.230 0.081 0.080 -0.071 0.043 0.073 0.398 0.152 0.931 0.007 -0.033 0.177 -0.018 
PSF1 0.110 0.024 0.028 -0.047 0.069 0.126 0.027 0.182 0.047 0.122 0.029 0.888 0.094 -0.065 0.070 
PSF2 0.208 -0.046 0.167 -0.105 0.056 0.080 -0.011 0.230 0.087 0.127 0.016 0.940 -0.011 0.028 0.002 
PSF3 0.116 -0.035 0.091 -0.084 0.073 0.085 0.034 0.125 0.106 0.123 0.145 0.849 0.038 -0.024 -0.005 
RIS2 -0.046 -0.081 -0.024 0.007 0.025 0.100 0.149 -0.122 -0.105 0.058 -0.050 0.052 0.955 0.102 0.371 
RIS3 0.082 -0.092 -0.016 0.055 -0.011 -0.043 0.134 -0.060 -0.140 0.020 -0.028 0.004 0.797 0.121 0.006 
SHT1 -0.085 0.061 0.058 0.052 0.089 0.005 -0.031 0.027 0.161 0.049 0.056 -0.012 0.100 0.847 -0.069 
SHT3 -0.061 0.046 0.045 0.144 0.177 0.078 -0.027 0.056 0.187 0.032 0.244 -0.018 0.117 0.966 -0.126 
SVF1 -0.046 -0.043 0.047 -0.093 -0.062 0.095 0.149 -0.027 0.062 0.077 0.058 0.063 0.167 -0.139 0.603 
SVF2 -0.119 -0.123 -0.098 0.038 -0.126 0.198 -0.028 -0.090 -0.056 -0.013 -0.062 0.002 0.242 -0.060 0.791 
SVF3 -0.076 -0.028 -0.069 -0.104 0.013 0.069 0.131 -0.057 -0.083 0.049 0.048 0.017 0.284 -0.113 0.828 
SVF4 -0.072 -0.057 -0.121 -0.037 -0.037 0.047 0.068 -0.062 -0.034 0.049 0.081 0.031 0.214 -0.071 0.712 
SVF5 -0.141 -0.221 -0.132 -0.015 -0.067 -0.003 0.325 -0.085 0.041 -0.003 0.022 0.018 0.131 -0.094 0.730 
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5.7.2.2 Assessment of the Structural Model 
 
The final stage of SEM is the structural model to determine the significance of the constructs 
and the explanatory power of the model. Based on the measurement model that yielded the 
confirmation of good psychometric properties, the structural model was assessed using Smart 
PLS 3.0. PLS will estimate the variance associated with endogenous construct (dependent 
variable). In the structural model of PLS, non-parametric resampling procedure known as 
bootstrap is used to examine the accuracy of the estimates and to generate significance tests of 
the results. Following recommendation by Hair et al. (2014), the bootstrapping option was run 
using 5000 subsamples to compute standard errors and significance levels. The results from 
the bootstrap produced the t-value. The application of the t-value is the same as the t-test, which 
to determine the significance on the relationship of the hypotheses.  
 
The R2 is ‘interpreted in a similar way as in any multiple regression analysis’ (Muthusamy, 
2011, p. 275) that represents the proportion of the dependent variable’s variance explained by 
the independent (exogenous) variables or a measure of model’s predictive accuracy or the 
exploratory power of the model (Hair et al., 2014, p. 133). The rule of thumb to determine the 
acceptable value of R2 are: 0.75 (substantial), 0.50 (moderate), and 0.25 (weak) (Hair et al., 
2014). Falk & Miller (1992) recommend R2 for endogenous variable be equal to or more than 
0.10. The research model reaches statistical significance if p-value, is denoted as p=.000; this 
really means p<0.0005 (Pallant, 2011). For this study, all statistical tests were assessed at 0.05 
level of significance (p≤0.05) using two-tailed t-tests. As for the t-value, if the value is 1.96 
and above, it indicates that the influence (or relationship) is significant at p≤0.05 (Pallant, 
2011). In addition, to examine the directions (negative or positive) between independent and 
dependent variables of this study, the signs (- or +) at the front of path coefficients (β) were 
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also inspected. Path coefficients represent ‘the hypothesized relationships linking the 
constructs with coefficients closer to +1 representing strong positive relationships and 
coefficient closer to -1 indicating strong negative relationship’,  (Hair et al., 2014, p. 114). The 
value of R2 and (β) is taken during the measurement model as shown in Appendix 8. The t-
value is derived in the structural model as shown in Appendix 11.  
 
Following Fichman, Hall, & Ave (1997), three models were estimated: the full model (both 
theoretical variables and control variables) as shown in Appendix 9, the empirical/theoretical 
model (theoretical variables only) as shown in Appendix 8, and the control model (control 
variables only) as shown in Appendix  11. The control model as depicted in Appendix 10 is 
used to provide a benchmark for assessing the additional impact of the variables in the 
theoretical model. These three models were estimated to provide a basis for assessing the true 
impact of the theoretical variables and to rule out alternative explanations. A comparison 
between the full model and the control models as shown in Table 5-25 indicates that the full 
model explains a substantive incremental variance of (57.8% - 16.9%) 40.9%. In contrast, the 
incremental variance derived by comparing the full model and the theoretical model amounts 
to a mere (57.8% - 53.1%) 4.7%. These results suggest that the theoretical model is substantive 
enough to explain a large proportion of the variance predisposition toward the intention to use 
forensic accounting services.  
 
As can be seen from Table 5-26, only one of the control variables, the size of internal audit is 
statistically significant both in the full model (IAT: β= 0.185, p < 0.05) and in the control model 
(IAT: β= 0.405, p < 0.01). Additionally, including control variables in the full model resulted 
the perceived severity of fraud (PSF: β= 0.096) to be statistically not significant compared in 
the empirical/theoretical model (PSF: β= 0.123, p < 0.05) that indicates having a significant 
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impact on the intention to use forensic accounting services. The results suggest that the control 
variables play an important role in the full model.  
Table 5-25: Comparison of the Structural Models-Summary 
Results 
Model 1 
Full Model 
(N=139) 
Model 2 
Control 
Variables Only 
(N=139) 
Model 3 
Empirical (Theoretical) 
Variables Only 
(N=139) 
Number of paths in the 
model 
21 7 14 
Number of significant 
paths in the model 
6 1 6 
Variance Explained (R2) 57.8% 16.9% 53.1% 
 
Table 5-26: Evaluation of the Structural Models- Results of the PLS Analysis: Path 
Coefficients 
Constructs 
Path Coefficients 
Model 1 
Full 
Model 
(N=139) 
Model 2 
Control Variables 
Only 
(N=139) 
Model 3 
Empirical (Theoretical) 
Variables Only 
(N=139) 
1. CGT 0.228*  0.231* 
2. MDN 0.039  0.051 
3. LAM 0.192*  0.205* 
4. NBP -0.093  -0.056 
5. SHT 0.096  0.084 
6. FSB 0.029  0.019 
7. BFT 0.199*  0.195* 
8. PFA 0.088  0.108 
9. COF -0.180*  -0.228* 
10. RIS -0.108  -0.086 
11. PSF 0.096  0.123* 
12. SVF 0.037  0.044 
13. ICO -0.113  -0.133 
14. CFT -0.199*  -0.189* 
15. LAS -0.034 -0.023  
16. IAT 0.185* 0.405**  
17. CFR -0.071 0.038  
18. T_COUNTY -0.018 -0.158  
19. T_UNITARY -0.025 -0.031  
20. T_METROPOLITAN 0.020 -0.020  
21. T_LONDON 0.122 0.178  
Variance Explained (R2) in 
Intention to Use 57.8% 16.9% 53.1% 
Path significance: 
** p<0.001 
*p<0.005 
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5.7.2.2.1 Coefficient of Determination 
 
The result of the R2 (0.578) in the full model indicates that 57.8% of the variance of the 
intention to use forensic accounting services can be explained by the research model based on 
the 21 exogenous variables, including control variables.  
 
5.7.3 Hypotheses Testing 
 
The results from the PLS data analysis reveal that the exploratory power of the organisational 
intention model is satisfactory at R2 = 57.8%. The standardized path coefficient (β) determines 
the positive and negative direction of the hypothesised relationship while the t-values 
determine whether the relationships of variables are significant or not. The next section details 
the results for each hypothesis. The results of the hypotheses testing were grouped based on: 
1) Institutional variables (coercive, mimetic, and normative pressures): 2) Forensic accounting 
perceptions factors: 3) Fraud perceptions factors: and 4) Internal factors.  
 
5.7.3.1 Hypotheses Based on the Coercive Pressures 
 
The first hypothesis test was the influence of central government and the related agencies in 
increasing the intention to use forensic accounting services among English local authorities. It 
was hypothesized that central government’s action and the reports issued by the related 
agencies would have a significant positive influence on the intention to utilise forensic 
accounting services. The evidence from the analysis indicates that central government and 
related agencies (H1: β= 0.228, t-value = 2.842, p < 0.05) have a positive and significant effect. 
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Therefore, H1 is supported that central government and related agencies influence the intention 
to use forensic accounting services among English local authorities. 
 
Hypothesis H2 tests the influence of media through television, radio and social media with the 
intention to use forensic accounting services by English local authorities. In contrast to H1, the 
evidence indicated that media (H2: β= 0.039, t-value = 0.630) has a positive effect but is not 
statistically significant. Based on the finding, it is argued that media does not have a significant 
influence on the intention to use forensic accounting services by English local authorities. 
Therefore, H2 has to be rejected. 
 
Overall, only one of the hypotheses under coercive pressures is supported (H1). The summary 
of the results for hypotheses H1 and H2 is summarised in Table 5-27 below. 
 
Table 5-27: Summary of Hypotheses Based on Coercive Pressures 
Hypothesis Standard 
path 
coefficient 
(β) 
t- value Outcome 
H1: Directives, rules, and policies (including 
initiatives and action plan) from central government 
and related government agencies will positively 
influence the intention of English local authorities to 
use forensic accounting services 
0.228 2.842 Supported 
H2: News of fraud highlighted by the media will 
positively influence the intention of English local 
authorities to use forensic accounting services 
0.039 0.630 Not 
Supported 
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5.7.3.2 Hypothesis Based on the Mimetic Pressures 
Hypothesis H3 tests the influence of other local government that used and received a high rate 
of success in using forensic accounting services to influence a local authority’s intention to use 
the services. The finding indicated that (H3: β= 0.192, t-value = 2.895, p < 0.05) has a positive 
influence and significant effect. This suggests that the higher perceived use and success of 
forensic accounting services by local authority, the level of intention to use forensic accounting 
services also increases. The finding also shows that the t-value (2.895) for H3 is the highest 
within the institutional variables, which indicates that mimetic pressure is the most influential 
factor on the intention to use forensic accounting services compared to the coercive and 
normative pressures. Table 5-28 summarised the results of the hypothesis testing H3. 
 
Table 5-28: Summary of Hypothesis Based on the Mimetic Pressures 
Hypothesis Standard 
path 
coefficient 
(β) 
t- value Outcome 
H3: Extent and perceived success of using forensic 
accounting services by other local authorities will 
positively influence the intention of English local 
authorities to use forensic accounting services 
0.192 2.895 Supported 
 
5.7.3.3 Hypotheses Based on Normative Pressures 
 
The results obtained from the PLS analysis of the normative pressures are presented in Table 
5-29. No hypotheses under the normative pressures (H4, H5, and H 6) are supported. The 
findings show that the professional bodies and associations (H4: β= -0.093, t-value = 1.162), 
forensic accounting services providers (H5: β= 0.029, t-value = 0.478), and stakeholders (H6: 
β= 0.096, t-value = 1.058). Surprisingly, the result of hypothesis H4 indicates a negative 
direction that suggests the higher participation of the professional bodies and association, the 
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lower intention to use forensic accounting services among English local authorities. It can 
therefore be assumed that the role of the professional bodies and associations, forensic 
accounting services providers, and stakeholders were not significant factors in the decision to 
utilise forensic accounting services.  
Table 5-29: Summary of Hypotheses Based on Normative Pressures 
Hypothesis Standard 
path 
coefficient 
(β) 
t- value Outcome 
H4: Recommendations to effectively detect and 
prevent fraud by the professional bodies and 
associations will positively influence the intention of 
English local authorities to use forensic accounting 
services 
-0.093 1.162 Not 
Supported 
H5: Forensic accounting services providers through 
published report on frauds, promoted to market their 
services, and had expertise and capabilities will 
positively influence the intention of English local 
authorities to use forensic accounting services 
0.029 0.478 Not 
Supported 
H6: Pressures from stakeholder will positively 
influence the intention of English local authorities to 
use forensic accounting services 
0.096 1.058 Not 
Supported 
 
5.7.3.4 Hypotheses Based on Forensic Accounting Perceptions Factors 
 
Hypothesis H7 examines the perceived benefits of forensic accounting services to influence 
the intention to use the services. It can be seen from Table 5-30 that the evidence from the 
analysis indicates that the perceived benefits of forensic accounting services (H7: β= 0.199, t-
value = 2.714, p < 0.05) have a positive and significant effect. The finding also indicates that 
the t-value (2.714) for H7 is the highest among the indicators other than institutional variables. 
This strong evidence implies that when  the perceived benefits of forensic accounting services 
are higher, local authorities in England had greater intention to utilise forensic accounting 
services.  
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Hypothesis H8 that emerged after conducting the exploratory factor analysis posits that the 
perceptions of the objectivity and credibility between forensic accountants and auditors will 
positively influence the intention of English local authorities to utilise forensic accounting 
services. The result shows that (H8: β= 0.088, t-value = 1.216) has a positive direction but not 
statistically significant. Therefore, H8 is rejected. 
 
Hypothesis H9 tests the impact of costs to acquire the services towards intention to use forensic 
accounting services. The evidence from the analysis indicates that financial costs (H9: β= -
0.180, t-value = 2.451, p < 0.05) have a negative and significant effect. The finding indicates 
that financial costs are a crucial consideration that influences local authorities’ intention to use 
forensic accounting services to detect and prevent fraud. 
 
Hypothesis H10 posits that the perceived risks had negative influence on the level of intention 
of English local authorities to use forensic accounting services. The result shows that (H8: β= 
-0.108, t-value = 1.249) has a negative direction but not statistically significant. Therefore, H10 
is rejected. 
 
Table 5-30: Summary of Hypotheses Based on Forensic Accounting Perceptions Factors 
Hypothesis Standard 
path 
coefficient 
(β) 
t- value Outcome 
H7: Perceived benefits of forensic accounting will 
positively influence the intention of English local 
authorities to use forensic accounting services 
0.199 2.714 Supported 
H8: Perceptions of the objectivity and credibility 
between forensic accountants and auditors will 
positively influence the intention of English local 
authorities to use forensic accounting services 
0.088 1.216 Not 
Supported 
H9: Transaction costs to use forensic accounting 
services will negatively influence the intention of 
-0.180 2.451 Supported 
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Hypothesis Standard 
path 
coefficient 
(β) 
t- value Outcome 
English local authorities to use forensic accounting 
services 
H10: Perceived risks of using forensic accounting 
services will negatively influence the intention of 
English local authorities to use forensic accounting 
services 
-0.108 1.249 Not 
Supported 
 
5.7.3.5 Hypotheses Based on Fraud Perceptions Factors 
Hypothesis H11 and H12 were proposed to test the perceived severity of fraud and the 
perceived susceptibility of fraud to positively influence the intention in using forensic 
accounting services by English local authorities. The results of the hypotheses testing are 
summarised in Table 5-31.The evidence from the analysis indicates the perceived severity of 
fraud (H11: β= 0.036, t-value = 0.455). The finding for the perceived susceptibility of fraud 
(H12: β= 0.102, t-value = 1.570). The corollaries for both hypotheses H11 and H12 are 
supported, but statistically not significant and are rejected. 
 
Table 5-31: Summary of Hypotheses Based on Fraud Perceptions Factors 
Hypothesis Standard 
path 
coefficient 
(β) 
t- value Outcome 
H11: Perceived severity of fraud will positively 
influence the intention of English local authorities to 
use forensic accounting services 
0.037 0.455 Not 
Supported 
H12: Perceived susceptibility of fraud will positively 
influence the intention of English local authorities to 
use forensic accounting services 
0.096 1.570 Not 
Supported 
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5.7.3.6 Hypotheses Based on Internal Factors 
 
Table 5-32 provides the summary of the statistic for the hypotheses testing under internal 
factors. Hypothesis H13 and hypothesis H14 test the strength of internal control systems and 
the strength of the in-house counter fraud resources to negatively influence the intention to use 
forensic accounting services. The evidence from the analysis indicates that the strength of 
internal control systems (H13: β= -0.113, t-value = 1.669) has a negative direction and not 
significant. The result of H14 that emerged as a new construct after exploratory factor analysis 
shows that the strength of the in-house counter fraud resources (H9: β= -0.199, t-value = 2.547, 
p < 0.05) has a negative and significant effect. These findings indicate that the greater the 
strength of counter fraud resources, the level of intention to use forensic accounting services 
is reduced, while there is no evidence to support the strength of the internal control systems to 
influence the intention to use the services among English local authorities. 
 
Table 5-32: Summary of Hypotheses Based on Internal Factors 
Hypothesis Standard 
path 
coefficient 
(β) 
t- value Outcome 
H13: Strength of internal control will negatively 
influence the intention of English local authorities to 
use forensic accounting services 
-0.113 1.669 Not 
Supported 
H14: Strength of the in-house counter fraud resources 
will negatively influence the intention of English 
local authorities to use forensic accounting services 
 
-0.199 2.547 Supported 
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5.8 Summary  
 
The first part of data analysis is related to descriptive statistic such as on the profile of local 
authorities, the extent of using forensic accounting services, the types of services used and the 
level of satisfaction on the use of the services. The second part of the analysis involved factor 
analysis of exploratory factor analysis and confirmatory factor analysis. The confirmatory 
factor analysis assesses how well the hypothesized models fit the sample data based on the 
observed variables from the questionnaire. All of the measurement models were assessed and 
re-specified as necessary until acceptable levels are met. The results of the findings are 
discussed in the next chapter. 
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6 CHAPTER 6: FINDINGS AND INTERPRETATIONS 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
The purpose of the study was to examine the extent of the use of forensic accounting services 
and to investigate the association of variables drawn from institutional theory and other 
important variables from the literature with the intention to use forensic accounting services to 
detect and prevent fraud by English local authorities. Accordingly, the three specific aims of 
the current study were: 
i. To identify the extent of using forensic accounting services to detect and prevent fraud 
by English local authorities. 
ii. To examine the perceptions of the English local authorities’ officers towards forensic 
accounting. 
iii. To investigate the factors that influence the intention to use forensic accounting services 
in detecting and preventing fraud by English local authorities. 
 
This chapter analyses the results from the analysis in relation to the research question in 
Chapter 1, including proposed hypotheses and conceptual framework in Chapter 3. It also links 
to the focus of the research related to forensic accounting services, fraud in local authorities 
presented in Chapter 2. The first section described the discussion of the results based on the 
research questions and proposed hypotheses. At the end, a summary of the chapter is presented. 
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6.2 Discussions of the Results 
 
The discussions of the results consist of six sections. The first section discusses the extent of 
using forensic accounting services to detect and prevent fraud. The second section examined 
the perceptions towards the core skill/essential traits of forensic accountants. The next section 
discussed the determinant factors that contribute in the decision to utilise forensic accounting 
services to detect and prevent fraud. The fourth section highlights the phenomenon of the 
debate about forensic accounting services, followed by the results of hypotheses testing. 
Finally, discussions on the outcome of the proposed hypotheses are presented. 
 
6.2.1 The Extent of Using Forensic Accounting Services to Detect and Prevent Fraud 
 
The first research questions were: ‘To what extent local authorities utilised the services from 
forensic accounting providers?’ and ‘What types of forensic accounting services are used by 
English local authorities?’  
 
This study found that almost a fifth (as outlined in Table 5.5) of the English local authorities 
surveyed had utilised forensic accounting services. These findings evidence the relevance and 
the existence of utilising external forensic accounting services within the public sector context, 
in which a ‘significant minority’ of local authorities used the services. However, the findings 
highlight the need for caution as those local authorities that did utilise the services might not 
continue to use the services in future. The utilisation of forensic accounting services among 
local authorities surveyed can be considered similar to other findings e.g. the recent report by 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers (2014b) that found 17% of organisations (mixed of companies and 
public sector) in the UK engaged a specialist forensic investigator. Other findings included EY 
(2003) which stated that only 20% of organisations (mainly private companies) worldwide 
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utilised forensic accounting services in fraud investigations, and PricewaterhouseCoopers 
(2006) stated that 38% of companies worldwide seek forensic accounting services. Thus, the 
extent of use is in keeping with other sectors in the UK. 
 
A possible explanation regarding the finding of this study is that some local authorities had 
good internal counter fraud teams/resources in dealing with fraud so there is no necessity to 
acquire the services from the external providers. It is found that more than 70% of the local 
authorities surveyed in this study had their own in-house counter fraud (as described in Table 
5.1). Further, more than 60% of the local authorities surveyed agreed on the statement that their 
local authority is able to retain or recruit people with necessary skills while more than half 
agreed that their local authority evaluates the strength of anti-fraud cultures regularly (as 
described in Table 5.13). 
 
Additionally, this study provided empirical evidence, in which nearly 20% of the English local 
authorities surveyed had utilised forensic accounting services. As the extent of the forensic 
accounting utilised by local authorities is previously unknown (to the best of researcher 
knowledge) and according to the previous studies e.g. Carnes & Gierlasinski (2001); Huber 
(2012); Rezaee et al. (1992) had claimed that the demand for forensic accounting is increasing, 
there are limited academic studies to support the argument. Thus, given the context of the 
current study, it provides additional knowledge on the usage of forensic accounting services 
within the public sector.  
 
This study demonstrated that the top five services used by local authorities in England were 
digital forensic (61.5%), fraud investigations together with asset tracing and recovery (46.2%) 
each, and fraud detection together with fraud risk management (42.3% each). Examples of 
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digital forensic included data mining, digital recovery, and software tools such as ACL, and 
Interactive Data Extraction and Analysis (IDEA) (McMullen & Sanchez, 2010). A digital 
forensic investigation commonly involved the extraction, processing/analysis and 
interpretation/reporting digital data (McKemmish, 1999), which required computer forensic 
skills and expertise (Bierstaker et al., 2006; McMullen & Sanchez, 2010). Fraud investigations 
work generally related to use investigative intelligence and analysis (experts in obtaining 
relevant information), forensic accounting/transaction analysis, computer forensic, fieldwork 
and interviews techniques (to interrogate witness or suspects), and reporting of investigation 
findings and subsequent actions (legal advice) involved (Porter & Crumbley, 2012; 
PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2008).  
 
Asset tracing and recovery could involve a forensic review of books and financial records, 
computer forensic, interview of witness, preparation of report, and provide evidence in court 
(Jacobs, Ingram, & Wide, 2012). Among the techniques used in fraud detection are a 
comprehensive whistleblower program, data mining on suspicious transaction analysis 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2008; Sharma & Kumar, 2012), and data-driven method (Albrecht 
& Albrecht, 2009). A comprehensive and effective fraud risk management consists of four 
phases; assess risks (identify the scope of analysis, profile the current arrangement), design 
(develop a range of program including controls to prevent, detect, and respond to fraud), 
implement (execute the strategy and process to implement new controls throughout 
organization), and evaluate (access current controls arrangement and compared with the best 
practices) (KPMG, 2006). Thus, forensic accounting services are significantly associated with 
investigations and recovery work with some prevention and detection.  
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These findings may help us to understand the issues of less use of computer forensic (Lane, 
2011) among local authorities as the demand to acquire this type of service was the highest 
compared to other services. This study also discovered the increasing use of digital forensic 
between 2013 and 2014 (more than 60%). As the internal counter fraud within local authorities 
still does not have enough experience/expertise in using computer forensic examination (Lane, 
2011), it is not surprising that local authorities sought this type of services from forensic 
accounting providers. Another explanation would be the increase of using digital technology 
across services and functions among local authorities (Audit Commission, 2014) and 
significant rise in cybercrime against public sector organisations (Mansfield-Devine, 2012; 
PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2014b) which in turn poses new fraud risks. An appropriate action, 
for example, would be providing more training and increasing the skills of computer forensic 
to the internal audit unit and in-house counter fraud resources.  
 
This study also showed that fraud investigation and fraud detection were among the highest 
services in demand within the public sector context. The result of this study found that fraud 
risk management was frequently acquired within a 12 month period as depicted in Table 5-8. 
This finding suggested that, currently, local authorities took initiative to apply not only reactive 
approaches (historically) but also proactive approaches (such as fraud risk management) as 
suggested in the literature (Audit Commision, 2013; Gee et al., 2011), which required local 
authorities to review the counter fraud policy regularly due to significant changes in counter 
fraud arrangement (Audit Commission, 2013), and the need to improve fraud controls and 
process as the first line of defence in preventing fraud (Home Office, 2012). Reactive approach 
is used when reliance is place on investigation after fraud happened while proactive approach 
is used on tools and methods before the incidence of fraud occurs to determine the fraud 
indicators or red flags (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2008; Vonya Global, 2009). 
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The second research question was ‘What types of forensic accounting services providers are 
used by English local authorities?’ Surprisingly, this study found that in general, local 
authorities surveyed preferred to use other than the Big Four accounting firms (67%) despite 
the Big Four accounting firms being considered a major player of forensic accounting providers 
in the market (Rezaee, 2005). The category of the providers other than the Big Four accounting 
firms derived from the survey of this study consisted of the private legal firm such as Bond 
Solon, and other local authorities with specialist skills and internal audit outsourcing providers. 
However, the results should be interpreted with caution based on the number of local authorities 
that participated in the survey. A possible explanation for this might be that the cost to acquire 
the forensic accounting services from the Big Four accounting firms is relatively high 
(Apostolou & Crumbley, 2008) and is determined by the complexity and scale of fraud. For 
example, in the case of London Borough of Tower Hamlets, PwC was commissioned by the 
DCLG to conduct best value compliance inspection on various issues of governance including 
allegations of fraud, with the costs of investigation reportedly amounting to £1 million at local 
authorities’ costs for seven months’ work. However, using sector specific providers who 
specialise makes sense and may be part of the mimetic behaviour in the sector. Villadsen et al. 
(2010) analysed mimetic decision making to describe the situation where managers in 
municipal councils (Denmark) obtain information about other field members with the possible 
intent of imitating them. Their finding is consistent with findings by Frumkin & Galaskiewicz 
(2004) that stated bureaucratic public organisations are likely to imitate one another.  
  
Additionally, the findings of the current study also show that costs to acquire forensic 
accounting services contributed to the factors in using forensic accounting services by English 
local authorities as described in the Section 5.7.3.4. The choices to use other than the Big Four 
accounting firms indicated that local authorities preferred to get services from providers with 
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whom they had close relationships e.g. other local authorities with specialist services and as 
part of outsourcing services. Hence, the market of forensic accounting services for local 
authorities is considered competitive.  
 
On the other hand, there are four-fifths of respondents that do not use forensic accounting 
services which indicates it is not a valued or favoured service. Those that do are addressed in 
the third research question ‘How satisfied are local authorities with the services received from 
forensic accounting services providers, and what are the levels of intention to continue using 
the services?’ Overall, two thirds of local authorities surveyed (as indicated in Table 5.9) were 
satisfied with the services provided by both the Big Four and non-Big Four accounting firms. 
This result may be explained by the fact that forensic accounting services providers which were 
specialist in their field had sufficient knowledge, expertise, and skills while giving their 
services (Ramaswamy, 2005 and Digabriele, 2008). For instance, based on the top five types 
of services acquired presented in this study, forensic accounting services providers had 
capabilities and expertise in digital forensic, fraud investigation and detection, and fraud risk 
management. An implication of this is that forensic accounting services providers could play a 
key role in fraud detection and prevention (Muthusamy, 2011) within local authorities’ context. 
This finding is consistent with a report by EY (2003) which stated that 88% were satisfied with 
the services delivered.  
 
Contrary to the level of satisfaction discussed above, this study found that the majority of local 
authorities surveyed (62%) that used forensic accounting services were uncertain whether to 
continue to use the services. This inconsistency may be due to the fact that the decision to use 
forensic accounting services might involve some factors such as costs to acquire the services, 
the nature of fraud (very complex and ‘unexpected’ to occur), and the strength of internal 
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counter fraud resources. Another reason could be due to the lack of resources as a result of 
austerity measures introduced by central government (Fraud Advisory Panel, 2011). This study 
has shown that most of the respondents agreed that the austerity measures have had a negative 
impact on the resources available for counter fraud activities as mentioned in Table 5-13. In 
general, therefore, it seems that the decision to continue using forensic accounting services 
needs to be carefully considered although to some extent, the level of satisfaction on their work 
was high.  
 
Within the management consultant perspective, Werr & Styhre (2002), there are two views of 
the consultant-client relationship, referred to as functionalist image: client as buyer and critical 
image: client vs victim. Applying the consultant-client relationship in the context of demand 
and supply of forensic accounting services, the decision to use forensic accounting services can 
be described as follow. 
Table 6-1: Consultants-Client Relationship: Demand and Supply of Forensic accounting 
services 
 Functionalist image: 
Client as buyer 
Critical image: 
client as victim 
Why use forensic 
accounting services? 
Knowledge, specialized skills 
such as utilizing digital forensic 
or lack of in house resources 
and capabilities 
Cognitive and socio- 
psychological needs emerging 
from the characteristics of the 
managerial task 
Nature of the client Probably mimicking and based 
on recommendations by local 
authorities  
Naive, anguished victim of 
consultant’s persuasive 
strategies 
Nature of the 
forensic accounting 
provider 
Preferred to use within the 
sector and shared services 
among local authorities rather 
than the Big Four firms 
Impressions that the need to 
use their services based on their 
own published reports 
Nature of the 
client-consultant 
relationship 
Contractual, arm’s length 
relationship with the client in 
control 
Exploitive relationship with the 
consultant in control 
Limitations to the 
client-consultant 
relationship 
Consultant’s superior 
knowledge and expertise 
Dependence on repeat sales, 
character of inter-firm and 
managerial structures, client’s 
knowledge and expertise 
(Source adapted from: Werr & Styhre, 2002) 
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6.2.2 Perceptions towards the Core Skill/Essential Traits of Forensic Accountants 
 
The fourth research question was ‘How are the core skills/essential traits of forensic 
accountants being perceived by local authorities’ officers?  
 
This study indicated that both internal auditors and counter fraud managers agreed that 
analytical/critical thinking, investigative ability, auditing skills, investigative intuition, and 
effective oral communication are among the important skills and essential traits that forensic 
accountants are expected to possess (as shown in Table 5-11 and Table 5-12). This finding is 
important as internal auditors need to distinguish these core skills/essential traits when 
conducting audit works and counter fraud activities. As indicated by HM Treasury (2012), it is 
not a primary role of internal audit to detect fraud (p. 7) as the provision of assurance services 
is the primary role for internal audit in the UK public sector (CIPFA, 2014. p. 5). However, 
there are internal auditors that are involved in fraud investigation in local authorities 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2011; Lane, 2011; Levi et al., 2007). In their report, 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (2011) acknowledged that internal audit can counter fraud effectively 
using appropriate techniques such as data analytics. For instance, a local authority may be able 
to save a substantial amount of money when their internal audit team applied an application 
known as Continuous Transaction Monitoring (CTM), which acts as an early warning system 
for the management by identifying predictive indicators of fraud (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 
2011). If internal auditors were assigned to counter fraud, then they have to obtain sufficient 
skills, competencies, including knowledge of fraud schemes, investigation techniques and laws 
(The Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA), 2009). Therefore, the counter fraud work by internal 
auditors may be at risk of not being able to detect fraud if internal auditors do not have 
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specialists’ investigation knowledge, training or skills in fraud investigation (Lane, 2011). 
Hence, improving internal auditors’ ability to counter fraud through continuing professional 
development (CIPFA, 2014) will lend technical competence and credibility to deter fraud. 
 
It can therefore be assumed that to become a good forensic accountant and meet the 
expectations of the customer it is crucial to acquire analytical/critical thinking. Based on the 
previous studies (e.g. Davis et al., 2010; Digabriele, 2008; Messmer, 2004), the findings of this 
study confirmed that analytical/critical thinking is the most important core skill/essential trait 
to become effective forensic accountants. According to Kranacher et al. (2011), critical 
thinking ‘sometimes referred to as lateral thinking or thinking “outside the box”, is a 
disciplined approach to problem solving’ (p. 9) that enables understanding of the “big picture” 
(Peterson, 2003, p. 265). For instance, applying critical thinking skills within a professional 
context required synthesizing and applying appropriate fraud causation elements to identify 
and prevent fraud with an emphasis on unstructured problem solving (Dominey et al., 2010) 
and the ability to use both financial and non-financial data to tell the complete story of who, 
what, when, where, how, and why that can be used by prosecutors, defence lawyers and juries 
to understand the full scheme under investigation (Kranacher et al., 2011, p. 25). 
 
Critical thinking skills are essential to understand, apply and adapt concepts in a variety of 
contexts and circumstances as business organisations continue to evolve in response to new 
information technology and meet challenges such as risks to fraud (Bawaneh, 2011; Schleifer 
& Greenawalt, 1996). As organisations are not immune to fraud, dependence on effective fraud 
investigators is essential, in which investigation of fraud requires strong critical thinking. 
Among the concerns in counter fraud activities within English local authorities was the 
argument that the fraud investigation was undertaken by internal auditors, in which not all 
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internal auditors are well equipped to conduct fraud investigations (Lane, 2010). Nevertheless, 
both internal auditors (if undertaking counter fraud work) and counter fraud specialists within 
local authorities require specialist investigation training or skills (Lane, 2011) to become 
effective in fraud investigation. Professional bodies within local authorities such CIPFA and 
Alarm also suggested the importance of adequate investment in anti-fraud function, 
professionalising investigators and intelligence development (Alarm, 2007; CIPFA, 2008b). 
Singleton et al. (2006) recommended that fraud auditors must have specific skills, knowledge 
and experience through tailored training such as interviewing skills, knowledge of criminal law 
and evidence gathering technique. 
 
On the other hand, the finding of this study found inconsistency in the perceptions of core 
skills/essential traits of forensic accountants among the group of respondents. As indicated in 
Table 5-12, despite common core skills/essential traits acknowledged by all three respondent 
groups, the Chief Executive/Managing Director, the Director of Finance ranked investigative 
ability as the most important. The Chief Executive/Managing Director ranked auditing skills 
as the second important followed by analytical/critical thinking. Contrarily, the Director of 
Finance ranked analytical/critical thinking as the second important followed by auditing skills. 
Problem solving and research skills were among the top five ranked by the Chief 
Executive/Managing Director and Director of Finance but were not ranked top five by internal 
auditors. Analytical/critical thinking was ranked first by the internal auditors/counter fraud 
managers followed by investigative ability and motivation. 
 
The discrepancies of the perceptions towards forensic accountants among the respondents’ 
group, however, can be explained as follows. The findings indicated that the Chief 
Executive/Managing Director and the Director of Finance, as senior management in local 
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authorities, perceived the abilities or skills in investigation, auditing and critical thinking as the 
top priority to counter fraud effectively. One of the reasons could be the expectation of general 
public, employees, regulators, government bodies and other stakeholders who want to see 
senior management taking the lead in evaluating the organisation’s counter fraud activities. In 
having priority that counter fraud activities are in place, the senior management is able to 
minimize its own liability and deter future fraud activity (EY, 2009) that can protect public 
fund. The interpretation of these findings, however, should be treated with caution due to 
limited number of responses from the two groups. 
 
From the perspective of internal auditors/counter fraud managers (as investigators), motivation 
was considered important besides investigation, intuition and critical thinking. According to 
Brooks and Labelle (2006) motivation is one of the important attributes that should be 
possessed by a forensic accountant in Canada- the term used is investigative and forensic 
accountants (IFA). For example, it is difficult to collect evidence of a fraud as the evidence 
sometimes is not visible. As a result, ‘extraordinary sensitivity to barely visible red flags is 
essential, as is the diligent extraction or teasing out of evidence from often obtuse or reluctant 
sources’ (Brooks & Labelle, 2006, p. 293). Thus, attributes such as critical thinking and 
investigative intuition, are useful to uncover and find the evidences. In addition, a proper 
investigative mindset based on an understanding of motivations and patterns behaviour will 
lead to proactive examinations for potential frauds that go much deeper than normal audit work 
(Brooks & Labelle, 2006). The implication of the current study finding is that if internal 
auditors/counter fraud managers applied those mentioned attributes, then their practices on 
counter fraud could be considered in the right direction. 
 
The current findings extend our knowledge of understanding the requirement to become 
effective forensic accountants by having a different set of skills within the UK public sector as 
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the studies mentioned above had been carried out mostly in the US, not specifically in the 
public sector context. 
 
6.2.3 Determinants that Influence the Intention to Use Forensic Accounting Services to 
Detect and Prevent Fraud  
 
The fifth research question was ‘Which factors have significant influence on the intention to 
use forensic accounting services?’ This followed by the sixth research question which was 
‘How strong are the significance of the factors that influence the intention to use forensic 
accounting services?’  
 
To address the fifth and sixth questions, this study found that there were five out of fourteen 
factors influencing the intention to use forensic accounting services as discussed in Section 
5.7.3 and depicted in Figure 6-1. The five factors that were significant in influencing the 
intention to use forensic accounting by English local authorities were: central government and 
related agencies (coercive pressures), other local authorities (mimetic pressures), perceived 
benefits of forensic accounting and costs to acquire forensic accounting services (forensic 
accounting perception factors), and the strength of the in-house counter fraud resources 
(internal factors). The empirical results indicated the impact of two institutional isomorphism 
namely coercive pressures (except for media) and mimetic pressures on the decision to use 
forensic accounting services. However, normative pressures (professional bodies and 
associations, forensic accounting services providers, stakeholders) were found not significant. 
Below are the discussions on the results of institutional isomorphism and the other factors that 
influence the decision to use forensic accounting services. 
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The role of central government towards anti-fraud function in local authorities began with the 
introduction of financial incentives such as Weekly Benefits Savings (WBS) focusing on 
benefit fraud (ceased in 2002) and Security Against Fraud and Error (SAFE) (ceased in 2006), 
followed by a number of different inspection bodies such as the BFI (ceased in 2008) and the 
Audit Commission (ceased in 2015) (Audit Commission, 2014; Lane, 2010). As the SAFE 
ended in 2006, there were no direct financial incentives for local authorities to focus on benefit 
fraud. Later, central government established the SFIS in which local authorities would focus 
solely on non-benefit fraud such as procurement and misappropriation of assets (Audit 
Commission, 2014). Those evidences suggested that central government used their coercive 
pressures (power) to dictate the use of certain institutional rules such as over directives, policies 
and legal requirement through their agencies to local authorities for counter fraud activities. 
Hence, although there are no direct rules or policies for local authorities to use forensic 
accounting services, local authorities might have to use the services if there is directive or 
intervention from central government to do so since ‘none of the local authorities was under 
any obligation to defy central government directives in this way’ (Bovaird and Downe, 2006, 
p. 450). A clear example is a recent case involving Tower Hamlet Council in 2014 where the 
central government through the Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government 
called upon PwC to carry out forensic auditing towards the governance and allegation of fraud 
in the council (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2014a; The Guardian, 2014). 
 
Within English local authorities’ context, Ashworth et al. (2007) suggested that coercive 
pressures through the form of legislation- the Local Government Act (1999) and the Best Value 
inspection program-were used by the central government on the introduction of a reform 
program (the Best Value framework). Bovaird & Downe (2006) found that coercive 
isomorphism existed within English local authorities in implementing the LGMA through 
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dependence on central government resources (financial, reputational or legitimating). In the 
present study, coercive pressures also found through reports on fraud by the Audit Commission. 
From 2001 to 2014, the Audit Commission published ‘Protecting Public Purse’, among others 
reports, on the awareness of the importance to counter fraud, promoted good practices, 
improved data on fraud detection and the extent of fraud within local authorities in England 
(Audit Commission, 2014). Therefore, local authorities could use the reports as guidance in 
effectively countering fraud through in-house resources or external services such as forensic 
accounting services.  
 
A study by Carpenter & Feroz (2001) found that coercive pressures through credit market 
influence in the early adoption of GAAP financial reporting practices by four US state 
governments, when conditions of fiscal stress and resource dependence exists. Local authorities 
require resources from the central government through grant to survive. For the period 2013/14, 
local authorities received 67% or £75.3 billion of government grant for their revenue 
expenditure (Office for National Statistics, 2015). Hence, other organisations that can provide 
resources can exercise power over lower level organisations (Carpenter & Feroz, 2001). The 
role of coercive pressures in institutional theory focus the impact of political rather than 
technical influences on organisational change (Ashworth et al., 2007). Power is a ‘reserve of 
potential influence through the allocation of budgetary resources can be affected’ (Carpenter 
& Feroz, 2001, p. 572). The resource dependency perspectives proposed that pressures from 
external resource providers result in coercive isomorphism (Mizruchi & Fein, 1999), which 
can be a dominant factor in influencing a government’s choice of accounting practices 
(Carpenter & Feroz, 2001). Thus, ‘institutional may work in concert with other pressures such 
as resource dependency in shaping a government’s decision to adopt a particular structure or 
management practice’ (Carpenter & Feroz, 2001, p. 572). 
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The next institutional isomorphism that is significant was mimetic pressures measured based 
on using forensic accounting services and the high rate of success received when using the 
services by other local authorities. Institutional theory assumes that after certain periods of time 
organisations will select among alternative structures or practices that are considered legitimate 
by other organisations in their field, regardless of structure or practices’ actual efficiency 
(Carpenter & Feroz, 2001). In context of the current study, local authorities actively exercised 
counter fraud activities since 1990s through directive, policies and framework by central 
government despite the decisions on counter fraud ultimately resting with local councillors 
(Lane, 2011, p. 203). As implied by Button (2011) and  Lane  (2011), the counter fraud 
activities vary in term of capabilities, competency and structure in which some local authorities 
have a dedicated counter fraud team and others depend on their internal auditors.  
 
In pursuing counter fraud, mimetic pressures could occur, i.e. through the formation of 
benchmarking clubs’ councils and the creation of a scheme such as Beacon Council in 
recognizing the best performing councils and spread best practice (Ashworth et al., 2007). In 
the context of the current study, the dissemination of information by local authorities that used 
and were satisfied with the success of forensic accounting services may happen through either 
formal or informal meeting among local authorities’ officers. For example, the formation of 
the ‘Fighting Fraud Locally’ as a strategy that collaborated counter fraud approach across local 
authorities in England. Part of the strategy was to have a right framework to encourage more 
effective information sharing both within local authorities, and between local authorities and 
central government departments and private sector (Home Office, 2012). The scope and 
complexity of fraud might cause elements of ‘uncertainty that lead to mimetic decision making’ 
(Villadsen et al., 2010, p. 373).  
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However, institutional isomorphism of normative pressures was found not to be significant in 
the current study. Normative isomorphism often occurs within a particular profession operating 
in organisations that prompt changes of what they believe are accepted modes and rules of 
behaviour through teachings and membership of professional societies (DiMaggio & Powell, 
1983). Carpenter & Feroz (2001) stated that institutional pressures for the US state government 
to adopt GAAP may stem from the professional education of accounting bureaucrats and from 
the growth of professional associations, such as the Government Finance Officers Association 
(GFOA) that span government organisations and promote specific financial management 
practices. Within English local authorities, Ashworth et al. (2007) measured normative 
pressures through trade unions, local government associations and professional groups, the 
Audit Commission, and the IDeA and concluded the influence of normative pressures in 
organisational change (implementation of the Best Value framework).  
 
The current study measured normative pressures through professional bodies within local 
authorities’ context in countering fraud - direct or indirect (the CIPFA, the ICAEW, and the 
ICFS), employees that hold professional membership, associations in local authorities (LGA, 
SOLACE, Alarm, and LAIOG), and the stakeholders (elected councillors, taxpayers, top 
management and business partners). As normative pressures were not associated with the 
intention to use forensic accounting services by English local authorities, it could indicate the 
strong influence of the professional bodies and associations towards maintaining using in-
house counter fraud rather than external resources like forensic accounting services. According 
to Button et al. (2007), the membership of the ICFS had the potential to grow substantially and 
had a forum for the members to share practices and as a network across public and private 
sector organizations. The ICFS, directly involved in providing professional certification, focus 
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on counter fraud in the UK and there were a significant number of accredited counter fraud 
specialists within the English local authorities (Button et al., 2007). 
 
The CIPFA was involved in developing counter framework in the public services including 
local authorities. The majority of the respondents of the current study were members of the 
CIPFA (as described in Table 5.4). While focusing to improve the internal resources, members 
of the profession need to acquire the desired skills through training and experience to gain new 
knowledge. There are possibilities that the internal resources within local authorities gained the 
appropriate skills and experiences from being a member of the ICFS and the CIPFA, equivalent 
to the skills of forensic accountants, to counter fraud. An alternative interpretation of the 
finding is the possibility of combination of the elements within normative and mimetic 
isomorphism. The professional bodies and association could encourage the members in the 
professions and associations to execute the practices adopted in their professions in their 
organisations. Hence, instead of using external services like forensic accounting services, local 
authorities focused upon their in-house counter fraud that would be mimicked by other local 
authorities. Mizruchi & Fein (1999) argued that it is somehow difficult to isolate different 
isomorphic forces in practice. For example, Ashworth et al. (2007) stated that the combined 
elements of normative and mimetic isomorphic existed: in the case of Beacon Council, 
disseminating their successful practices to facilitate improvement elsewhere through road 
shows, open days, site visits, secondments and consultancy.  
 
Another possible explanation was the development of professional forensic accounting in the 
UK that could also affect the findings of the current study. Unlike in the US and Canada, there 
is no single regulated forensic accounting professional body in the UK at present. The ICAEW 
is responsible in governing the forensic accounting practices through the accreditation scheme 
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voluntarily under the special group rather than a formal certification in forensic accounting. 
Thus, there is possibility that the influence of using forensic accounting services is not too 
strong compared to if there is a regulated forensic accounting body with a significant number 
of members in local authorities. Other professional bodies like the CIPFA might want their 
members to focus based on their needs. According to Lane (2011), CIPFA and Alarm 
emphasized the significance of adequate investment in anti-fraud function, professionalizing 
staff and intelligence development and sharing (p. 199).  
 
The insignificant results of normative pressures, somehow, similar to Yigitbasioglu (2015) that 
found normative pressures (promotion by the government and suppliers) were not influence 
top management team’s decision to adopt cloud computing services in Australia. Similarly, 
Liang et al. (2007) concluded that normative pressures (the networking of top managers and 
the value chain comprising a group of closely related suppliers and customers) failed to confirm 
that normative pressures affect top management’s participation in activities advancing ERP 
assimilation. 
 
Other factors that influence the decision to use forensic accounting were perceived benefits of 
forensic accounting, costs to acquire forensic accounting services and the strength of internal 
control. Forensic accounting services have been applied in a variety of services areas, 
including: bankruptcy, insolvency and reorganization; computer forensic analysis; economic 
damages calculations; family law; fraud prevention, detection and response; financial statement 
misrepresentation; and valuations (Stanbury & Paley-Menzies, 2010). Under the services 
related to fraud, Singleton & Singleton (2010) stated that forensic accounting is the 
comprehensive view of fraud investigation that includes preventing frauds and analysing 
controls and gathering non-financial information.  Crumbley et al. (2003) argued the difference 
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between forensic accounting and fraud auditing; in which a fraud auditor is an accountant with 
special skills in auditing, and a forensic accountant may take on fraud auditing engagements 
and be a fraud auditor but use other skills in accounting, consulting, legal in broader 
engagements.  
 
Those studies mentioned above proved insightful on the role of forensic accountants that led 
to the benefits of forensic accounting particularly in fraud detection, prevention and 
investigation. The current study measured perceived benefits of using forensic accounting 
through: being able to deter fraud, enhance the image, and recovery of cash and assets. Skalak 
et al. (2005) provide a conceptual overview of fraud deterrence cycle comprising: 
establishment of corporate governance, implementation of transaction-level control process or 
the system of internal accounting controls, retrospective examination of governance and 
control, and investigation and remediation of suspected or alleged problems (p. 14). The 
authors mentioned that fraud deterrence cycle occurs over time and it is an interactive process 
which represents the first line of defence against fraud. For example, while an audit responds 
to the risks of fraud, forensic accounting investigation may respond to suspicions, allegations 
or evidence of fraud and can assist the auditor in formulating a plan to respond to external 
influences, such as tip-off and whistleblower allegations. The findings from the investigation 
will determine the action that should be taken in the form of both internal actions, such as 
suspension or dismissal, and external actions against the fraudsters (Skalak et al., 2005). Thus, 
organisations could protect their reputation or image by having a comprehensive fraud 
deterrence cycle amid the increase of expectation on governance within organisations from 
stakeholders. Fraudulent acts committed against organisations not only create loss on monetary 
but also the reputation and create a negative connotation to the stakeholders (Christensen et al., 
2005). In the context of local authorities, the act of fraud ‘is not a victimless crime and its 
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impact is often felt much more widely than the purely financial, resulting in social and 
emotional harm to the members of society’ (Fraud Advisory Panel, 2011, p. 5) and ‘often has 
the sort of direct, negative impact on human life that is not found elsewhere’ (Gee et al., 2011, 
p. 1). 
 
The next factor that influenced the decision to use forensic accounting services is cost to 
acquire the services. According to Grippo & Ibex (2003) and Gray (2002, as cited in 
Christensen et al., 2005, p. 74) forensic accounting services may be very costly depending on 
the scope and the extent of a forensic investigation. Apostolou & Crumbley (2008) stressed 
that a forensic audit may be significantly more expensive and time consuming than regular 
audit e.g. cover much more detail of fraud investigation work compared to financial or 
management audit. The cost of forensic accounting services could be higher if involved in 
litigation process (Grippo & Ibex, 2003; Ibrahim & Abdullah, 2007). For example, the cost of 
forensic audits on the allegations of governance failure and fraud cost Tower Hamlets councils 
nearly £1 million paid to PwC (The Guardian, 2014). Apostolou & Crumbley (2008) and 
Muthusamy (2011) reported that in the US, the overall fees incurred for the services in 
examining financial statement fraud of HealthSouth, the leading providers of healthcare service 
were $276.8 million. The current study measured the cost to acquire forensic accounting 
services through a statement of: 1) forensic accounting services are very costly, 2) the cost of 
using forensic accounting services would influence my local authority’s decision to use the 
services, and 3) my local authority cannot afford the cost of acquiring forensic accounting 
services.  
 
The findings of the current study indicated that cost to acquire forensic accounting services is 
a major constraint towards acquiring the services. Within English local authorities, some 
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authorities were limited in their budget to counter fraud, particularly in district councils (Home 
Office, 2012). As described in Table 5-1, most local authorities that participated in the survey 
were English district councils which could contribute to the findings. Previous studies reported 
that resources or the size of organisations could impact the decision to use forensic accounting. 
For example, Ibrahim & Abdullah (2007) stressed that only big companies in Malaysia could 
afford the bills to acquire forensic accounting services. In the same view, Bierstaker et al. 
(2006) concluded that firms in the US with revenues of more than $1 billion did use forensic 
accountants more than smaller firms. Additionally, the smaller entities were reluctant to invest 
due to concerns about costs in acquiring the services (Bierstaker et al., 2006). 
 
Another explanation could be the investment made by some local authorities that created their 
own counter fraud team with a significant number of staff equipped with specialised skills such 
as within London Borough (Lane, 2011) which could be considered as cost effective for the 
authorities to operate in-house. Accordingly, consideration of a cost and benefit relationship 
was vital before engaging forensic accounting services (Grippo & Ibex, 2003). As argued by 
Bierstaker et al. (2006) and Christensen et al. (2005), organisations may be worried about the 
costs to invest in anti-fraud technology and forensic accountants, but may underestimate the 
potential benefits in terms of cost savings towards reducing losses related to fraud. As noted 
by Bierstaker et al. (2006), ‘cost and benefit trade-off in mandating organisational use of 
forensic accountants may be an issue worthy of consideration by regulators’ (p. 531). 
 
Finally, strength of the in-house counter fraud resources was determined to be a significant 
factor in the decision to use forensic accounting services. According to Button et al. (2007), 
local authorities were among the major entities beside the DWP and the NHS that employed 
fraud investigators known as the CFS. The emergence of the CFS within local authorities is 
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encouraging with about 3,000 counter fraud specialists possessing accredited qualifications 
such as Accredited Counter Fraud Trainer (ACFT), Accredited Counter Fraud Specialist 
(ACFS), and Accredited Counter Fraud Manager (ACFM) (Button et al., 2007).  
 
6.2.4 Results of Hypotheses Testing 
 
Figure 6-1 summarised the results of the PLS analysis, including standard path coefficients (β), 
path significant (t-value), and variance explain (R2) as discussed in Section 5.7.2.2, Table 5-25 
and Table 5-26. Overall, the model explains 57.8% of the variance of the intention to utilise 
forensic accounting services in fraud detection and prevention by English local authorities that 
participated in this study. As suggested by the findings, two of the institutional pressures, 
central government and related agencies (coercive), together with other local authorities 
(mimetic), were found to be statistically significant. Thus, the application of institutional 
variables as the main theoretical framework/model was supported. The next section discusses 
the outcome of each hypothesis testing, the implications, and contributions. 
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Coercive Pressures 
 
Mimetic Pressures 
Normative pressures 
Internal factors Fraud perception factors 
 
 
 
Forensic accounting perception factors 
Intention to use 
forensic accounting 
services (R2= 0.578) 
Central government and 
related agencies 
Media 
Other local authorities 
Professional bodies and 
associations 
Forensic accounting 
services providers 
Stakeholders 
Strength of 
counter fraud 
resources 
 
Strength of 
internal control 
system 
Perceived 
severity of 
fraud 
Perceived 
susceptibility to 
fraud 
Perceived benefits 
of forensic 
accounting  
Perceived risks 
of forensic 
accounting 
Costs to 
acquire the 
services 
Control factors 
 Types of local 
authorities 
 
 
Size of local 
authorities 
Size of internal 
audit department 
Perceptions 
toward forensic 
accountants  
H1: ᵦ=0.228*  
H2: ᵦ=0.039 
H3: ᵦ=0.192* 
H4: ᵦ=-0.093 
H5: ᵦ = 0.029 
H6: ᵦ = 0.096 
H7: ᵦ = 0.199* 
H8: ᵦ= 0.088 
H10: ᵦ =-0.180* 
H9: ᵦ=-0.108 
H14: ᵦ = -0.199* 
H13: ᵦ =-0.113 
H11: ᵦ=0.037 H12: ᵦ = 0.096 
Counter fraud 
team/unit 
County 
London 
 
Unitary 
 
Metropolitan 
 
 ᵦ=-0.071 
 ᵦ=0.185* 
 ᵦ=-0.034 
 ᵦ=-0.122 
 ᵦ=-0.020 
 ᵦ=-0.031  ᵦ=-0.018 
Path significance: 
*p<0.05 
 
Hypothesis supported  
Hypothesis not 
supported 
Figure 6-1: Results of Hypotheses Testing 
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6.2.5 Discussions on the Hypotheses 
 
This section discussed the proposed hypotheses as described in Section 3.2. The first section 
discussed the hypotheses based on coercive pressures followed by mimetic pressures and 
normative pressures. Next, the hypotheses based on forensic accounting perceptions factors, 
fraud perceptions factors and internal control factors. 
 
6.2.5.1 Hypotheses Based on Coercive Pressures 
 
This section discusses the results of coercive pressures consisting of central government and 
related agencies and media. 
 
6.2.5.1.1 Hypothesis H1: Directives, rules, and policies (including initiatives and action 
plan) from central government and reports on fraud by the related 
government agencies will positively influence the intention of English local 
authorities to use forensic accounting services. 
 
The current study hypothesised that central government through directives, rules, and policies 
(including initiatives and action plan) and the related government agencies that issued reports 
on fraud will positively influence the intention to use forensic accounting services. The results 
supported this hypothesis, indicating the role of central government that might influence local 
authorities in decision-making process either through legal coercion or voluntarily diffusion 
(Oliver, 1991), which this study measured through the importance of the following statements: 
1) directives, rules and policies from central government, 2) initiatives and action plan by 
central government to reduce fraud, and 3) reports on fraud by the government bodies such as 
the Audit Commission, the NFA and the DWP in influencing the decision to utilise forensic 
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accounting services. As outlined in the findings discussed in Table 5-7, such directives, rules 
and policies through best practice seem important as local authorities that used forensic 
accounting services tend to use the specialist sector rather than the Big Four with some 
authorities using shared services. As suggested by Lane (2011), the Audit Commission along 
with CIPFA produced best practices to counter fraud effectively that seemed important and 
beneficial for local authorities. ‘Fighting Fraud Locally’ published by the NFA recommended 
that local authorities should collaborate closely to counter fraud such as on regional 
partnerships, intelligence hubs and information sharing hubs (Home Office, 2012). 
 
Accordingly, central government may view local authorities as a mechanism to achieve their 
policies rather than separate institutions that represent local citizens (Wollmann, 2000). As 
such, central government may provide assistance and action plan to local authorities in order 
to counter fraud effectively. Although there are no direct directives, rules and policies by 
central government for local authorities, there are guidelines and best practices have been 
produced by government bodies such the Audit Commission and the NFA. An example of 
directive imposed by central government was in a recent alleged mismanagement of public 
money in London Borough of Tower Hamlets in 2014. Central government intervened through 
the DCLG that appointed PwC to conduct the investigation process and the forensic audit. In 
this case, local authorities had no choice but to investigate using forensic accounting services 
providers.  
 
The intervention by central government evidenced that local authorities have to abide by any 
action or policies of central government, particularly in high profile cases, and to ensure the 
best value of public spending (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2014a). The appointment of PwC, in 
this context, can be considered as a signal from central government to local authorities on the 
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importance of protecting public fund and as enhancing deterrent of fraud. However, counter 
fraud work comes at cost. For instance, in efforts to reduce fraud, central government spent 
around £29 million to establish the NFA in 2008 (dissolved in 2014) and a fraud reporting 
centre (Lane, 2011). As a result of the introduction of the SFIS in 2014, central government 
provided £16 million fund to local authorities to refocus their counter fraud activities on non-
benefit fraud (Audit Commission, 2014). The cost of investigation and forensic audit paid to 
PwC was borne by Tower Hamlets for almost £1 million (The Guardian, 2014).  
 
Additionally, the principle of value for money is important as a tool related to principle of 
public accountability (House of Commons Committee of Public Accounts, 2007). As the costs 
to acquire forensic accounting services could be expensive, analysis of costs and benefits need 
to be considered. This could be the reason why no such directive is being implemented 
currently by central government. Lane (2011) stated that the DWP spent £9 million in 2006/07 
for counter fraud work and the NAO concluded it not to be cost effective at a local level. 
Additionally, with the real cost of fraud being unknown, then cost and benefit analysis is hard 
to pin down. Central government, elected councillors and committees within the English local 
authorities’ departments play a significant role in a decision to appoint external (planning) 
consultants (Mitchell, 1993). Furthermore, the author stated that the growth on the use of 
external consultants was due to central government’s view that local authorities’ officers lacked 
in terms of their independence and market knowledge and central government was willing to 
allocate funds to meet the purposes. Within the current study context, however, there were 
some action plans taken by central government with more focus on developing a good internal 
resource that could be embedded for a longer period rather than short term investigations by 
external providers.  
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For instance, central government, through regulated bodies such as the Audit Commission and 
the NFA, provides documentation of best practice for the public sector: ‘Managing the Risk of 
Fraud: A Guide for Managers’ (HM Treasury, 1997) and ‘Good Practice in Tackling External 
Fraud’ (National Audit Office and HM Treasury, 2008). The CIPFA (2008b) has also 
contributed to the development of best practice with its document ‘Managing the Risk of Fraud 
Actions to Counter Fraud and Corruption’ and the National Fraud Authority (2011) provided 
guidelines ‘Fighting Fraud Locally’ to become the best practice in local government counter 
fraud strategy. Within institutional theory, the best practice documents somehow come through 
coercive and normative pressures. Previous research e.g. Ashworth et al. (2007) classified 
central government as coercive pressures while the Audit Commission as normative pressures. 
For the current study, the best practices or guidelines, such as by the Audit Commission and 
the NFA, which act as central government bodies, were classified as coercive pressures. The 
documents published by the professional bodies within local authorities such as CIPFA were 
categorised as normative pressures. As noted by Carpenter and Feroz (2001), it may be difficult 
to distinguish the three forms of isomorphic pressures empirically, that may be acting on an 
organisation at any given point in time as it is possible that two or more forms will be acting at 
the same time. 
 
This finding is on the lines of earlier institutional theory literature by Khadaroo (2005), Arena, 
Arnaboldi, & Azzone (2006) Bovaird & Downe (2006), Tsamenyi et al. (2006), Williams et al. 
(2009) that found coercive pressures through central government and related government 
agencies to positively influence on the intention to adopt and on the organisational changes 
both in the public and private sector. Within state government context, the result is consistent 
with findings by Carpenter & Feroz (2001) which revealed that federal government (potential 
to alter power relations of elected officials) affects the decision to adopt new accounting 
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practices in the US. Furthermore, the result supports  the study by Ashworth et al. (2007), which 
suggested that central government (the form of legislation- the Local Government Act (1999) 
and the Best Value inspection program) was one of the strongest influences on organisational 
changes specifically on a set of highly structured organisations like English local authorities. 
Bovaird & Downe (2006) found that coercive isomorphism existed within English local 
authorities in implementing the LGMA through dependence on central government resources 
(financial, reputational or legitimating). Thus, the current study confirms central government 
and related government agencies as an important factor that influences the decision to use 
forensic accounting services. At the same time, the finding provides empirical implications of 
the theoretical model by examining central government and their agencies as coercive pressures 
in the field of forensic accounting. 
 
The practical implications of the findings are twofold: local authorities do their best to remedy 
fraud issues in line with the direction or aim of central government to reduce fraud cases in 
both prevention of and detection of fraud by investing in use of forensic accounting services. 
At the same time, the reports on fraud measurements by the related agencies such as the 
National Fraud Authority and the Audit Commission provide valuable information on the 
nature and extent of fraud in local authorities. Central government could also emphasize the 
need to engage with external consultants by promoting use of forensic accounting services. In 
view of the high costs of forensic accounting services (e.g. the case of Tower Hamlets that 
costs nearly £1 million), central government could recommend local authorities to ensure the 
practice of transferring skills of forensic accountants into the in-house counter fraud resources 
is being carried out. As indicated in Table 5-8, fraud prevention, detection, investigations and 
digital forensic were among the most types of services utilised from forensic accounting 
services. The findings revealed an increase by those who used forensic accounting services in 
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services such as improving internal control systems and developing compliance strategies 
alongside fraud training services. Thus, there is opportunity to embed and transfer skills. This 
will benefit in the long term with low costs involved compared to hiring the forensic accounting 
services on a regular basis. This is particularly important at the time of austerity measures, and 
prevention and detection of fraud can be used as a tool to make savings. In addition, central 
government perhaps could provide assistance such as giving incentives to local authorities in 
enhancing their counter fraud resources by using forensic accounting services, particularly in 
the areas of digital forensic, fraud investigations, asset tracing and recovery, fraud detection, 
and fraud risk management. These particular services were among the top five of the types of 
forensic accounting services utilised by local authorities surveyed in this study.  
 
Apart from that, central government could make the existence of counter fraud teams or units 
compulsory, similar to what has happened in the NHS, as the CFS had similar skills and 
knowledge with forensic accountants. Local authorities need to ensure it is important to 
estimate the cost of fraud within their own organisation e.g. for allocation of resources. The 
reports of fraud by the National Fraud Authority and the Audit Commission were estimated 
based on all local authorities which might not reflect the ‘real’ extent and nature of fraud within 
each local authority or merely be the tip of the iceberg as there are possibilities that many frauds 
are undiscovered, hence hidden from official reports (Button et al. 2011). Moreover, both the 
National Fraud Authority and the Audit Commission had been abolished by central government 
during 2015, which either directly or indirectly had impacts on the estimation and nature of 
fraud. As shown in Table 5-13, most local authorities (66%) agreed it is difficult to estimate 
the total economic costs of fraud in their local authority. As such, local authorities could adopt 
a good technique used by forensic accounting services such as on fraud measurement (under 
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fraud risk management and digital forensic services) that could provide a more accurate picture 
on the extent of fraud. 
 
6.2.5.1.2 Hypothesis H2: News of fraud highlighted by the media will positively 
influence the intention of English local authorities to use forensic accounting 
services 
 
The current study proposed that media through the dissemination of news, publications and 
discussions on fraud will positively influence the intention of English local authorities to use 
forensic accounting services. Based on the  data analysis, the results indicated that it is not 
significant. Van Peursem & Balme (2010) analysed on the role of media (news articles) towards 
the practice of quality and threat of disestablishment of the New Zealand Serious Fraud Office 
based on the institutional perspective. The findings of the study show that media could be a 
powerful social and functional pressure for change. The role of media in publishing financial 
crime such as fraud has been regarded as ‘infotainment’ (Levi, 2006). The argument that the 
headlines on the news were sometimes overwhelming might, to a certain extent, overshadow 
the need to remedy the real issues into a larger perspective. In this context, the media is 
considered exaggerating the risks of crime, cultivating an image of the world that is ‘scary’ 
and ‘mean’ (Reiner, 2007). For example, in the UK, the proportion of violent crimes relative 
to other crimes reported in television news broadcast is similar to the tabloid data rather than 
the quality or official data. As a result of this, it could have led confusions among the users of 
what being reported from different types of media. 
 
There are also variations between media and market; printed media is more likely to provide 
more analysis than radio and television (Reiner, 2007). In another view, Chibnall (1997) 
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suggested that news on corruption and other police wrongdoings’ stories have traditionally 
been set within the ‘one bad apple’ context, whereas the news of normal individuals is 
interpreted as a testimony of the system (as cited in Reiner, 2007). As the story of ‘one bad 
apple’ is being used many times, it has been changed as a story of institutional reform, ‘this 
acknowledges the problems of previous practice but safeguards the legitimacy of the institution 
as one that is already putting things right’ (Reiner, 2007). Within the local authorities, the 
situation can be very complex as other stakeholders such as central government and 
enforcement agencies did have interest pertaining to highlighted issues in the news. Apart from 
that, the insignificant result of the role of media could be due to local authorities’ officers 
discounting media because they are experts and know reality. In addition, local authorities’ 
officers have little regard for media. Thus, media, when reporting financial crimes, should be 
objective and continuously pressure to generate a greater awareness to tackle the real issues 
without any bias.  
 
6.2.5.2 Hypothesis Based on Mimetic Pressures 
 
This section outlines the discussion on the results of mimetic pressures of the extent and 
perceived success of using forensic accounting services by other local authorities. 
 
6.2.5.2.1 Hypothesis H3: The extent and perceived success of using forensic accounting 
services by other local authorities will positively influence the intention of 
English local authorities to use forensic accounting services  
 
This study anticipated that mimetic pressures through perceived used and success of forensic 
accounting services by other local authorities will positively influence the intention of English 
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local authorities to use the services. Based on the findings, forensic accounting services used 
and high rate of success in using forensic accounting services by other local authorities 
positively influence the intention of a local authority to use the services to detect and prevent 
fraud.  
 
This finding suggested that information sharing among local authorities is important as it can 
be used as an input in deciding the correct supplier in the market. It is beneficial for government 
bodies to be an intelligent customer or user by sharing information and experience as a 
precautionary measure before appointing the external providers (House of Commons 
Committee of Public Accounts, 2007). For instance, the LGA could facilitate a medium for the 
interaction among local authorities through a special session or forum or online forum. The 
NFA Regional Partnership launched in 2010 encouraged local authorities and other agencies 
to work in partnership. This was either through exchanging information or fully operational 
partnership based on location (National Fraud Authority, 2011). Accordingly, Stock & Zinszer 
(1987) suggested that at earlier stages of selecting the potential external consultant, 
recommendations by others inside and outside the organisation are considered as one of the 
important factors.  
 
The advantages of having input from the local authorities that already employed the forensic 
accounting services included; knowing the estimated costs will not be charged higher for the 
same work carried out and the performance of the providers also can be pre-evaluated. This is 
particularly important at the time when there is a reduction of allocation in the austerity era; 
any decision making could be more effective and efficient. Central government through the 
NAO recommended that government bodies implement ‘better value for money from 
professional services’ (House of Commons Committee of Public Accounts, 2007). 
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Within the NIS of institutional theory, the main driver of changes is from external environment 
(e.g. government policy, regulation, supplier relationships) and not cost-minimising objectives 
(Moll et al., 2006). The findings of the current study are similar with findings from previous 
studies within the institutional theory that suggest mimetic pressures as a process of imitation 
among organisational field (Lawrence, 1999; Teo et al., 2003; Khadaroo, 2005; Touron, 2005; 
Khalifa & Davison, 2006; Williams et al., 2009; Ugrin, 2009; Henderson et al., 2011). 
Furthermore, the results are similar to Ashworth et al. (2007) study which suggested that 
mimetic pressures through practices of other local councils in England give impact on 
organisational change. Thus, based on the hypothesis H3, mimetic pressures through perceived 
use and success of other local authorities that engaged in forensic accounting services initiate 
a local authority to use the services in detecting and preventing fraud.  
 
The practical implication is that central government through initiatives, rules, and policies such 
as by publishing best practices and guidelines to counter fraud that could be applied by local 
authorities to use forensic accounting techniques or services, could provide better results. The 
experiences in utilising forensic accounting services and the success of detecting, preventing 
and investigating fraud cases could be shared among local authorities resulting in increasing 
their intention to use the services. In order to have better information sharing, other institutional 
bodies such as central government or the LGA could facilitate the initiatives. Another option 
is to create a single body that can act as intermediary that can be referred to by local authorities 
in searching the best solution to deter fraud. As local authorities share similar types of fraud, a 
pool of information and resources is useful so as to determine the appropriate actions to remedy 
fraud in-house or as a basis to appoint external providers. 
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6.2.5.3 Hypothesis Based on Normative Pressures 
 
This section discuss the results of the hypotheses based on professional bodies and associations, 
forensic accounting services providers and stakeholders. 
 
6.2.5.3.1 Hypothesis H4: Recommendations by the professional bodies and associations 
to effectively detect and prevent fraud will positively influence the intention of 
English local authorities to use forensic accounting services. 
 
This study proposed that normative pressures through professional bodies and associations will 
positively influence English local authorities to acquire forensic accounting services. Contrary 
to expectations, there was no statistical evidence that H4 has an influence to utilise the services, 
thus H4 was rejected. The insignificant result may be explained by the discussions below. 
 
The counter fraud work within local authorities is subject to action or plan by central 
government through other agencies and the professional bodies. There were three professional 
bodies used in this study; the CIPFA (majority of the respondents in this study were CIPFA 
members as depicted in Table 5-3), the ICAEW and the ICFS. Among these three professional 
bodies, the CIPFA was directly involved in developing counter framework in the public 
services including local authorities. A number of publications as a guidance for better 
governance has been produced such as ‘Managing the risk of fraud, actions to counter fraud 
and corruption’ in 2008 which have become the standard of anti-fraud activity in the public 
services. Within this standard, the focus is to develop and improve a corporate anti-fraud 
capability within each public body by having adequate resources and strategies that could be 
implemented internally. While focusing to improve the internal resources, members of the 
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profession need to acquire the desired skills through training and experience to gain new 
knowledge. There are possibilities that the capabilities of the internal resources within local 
authorities after gaining the appropriate skills and experiences being a member of the CIPFA 
are equivalent to the skills of forensic accounting services providers. Therefore, such decisions 
to recommend turning to outsource can be very minimal. 
 
Another possible explanation for this is that other professional bodies, such as ICFS, are 
directly involved in providing professional certification focus on counter fraud in the UK. 
According to Button et al. (2007), a significant number of accredited counter fraud specialists 
present within the English local authorities. Some local authorities, particularly in London 
Borough and Birmingham City Council, do have internal expertise and sufficient resources in 
detecting and preventing fraud. In practice, the ICAEW introduced the accreditation scheme 
for the forensic accountants to enable potential employers such as lawyers, the NAO and the 
SFO to choose a good forensic accountant. Overall, the findings also indicated that members 
of the profession (the CIPFA and the ICFS) were more inclined to use internal resources than 
the external providers. 
 
The result is in contrast with findings from previous studies by Teo et al. (2003), Khadaroo 
(2005) and Henderson et al. (2011) which indicated the positive influence of normative 
pressures through professional bodies and society in organisational change. Both studies by 
Teo et al. (2003) and Henderson et al. (2011) were carried out within the private sector context 
that may have different perspectives to the current study. However, the result aligns with 
evidence provided by Yigitbasioglu (2015) that suggested normative pressures (the promotions 
by the government and suppliers) in Australia were not influence top management team’s 
decision to adopt cloud computing services. Similarly, Liang et al. (2007) found that normative 
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pressures (the networking of top managers and the value chain comprising a group of closely 
related suppliers and customers) unable to confirm that normative pressures affect top 
management’s participation in activities advancing ERP assimilation. 
 
Thus, the results of hypothesis testing may be affected by the internal strategies and resources 
from the professional bodies and the overall indication is that normative pressures through 
professional bodies and associations do not significantly influence English local authorities in 
using forensic accounting services. 
 
6.2.5.3.2 Hypothesis H5: The reports on frauds and the promotion of forensic 
accounting services in the market by the forensic accounting services providers 
together with their expertise and capabilities to perform forensic accounting 
will positively influence the intention of English local authorities to use forensic 
accounting services 
 
Hypothesis H5 examined the positive influence of normative pressures through forensic 
accounting providers (suppliers) on the intention of English local authorities to use forensic 
accounting services. The hypothesis results are not significant. Therefore, hypothesis H5 was 
rejected. This result may be due to lack of promotion by the providers to disseminate 
information of their expertise needed by local authorities. Another possible explanation was 
due to scepticism about the promoted services by the recipients of the promotion. The report 
of fraud issued by the accounting firms tended to not specifically analyse the nature of fraud 
within local authorities’ context. For example, the report by PwC and KPMG covered the 
statistics of fraud in both the private and the public sector. As indicated by the findings of the 
current study, local authorities were more inclined to have a specific service such as computer 
forensics. Based on a descriptive analysis in Section 5.3.2 this study found that forensic 
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accounting providers (the Big Four) do have competitors as some local authorities sought the 
services either from other local authorities that have expertise or their outsourcing providers 
(medium and small size). 
 
The result is inconsistent with findings from studies by Teo et al. (2003) and Yoon & George 
(2013) who reported that perceived dominance of supplier is a significant predictor of 
innovation adoption. The contrast results, however, support the argument by Son & Benbasat 
(2007) that normative pressures through perceived dominance of supplier adopters was not a 
significant factor of initial adoption of B2B e-marketplaces.  
 
6.2.5.3.3 Hypothesis H6: Pressures from stakeholders will positively influence the 
intention of English local authorities to use forensic accounting services 
 
The final variable of normative pressures is investigated through H6 that posited stakeholders 
have a positive influence on the intention of English local authorities to utilise forensic 
accounting services. As suggested by Gomes (2006), the stakeholders included in this study 
were elected councillors, taxpayers, top management and business partners. The results of 
hypothesis testing show a positive relationship but not statistically significant, thus H6 was 
rejected.  
 
The finding is contrasted with the results by Gomes (2004) who indicated that English local 
authorities are stakeholder-based organisations. The author suggested that stakeholders play an 
important role when local authorities devise their strategies. Furthermore, Henriques & 
Sadorsky (1996) confirmed the role of stakeholders in influencing a firm’s strategies in 
environmental plan. The findings of the current study provide evidence that the role of 
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stakeholder might be different in terms of context and issues. For example, top management 
and elected councillors may not want to expose any wrongdoings publicly, rather solve the 
problem internally as the issues of fraud could get greater attention from the public, whereas 
the taxpayers may have to find a proper forum to disseminate their intention or request to local 
authorities in using forensic accounting services. Additionally, the taxpayers might not be 
aware of the role of forensic accounting in detection and prevention of fraud. The stakeholders 
are unlikely to be interested in the technical issue of forensic accounting services and deemed 
to lack knowledge.  
 
The non-significant results may partly be explained by the existing structure of counter fraud 
in local authorities. The views of stakeholders are perhaps local authorities have adequate 
resources with a strong structure to counter fraud internally. Fraud prevention also may not be 
well publicised in the media to suggest that services such as forensic accounting services might 
be needed. Therefore, in-house counter fraud is sufficient enough, that may not require external 
services such as forensic accounting. Another possible explanation is the low level of the 
knowledge about the forensic accounting services among the stakeholders. These possibilities 
may lead to the rejection of H6 which empirically is not significant.  
 
6.2.5.4 Hypothesis Based on Forensic Accounting Perceptions Factors 
 
This section outlines the discussion on the findings of perceived benefits of forensic 
accounting, perceptions of the objectivity and credibility of forensic accountants, perceived 
risks of forensic accounting and costs to acquire the services. 
 
 292 
 
6.2.5.4.1 Hypothesis H7: Perceived benefits of forensic accounting will positively 
influence the intention of English local authorities to use forensic accounting 
services  
 
This study proposed that the perceived benefits of forensic accounting will positively influence 
the intention of English local authorities in acquiring forensic accounting services. The 
hypothesis testing provides empirical evidence that the perceived benefits were determinant 
factors in influencing English local authorities to hire forensic accounting services. As 
described in Table 5-5, nearly one fifth of the 139 local authorities that participated used 
forensic accounting services. Additionally, the results indicated that forensic accounting 
services are utilised regardless of the types of local authorities. In Table 5-9, the findings 
indicated that most local authorities that used (60%) were satisfied with the services received 
from the providers, either from the Big Four accounting firms or other providers. Therefore, it 
can be assumed that for those that utilised the services, they also realised the benefits of using 
the services which contributed to result (significant) on the benefits of forensic accounting. For 
local authorities that did not utilise the services, they perceived forensic accounting techniques 
and skills, such as using digital forensic, as important to deter fraud. 
 
As noted by Singleton & Singleton (2010), forensic accounting services in the area of fraud 
refers to comprehensive view of fraud investigation that includes preventing frauds and 
analysing controls and gathering non-financial information. In addition,  Crumbley et al. (2003) 
argued that the difference between forensic accounting and fraud auditing is: a fraud auditor is 
an accountant with special skills in auditing, and a forensic accountant may take on fraud 
auditing engagements and be a fraud auditor but use other skills in accounting, consulting, legal 
in broader engagements.  
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The results show that local authorities recognised the benefits of forensic accounting services 
in terms of greater knowledge, skills, experiences and quality of services to deter fraud, and 
asset recovery (measurement used in this study). Relatively, Selim & Yiannakas (2000) found 
that, both the public and private sector in the UK decided to outsource the internal audit services 
because of the benefits by means of greater access to the skills and high quality of services as 
organisations lack of in-house that possessed necessary skills. As suggested by Carey, 
Subramaniam & Ching (2006), the external services providers such as accounting firms had 
advantages over in-house resources such as internal audit department because accounting firms 
have the latest technology-based resources, industry specialisation and professionals who are 
specialists, experienced and well qualified. Within the management consultants’ literature, 
Deakins & Dillon (2006) found that specific expertise of consultants and cost effectiveness 
were the main reasons for local authorities in New Zealand to acquire the services.  
 
6.2.5.4.2 Hypothesis H8: Perceptions of the objectivity and credibility between forensic 
accountants and auditors will positively influence the intention of English local 
authorities to use forensic accounting services 
 
The hypothesis H8 posited that the perceptions of the objectivity and credibility between 
forensic accountants and auditors would positively influence the intention of English local 
authorities to use forensic accounting services. The results indicate it is statistically not 
significant. This hypothesis was assessed through a statement that forensic accountants have 
more objectivity and credibility than internal auditors and have accounting expertise and 
knowledge in dealing with fraud. The internal auditors may perceive that dealing with fraud 
required a good understanding of internal issues such as environment of work and confidential 
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issues. Another possible explanation is the issue of inter-professional conflict that could affect 
the result. Internal auditors and CFS could perceive they had been thought not to do their job 
well if using forensic accounting services. The perceptions towards the objectivity and 
credibility of forensic accountants also could be difficult to be justified e.g. from own 
experience and recommendations from peers.  
 
This finding, however, is contrasted with the findings of a study by Carey et al. (2006) who 
found that the perceptions of technical competence, including objectivity and credibility, posed 
by external providers’ and in-house internal auditors influence the decision to outsource 
internal audit services. The findings of the current study might reflect that internal auditors did 
have certain knowledge and expertise in handling fraud.  
 
6.2.5.4.3 Hypothesis H9: The costs of forensic accounting services will negatively 
influence the intention of English local authorities to use forensic accounting 
services  
 
This study proposed a negative effect on the relationship between the costs to acquire the 
services and the intention to utilise forensic accounting services by English local authorities. 
The results found that H9 was empirically supported. Both the negative relationship and the 
significance value were confirmed. The current study measured the costs to acquire forensic 
accounting services through a statement of: 1) forensic accounting services are very costly, 2) 
the cost of using forensic accounting services would influence my local authority’s decision to 
use the services, and 3) my local authority cannot afford the cost of acquiring forensic 
accounting services.  
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In the public sector context, Corcoran & Mclean (1998) expressed that principle of value for 
money was concerned with balancing conflicting elements (product or services with costs, and 
the risk) when purchasing the external services. Within the current study context, the high costs 
of forensic accounting services (i.e. the case of Tower Hamlets that cost nearly £1 million) 
means that local authorities are reluctant to use the services unless there are ideal justifications 
in terms of the ‘worthiness’ that the work undertaken will be successful and give value added. 
The main objective of applying the principle of value for money is to ensure the taxpayer’s 
money is well spent but, more importantly, it is an imperative directing them to keep their costs 
down, e.g. to operate efficiently, effectively and economically that reflects public 
accountability (Corcoran & Mclean, 1998).  
 
There is concern from government and the public over the use and cost of management 
consultants in the public sector (ACCA, 2010). For example, the costs and benefits analysis is 
important in using external providers which usually required a substantial amount of fees. In 
the time of budget constraints, the best alternative solutions need to be carefully considered. 
Another concern raised is how external providers could transfer the appropriate skills to the 
public sector (ACCA, 2010). It will create a burden (additional costs) to the organisations if 
the same type of work is acquired from time to time rather than improving the internal 
structures within the organisations as a long term investment. As argued by Bierstaker et al. 
(2006) and Christensen et al. (2005), organisations may be worried about the costs to invest in 
anti-fraud technology and forensic accountants, but may underestimate the potential benefits 
in terms of cost savings towards reducing losses related to fraud in the future. 
 
The result seems to be consistent with previous studies, which found that financial costs did 
influence the intention to adopt (Wymer & Regan, 2005), decision to outsource business 
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process (Gewald & Dibbern, 2009), and decision to outsource internal audit services (Speklé 
et al. 2007). Similarly, Balakrishnan et al. (2010) found that costs pressures negatively 
associated with the decision to outsource non-clinical services in the government hospitals. 
Their argument is based on the fact that compared to the private hospital, the governance 
structure in the government hospitals enforces institutional constraints on the management 
decision making process. The institutional constraints include the bureaucratic process and 
squeeze controls that were norm practices within the public sector context. Thus, the decision 
process may have been delayed or not been reviewed by the personnel that understand the 
nature of the problem. 
 
An implication of this is the possibility that the presumption of ‘expensive’ forensic accounting 
services only caters for ‘wealthy’ organisations. If the cost becomes a major hurdle, then, it 
shows a ‘missing link’ between what the forensic accounting is all about and how the practices 
have been operationalised. The argument is that management consultants of the Big Four 
accounting firms are among the highest revenues in the global market. Thus, the real purpose 
of providing services to assist organisations is no longer valid as it is more about maximising 
the profits or higher fees. Additionally, the notation ‘ethic challenge’ as suggested by Cowton 
(2009) implies the need for the accounting profession to reflect ethical matters e.g. to help build 
a decent moral community (p. 187). Within this context, as organisations struggle to find the 
solutions to fight fraud, forensic accounting providers could do more (social contributions) 
rather than business focus types of services as the consequences of fraud not only affect the 
loss of money, but also the services that should be received by the public. 
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6.2.5.4.4 Hypothesis H10: Perceived risks of forensic accounting will negatively 
influence the intention of English local authorities to use forensic accounting 
services  
 
Hypothesis H10 proposed that perceived risks of using forensic accounting services will 
negatively influence the intention of English local authorities to acquire forensic accounting 
services. As indicated by the empirical finding, the statistical evidence indicates the negative 
direction is supported but statistically not significant. Perceived risks in this study refer to the 
uncertainty faced by local authorities, where the consequences of the decision cannot be 
anticipated when acquiring forensic accounting services. The type of perceived risk 
operationalized in this study was performance risk, which is the risk that the service provided 
by the forensic accounting providers will not be delivered as expected by local authorities. For 
example, as credence based services, the pre-purchase information and knowledge on the 
services to be acquired naturally are difficult to realize (Mitra et al., 1999).  
 
The findings indicated that English local authorities were concerned on the issues of 
confidentiality and the risk that forensic accounting services cannot guarantee the outcome. 
Mitchell (1994) stated that most providers of the professional services are allowed a significant 
amount of autonomy in the performance of their duties although they are bound by their code 
of ethics. Organisations spend a huge amount of money to protect classified information, yet 
professional services often get access and, in many aspects, may be total strangers or outsiders. 
This may expose risks that important information might be passed to unknown parties for 
various purposes and do harm to organisations. 
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 The outcome on the use of professional services is based on the skill level of the professional, 
and that skill level cannot be applied constantly with equal result (Mitchell, 1994). A study by 
Deakins & Dillon (2006) suggested that some local authorities in New Zealand were 
experiencing significant gaps between their expectations and what is being delivered by 
management consultants. Within the context of the current study, there are possibilities that the 
forensic accountants might miss something or not be able to find anything during the 
investigations. While in the prevention of fraud, the question of who knows and what does not 
come to happened might aroused or none can predict the outcome with any degree of certainty. 
The result contrasts with the findings of previous studies by Gewald et al. (2006) and 
Featherman & Fuller (2003) who concluded that perceived risks are significant factor, which 
has negative influence of perceived risk on adoption intention. This may be explained by the 
fact that faced with problems with uncertain solutions (or dealing with the complexity to 
counter fraud), organisational decision makers tend to rely on mimetic pressures from the 
environments to economize on search costs (adapted from Cyert & March, 1963) to avoid the 
risks that are borne by first movers (Lieberman & Montgomery, 1998). As stated in Section 
5.7.3.2, the mimetic pressures through other local governments are statistically influencing 
English local authorities to use forensic accounting services. 
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6.2.5.5 Hypothesis Based on Fraud Perceptions Factors 
 
This section discusses the findings of the results of perceived severity of fraud and perceived 
susceptibility to fraud. 
 
6.2.5.5.1 Hypothesis H11: Perceived severity of fraud will positively influence the 
intention of English local authorities to use forensic accounting services 
 
Perceived severity of fraud refers to the serious potential consequences after the event of fraud 
faced by local authorities. The implications of fraud to local authorities are not limited to the 
financial losses but could also impact the quality of public services (Gee et al., 2010). Thus, 
hypothesis H11 proposed that the perceived severity of fraud will positively influence the 
intention of English local authorities to use forensic accounting services. However, the result 
of the PLS analysis does not support the hypothesis.  
 
Local authorities might prefer to use internal resources at the beginning of the fraud 
investigation to avoid the negative impressions that there is a major case of fraud that involves 
external parties. Despite the published report on fraud e.g. Audit Commission (2012); National 
Fraud Authority (2012b); PricewaterhouseCoopers (2014) that highlighted the amount of loss 
and consequences to the society, it is very difficult to measure the actual effects of fraud. The 
question to what extent fraud could impact on the society, for instance, is difficult to measure. 
Compared to the private sector, for example, the effect of fraud includes the reduction of share 
prices, disclosure of business, and higher costs of fraud investigations in the event of massive 
fraud happening. In addition, the result of this study is similar to the study by Downs, Holbrook, 
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& Cranor (2007) that reported perceived severity of phishing risk (to avoid internet fraud) does 
not predict behaviour response.  
 
The result of this study indicated the seriousness toward the implications of fraud not 
considered as the main driver to engage with professional services like forensic accounting 
services. Local authorities believed that the consequences can be dealt with through their 
internal control or internal resources.  
 
6.2.5.5.2  Hypothesis H12: Perceived susceptibility of fraud will positively influence the 
intention of English local authorities to use forensic accounting services 
 
Local authorities, like any other organisations, are not immune to risks of fraud. Numerous 
reports on fraud by e.g. National Fraud Authority (2012b) and Audit Commission (2014) 
indicated the extent and the potential of fraud. In this study, perceived susceptibility of fraud 
refers to local authorities’ perceptions towards the likelihood that fraud could occur in their 
organisation. Thus, hypothesis H12 posited that the perceived susceptibility of fraud will 
positively intention of English local authorities to use forensic accounting services. The result 
from the data analysis contrasts with the proposed hypothesis H12. The empirical findings 
show that the perceived susceptibility of fraud is not statistically significant, thus H12 was 
rejected. 
 
This result is likely to be related to how local authorities assess and estimate the nature and 
amount of fraud. The descriptive analysis of this study indicates that most local authorities face 
difficulties to estimate the total economic costs of fraud in their organisations. This implies that 
if local authorities are not able to determine the extent costs of fraud, the appropriate measures 
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to identify potential fraud will be low. Studies that highlighted the importance of fraud 
measurement stated that ‘fraud is an ongoing problem that needs continuous monitoring and 
assessment’ (Brooks et al., 2009); it is difficult to apply the right solution if the nature and scale 
of the problem is not clear (Gee et al., 2010). Hence, fraud is still uncovered as there is no 
indication of the existence of fraud if no measurement of fraud has been done For example, 
Gee et al. (2012) reported that only a quarter of local authorities implemented estimation on 
the total economic cost of fraud.  
 
In addition, the role of government bodies, such as the NFA that established ‘Fighting Fraud 
Locally’, provides support and guidance to use the best practice approach to tackle fraud. The 
guidance among others stressed the need to emphasize a ‘three-tiered’ approach: managing 
fraud risks, preventing and detecting more fraud, and pursuing and recovering losses. Hence, 
local authorities tend to rely on the best practices provided and implement within their local 
authorities, resulting in counter fraud more in-house rather than to outsource the services. 
 
6.2.5.6 Hypothesis Based on Internal Factors 
 
This section discusses the results on the findings of strength of internal control systems and 
strength of counter fraud resources. 
 
6.2.5.6.1 Hypothesis H13: Strength of internal control will negatively influence the 
intention of English local authorities to use forensic accounting services 
 
Internal control plays an important role as the front line defence to detect and prevent fraud 
(Ryan & Gerry, 2011). Hypothesis H13 proposed that strong internal control will have a 
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negative influence towards using the services by English local authorities. The results of data 
analysis do not support the proposition and H13 was rejected. Strength of internal control was 
measured by the statements of: 1) organisational structure supports effective internal control, 
and 2) management and employees are assigned appropriate levels of authority and 
responsibilities. 
 
One possible explanation of the result is the local authorities’ belief that it is more feasible to 
solve internally any internal control weakness, such as through internal auditors (Muthusamy, 
2011) or counter fraud specialists rather than forensic accounting services. On the other hand, 
Button et al. (2007) argued that the structure, governance, and capabilities of the counter fraud 
(as part of internal control) within local authorities may vary, where some can be considered 
doing well and others either perform moderately or very minimally. The results of this study 
unsurprisingly evidence a recent study by Gee et al. (2012) that concluded most English local 
authorities performed best in terms of having a written counter fraud and corruption strategy 
in place. Additionally, the present result corroborates the results of Matsumura & Tucker 
(1992) who reported that if the internal control system in an organisation is good, more fraud 
can be detected internally (auditors). Additionally, Alleyne & Howard (2005) and Muthusamy 
(2011) agreed  that organisations with strong internal controls are more capable in fraud 
detection and prevention. The overall indication is that local authorities with strong internal 
control will rely on their internal resources rather than the external professional services like 
forensic accounting. 
 
The implications of these results suggested that local authorities can rely on their effective 
internal control system besides moving to proactive approach to deter fraud. However, as the 
fraud evolves, the internal control system needs to be regularly updated, such as reviewing the 
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fraud risk management system. Furthermore, the supports given by central government through 
their agencies by having best practice strategy or policy can be used by local authorities to 
strengthen the preventive measures.  
 
6.2.5.6.2 Hypothesis H14: Strength of the in-house counter fraud resources will 
negatively influence the intention of English local authorities to use forensic 
accounting services 
 
Prior studies that have noted the role of counter fraud specialists within local authorities include 
e.g. Button et al. (2007); Gee et al. (2010) and Lane (2011). Hypothesis H14 posited that 
strength of in-house counter fraud will negatively influence the intention of English local 
authorities to use forensic accounting services. The result of data analysis supports the 
preposition and H14 was accepted. The current study asked whether the number of staff and 
resources were adequate to counter fraud, received specialist professional training and 
accreditation, and the effectiveness of in-house is very high.  
 
There are possible explanations for this result. First, the existence of counter fraud specialists 
in local authorities is not a legal requirement unlike the NHS (Button et al., 2007). Therefore, 
the structure, governance, and capabilities of the counter fraud within local authorities may 
vary. For instance, in some local authorities, the capabilities of the in-house counter fraud can 
be considered as doing very well, but some authorities may perform moderately or with very 
minimum impact. Similarly, Lane (2010) concluded that the in-house counter fraud in London 
Borough can be considered well equipped compared to the NHS and DWP but the scenario in 
other authorities could be different. With adequate number of counter fraud resources, the 
performance of London Borough to counter fraud is relatively similar to DWP at least.  
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Secondly, during the transition period of significant changes made by central government e.g. 
abolishment of the Audit Commission, the creation of the SFIS perhaps had effect in some 
local authorities. For example, in some local authorities with adequate counter fraud resources, 
fraud may be detected and prevented effectively. However, local authorities that faced a 
reduction of counter fraud staff as a result of the establishment of the SFIS may seek external 
services of forensic accounting. Thus, perhaps the uncertainty and the impact result of mixed 
arrangements to counter fraud might affect the result of this study.  
 
6.3 Summary 
 
This chapter explained and discussed the outcome of the hypotheses testing. Overall, five 
hypotheses were found to be significant factors in influencing local authorities to utilise 
forensic accounting services; coercive pressures, mimetic pressures, perceived benefits and 
costs of forensic accounting services, and the strength of the in-house counter fraud resources.  
Additionally, the results were compared with previous literature accordingly. Then, the 
possible explanations of non-significant hypotheses were highlighted. Finally, the plausible 
implications that perhaps could increase the use of forensic accounting services among English 
local authorities were provided. The next final chapter will recap the present study. The 
theoretical and practical contributions, limitations of the research, and direction of future 
research will be described. 
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7 CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSIONS 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
The objectives of this study are threefold: (1) to examine the extent of use of forensic 
accounting services by English local authorities, (2) to examine the perceptions toward the 
core skills/essential traits of forensic accountants from the users’ perspective, and (3) to 
investigate the factors that influence the intention to use forensic accounting services to detect 
and prevent fraud by English local authorities. In order to achieve the research objective (3) on 
the factors that influence the intention, institutional theory was used as a lens with which to 
view and organise the theoretical framework alongside other salient factors.  
 
This chapter is organised into six sections. Firstly, a summary of the research aim and 
objectives is presented. Secondly, the main findings outlined the types of services used, in 
which indicated the demand in utilising forensic accounting services within the public sector 
context; i.e. digital forensic was one of the most services acquired due to the increase of 
complex and technical frauds; and the effects of institutional variables of coercive and mimetic 
pressures in shaping the use of forensic accounting services in local authorities. Thirdly, 
implications of the study are highlighted from the academic/theoretical and practical 
perspectives, including expanding the existing literature on the use of external providers to 
counter fraud within the public sector context. Next, limitations of the current study are 
presented followed by recommendation for future research. Lastly, some final concluding 
remarks are provided bringing the chapter to a close.  
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7.2 Main Findings 
 
This study evidenced the existence and the usage of external professional services as a tool to 
protect public accountability within the public sector environment. In this context, the 
providers of forensic accounting play a role in providing their services to detect and prevent 
fraud in English local authorities. As fraud is considered a major problem, in some events 
although it can be detected, there are concerns of undetected fraud. Additionally, as 
increasingly complex and technological frauds are emerging one would expect the demand for 
forensic accounting services to increase, hence understanding more about forensic accounting 
services is important. The type of services acquired ranged from the most of digital forensic, 
including data mining, to the least of prosecution cases. Based on this, local authorities 
employed digital forensic as it is considered the area that resources in local authorities still 
lacked using it. Most local authorities surveyed in this study used non Big Four accounting 
firms as their external providers, with acceptable level of satisfaction of their services. 
However, it is difficult to judge the intention to use the services in the future because 
organisation may evaluate the costs and benefits to acquire the services besides the complexity 
of fraud cases. 
 
Not all local authorities have counter fraud specialists and as a result of austerity measures, 
there is evidence that the number is falling. The reduction in investigative resources will mean 
that fraud is likely to be increased and local authorities will detect less fraud. Forensic 
accounting services are increasingly important when new fraud exists; counter fraud specialists 
can help but forensic accounting services are needed particularly in the prevention, detection 
and investigation, for example evidence of the findings from the current study indicated that 
digital forensic is the most used type of services. Although the growth of forensic accounting 
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services is considered as demand driven, mainly in the private sector and in the US, the 
situation in the UK public sector is considered different. The current study found that at least 
some types of services, i.e. digital forensic and fraud risk management, can be considered as 
demand driven. The diversified forensic accounting services offered by the providers, 
however, can be categorized as supply driven as local authorities tend to rely on external 
providers to solve the problems where there is lack of either capacity or expertise in-house 
particularly in complex and technological frauds. Overall, it is hard to figure out whether 
forensic accounting services in the UK are supply or demand driven but given the conditions 
in the public sector context, particularly in local authorities which are subject to fraud on what 
appears a massive scale, we can say that with the increase in fraud then conditions in the public 
sector for demand side is increasing. As evidenced in the current study, digital forensic 
including data mining and digital recovery were some of the services that have increasingly 
been utilised compared to other services. 
 
Local authorities have expertise in forensic accounting services areas because of internal 
auditors and counter fraud specialists; however, not all local authorities have counter fraud 
specialists and fraud needs much more expertise, for example in the areas of computer forensic 
and poor ‘fraud’ record in fraud management. In relation to the views of the functionalist and 
critical image as suggested by Werr & Styhre (2002), the consultant-client relationship inclined 
to functionalist image client as a buyer rather than as a victim, as indicated in Table 6.1. For 
example, the reason for using forensic accounting services was due to lack of capabilities or 
skills such as in computer forensic examination and fraud risks management. Furthermore, in 
the aspect of nature of the client, the current study found that the utilisation of forensic 
accounting services by local authorities is based on the recommendation by local authorities 
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or mimicking process rather than using the services because of persuasive strategies by the 
providers.  
Within the institutional factors, mimetic pressures were one of the significant factors in the 
current study. In this context, a local authority tends to model other local authorities that they 
perceived successful when using forensic accounting services. The number of local authorities 
with and without counter fraud units surveyed in this study indicated a similar pattern regarding 
the number that used forensic accounting services, which reflects the complexity of fraud cases 
that occurred. It is still not certain why central government does not make it compulsory 
through statute for local authorities to have their own counter fraud unit as compared to the 
NHS (Lane, 2010). It is important to have a statutory requirement in the basis to have some 
standardisation in terms of counter fraud structures and techniques to counter fraud but it has 
not yet been implemented in local authorities. Hence, it may rationalise the demand for forensic 
accounting services within local authorities as indicated in the findings of the current study.  
 
The emergence of NPM during the 1980s shaped the demand for business management 
expertise in public sector circles (Saint-Martin, 1998). Due to the dominance of the NPM in 
the public sector reforms, NPM provides an important context of the growing demand and the 
role of management consultants within the public sector, including in the UK. As indicated in 
the literature, public sector accounting accounted for more than 30% of global consulting and 
that management consultant packaged and sold the NPM reforms. Although some used 
management consultants, it does not indicate a strong supply side but clearly those that buy are 
using these in technically advanced instances of fraud. Forensic accounting supplies are not 
‘villain’ here in the NPM reforms but could be part of a solution building trust in public 
finances. As part of the component of the NPM principles, management consultants known as 
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forensic accounting services in the context of the current study, could play a greater role to 
protect public fund through detecting and preventing fraud within local authorities.  
The findings of the current study evidenced that there is an increase in the types of services 
engaged by local authorities, for example, in digital forensic and fraud risk management. 
Hence, it is clear that utilising forensic accounting services is at the vanguard of developments 
to stop these complex and technological frauds. As indicated by Corcoran & Mclean (1998), 
within the public sector, sometimes it may be difficult for the potential buyers to evaluate the 
services being offered by the management consultant. Forensic accounting services are 
considered multi-diversified services. Thus, it is an opportunity for the providers to be clear 
what they offer and advertise their success in forensic accounting services provided to the 
public sector. As a result, it will be useful to the providers, the local authorities in fraud 
management and for the public good. Local authorities surveyed are found to choose forensic 
accounting services within the sector and shared services more than the Big Four accounting 
firms, which might be an independence issue if the Big Four accounting firms are already used 
for statutory audit. However, another issue could arise whether the capability of the providers 
within the sector is enough going forward with all the advances in fraud techniques and 
technology. 
 
The rise of utilising management consultants, given the variation of services offered in which 
the public sector is considered as a major customer, however, has not materialised in the current 
study as expected. Hence, taking into consideration the complexity of fraud and the 
development of forensic accounting services in the UK context, the situations in local 
authorities were different. Overall, only a fifth of local authorities surveyed are using forensic 
accounting services and satisfied with the services received of fraud detection, prevention, and 
investigation. Although local authorities are not used much but the types of services i.e. fraud 
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investigation are the most sought, for example, digital forensic including data mining, asset 
tracing and recovery. Under fraud prevention types of services, most local authorities used the 
services for fraud risk management, fraud training, and reviewing counter fraud procedures.  
 
The use of forensic accounting services from fraud risk management to digital forensic 
indicated the importance of the services now to the public sector and are expected to expand 
in future. It is not just investigations services that have been used, thus forensic accounting 
services can support work of internal auditors and detection work of counter fraud specialists 
especially at the cutting edge of fraud techniques. Therefore, it is an opportunity for forensic 
accounting services to get into the public sector market as in-house services are being cut due 
to the austerity measures and the establishment of the SFIS. The remaining local authorities 
that did not use the forensic accounting services could be due to some reasons; including the 
belief that any investigation of fraud is better carried out in-house, the issue of effectiveness 
for some local authorities that are small district councils with traditional low levels of fraud 
and will only use the services on a ‘needs basis’ i.e. on the complexity of fraud or the need for 
obsolete independence.  
 
In relation to the concept of deinstitutionalisation, it is not clear whether the process of 
deinstitutionalisation; the abolishment of central government agencies such as the Audit 
Commission that are part of fraud management strategies to institutionalisation i.e. using 
forensic accounting services from the private sectors occur in the context of this study. 
Although the operation of the Audit Commission has ceased, the counter fraud work is 
continued under the CIPFA. Additionally, not all local authorities surveyed in this study use 
forensic accounting services as there are local authorities that still rely on their in-house 
resources. 
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To identify the determinant factors, within the institutional context, the findings indicated that 
the coercive pressures through central government and related agencies and mimetic pressures 
through practices of other local authorities significantly influenced the decision to use the 
forensic accounting services. Additionally, perceived benefits of forensic accounting services, 
cost to acquire the services, and strength of the in-house counter fraud were deemed to be 
associated with the intention to use forensic accounting services. Overall, mimetic pressure 
was the most significant among those factors. 
 
7.2.1 Coercive, mimetic and normative pressures 
 
DiMaggio & Powell (1983) posited three forms of institutional isomorphism - coercive, 
mimetic and normative. Coercive pressures derived from legal pressures, political pressures or 
‘the kind of intense pressure powerful organisations are able to exert on less-powerful, 
dependent organisation’ (Jacobson, 2009, p. 6). Mimetic isomorphism refers to the tendency 
to mimic other organisations in a similar field, in which organisations tend to model themselves 
after similar organisations in their field that they perceive to be more legitimate or more 
successful. Normative isomorphism is related with the professionalism associated with formal 
education and professional networks Within institutional theory, this study identifies two 
organizational factors that can significantly influence the use of forensic accounting services 
to detect and prevent fraud by English local authorities: (1) directives, rules, and policies 
(including initiatives and action plan) from central government and related government 
agencies; and (2) extent and perceived success of using forensic accounting services by other 
local authorities. These institutional pressures were created by central government either 
directly or through their agencies, and other local authorities. Thus, local authorities were 
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subjected to at least two forms of isomorphic pressures: coercive and mimetic. Over the years, 
the arrangement and development of counter fraud in English local authorities was largely 
dependent on central government. Without a statutory lever, central government either directly 
or through their agencies encouraged local authorities to invest in counter fraud functions.  
 
Government pressures for effective fraud investigation can be seen through a number of 
different inspections such as the BFI, and the Audit Commission, and funding regimes (Lane, 
2010). Given the nature and the complexity of fraud besides the capability to counter fraud, 
local authorities imitate other local authorities by using external providers within the sector. 
However, no compelling evidence was identified that normative pressures were active forces 
for local authorities in this study. Empirically, the three forms of isomorphic pressures that 
may be acting on an organisation at any given point in time may be difficult to distinguish as 
it is possible that two or more forms will be acting at the same time (Carpenter & Feroz, 2001). 
Within the context of this study, both coercive and mimetic pressures might be most effective 
in influencing organisations to engage forensic accounting services (Muthusamy, 2011) based 
on the complexity of fraud cases. For example, coercive pressures from government arose in 
the case of the Tower Hamlet Council that involved government intervention by appointing 
PwC to investigate mismanagement, while mimetic pressures occur as a local authority inclines 
to model other local authorities that they perceive successful when using forensic accounting 
services based on the similarity of fraud cases. Overall, institutional theory provides a useful 
theoretical lens through which to view organisational choice in the public sector, as in the 
context of the current study, the choice to use external services by local authorities through 
coercive and mimetic pressures. 
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7.3 Contributions of the Study 
 
This study has provided an assessment of the extent, perceptions, and factors related to the use 
of a strand of the management consultants (professional services firms) of forensic accounting 
services in fraud detection and prevention using a survey of local authorities in England. 
 
7.3.1 Academic and Theoretical Contributions 
 
A chief finding is empirical evidence on the extent of use of forensic accounting services 
among English local authorities surveyed. It is particularly important to understand the 
resilience against fraud in local authorities at the time of budget cuts and changes in the 
inspection body of the Audit Commission that was dissolved in 2015. Previous studies on 
counter fraud within local authorities mainly discussed the use of internal resources to counter 
fraud (e.g. Button et al., 2007; Lane, 2011; Button, 2011; and Gee et al., 2012). The literature 
review indicated very limited empirical study in forensic accounting and the use of it as a tool 
to prevent, detect and investigate fraud in the UK context. Additionally, Lapsley & Oldfield 
(2001) and Deakins & Dillon (2006) stressed that little is known on the practices of 
management consultants in the public sector. Thus, this study contributes to the body of 
knowledge within the forensic accounting; fraud and management consultants within the 
public sector context by complementing those earlier studies, in focusing on the utilisation of 
external resources such as forensic accounting services to counter fraud particularly in the UK 
public sector.  
 
Another main contribution is that this study provides a theoretical framework as a lens to 
determine the factors that influence the organisational intention in using management 
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consultants such as forensic accounting services as depicted in Figure 6-1. The integration of 
institutional theory as the fundamental framework and other variables based on forensic 
accounting, fraud, and internal control literature resulted in a comprehensive model at 
organisational level. The applicability of institutional theory is substantial as institutional 
pressures are considered strong in a set of highly structured organisations such as English local 
authorities (Ashworth et al., 2007). The findings of this study add to the growing evidence that 
coercive pressures and mimetic pressures directly influence organisational action by 
confirming its applicability to the intention in using forensic accounting services. In other 
words, changes of accounting practices (relying on the external providers) are more likely to 
occur when there are pressures from central government and organisations in a similar field 
(other local authorities). Mimetic pressures through other local authorities are the most 
significant among the institutional variables. However, the current study did use institutional 
theory to test it but mainly used it as a frame. Therefore, the model that had been developed in 
the current study can be used to examine other sectors and industries.  
 
As argued by Parkhe (2003), institutional changes necessarily lead to deinstitutionalisation, 
which refers to the process by which institutions weaken and disappear (Oliver, 1992). In the 
context of the current study, an institutionalised organisational practice could refer to the 
current arrangement of counter fraud in local authorities such as using internal resources 
(internal audit and counter fraud team) while the new practice refers to utilising external 
providers of forensic accounting services. The findings of the current study, however, do not 
confirm that deinstitutionalisation process occurs as not all local authorities utilise forensic 
accounting services to counter fraud.  
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Finally, other important variables incorporated in the theoretical model; perceived benefits of 
forensic accounting, costs of forensic accounting services, and strength of counter fraud 
resources indicated a strong empirical support as predictors of organisational intention to use 
forensic accounting services. Accordingly, by combining institutional based variables and 
other important factors, this study corroborates the arguments and evidence that organisations 
may simultaneously use both social and technical indicators as guides to actions even in a 
single domain such as intention to use forensic accounting services (adapted from DiMaggio 
& Powell, 1991 and Teo et al., 2003). In this study, coercive pressures arising from central 
government and related agencies, and mimetic pressures through other local authorities, are 
considered as social indicators that significantly influence the intention to use forensic 
accounting services.  
 
7.3.2 Practical Contributions  
 
This study has demonstrated the influence of at least two forms of isomorphic pressures; (i) 
coercive: central government and related agencies, and; (ii) mimetic: perceived used by other 
local authorities on the intention to use forensic accounting services. Practically, central 
government could play a greater role, such as providing incentives aligned with the high costs 
of forensic accounting services. As indicated previously, the cost of forensic accounting is one 
of the significant factors that influences local authorities to use forensic accounting services. 
Alternatively, certain types of forensic accounting services needed by local authorities might 
need to be given greater attention or support from central government. The types of forensic 
accounting services include digital forensic, fraud risk management and fraud training. Both 
fraud risk management and fraud training can be considered as an initial investment to provide 
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necessary forensic skills for in-house counter fraud, which is beneficial in the long-term. At 
the end, both central government and local authorities are accountable to protect public funds. 
 
Corresponding to mimetic pressures, the result of the current study suggests that local 
authorities have a greater tendency to follow a similar practice of utilising forensic accounting 
services to detect and prevent fraud that they perceive to be more legitimate or successful. The 
finding enhances the understanding of mimetic isomorphism as local authorities incline to 
adopt similar practices from other local authorities. In order to have better information sharing, 
other institutional bodies such as central government or the LGA could facilitate the initiatives. 
Considering the nature of fraud which can be very complex, and the effectiveness of forensic 
accounting services which is unknown, mimetic isomorphism arises as a response to 
organisational uncertainty in identifying the best course of action (adapted from Carpenter & 
Feroz, 2001).  
 
Additionally, the result of this study provides insights that local authorities could initiate or 
improve their relationships with other local authorities in order to find the best or effective 
solutions to counter fraud. This can be achieved by having shared services or partnership from 
other local authorities that have capabilities and strengths in their counter fraud resources. 
Thus, sharing information and intelligence among local authorities is vital in order to have an 
effective counter fraud.  
 
Based on the forensic accounting perceptions factors, perceived benefits and costs of forensic 
accounting services are the determinant factors to use forensic accounting services. Realising 
the benefits in using forensic accounting services, the intention to acquire forensic accounting 
services was constrained by the financial costs. Therefore, a practice of transferring skills and 
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knowledge from the forensic accounting providers into in-house counter fraud could provide 
long-term costs benefits. Additionally, forensic accounting services’ providers could have 
better marketing strategies in order to supply specific services needed by local authorities. For 
instance, the most types of services engaged by local authorities in this study were digital 
forensic and risk management. The professional bodies such as the CIPFA, the ICAEW and 
the ICFS could provide incentives by giving recognition to local authorities that were 
considered to have performed well in combating fraud. Such recognition and award could 
motivate other local authorities to follow the best practices. In other words, the perception of 
forensic accounting services as ‘luxury services’ needs to be changed.  
 
7.4 Limitations of Research 
 
This study is subject to a number of limitations. First, this study examined only one public 
sector, which is local authority. Therefore, this study cannot seek to generalise based on one 
sector/industry, but the model that has been developed could be used for other 
sectors/industries. Secondly, this study is subject to limitations by using a questionnaire of 
close-ended questions in nature. Thus, further research can be conducted by combining 
qualitative methods (for instance, short or full interviews) and quantitative methods (for 
example, survey). In this sense, more than one method can be used to improve the validation 
process of research data for examining the phenomena and enhance the future findings on the 
utilisation of forensic accounting services. 
  
A further limitation of the current study is related to the use of the group of respondents that 
may also limit the generalization of the results. Despite the group of respondents (Chief 
Executive, Director of Finance and internal auditors) having either direct or indirect influence 
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in the decision-making process, the opinions of councillors, audit committee members, and 
minister or secretary in the DCLG are also influential. Thus, future study could incorporate 
other important groups of respondents such as the councillors and audit committee members 
of local authorities besides representation from the related ministry.  
 
The final limitation of this study is the issue of social desirability bias, which relies on truthful 
responses from respondents in survey-based research. However, social desirable responding is 
the tendency for participants to present a favourable image of themselves (Mortel, 2008). 
However, several efforts (e.g., ensuring anonymity and confidentiality) were used to limit 
concerning this issue.  
 
7.5 Future Direction of Research 
 
The limitations of the study imply the requirement for further research. The first 
recommendation would be a replication of the current study’s theoretical framework in 
different settings, which might include other public bodies such as the NHS and the ministry 
departments. Moreover, a further study in other countries’ public sector bodies could provide 
interesting insights into national comparisons and international practices considering 
institutional, economic, political environment, and cultural differences. It is worth noting that 
this is a snapshot study carried out at the time of some changes made by central government 
that affect the counter fraud arrangements in local authorities, such as the abolishment of the 
Audit Commission, austerity measures, and the establishment of the SFIS. Thus, some of the 
influences of factors such as government pressures, normative pressures and financial costs 
may vary during this transition period. A longitudinal study on the factors that influence the 
organisational intention to use forensic accounting services could affect the variables. 
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This study involved a group of senior management in local authorities for data collection. 
Although the justification to use key personnel that act as proxy to local authorities is strong, 
future study could conduct interviews and survey other significant participants (Muthusamy, 
2011). The purpose of interviews, for instance, is to explore possible explanations and 
interpretations to have richness of data. Data collection may engage councillors, and members 
of the audit committee may also play an important role in the decision-making process. As one 
of the findings of the current study shows the presence of strong coercive pressures related to 
central government, representatives from the DCLG could be included in the data collection. 
Furthermore, future studies could incorporate providers of forensic accounting services and 
not just potential users to gather information from various perspectives. 
 
A further recommendation for future research is to incorporate additional factors that could 
increase the explanatory power of the dependent variables. As the use of institutional theory in 
this study focused on the social actors, using other theory, such as Transaction Costs Economic 
(TCE) theory, might be useful to investigate from the economic perspectives. The inclusion of 
the additional variables may possibly improve the ability of the model to more accurately 
predict intention. It is also recommended that further research be undertaken to measure the 
performance of forensic accounting providers in detecting and preventing fraud within the 
public sector context.  
 
Future research could also examine how the implementation of the new framework of local 
audit affects financial management practices including counter fraud activities in local 
authorities. This is particularly important as future research could have implications for policy 
and practice in relation to the major changes in policies and framework within local authorities’ 
landscape. As outlined by RAND Europe and Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local 
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Government (2018), major changes to local audit includes the termination of inspection and 
assessment exercises by the Audit Commission, the outsourcing of audits which were 
previously carried out by the Audit Commission, the introduction of the Local Audit and 
Accountability Act 2014 and the establishment of the new local audit regime. Among the issues 
are whether reports provided under the ‘old regime’ of the Audit Commission which are no 
longer available, such as conducting value for money assessment, will be replaced and whether, 
in a ‘free market’ for external auditors, some large accounting firms come to dominate (DCLG, 
2013c; RAND Europe and Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, 2018). 
Moreover, there could be potential conflicts of interest between audit and non-audit services 
provided by the accounting firms. Some of the accounting firms also need to build their 
expertise in public sector that could take time and effort. As the operations of the Audit 
Commission completely ceased in 2015, it is interesting for future research to investigate and 
compare the sustainability of local authorities to protect public funds.  
 
As a result of the local audit regime mentioned above, some new bodies have been embedded 
within local authorities’ framework such as the CIPFA Counter Fraud Centre which is in charge 
of Fighting Fraud and Corruption Locally, which began in 2016, the Financial Reporting 
Council (FRC) which is responsible for inspections and regulation of the quality of audits, and 
the National Audit Office (NAO) which is responsible for developing codes of audit practice 
and guidance for the regulation of external auditors (CIPFA Counter Fraud Centre, 2016, 
RAND Europe and Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, 2018).  Future 
research could incorporate the emergence of new players within local authorities’ context in 
using new variables based on institutional isomorphism of normative and coercive pressures 
adopted in the present research. 
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Practically, it is also useful for future research to examine the diverse roles of forensic 
accounting services. As pointed out in Figure 2-1 on the role of forensic accounting services, 
investigation services (the focus of the present research) and litigation services were the main 
services provided. Further extensive examination of the litigation services could provide a 
comprehensive picture of the role of forensic accounting services (Muthusamy, 2011) within 
local authorities. Initially, the present research discovered that the use of litigation services and 
expert witness has decreased by local authorities, as outlined in Table 5-8. Therefore, further 
study could investigate what is driving the decline in litigation services, e.g. whether it is due 
to financial constraints as a result of austerity measures, less detected fraud cases or other 
factors.  
 
In order to enhance the level of intention to use forensic accounting services, future research 
could expand the current theoretical framework by adding mediator or moderator variables that 
could provide more theoretical contribution. Future research could benefit practice by extend 
exploration of underlying mechanisms in terms of mediating and moderating effects in order 
to be able to make recommendations on the use forensic accounting services, e.g. by addressing 
the level of perceived complexity of fraud cases, types of external auditors and different counter 
fraud structures in local authorities. Additionally, incorporating smaller local authorities in the 
study sample could provide a significant practical recommendation for the government to 
detect and prevent fraud in differences types of local authorities. Furthermore, future research 
could be conducted based on case studies in term of local authorities that are considered doing 
well and not doing well in countering fraud. Among other things, an examination of the 
previous practices such as having Comprehensive Performance Assessment (CPA) back in 
2002 (replaced by Comprehensive Area Assessment (CAA) in 2009) with the objective to 
measure the overall performance of local authorities regularly could still be relevant to be used 
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in future.  Finally, future studies could make comparison with other countries such as Scotland, 
where the Accounts Commission is still in operation, and Wales, where the Auditor General of 
Wales is responsible for auditing most public sector bodies. This could add insight into the 
recent audit reform in England (RAND Europe and Ministry of Housing, Communities and 
Local Government, 2018). 
 
All in all, the current research and future research should provide ample evidence to help 
government and local authorities to manage fraud and corruption, especially through the 
judicious use of forensic accounting services – if there is an appetite for such evidence. 
 
7.6 Conclusion  
This study empirically investigated the extent in using forensic accounting services and the 
determinants of organisational intention to use the services within English local authorities. 
This study found that forensic accounting services play a role in local authorities to counter 
fraud. A cross-sectional study and quantitative data analysis identified the important predictors 
of organisational intention to detect and prevent fraud by English local authorities. Coercive 
pressures through central government and related agencies, mimetic pressures through other 
local authorities, perceived benefits, financial costs, and counter fraud resources were 
identified as significant direct antecedents of organisational intention. This study also offered 
a theoretical contribution in pioneering in using the institutional variables in the context of 
forensic accounting services to detect and prevent fraud within the public sector context. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix 1: Types of Forensic Accounting Services in the UK 
 
KPMG 
1. Anti-Bribery and Corruption Compliance and Investigations 
 Ensuring effective firm-wide policies, systems and controls comply with 
regulation 
2. Anti-Money Laundering (AML) and Sanctions Compliance 
 Ensuring AML and sanctions compliance framework 
3. Corporate Intelligence 
4. Dispute Advisory Services 
5. Economics and Regulation Advice 
6. Forensic Assistances in Transactions 
7. Fraud and Financial Misconduct 
 Using technology expertise 
 Tracing, freezing, recovering funds/assets 
 Taking remedial action  
8. Intellectual Property and Contract Governance 
9. Major Projects Advisory 
 Risk analysis and Management 
 Project and Programme Management 
10. Software Asset Management 
 Quantification of Licence Position 
 Licence Optimisation 
 Procurement Advice 
EY 
1. Fraud and Investigations 
2. Dispute Services 
 Expert witness services 
 Commercial and contractual disputes 
 Expert determination 
 Professional negligence 
3. Forensic Transaction Services 
4. Business Integrity and Corporate Compliance 
 Identifying risk exposures 
 Implementing compliance programmes 
5. Forensic Technology and Discovery Services 
 eDiscovery and information governance 
 Cybercrime 
 Software license forensics 
 Data analytic 
PwC 
1. Disputes  
2. Investigations 
 Anti-money laundering 
 Asset tracing 
 Bribery & corruption 
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 Computer forensics 
 Data analytics 
 Forensic technology solutions 
 Fraud and fraud risk 
3. Forensic Advisory 
 Contract and project risk 
 Integrity due diligence 
 Fraud prevention and detection 
 Litigation readiness reviews 
 Software asset management 
 Value for money reviews 
Deloitte 
1. Bribery and Corruption Risk 
 Bribery Act UK 2011 
2. Financial Crime 
3. Fraud Risk Management 
 Vulnerability diagnostic 
 Vulnerability workshops 
 Staff training 
 Policies in ethics and whistle blowing 
4. Anti-Money Laundering 
5. Fraud and Accounting Investigations 
 Bribery and corruption 
 Accounting issues and irregularities 
 Fraud & theft 
 Intellectual property infringements 
6. Intellectual Property Investigations 
7. Asset Tracing & Recovery 
8. Expert Witness Services 
9. Expert Determination 
10. Arbitration 
11. Business Intelligence Services 
12. Deloitte Discovery 
 Computer forensics specialists-collecting data in a wide range of formats and 
media, navigating IT systems, preserving data 
 Data analytics- assisting in locating, scoping, acquiring, testing, verifying 
data, data mining 
13. General Counsel Programme 
 Seminars and round table events 
Grant Thornton 
1. Digital Forensics 
 Computer forensic 
 Data analytics 
 Data visualisation 
 E-discovery and disclosure 
2. Expert Witness 
 Commercial and contractual disputes 
 Professional negligence  
3. Fraud Solutions 
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 Fraud Training 
 Fraud Risk Management 
 Fraud Investigations 
 White Collar Crime 
 Asset tracing 
 Criminal defence 
4. Fraud Insolvency Division 
 Traces and recovers funds from assets misappropriation 
5. Insurance Claims 
6. Internet Intelligence 
 Using advanced internet search technologies 
7. Valuations 
PKF 
1. Appraisal of financial losses resulting from fraud 
2. Appraisal of damage resulting from prejudicial acts 
3. Preparation of expert opinions  
4. Assisting solicitors in the financial aspects of cases 
5. Intervention as arbitrators or mediators in dispute resolution 
Kroll 
1. Fraud & Internal Investigations 
 Intelligence gathering 
 Law enforcement 
 Data analytics 
 Cyber investigation expertise 
2. Cyber Investigations 
3. Anti-Bribery & Corruption 
 UK Bribery Act 
4. Assets Searches & Recovery 
5. Misuse of Intellectual Property 
6. Regulatory Investigations 
7. Monitorships 
 Business monitoring programs to identify and control fraudulent or unethical 
activity 
8. Litigation & Disputes 
NIFA 
2. Commercial/Fraud 
 Contract disputes 
 Expert determinations 
3. Criminal 
 Theft acts offences 
 Fraud prevention, detection and measurements 
 Identity theft 
4. Professional Negligence 
 Auditors/ Accountants/ Tax negligence 
5. Insurance Claims 
 Claims evaluation 
 Investigation of fraudulent claims 
 Loss of profit/consequential 
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Appendix 2: Literature on Forensic Accounting 
Author/s 
(Year) 
Title/Aims 
Theoretical 
Perspective 
Method 
Sample Size 
(Country) 
Findings 
Rezaee et al. 
(1992) 
Forensic Accounting in the 
Curriculum 
 
To explore the need for 
coverage of forensic 
accounting in the accounting 
curriculum 
 
To examine the benefits of 
integrating forensic 
accounting into the 150-hour 
accounting programme 
Not stated 
 
Descriptive 
Reviewing 
articles, and 
report 
Not stated 
 
(US) 
Not enough coverage of forensic accounting 
in accounting curriculum provided by the 
higher education. Benefits to the student: 
i. offer a rewarding career 
ii. continuous life-long learning 
iii. career development and promotion 
Rezaee et al. 
(2004) 
Forensic accounting 
education: A survey of 
academicians and 
practitioners 
 
To gather opinions from 
academicians and 
practitioners relates to the 
importance, relevance, and 
delivery of forensic 
accounting education. 
Not stated 
 
Descriptive 
 
A content 
analysis (21 
forensic 
accounting 
syllabi) and a 
nationwide 
survey 
(accounting 
academicians 
and practicing 
CPAs) 
 
Accounting 
academicians 
and CPA 
practitioners  
 
(US) 
More universities are planning to offer a 
forensic accounting course. Most of the 
respondents agreed that forensic accounting is 
important to be integrated. The business 
community and the accounting profession are 
concerned with the accounting scandals, the 
demand for forensic accounting practices 
increased. 
Schneider 
(2004) 
Exploring the role of private-
sector, financial investigative 
agencies in combating 
money laundering in Canada 
 
Not stated 
 
Descriptive  
 
Not stated Not stated 
 
(Canada) 
Recommend the government: 
To take the lead in developing formal policies 
and programs to promote a greater role of 
FIA. 
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Author/s 
(Year) 
Title/Aims 
Theoretical 
Perspective 
Method 
Sample Size 
(Country) 
Findings 
To explore the role played by 
private sector financial 
investigative agencies (FIA) 
in combating money 
laundering in Canada and 
abroad. 
To outsource the intelligence gathering and 
investigative functions to FIA. 
The private-sector forensic accounting, 
investigative and consulting expertise satisfies 
the criteria required to combat financial 
crimes such as level of experience and 
expertise, and service lines (proactive, 
prevention and detection), which unfulfilled 
by public police. 
Apostolou & 
Crumbley 
(2005) 
The expanding role of the 
forensic accountant 
 
To analyse the demand for 
forensic accountants to 
supplement the efforts of 
auditors 
Not stated 
 
Descriptive  
 
Reviewing 
literature 
 
Not stated 
 
(US) 
The demand for using forensic accountants in 
detecting fraud is continuing supplement to 
auditors. 
Ramaswamy 
(2005) 
Corporate governance and 
the forensic accountant  
 
To analyse the relationship 
between corporate 
governance, forensic 
accounting, and financial 
reporting misconduct. 
Not stated 
 
Descriptive  
 
Reviewing 
literature 
 
Not stated 
 
(US) 
The forensic accountants can make a 
significant contribution in the following areas; 
corporate governance, preventing fraud, 
creating a positive working environment, 
establishing effective lines of communication, 
vigilant oversight, establishing consequences, 
and fraud investigations. 
Bierstaker et 
al. (2006) 
Accountants' perceptions 
regarding fraud detection and 
prevention methods 
 
To examine the extent to 
which accountants, internal 
auditors, and certified fraud 
Not stated 
  
Descriptive  
 
A survey 86 accountants, 
internal auditors 
and certified 
fraud examiners 
 
 (US) 
Forensic accountants, discovery sampling, 
data mining and digital analysis software are 
not often used but had high ratings of 
effectiveness (may be due to lack of 
resources). Common methods used include 
firewalls, virus and password, and review and 
improve internal control. Smaller firms tend to 
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Author/s 
(Year) 
Title/Aims 
Theoretical 
Perspective 
Method 
Sample Size 
(Country) 
Findings 
examiners used fraud 
prevention and detection 
methods, and their 
perception regarding the 
effectiveness of those 
methods. 
not invest in fraud and detection methodology 
(maybe due to the costs). The larger firm 
under-utilised the anti-fraud methods and 
software. The cost and benefit trade off in 
mandating organisational use of forensic 
accountants may be highly considered by 
regulators. 
Houck et al. 
(2006) 
Forensic Accounting as an 
Investigative Tool 
Developing a Model 
Curriculum for Fraud and 
Forensic Accounting 
 
To analyse the effectiveness 
of forensic accounting skills 
in fraud investigations. 
Not stated 
 
Descriptive 
 
 
Reviewing 
literature, and 
reports 
Not stated 
(US) 
Essential skills and abilities are needed in 
developing a model for fraud and forensic 
accounting. The Technical Working Group for 
Education in Fraud and Forensic Accounting 
(TWGED-FFA) developed a model 
curriculum for fraud and forensic accounting 
that identifies areas of knowledge, skills, and 
abilities necessary to enter the field given the 
multiple career paths. This will provide future 
accountants to effectively, and efficiently 
investigate fraud and other illegal activities. 
Rosen 
(2006) 
CAP Forum on Forensic 
Accounting in the Post-
Enron World Forensic 
Accounting: Where and 
When Headed? 
 
To explain the important 
skills to be a forensic 
accountant particularly as an 
expert witness in court cases. 
Not stated 
 
Descriptive  
Reviewing 
literature, and 
reports 
Not stated  
 
(Canada) 
High demand of financial investigation skills 
(forensic accountant) particularly in non-
litigation areas. For example appointed as a 
special investigator under the Education Act 
or Public Hospitals Act to examine the 
financial matters which required identifying 
and mastering unique/special issues quickly 
(in depth knowledge, objectivity, and 
professional scepticism, thinking skills, 
communication). The need to design and 
implement the education and skills for a 
forensic accountant such as case scenario 
based. Required a significant investment by 
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Author/s 
(Year) 
Title/Aims 
Theoretical 
Perspective 
Method 
Sample Size 
(Country) 
Findings 
higher education to revise accounting 
programmes. 
Nunn et al.  
(2006) 
Forensic accountants: 
Financial investigators  
 
To examine the necessary 
skills to become a forensic 
accountant. 
Not stated 
 
Descriptive  
 
Reviewing 
literature, and 
reports 
Not stated 
 
(US) 
Forensic accountants need to have many skills 
(experience, communication, accounting, 
auditing, taxation, business operations and 
management, internal control, interpersonal 
relationships, and people) besides specialized 
education and training. High demand for 
forensic accountants. For example, experience 
in dealing with a complex fraud case in law 
enforcement for several years may provide 
valuable knowledge. 
Ahmad (2007) Forensic accounting courses 
in Malaysia 
 
To describe the development 
of the forensic accounting 
model in the joint program of 
the government agency 
namely Anti-Corruption 
Agency (ACA) and a higher 
institution. 
Not stated 
 
Descriptive  
 
 
Reviewing 
literature and 
the forensic 
accounting 
course that has 
been conducted  
 
Not stated 
 
(Malaysia) 
Using forensic accounting techniques, 
knowledge and skills in investigative methods 
will enhance the investigation of fraud, 
bribery and other corrupt practices. The 
components of the forensic accounting course 
include financial statement preparation and 
analysis, accounting standard, companies act 
and other guidelines, and forensic accounting 
and financial fraud (via formal instruction, 
presentation and case studies). Important to 
the agency (ACA) to ensure the capabilities of 
the staff are well-equipped in dealing with 
sophisticated illegal activities. 
Albrecht et al. 
(2008) 
Current trends in fraud and 
its detection  
 
To discuss the basic nature 
of fraud and the role of 
auditors and examine the 
Not state 
 
Descriptive  
 
Reviewing the 
literature, 
standards, and 
reports 
Not stated  
 
(US) 
Fraud audits can provide more reasonable 
assurance in financial statement fraud rather 
than GAAS audits (made a table comparison). 
Fraud audits more expensive than traditional 
audits, but can be embedded in auditor 
training and engagement practices (using 
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Author/s 
(Year) 
Title/Aims 
Theoretical 
Perspective 
Method 
Sample Size 
(Country) 
Findings 
impact of the current 
financial statement fraud. 
computer-relational databases, queries and 
macros/scripting to determine sampling. The 
fraud triangle as a fundamental need to be 
considered in long term solutions in fraud.  
Boys 
(2008) 
Forensic Accounting in New 
Zealand: Exploring the gap 
between education and 
practice 
 
To identify the gap between 
what forensic practitioners 
identify as important skills 
and capabilities and the 
learning outcomes and 
competencies of accounting 
education. 
Not stated 
 
Descriptive  
A survey 
 
-qualitative data 
(the skills and 
job of forensic 
accountants, and 
explicit opinions 
where to acquire 
such skills) 
 
Using a 5 point 
Lickert scale 
 
A secondary 
data (current 
admission 
policy and the 
Statement of 
Learning 
Outcomes No. 
1-10) 
 
30 respondents 
of forensic 
specialists 
attending a New 
Zealand Institute 
of Chartered 
Accountants 
(NZICA) 
seminar and 
Serious Fraud 
Office (SFO) 
 
(New Zealand) 
Forensic accounting is a growing 
specialization in accounting. Need technical 
skills and expertise in litigation support and 
fraud investigation. No specific provision in 
forensic accounting education as a pathway to 
gain admission to the professional body. 
Higher institutions need to consider the 
demand of expertise to fill the gap. For 
instance, provide specialized programmes in 
specialist areas beyond the undergraduate 
academic level as a path to professional 
bodies. Respondents believed the skills and 
job training are important. The skills are 
acquired through education and job training. 
Currently depend on the US based association 
(AFCE) to gain training, seminar and 
professional certification. 
Gray 
(2008) 
Forensic accounting and 
auditing: compared and 
contrasted to traditional 
accounting and auditing 
 
Not stated 
 
Descriptive  
Reviewing 
literature 
Not stated 
 
(US) 
Have similar objectives but different roles, 
knowledge and skills (auditor responsible for 
error identification and prevention, and 
forensic accountants responsible for fraud 
identification). Forensic accountants as a 
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Author/s 
(Year) 
Title/Aims 
Theoretical 
Perspective 
Method 
Sample Size 
(Country) 
Findings 
To explain the forensic 
science and fraud symptoms, 
compare traditional 
accounting and auditing by 
presenting criminalists, 
expert testimony and 
corporate governance. 
combination of an auditor and private 
investigators (with skills and knowledge in 
investigative, research, law, quantitative 
methods, finance, auditing, accounting, law 
enforcement officer insights, organizational 
behaviour, and psychology). In public sector 
employed by the FBI, CIA, IRS, Federal 
Trade Commission, Homeland Security, and 
Governmental Accountability Office (focus 
on the white collar crime). In private sector 
employed by the bank, insurance, criminal 
court hearing (expert witness). Forensic 
accounting standards evolve from courts of 
law and financial accounting governed by the 
SEC. Forensic accountants practise 
criminalistics in computer and document 
related evidence. Specialised audit techniques 
in fraud cases include supervising, search 
warrant, surveillance, source and application 
of funds, and tips similar to anonymous 
complaints-the most successful techniques). 
Pearson & 
Singleton 
(2008) 
Fraud and forensic 
accounting in digital 
environment 
 
To analyse the role of 
technologies and digital data 
in perpetrating and detecting 
fraud activities. 
Not stated 
 
Descriptive  
Reviewing 
literature 
 
Not stated 
 
(US) 
Perpetrating; 
-Increased usage of information technology 
(growth of Internet and expansion in business) 
-Cybercrime/computer fraud (unauthorized 
intrusion, credit card fraud, extortion, money 
laundering, and identity theft)  
Detecting; 
-Internal audit department and public 
accounting firms use software for data 
analytics and data mining (dedicated staff, 
using ‘macros’ to find ‘red flags’). 
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Author/s 
(Year) 
Title/Aims 
Theoretical 
Perspective 
Method 
Sample Size 
(Country) 
Findings 
-Need to have cyber-forensic skills and 
knowledge (still a relatively recent 
phenomenon, growing rapidly, traditional 
accounting education doesn't have educational 
provisions-cybercrime prevention, detection, 
investigation and remediation, and critical 
component such as Certified Information 
Systems Auditor and similar background). 
Most accounting programs include the 
element of fraud examination and forensic 
accounting in the curricula but related 
information technology content also is needed 
to be embedded.  
Heitger & 
Heitger (2008) 
Incorporating forensic 
accounting and litigation 
advisory services into the 
classroom 
 
To highlight the litigation 
support and expert witness in 
forensic accounting, and 
issues on developing forensic 
accounting courses. 
Not stated 
 
Descriptive  
Reviewing 
literature 
 
Not stated  
 
(US) 
The litigation support and expert witness (one 
of the major source revenue) required forensic 
accountants to provide varieties of 
information and advice to attorney –either as 
fact witness or expert witness. Some of 
accounting knowledge in forensic accounting; 
cost behaviour, differential/incremental costs, 
the matching concept, and consistency. 
Students need to equip good accounting 
knowledge, and communication skills to 
become forensic accounting litigation support 
specialists. The universities need to support by 
providing the necessary knowledge based, 
skills (essential foundations), and a capstone 
experience for the students include in an 
effective course. 
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Author/s 
(Year) 
Title/Aims 
Theoretical 
Perspective 
Method 
Sample Size 
(Country) 
Findings 
Digabriele 
(2008) 
An empirical investigation of 
the relevant skills of forensic 
accountants 
 
To investigate whether views 
of the relevant skills of 
forensic accountants differ 
among forensic accounting 
practitioners, accounting 
academicians, and users of 
forensic accounting services. 
Not stated 
 
Descriptive 
A web based 
survey 
 
A 5 point 
Lickert scale 
 
1,500 random 
samples of 
accounting 
academics, 
forensic 
accounting 
practitioners, 
and users of 
forensic 
accounting 
services  
 
(US) 
Increasing demand of forensic accounting 
needs attention from universities. Both 
academicians and practitioners have the same 
view that critical thinking, unstructured 
problem solving, investigative flexibility, 
analytical proficiency, and legal knowledge 
are vital skills (changed from a narrow 
approach to holistic technique). The most 
important skill is a deductive analysis while 
composure is the least. The outcome should 
be useful for developing forensic accounting 
curricula by identifying the proficiencies that 
need to be merged with course content. 
Newman 
(2009) 
Computer forensic fraud 
investigations 
 
To explain the importance of 
using computer forensic 
techniques in fraud 
investigations. 
Not stated 
 
Descriptive  
Reviewing 
literature 
 
Not stated  
 
(US) 
Computer forensic techniques can be used in 
investigations of fraud involving digital 
device, identity theft, and fraud investigation. 
Be able to identify the location of financial 
accounts and others assets, prove the source 
and disposition monies, conceal the true 
nature of fraudulent transactions, and identify 
illegal income.  
Smith, 
Crumbley 
(2009) 
How Divergent Are 
Pedagogical Views Toward 
the Fraud/Forensic 
Accounting Curriculum 
 
To assist academicians in 
developing fraud/forensic 
accounting curricula in the 
future. 
 
Not stated 
 
Descriptive 
An online 
survey 
 
111 of 
academicians 
(US, UK, 
Australia, Hong 
Kong and 
Lebanon) in 
fraud/ forensic 
accounting 
courses 
 
Most of content of the curricula related to 
fraud examination areas not wider-ranging 
forensic accounting. Other than financial 
statement fraud, digital investigations, 
criminology and litigation services are not 
being covered. Need to the differences 
between fraud examination and forensic 
accounting. Suggest revising such program 
based on fraud model, a more wide-ranging 
forensic model, or a combination of both 
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Author/s 
(Year) 
Title/Aims 
Theoretical 
Perspective 
Method 
Sample Size 
(Country) 
Findings 
 (US) 
 
approaches to ensure meeting the need to the 
profession. 
DiGabriele 
(2009) 
Implications of regulatory 
prescriptions and audit 
standards on the evolution of 
forensic accounting in the 
audit process 
 
To determine the level of 
agreements among 
academics, auditors, and 
forensic accountant 
regarding the current 
environmental framework to 
merge forensic accounting 
and auditing. 
Not stated 
 
Descriptive 
A web based 
survey 
A 5 point 
Lickert- scale, 
ANOVA test, 
and two tailed 
tests 
 
1,500 random 
samples of 
accounting 
academics, 
forensic 
accounting 
practitioners, 
and auditors  
 
(US) 
The three groups of respondents agreed to the 
survey statements except the statement that 
brainstorming sufficiently addresses the 
discovery of fraud (SAS No.99). Some of the 
survey statements; the current regulatory 
environment increased the need for auditors to 
possess forensic accounting skills, exercised 
professional scepticism, future audit 
approach-auditor’s ability to detect and deter 
fraud, forensic accounting procedures should 
be included in the current audit programs, 
audit firm using forensic audit techniques 
would have a positive valuation impact on 
audit, the addition of forensic auditing helps 
to fulfil the expectation gap, the addition of 
forensic services standard would be a more 
complete step beside SAS No.99, the increase 
regulatory environment, SAS 99, Sarbox, 
PCAOB has pushed toward a convergence of 
the financial auditing and forensic accounting 
philosophy. Forensic accounting has a place in 
the audit process and need to add some of the 
skills to their professional profile as changed 
in the audit market (through continuing 
professional education organizations and 
universities that increased offering the 
courses). Future research may use 
experimental design to reconcile the current 
study.  
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Author/s 
(Year) 
Title/Aims 
Theoretical 
Perspective 
Method 
Sample Size 
(Country) 
Findings 
Buckhoff et al. 
(2010) 
A Fraud Audit: Do You 
Need One? 
 
To differentiate between a 
fraud audit and a financial 
statement audit. 
Not stated 
 
Descriptive  
Not stated 
 
Not stated 
 
(US) 
External auditors are responsible to detect 
financial statement fraud but not for 
misappropriation of assets fraud (outside the 
scope). The fraud audit has primary objective; 
examining, identifying weaknesses, anyone 
who manipulated or exploited in the system of 
internal controls. The fraud auditor should be 
a Certified Fraud Examiner or Certified in 
Financial Forensic. Many companies 
mistakenly assume that external auditors do 
the fraud audit specifically to discover 
misappropriation of assets. 
McMullen & 
Sanchez 
(2010) 
A Preliminary Investigation 
of the Necessary Skills, 
Education Requirements, and 
Training Requirements for 
Forensic Accountants 
 
To investigate the necessary 
skills, education, 
requirements for forensic 
accountants. 
Not stated  
  
Descriptive 
A survey 
a 7 point 
Lickert-scale 
Audit partners of 
Big 4, 
accounting firms 
and practitioners 
(Certified Fraud 
Examiner)  
 
(US) 
Respondents agreed that sixteen listed skills 
are important to become forensic accountants 
as well as ten characteristics. The important 
skills are analytical, basic accounting, 
problem solving and data analysis. The 
important characteristics are persistent, 
scepticism, puzzle, and people skills. Other 
than accounting degree, other degrees 
considered most appropriate are computer 
information systems; economics, legal studies 
and other Demand for forensic accountants 
will be higher in the future or increase in the 
next 10 years. The most important software 
tool used is data mining compared to ACL, 
Interactive Data Extraction and Analysis 
(IDEA) and digital evidence recovery. 
Universities and firm training should respond 
by appropriate curricula and training 
programs, respectively.  
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Author/s 
(Year) 
Title/Aims 
Theoretical 
Perspective 
Method 
Sample Size 
(Country) 
Findings 
Ibex & Grippo 
(2011) 
Forensic Accounting: Should 
It Be A Required Course For 
Accounting Majors? 
 
To examine the important to 
include forensic accounting 
skills and attributes in 
accounting/auditing 
programs 
Not stated 
 
Descriptive  
Not stated Not stated 
 
(US) 
Suggest that the skills and attributes to 
become a good forensic accountant 
specifically in the litigation support cannot be 
acquired in such course (auditing). For 
example, experiences and strong 
communication skills must be together in 
dealing with people and their attitudes. As a 
result, need to include related skills such as 
communication skills, independence, 
objectivity particularly regards to litigation 
issues in forensic accounting education. 
Huber (2012) Is Forensic Accounting in 
the United States Becoming 
a Profession? 
 
To explore the possibility of 
forensic accounting as a 
profession in its own right. 
Attribute Model ; 
-identify 
attributes, traits, 
categories, 
characteristics, or 
dimension of 
professions 
 
Descriptive  
Content analysis Not stated  
 
(US) 
Forensic accounting is considered as a 
profession as based on the attribute model, 
forensic accounting meets most of the 
attributes (education, training and CPE, 
professional bodies, certification as a symbol, 
examinations, code of ethics and 
independence. However, other factors such as 
public recognition and government 
intervention (law and standard) need to be 
considered. 
Muehlmann et 
al. (2012) 
The Use of Forensic 
Accounting Experts in Tax 
Cases as Identified in Court 
Opinions 
 
To examine the use of 
forensic accounting experts 
in tax litigation according to 
the judges’ opinions. 
Not stated 
 
Descriptive  
Archival; 
Step 1: Select 
and retrieve 
electronic tax 
research 
platform 
indicated the 
involvement of 
a forensic 
accountant 
84 federal and 
28 state reported 
tax 
 
(US) 
Potential types of assignments by forensic 
accountants; fraud investigation (second most 
found), regulatory/government compliance 
(the most found), commercial damages (third 
most found), personal economic damages and 
business valuation (not found-assistance of 
expert witness). The use of forensic 
accounting experts in tax litigation is an 
emerging field (a large increase in forensic 
accountants’ expert testimony) with 80% 
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Author/s 
(Year) 
Title/Aims 
Theoretical 
Perspective 
Method 
Sample Size 
(Country) 
Findings 
Step 2: Detailed 
review whether 
forensic 
accountant 
involved 
Step 3: 
Analysed the 
case data 
 
reported cases using forensic accounting from 
2001-2010. In the judges’ written opinion, 
forensic accountant (expert witness) is 
effective (hired by taxpayers). Overall, half of 
the forensic accountants were considered 
effective by the judges. Some of the reasons 
not effective; work performed not relevant, 
insufficient time to complete, and not 
performed properly. 
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Appendix 3: Literature on Public Sector Fraud in the UK 
Author (s) 
(Year) 
Title/Aims 
Theoretical 
perspective 
Method Populations Findings 
Doig (1993) ‘Someone Else's Money’: 
Learning from Economic 
Crime in the Public Sector 
 
To analyse the developments 
relating to the issues of fraud 
and corruption within the 
Property Services Agency 
(PSA) 
Not stated 
 
Descriptive  
 
 
Case study: 
Property 
Services Agency 
Property 
Services 
Agency 
The issues of prevention, detection, investigation, 
and reform in PSA relate to fraud and corruption 
could only be addressed when senior management 
had the self-determined will and authority to do. 
A lesson to other public sector not to overlook 
internal fraud particularly employees with the 
authority to make a decision, and management is 
responsible to ensure procedures, and mechanism 
to prevent and detect fraud is in place. 
Doig (1997) Local authorities and 
housing benefit: Cost and 
control of fraud 
 
To analyse how housing 
benefit and related fraud 
have become an issue of 
concern by reviewing 
strategies, and proposed 
legislation in a local 
government context.  
Not stated 
 
Descriptive 
Analyse and 
review various 
government 
reports, 
inquiries, and 
policies. 
Local 
government 
(UK) 
Using the national data matching scheme by the 
Audit Commission (AC) improved the fraud 
detection but is not the ultimate solution. The 
situation of having fraud investigation is very 
complex as may involve many agencies, the 
political party that controls the government, and 
adequate resources. 
Doig et al. 
(2001) 
New Public Management, 
Old Populism and the 
Policing of Fraud 
 
To review the development 
of the policing of fraud 
(staffing, activities, and 
priorities of the government) 
Not stated 
 
Descriptive  
 
A survey and 
face to face 
interviews (5 
mainland forces-
based on the 
size, and 
activities) 
 
52 civilian 
police forces 
(police forces, 
other fraud 
squads-
Ministry of 
Defence police, 
and offshore 
Fraud is considerably not the core priority; not the 
Home Office objective, and not a force 
performance measure (except one force). Fraud 
squads subject to cuts and restraints; some force 
dissolve their fraud squads or joining to larger 
units. A gap between resources to investigate 
fraud and the value of fraud cases. Lack of staff 
and resources. Recommend that access to 
information and intelligence on a regional or 
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Author (s) 
(Year) 
Title/Aims 
Theoretical 
perspective 
Method Populations Findings 
-to access the implications 
for the future policing of 
fraud 
 
police fraud 
squads) 
inter-force basis is needed to be effective and 
efficient for fraud investigations. An option in 
focus privatization of fraud. The New Public 
Management and Old Populism don't have a 
significant impact to the policing objective 
relating to the fraud. 
Button et 
al.(2007) 
New directions in policing 
fraud: The emergence of the 
counter fraud specialist in the 
United Kingdom 
-to provide basic descriptive 
data about CFS, 
characteristics. 
 
To analyse issues raised by 
the growth of CFS, the 
possible emergence of an 
embryonic ‘fraud police’, the 
indirect ‘load shedding’, and 
the governance of CFS. 
Not stated 
Categorisation: 
The work of 
CFS, 
demographic, 
profile of CFS, 
working hours, 
experience 
during fraud 
investigations, 
the governance 
and status of 
CFS, and 
prospects of CFS 
 
Descriptive  
A survey & 
semi-structured 
interview 
(Consultation 
with 
NHSCFSMS) 
 
E-mail 
distribution lists 
of the 
NHNSCFSMS, 
London Fraud 
Investigators 
Group, the 
CFAB database, 
the address of 
local authority 
fraud 
investigation 
teams, the 
details of 
attendees at 
annual Institute 
of Counter Fraud 
Specialists 
Conference 
Public sector 
(government 
departments, 
executive 
agencies, and 
non-
departmental 
bodies) 
FTSE 100 
companies 
 
Counter fraud 
specialist 
(CFS)-mostly 
in public sector 
 
Counter fraud 
personnel in the 
police, local 
authorities, the 
NHS, 
government 
department and 
agencies, and 
other relevant 
fraud bodies  
The emergence of CFS is seen as the most 
common type fraud investigators. Many CFS are 
new to the work, undertake investigative related 
functions, and normal working hours (9-5). Some 
experience verbal abuse, threatened with violence 
or actual assault. The status and future governance 
still uncertain until the actual Government 
proposals in response to the Fraud Review Team. 
Significant opportunities for the CFS to enhance 
their status and expand their operations. One of 
the core functions of CFS is the investigation of 
fraud and related offences. 
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Author (s) 
(Year) 
Title/Aims 
Theoretical 
perspective 
Method Populations Findings 
(Total 1,866 
respondents) 
 
Quantitative 
(SPSS) and 
qualitative 
 
Levi et al. 
(2007) 
The Nature , Extent and 
Economic Impact of Fraud in 
the UK 
 
To determine the nature, 
extent, and cost of fraud to 
the public and private 
sectors. 
 
To access critically the 
availability and quality of 
existing evidence on fraud. 
 
To recommend appropriate 
strategies to facilitate the 
comprehensive and 
consistent recording of data 
on fraud. 
 
Not stated 
 
Descriptive  
 
Review publicly 
available 
information on 
fraud in the UK 
(sources 
throughout the 
public, private 
sectors, and 
academic 
journals) 
Both public and 
private sectors  
 
Many academic fraud studies, details of the 
methodology used are typically lacking (fraud in 
private sector appears to constitute ‘research’). 
Estimating the extent of fraud is not centralised 
(substantial and varied data about many types of 
fraud are available). Based on the best evidence 
available, fraud losses in 2005 for business in the 
financial service sector (£1.005 billion), business 
in the non-financial sector (£0.934 billion), 
private/individuals-very little intentions in any of 
the studies (£2.75 billion), public bodies at the 
national level-data from NHSCFSMS and NFI 
(£6.434 billion-with tax fraud is the highest), and 
public bodies at the local level (£0.004 billion). 
However, the stated fraud loss figure is merely 
indicative due to sources of data neither mutually 
exclusive nor collectively exhaustive (many high 
cases that appear to meet the criteria of criminal 
fraud are investigated by forensic accounting and 
law firms, and treated as civil matters for 
litigation. The study recommends that future 
reporting and recording fraud should have a 
central body, a reasonably well-resourced and 
improved study of fraud as what stated in the 
National Fraud Reporting Centre (NFRC).  
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Author (s) 
(Year) 
Title/Aims 
Theoretical 
perspective 
Method Populations Findings 
Levi & 
Burrows 
(2007) 
Measuring the Impact of 
Fraud in the UK: A 
Conceptual and Empirical 
Journey 
 
To examine the conceptual 
and empirical underpinnings 
of data on the cost of fraud 
Rapid evidence 
assessment 
(REA) 
Categorisation: 
Losses affecting 
the private 
sector, losses 
affecting the 
public sector, 
overall fraud, 
defining fraud 
 
Descriptive 
Review publicly 
available 
information on 
fraud in the UK 
(sources 
throughout the 
public, private 
sectors, and 
academic 
journals) 
Both public and 
private sectors  
 
The process of compiling, testing, and 
aggregating data is difficult. A true picture of 
fraud is a chimera but it can be realized. Similar 
to the Fraud Review 2006, the establishment of a 
NFRC is at the right time (Canada and the US use 
the model). Suggested that the outcome should 
cover the apprehension and detection of the 
perpetrators, and fraud prevention. A possibility 
that the work of police and other central bodies 
might not meet the rising of fraud cases. This gap 
refers to the constraint of resources by the police 
(tactical and strategic approach) to investigate 
fraud and the public who expect something 
identifiable in the fraud cases. Views that fraud is 
a very significant problem and the cost, level of 
significance may remain high in the future. 
Doig & 
Macaulay 
(2008) 
Decades, Directions and the 
Fraud Review: Addressing 
the Future of Public Sector 
Fraud? 
 
To review the findings of 
research conducted in 1995 
on the investigation of fraud 
by police and the public 
sector 
 
To seek recommendations 
/changes based on the Fraud 
Review 2006 as highlighted 
in the research conducted in 
1995 
Not stated 
 
Descriptive 
Analyse and 
review previous 
authors’ 
research, various 
government 
reports and 
policies 
Public sector  Action taken by the government (establishment of 
Fraud Review 2006) aligns with the findings of the 
author’s research in 1995 that the public sector will 
continue to use their own resources in dealing with 
fraud. The Fraud Review 2006 emphasises that it 
will not replace the existing strategies but to assist 
in coordinating the approach taken.  
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Author (s) 
(Year) 
Title/Aims 
Theoretical 
perspective 
Method Populations Findings 
Button et al. 
(2009) 
Fraud typologies and victims 
of fraud literature review 
 
To review profiles a wide 
range of frauds which affect 
individuals and small 
business 
Not stated 
 
Descriptive  
 
Review of 
reports and 
literature 
 
(UK) 
Fraud among 
individuals and 
small business  
A wide range of techniques used to commit frauds 
(identity fraud-hack, operate in jurisdictions 
where they are unlikely to be bothered by law 
enforcement). The profile of victims varied (mass 
marketing fraud does not attract one type of 
victim- men, women, the old, and the young tend 
to fall for different variations). Low reporting of 
identity fraud due to: the victim may not know 
they have been defrauded, feel partly responsible, 
embarrassment, low financial loss, the ambiguity 
of fraud, the attitude of statutory bodies, and 
confusion. The major impacts include financial 
losses, lost employment, emotional impacts, 
health problems, disintegration of the family, self-
blame, and behavioural changes. Author 
mentioned that compared to many other crimes, 
fraud is relatively neglected by researchers (Levi, 
2008). 
Doig & Levi 
(2009) 
Inter-agency work and the 
UK public sector 
investigation of fraud, 1996–
2006: joined-up rhetoric and 
disjointed reality 
 
To explore the shifting 
rhetoric and on-the- ground 
efforts to escape 
departmental silos in order to 
address the fraud problem 
and fraudsters more 
efficiently and effectively via 
joint working. 
Not stated 
 
Descriptive 
 
A review of 
government 
reports, policies, 
and previous 
research 
 
Public Sector  
 
 
Efforts at joined up working against fraud 
contradict by the dominance of the related bodies, 
and the need to meet the intra-departmental 
objectives and targets. The joined up working 
having problem in funding, cycles of 
organizational change, and often superseding or 
displacing reforms in implementation. Suggest 
having a combined function to address the issues 
of fraud. 
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Author (s) 
(Year) 
Title/Aims 
Theoretical 
perspective 
Method Populations Findings 
Button & 
Brooks 
(2009) 
“Mind the gap”, progress 
towards developing anti-
fraud culture strategies in 
UK central government 
bodies 
 
To assess the extent and 
quality of anti-fraud culture 
strategies in the UK central 
government bodies. 
 A survey (close 
and open 
answer) 
 
Analysis upon 
HM treasury 
survey 
338 
(government 
department-
ministry and 
non-ministry, 
executive 
agencies, and 
executive 
NDPB) 
Significant numbers of central public bodies lack 
of anti-fraud cultural strategies (staff awareness 
training, and screening procedures) - discretion in 
policy and practice, different approaches, and 
commitment. The NHSCFSMS is considered a 
very successful counter fraud strategy (saving 
from fraud of £811 million- 12:1 return on 
investment). Most of fraud committed by internal 
parties. Suggest having a central government 
resource to advise, and inspect the standard of the 
counter fraud strategies.  
Gee et al. 
(2009) 
The financial cost of fraud 
 
To examine the measurement 
of fraud and fraud losses 
globally 
 
 
Not stated  
 
Descriptive 
 
 
Reviewed 132 
exercises to 
accurately 
measure fraud 
and error losses 
covering 32 
different types of 
expenditure 
44 
organisations 
from 9 
countries 
(Europe, North 
America, 
Australia and 
New Zealand, 
and none were 
found in Asia 
and Africa) 
Losses to fraud and error can be treated as a 
business cost (can be tracked and reduced). The 
work to measure the losses can be high costs-
effective (15% of average fraud losses is reduced-
example in the UK, and US). The UK’s NHS-
60% (1998-2006); the US department for 
Education-35% (2001-2005); the US department 
of Agriculture-28% (2002-2004), and the UK’s 
DWP-50% (1997/98-2005/06).With the benefit of 
accurate information the nature and extent of 
fraud, losses can be reduced significantly. 
Gannon & 
Doig (2010) 
Ducking the answer? Fraud 
strategies and police 
resources 
 
To analyse and review the 
strategies, and resources of 
police in dealing with fraud 
pre and post Fraud Review 
2006 
Not stated  
Categorisation: 
Structure, 
policy, caseload, 
and 
performance. 
 
Descriptive  
A survey. 
 
Semi-structured 
interviews with 
selected 
respondents 
 
 
47 civilian 
police forces 
(Regional, 
British 
Transport 
Police, and 
Crown 
Dependencies 
 
The Fraud Review unable to address the issue in 
optimizing the police force for example number 
of staff, and training in fraud investigation are 
needed. The role of the Police Fraud Squad seems 
to disappear in the current structures. Some 
specialist resources still in operation but located 
in multifaceted departments and more focus on 
asset recovery, and organized crime fraud rather 
than fraud investigations. 
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Author (s) 
(Year) 
Title/Aims 
Theoretical 
perspective 
Method Populations Findings 
 
 
Chief 
Constable’s 
office  
Gee et al. 
(2010) 
The financial cost of UK 
public sector fraud: a less 
painful way to reduce public 
expenditure 
 
To estimate the financial 
costs of fraud in the UK 
(public expenditure, taxation 
revenues, both at local and 
national levels) and give 
recommendations 
Not stated  
 
Descriptive  
 
An extensive 
review of a 
survey based on 
the previous 
‘global survey 
percentage’ of 
‘The Financial 
Costs of Fraud 
Report (2009) 
and ‘The 
Financial Cost of 
Health Care 
Fraud Report 
(2010). 
Public sector  Estimated that the financial costs of the UK public 
sector fraud more than £36 billion. The UK is 
probably no worse or no better than most 
countries (estimated losing £22.407 billion in 
public sector expenditure), uncollected tax 
revenue of £16 billion as a result of fraud-related 
behaviour. Example of fraud losses can be 
reduced: The NHS-reduced up to 60% between 
1998 and 2006, the DWP-reduced up to 50% 
between the periods of 1997/98-2005/06. The 
approach of most of the UK public sector to fraud 
has been reactive (detecting, investigate, and 
prosecute) which does not address the financial 
losses. Suggests the need for a body- Public 
Sector Counter Fraud Agency linked to the 
department (Treasury) and with defined remit, 
authority, and resources to work on reducing 
losses. A program of accurate measurement of 
losses should be implemented major area of 
public expenditure.  
Button 
(2011) 
Fraud investigation and the 
‘flawed architecture’ of 
counter fraud entities in the 
United Kingdom 
 
To analyse the foundations 
of counter fraud entities in 
Not stated 
Categorisation: 
Structure and 
legal status, 
history and 
culture, 
functional and 
geographical 
A survey 
 
Semi-structured 
interview 
 
Review public 
documents 
 
Various counter 
fraud personnel 
(police, local 
authorities, the 
NHS, 
government 
department and 
agencies, 
A very diverse range of counter fraud entities 
(differs capabilities, and the architecture is subject 
to change) quangos, government departments or 
parts of them. The government decided to reduce 
the number of quangos through mergers, 
abolition, and change of status (2010) including 
Audit Commission-National Fraud Initiative, 
audit, Office for Trading merged with the 
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Author (s) 
(Year) 
Title/Aims 
Theoretical 
perspective 
Method Populations Findings 
investigating fraud 
effectively. 
domination, 
funding and 
capacity, 
operational 
independence, 
and the ebb and 
flow or 
organization 
reform. 
 
Descriptive  
 
 private sector, 
and other 
relevant fraud 
bodies) 
 
28 interviews 
Public sector 
(government 
departments, 
executive 
agencies, and 
non-
departmental 
bodies) 
FTSE 100 
companies 
 
Counter fraud 
specialist 
(CFS)-mostly 
in public sector 
 
Counter fraud 
personnel in the 
police, local 
authorities, the 
NHS, 
government 
department and 
agencies, and 
other relevant 
fraud bodies 
Competition Commission, and Serious Organized 
Crime Agency (SOCA) merged with to create the 
National Crime Agency. Fraud is a major problem 
but the counter fraud entities are fragmented with 
varying capabilities, and resilience (different 
levels of competency, resources (prone to cuts), 
and the security of the resources-some are good, 
average, and poor). A CFS has specialist 
knowledge in law related to fraud and benefits 
law, and involved in preventive work (vary 
among organization - NHS is very committed). A 
number of criminal prosecution in court does vary 
(CFS responsibility) where CFS prepare and give 
to their own prosecution department (NHS and 
DWP) or to the police. The establishment of the 
NHS Counter Fraud and Security Management 
Service (NHSCFSMS), and the emergence of 
CFS across central, local government, and private 
sector accredited by the Counter Fraud 
Professional Accreditation Board (CFACB). The 
reasons include the failure of the police to take 
fraud seriously; an attitude towards fraud is 
increased in the public sector (mid-1900s), and 
desire for professionalization. Fraud in local 
authorities might be investigated completely by 
local authorities, or hire private investigators, a 
partnership with the police, or totally by the 
police. Local CFS (must have ACFS) is a legal 
requirement in the NHS but not in other 
organizations. The salary in DWP is the lowest 
compared to the NHS and local authority. Further 
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Author (s) 
(Year) 
Title/Aims 
Theoretical 
perspective 
Method Populations Findings 
(semi- 
structured 
interview) 
 
research to optimize in fraud investigation is 
needed. 
Lane (2011) Are local authority fraud 
teams fit for purpose?  
 
To analyse fraud 
investigation practices in 
London local governments, 
and compare with the 
Department for Work and 
Pensions (DWP), and 
National Health Services 
(NHS). 
Not stated  
 
Descriptive 
A survey 
 
33 officers 
responsible for 
fraud in all 
London 
boroughs 
(UK) 
Most of the London boroughs have their own 
corporate fraud team same as DWP and NHS. 
NAO measured the anti-fraud activities, and 
Audit Commission (AC) together with the CIPFA 
provides guidelines (‘good practice’). No standard 
of anti-fraud operations and investigations 
approaches among local government. Most of the 
fraud officers had the Counter Fraud Specialists 
(CFS) qualification although no minimum 
competency standard at national level is being set 
up. 
Good practice in interviewing, case screening, 
case supervision, and training development. 
Surveillance and forensic computer examination 
skills; still lack of use and not enough training. 
More research to study the local government 
fraud outside the London boroughs. 
Button et al. 
(2011) 
Measuring the cost of fraud: 
an opportunity for the new 
competitive advantage 
 
To provide evidence by 
analysing 132 fraud risk 
management exercises. 
Not stated 
 
Descriptive 
Analysed 132 
fraud risk 
measurement 
exercises from 9 
countries of 
different sectors. 
Determine the 
percentage loss 
rate (PLR) and 
the fraud 
44 
organisations 
from nine 
countries  
Fraud and error losses in an organisation should 
currently be expected to be at least 3%. The PLR 
when first measured has been found to be 5.40 per 
cent and 4.61 per cent when last measured, 
representing an average reduction of just fewer 
than 15 per cent. The fraud and error can be 
measured and the greater use of fraud risk 
measurement and counter fraud strategies can 
reduce the losses. 
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Author (s) 
(Year) 
Title/Aims 
Theoretical 
perspective 
Method Populations Findings 
frequency rate 
(FFR)-using 
Excel 
Gee et al. 
(2012) 
The Resilience to Fraud of 
the Local Government 
Research Into How Well 
Local Authorities Protect 
Themselves 
 
To examine how well the 
UK local government sector 
protect itself from fraud. 
Not stated 
 
Descriptive 
A survey 
 
Self-Assessment 
Fraud Resilience 
(SAFR) 
72 local 
authorities 
Overall, the local government achieved a mean 
score of 35.1 of 50. 
Performed well in the following areas: 
i. have a written counter fraud strategy 
in place and agreed by the executive 
authority 
ii. further investigation arrangement 
iii. investigation with clear guidance 
iv. ensure the possible sanctions taken 
such as disciplinary, civil and 
criminal 
Not performed well in the following areas: 
i. estimation of losses for counter fraud 
resources/budget 
ii. evaluate the extent of a real anti-fraud 
culture in organisation 
iii. estimate the total economic cost of 
fraud 
iv. formal relationship with external 
agencies 
v. regularly review the effectiveness of 
counter fraud work against 
performance indicators  
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Appendix 4: List of English Local Authorities 
Region Districts/County  Number 
Metropolitan 
North West Manchester, Bolton, Bury, Oldham, Rochdale, Stockport, Tameside, 
Trafford, Wigan, Liverpool, Knowsley, St Helen, Sefton, Wirral 
15 
Yorkshire and 
Humber 
Sheffield, Barnsley, Doncaster, Rotherham 4 
North East Newcastle upon Tyne, Gateshead, South Tyneside, North Tyneside, 
Sunderland 
5 
West 
Midlands 
Birmingham, Coventry, Dudley, Sandwell, Solihull, Walsall, 
Wolverhampton 
7 
Yorkshire and 
Humber 
Leeds, Bradford, Calderdale, Kirklees, Wakefield 5 
Total  36 
London borough 
London 
Borough 
Barking and Dagenham, Barnet, Bexley, Bromley, Camden, City of 
London, Croydon, Ealing, Enfield, Greenwich, Hackney, Hammersmith 
and Fulham, Haringey, Harrow, Havering, Hillingdon, Hounslow, 
Islington, Kensington and Chelsea, Kingston upon Thames, Lambeth, 
Lewisham, Merton, Newham, Redbridge, Richmond upon Thames, 
Southwark, Sutton, Tower Hamlets, Waltham Forest, Wandsworth, 
Westminster 
33 
Total  33 
Unitary Councils 
East of 
England 
Central Bedfordshire, Luton, Peterborough, Southend-on-Sea, Bedford, 
Thurrock 
6 
East Midland Nottingham, Leicester, Derby, Rutland 4 
South West Cornwall, Bristol, Wiltshire, South Gloucestershire, Plymouth, North 
Somerset, Swindon, Bath and North East Somerset, Bournemouth, Poole, 
Torbay, Isles of Scilly 
12 
North West Cheshire East, Cheshire West and Chester, Warrington, Halton, 
Blackpool, Blackburn with Darwen 
6 
North East Northumberland, County Durham, Stockton-On-Tees, Middlesbrough, 
Redcar and Cleveland, Darlington, Hartlepool 
7 
South East Slough, Windsor and Maidenhead, West Berkshire, Reading, Wokingham, 
Portsmouth, Milton Keynes, Brighton & Hove, Medway, Isle of Wight, 
Bracknell Forest, Southampton 
12 
Yorkshire and 
Humber 
East Riding of Yorkshire, Hull, York, North Lincolnshire, North East 
Lincolnshire 
5 
West Midland Telford and Wrekin, Herefordshire, Stoke-on-Trent, Shropshire, 4 
 
Total  56 
District Councils 
South East 
South Bucks, Chiltern, Wycombe, Aylesbury Vale, Hastings, Rother, 
Wealden, Eastbourne, Lewes, 
Gosport, Fareham, Winchester, Havant, East 
Hampshire, Hart, Rushmoor, Basingstoke and Deane, Test 
Valley, Eastleigh, New Forest, Spelthorne, Runnymede, Surrey 
Heath, Woking, Elmbridge, Guildford, Waverley, Mole Valley, Epsom 
55 
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and Ewell, Reigate and Banstead, Tandridge, 
Worthing, Arun, Chichester, Horsham, Crawley, Mid Sussex, Adur, 
Oxford, Cherwell, South Oxfordshire, Vale of White Horse, West 
Oxfordshire 
East of 
England 
Cambridge, South Cambridge, Huntingdonshire, Fenland, East 
Cambridge, Harlow, Epping Forest, Brentwood, Basildon, Castle 
Point, Rochford, Maldon, Chelmsford, Uttlesford, Braintree, 
Colchester, Tendring, Three Rivers, Watford, Hertsmere, Welwyn 
Hatfield, Broxbourne, East Hertfordshire, Stevenage, North 
Hertfordshire, St Albans, Dacorum, Norwich, South Norfolk, Great 
Yarmouth, Broadland, North Norfolk, King's Lynn and West 
Norfolk, Breckland, Ipswich, Suffolk Coastal, Waveney, Mid 
Suffolk, Babergh, St Edmundsbury, Forest Heath 
41 
North West 
Barrow-in-Furness, South Lakeland, Copeland, Allerdale, Eden, Carlisle, 
West Lancashire, Chorley, South 
Ribble, Fylde, Preston, Wyre, Lancaster, Ribble Valley, South 
Northamptonshire, Northampton, Daventry, Wellingborough, Kettering, C
orby, East Northamptonshire 
18 
East Midlands 
High Peak, Derbyshire Dales, South Derbyshire, Erewash, Amber 
Valley, North East Derbyshire, Chesterfield, Bolsover, 
Charnwood, Melton, Harborough, Oadby and Wigston, Blaby, Hinckley 
and Bosworth, North West Leicestershire, 
Rushcliffe, Broxtowe, Ashfield, Gedling, Newark and 
Sherwood, Mansfield, Bassetlaw 
29 
South West 
Exeter, East Devon, Mid Devon, North Devon, Torridge, West 
Devon, South Hams, Teignbridge, Weymouth and Portland, West Dorset, 
North Dorset, Purbeck, East Dorset, Christchurch, 
Gloucester, Tewkesbury, Cheltenham, Cotswold, Stroud, Forest of Dean, 
South Somerset, Taunton Deane, West Somerset, Sedgemoor, Mendip 
25 
Yorkshire and 
Humber 
Lincoln, North Kesteven, South Kesteven, South Holland, Boston, East 
Lindsey, West Lindsey, 
Selby, Harrogate, Craven, Richmondshire, Hambleton, Ryedale,  
Scarborough 
14 
West Midland 
North Warwickshire, Nuneaton and Bedworth, Rugby, Stratford-on-
Avon, Warwick, Tamworth, Lichfield, Cannock Chase, South 
Staffordshire, Stafford, Newcastle under-Lyme, Staffordshire 
Moorlands, East Staffordshire, Worcester, Malvern Hills, Wyre 
Forest, Bromsgrove, Redditch, Wychavon 
19 
Total  201 
County Councils 
South East 
Buckinghamshire, East Sussex, Hampshire, Kent, Oxfordshire, Surrey, 
West Sussex 
7 
East of 
England 
Cambridgeshire, Hertfordshire, Norfolk, Suffolk, Essex 
5 
East Midland Derbyshire, Leicestershire, Northamptonshire 3 
North West Cumbria, Lancashire 2 
South West Devon, Dorset, Gloucestershire, Somerset 4 
Yorkshire and 
Humber  
Lincolnshire, North Yorkshire, Durham  
3 
West Midland Warwickshire, Worcestershire, Staffordshire  3 
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Total  27 
Grand Total  353 
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Appendix 5: Cover Letter 
March 2014 
 
«First_Name» «Last_Name» 
«Position» 
«Address_1» 
«Address_2» 
«Addres_3» 
«Postcode» 
 
Dear «Designation» «Last_Name» 
 
Invitation to participate in a survey on forensic accounting services 
 
My name is Mohd Hadafi Sahdan and I am a PhD candidate at the University of Huddersfield. I am conducting research 
entitled ‘Organisational Intention to Use Forensic Accounting Services in Detecting and Preventing Fraud’. The 
research aims to investigate and explore the current status of using forensic accounting services to detect and prevent 
fraud. 
 
This research project has been approved by the University of Huddersfield Business School Research Committee. It 
will take you approximately 15 to 20 minutes to answer all the questions. I would like to assure you that all responses 
will be kept confidential and no reference will be made to any particular local authority arising from the results of the 
questionnaire.  
 
I value your time and prompt response to the questionnaire and your kind participation is greatly appreciated. If you 
require further information about the research project, kindly contact me or my supervisor, Dr. Julie Drake. Please 
return this survey by 20 April 2014 using the adhesive address label that is included in this envelope. 
 
Thank you very much for taking you time and effort to complete this survey. 
 
 
Yours faithfully, 
 
 
 
Mohd Hadafi Sahdan     Supervised by; 
PhD Candidate      Julie Drake, BA MA PhD FCA FHEA 
Business School      Department of Accountancy 
University of Huddersfield    Business School 
HD1 3DH Queensgate     University of Huddersfield 
Email: u1171885@hud.ac.uk    HD1 3DH Queensgate 
Tel: 07429336074     Email: j.e.drake@hud.ac.uk 
       Tel: 01484472350 
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Appendix 6: Questionnaire 
 
 
 
 
A Survey of  
Organisational Intention 
to Use Forensic Accounting 
Services in Detecting and 
Preventing Fraud 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
 
Financial Ethics and 
Governance Research Group 
(FEGReg)  
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For the purpose of this research project, the following definition will be used: 
 
Forensic accounting services refer to any external providers such as accounting firms, and specialised 
forensic accounting firms that applied special skills, investigative skills, techniques, and practical 
experiences in detecting and preventing fraud as part of their services to organisations. 
. 
Fraud refers to an intentional false representation, failing to disclose or abuse of position to make gain, 
cause loss or expose another to the risk of loss as stipulated in the Fraud Act 2006. Examples of fraud 
include housing benefit/council tax benefit, procurement, payroll, and internal fraud. 
 
SECTION 1: LOCAL AUTHORITY CHARACTERISTICS 
 
1.1   Please indicate your local authority type  
 English County Council   London Borough Council 
 Metropolitan Borough Council   English District Council 
 English Unitary Council    
 
1.2   Please indicate the political majority in your local authority  
 
 Conservative    Independent Group  
 Labour    Other (Please specify) 
 Liberal Democrat   ___________________ 
 
1.3   Please indicate the current provision of internal audit services in your local authority 
 
 Internal audit function maintained in-house   Internal audit function partially outsourced 
 (Number of internal audit staff: ___)                        (Number of internal audit staff: __) 
 Internal audit function fully outsourced    
     
 Internal audit function through joint/shared services 
 (Number of internal audit staff: ___) 
 
 
1.4   Please indicate your local authority’s net revenue for the financial year ended 2012/2013 
 Less than £100 million    £1,001 million - £1,300 million 
 £101 million - £400 million   £1,301 million - £1,600 million 
 £401 million - £700 million   £1,601 million - £1,900 million 
 £701 million - £1,000 million   More than £1,900 million 
 
1.5    Please indicate if your local authority has an in-house counter fraud team/unit 
   Yes        No 
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If the answer for Question 1.5 is Yes, please answer the following question (1.6). Otherwise, please 
directly proceed to the next section (Section 2). 
 
1.6    Please indicate the number of staff in the counter fraud team/unit 
 Less than 10 staff    21-25 staff 
 10-15 staff    26-30 staff 
 16-20 staff    31-35 staff 
 21-25 staff   More than 30 staff 
 
 
SECTION 2: FORENSIC ACCOUNTING SERVICES 
 
2.1 Please identify and rank the five (5) core skills that you think a forensic accountant needs to 
possess. Please rank your preference from 1 (most preferred) to 5 (least preferred) 
 
 Auditing skills   Problem solving skills 
 Critical/strategic thinking   Research skills 
 Effective oral communication   Scepticism 
 Effective written communication   Simplifying the information 
 Identifying key issues   Think like the wrongdoer 
 Investigative ability   Understand the goals of the case 
 Investigative intuition   Synthesise results of investigations 
 Motivation   Other (Please specify)_________ 
 
 
2.2 Is your local authority currently using forensic accounting services or has it previously done so? 
 
 
 
 
If your answer to Question 2.2 is Yes, please answer the following question (2.3). Otherwise, you 
can proceed to the next section (Section 3). 
  
No Yes 
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2.3 (a) Please indicate the type(s) of forensic accounting services your local authority has used (in 
the last 12 months) or in the past (more than 12 months). You may tick more than one box.  
             
Forensic Accounting Services Used in 
Last 12 
Months 
Used More 
Than 12 
Months Ago 
Fraud prevention system   
Fraud detection   
Fraud investigations   
Litigation support and expert witness   
Digital forensic including data mining, data imaging and 
recovery 
  
Asset tracing and recovery   
Assessing and improving internal control system   
Damage or loss quantification   
Fraud risk management   
Developing regulatory compliance strategies   
Prosecution cases   
Fraud training   
Reviewing current counter-fraud procedures   
Other (Please specify)    
           
2.3   (b) Please indicate the forensic accounting service providers your organization has used and the 
level of satisfaction with the quality of the provided services by choosing the appropriate number 
on a scale of 1 (Very Dissatisfied) to 5 (Very Satisfied). 
 
Very Dissatisfied Dissatisfied Uncertain Satisfied Very Satisfied 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 Big Four accounting firms* 
 
1 2 3 4 5  
 Other (Please specify) _________________________ 
 
1 2 3 4 5  
* Big Four accounting firms refer to KPMG, PwC, Deloitte, and EY 
 
2.3  (c) Please indicate your local authority’s intention to use forensic accounting services in the future. 
In answering, use the following response scale of 1 (Decrease) to 5 (Increase Significantly). 
Please circle the number corresponding to your level of agreement with the statement. 
 
    Decrease       Decrease Slightly  Uncertain Increase Slightly Increase Significantly 
 1    2   3       4 5 
 
My local authority’s intentions to use forensic accounting services to detect and 
prevent fraud in future will likely… 
1 2 3 4 5 
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SECTION 3: FORENSIC ACCOUNTING SERVICES PERCEPTION FACTORS 
Please indicate the extent to which you agree with each of the following statements. In answering, use 
the following response scale of 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 5 (Strongly Agree) and circle the number 
corresponding to your level of agreement with each statement. 
 
Strongly Disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 
     
3.1 The use of forensic accounting services helps to deter fraud  1 2 3 4 5 
3.2 The use of forensic accounting services enhances the image of my local 
authority 
1 2 3 4 5 
3.3 Forensic accounting services help in the recovery of cash and assets that 
have been embezzled 
1 2 3 4 5 
3.4 Forensic accountants have more objectivity and credibility in fraud 
detection and prevention than internal auditors 
1 2 3 4 5 
3.5 Forensic accountants have accounting expertise and local authority 
knowledge in dealing with fraud 
1 2 3 4 5 
3.6 The use of forensic accounting services can improve internal control system  1 2 3 4 5 
3.7 Using forensic accounting services could cause confidentiality issues in my 
local authority 
1 2 3 4 5 
3.8 Forensic accounting services are very costly 1 2 3 4 5 
3.9 The cost of using forensic accounting services would influence my local 
authority’s decision to use the services 
1 2 3 4 5 
3.10 My local authority cannot afford the cost of acquiring forensic accounting 
services 
1 2 3 4 5 
3.11 Forensic accounting services cannot guarantee fraud detection and 
prevention  
1 2 3 4 5 
3.12 It is difficult to evaluate the effectiveness of forensic accounting services to 
detect and prevent fraud before acquiring the services 
1 2 3 4 5 
3.13 My local authority is aware of the role of forensic accounting services in 
fraud detection and prevention 
1 2 3 4 5 
3.14 My local authority is knowledgeable about the benefits of using forensic 
accounting services 
1 2 3 4 5 
3.15 My local authority is knowledgeable about the risks of using forensic 
accounting services 
1 2 3 4 5 
3.16 The promotion of forensic accounting services leads my local authority to 
use the services 
1 2 3 4 5 
3.17 Forensic accounting firms can provide high quality services 1 2 3 4 5 
3.18 The presence of a large number of forensic accounting services providers 
in the market initiate local authorities to use the services 
1 2 3 4 5 
3.19 Overall, my local authority perception of forensic accounting is positive 1 2 3 4 5 
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SECTION 4: FRAUD PERCEPTION FACTORS 
Please indicate the extent to which you agree with each of the following statements. In answering, use 
the following response scale of 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 5 (Strongly Agree) and circle the number 
corresponding to your level of agreement with each statement. 
 
Strongly Disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 
  
4.1 If my local authority is a victim of fraud, the…  
i.      financial loss will most likely be serious 1 2 3 4 5 
ii. effect on local authority image will most likely be serious 1 2 3 4 5 
iii. effect on the employee morale will most likely be serious 1 2 3 4 5 
iv. effect on the efficiency and productivity in my local authority will most 
likely be serious 
1 2 3 4 5 
v. cost of investigation and prosecution will most likely be high 1 2 3 4 5 
4.2 My local authority often worries about being a victim of fraud 1 2 3 4 5 
4.3 The probability of my local authority being a victim of fraud is very low 1 2 3 4 5 
4.4 Compared to other local authorities, my local authority’s risk of fraud is 
lower 
1 2 3 4 5 
4.5 The creation of the Single Fraud Investigation Service (SFIS) provides 
benefits to counter fraud activities in my local authority 
1 2 3 4 5 
4.6 My local authority shares data and fraud intelligence with other local 
authorities 
1 2 3 4 5 
4.7 The abolishment of the Audit Commission has had a negative impact on 
counter fraud activities in my local authority  
1 2 3 4 5 
4.8 A fraud awareness campaign is an important tool to prevent and deter fraud 
in my local authority 
1 2 3 4 5 
4.9 A standard definition of fraud that can be used by all local authorities needs 
to be developed to establish a more reliable picture of fraud and to make an 
appropriate allocation of counter fraud resources in my local authority 
1 2 3 4 5 
4.10 Other local bodies such as the National Health Service (NHS) and the 
Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) that are considered effective in 
how they tackle fraud led my local authority to use forensic accounting 
services 
1 2 3 4 5 
4.11 The austerity measures introduced by central government have had a 
negative impact on the resources available for counter fraud activities  
1 2 3 4 5 
4.12 Lack of counter fraud standards at national level affects my local authority 
to detect and prevent fraud  
1 2 3 4 5 
4.13 The judgment of an outside contractor such as a forensic accounting firm 
towards fraud is more likely to be impartial  
1 2 3 4 5 
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SECTION 5: INTERNAL CONTROL FACTORS 
Please indicate the extent to which you agree with each of the following statements. In answering, use 
the following response scale of 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 5 (Strongly Agree) and circle the number 
corresponding to your level of agreement with each statement. 
 
Strongly Disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 
      
5.1 The organisational structure in my local authority supports effective 
internal control 
1 2 3 4 5 
5.2 In my local authority, management and employees are assigned 
appropriate levels of authority and responsibilities to facilitate 
effective internal control 
1 2 3 4 5 
5.3 The Audit Committee in my local authority oversees risk management, 
governance and counter fraud arrangements 
1 2 3 4 5 
5.4 There is a significant number of independent members within the Audit 
Committee in my local authority  
1 2 3 4 5 
5.5 At least one member of the Audit Committee is a financial expert such 
as a qualified accountant or other financial professional   
1 2 3 4 5 
5.6 The Audit Committee in my local authority has a regular meeting with 
internal auditors 
1 2 3 4 5 
5.7 The Audit Committee in my local authority recommends that we use 
forensic accounting services in detecting and preventing fraud 
1 2 3 4 5 
5.8 My local authority has an effective and up-to-date counter fraud 
strategy  
1 2 3 4 5 
5.9 In my local authority, the number of staff and resources allocated are 
adequate to counter fraud  
1 2 3 4 5 
5.10 In my local authority, those working to counter fraud have received  
specialist professional training and accreditation 
1 2 3 4 5 
5.11 The effectiveness of in-house fraud investigation in my local authority 
is very high  
1 2 3 4 5 
5.12 It is difficult to estimate the total economic cost of fraud in my local 
authority 
1 2 3 4 5 
5.13 My local authority be able to retain (or recruit) people with the 
necessary skills  
1 2 3 4 5 
5.14 My local authority evaluates the strength of anti-fraud cultures 
regularly 
1 2 3 4 5 
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SECTION 6: INSTITUTIONAL AND OTHER FACTORS  
Please rate the importance of the following statements in influencing your local authority’s decision to 
use forensic accounting services. In answering, use the following response scale of 1 (Not at All 
Important) to 5 (Very Important) and circle the number accordingly. 
 
Not at All Important Not Important Neutral Important Very Important 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
6.1    Directives, rules and policies from central government 1 2 3 4 5 
6.2 Initiatives and action plan by central government to reduce fraud cases  1 2 3 4 5 
6.3 Reports on fraud issued by the following bodies:       
i. the Audit Commission  1 2 3 4 5 
ii. the National Fraud Authority (NFA) 1 2 3 4 5 
iii. the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) 1 2 3 4 5 
6.4 The used of forensic accounting services by other local authorities  1 2 3 4 5 
6.5 The high rate of success received by other local authorities when using 
forensic accounting services 
1 2 3 4 5 
6.6 Recommendations by the professional bodies such as:      
i.  the Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy  (CIPFA) 1 2 3 4 5 
ii. the Institute of Chartered of Accountants in England and Wales 
(ICAEW) 
1 2 3 4 5 
iii. the Institute of Counter Fraud Specialist (ICFS) 1 2 3 4 5 
6.7 Recommendations by associations such as:      
i. the Local Government Association (LGA) 1 2 3 4 5 
ii. the Society of Local Authority Chief Executives (SOLACE)      
iii. the Public Risk Management Association (Alarm) 1 2 3 4 5 
iv. the Local Authority Investigation Officers Group (LAIOG) 1 2 3 4 5 
6.8 Pressures from the following stakeholders: 
i. Elected councillors 
ii. Tax payers/local residents/voters 
iii. Top management 
iv. Business partners 
     
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
6.9 Recommendations by the external auditors 1 2 3 4 5 
6.10 Recommendations by the Audit Commission 1 2 3 4 5 
6.11 Recommendations by employees that hold a related professional 
membership or qualification in accounting and fraud  
1 2 3 4 5 
6.12 News, publications and discussions on fraud from….. 
i. Television 
ii. Radio 
iii. Newspapers/magazines 
iv. Online news 
v. Online social networking such as Linkedln, Facebook, Twitter 
     
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
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SECTION 7: INTENTION TO USE FORENSIC ACCOUNTING SERVICES 
 
The following questions explore your local authority’s intention toward using forensic accounting 
services. It does not matter if your local authority has used forensic accounting services or not.  
 
In answering the following question, use the following response scale of 1 (No Intent to Use) to 5 
(Definite Intent to Use) and circle the number corresponding to your level of agreement with the 
statement. 
 
No Intent to Use Little Intent to 
Use 
Don’t 
Know  
Moderate Intent to 
Use 
Definite Intent to 
Use 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
7.1 Does your local authority intends to use forensic accounting services for 
fraud detection and prevention?  
1 2 3 4 5 
 
In answering the following questions, use the following response scale of 1 (Less Than 6 Months) to 5 
(More Than 24 Months) and circle the number corresponding to your level of agreement with each 
statement. 
 
Less Than 6 
Months 
6-12 Months 12-18 Months  18-24 Months More Than 24 
Months 
1              2             3           4      5 
 
7.2   If your local authority is intending to use forensic accounting services, how   
soon do you anticipate that it will operationally implemented? 
1 2 3 4 5 
7.3  My local authority intends to use forensic accounting services for  the 
following types of services: 
     
i. Fraud prevention system 1 2 3 4 5 
ii. Fraud detection 1 2 3 4 5 
iii. Fraud investigations 1 2 3 4 5 
iv. Litigation support and expert witness 1 2 3 4 5 
v. Digital forensic including data mining, data imaging and recovery 1 2 3 4 5 
vi. Asset tracing and recovery 1 2 3 4 5 
vii. Assessing and improving internal control system 1 2 3 4 5 
viii. Damage or loss quantification 1 2 3 4 5 
ix. Fraud risk management 1 2 3 4 5 
x. Developing regulatory compliance strategy 1 2 3 4 5 
xi. Prosecution cases 1 2 3 4 5 
xii. Fraud training 1 2 3 4 5 
xiii. Reviewing current counter-fraud procedures 1 2 3 4 5 
xiv. Other (Please specify):__________________________ 1 2 3 4 5 
7.4   My local authority intends to use forensic accounting services to detect and 
prevent fraud for: 
     
i. Housing tenancy fraud 1 2 3 4 5 
ii. Payroll fraud 1 2 3 4 5 
iii. Council Tax fraud 1 2 3 4 5 
iv. Grant fraud 1 2 3 4 5 
v. Pension fraud 1 2 3 4 5 
vi. Internet fraud/cybercrime 1 2 3 4 5 
vii. Internal fraud (including management fraud) 1 2 3 4 5 
viii. Other (Please specify):_________________________ 1 2 3 4 5 
 
SECTION 8: PERSONAL PROFILE 
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8.1 Please indicate your current job title 
 
 Chief Executive 
 Managing Director 
 Director of Corporate Resources 
 Director of Finance/S 151 Officer 
 Chief /Head /Manager of Internal Audit 
 Chief /Head /Manager of Corporate Fraud Team 
 Other (Please specify)___________________ 
 
8.2 Please specify your age group 
 
 Less than 30 years   46-50 years 
 31-35 years   51-55 years 
 36-40 years   55-60 years  
 41-45 years   Above 60 years 
 
8.3 Please specify your academic qualification(s)  
 
 BA/BSc 
 MA/MSc/MBA 
 Phd/DBA 
 Other (Please specify)____________________ 
 
8.4 Please specify your membership in the following professional body.  
 
 The Association of Chartered Certified Accountant (ACCA)  
 The Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales (ICAEW)  
 The Chartered Institute Management Accountant (CIMA)  
 The Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy (CIPFA)  
 The Association of Certified Public Accountants (CPAUK)  
 The Chartered Institute of Internal Auditors (CIIA)  
 The Institute of Counter Fraud Specialists (ICFS)  
 The Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE)  
 Other (Please specify)_____________________________  
 
        Are there any further comments you would like to make? 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
End of Survey 
Thank you very much for your cooperation in completing this survey 
 
I would be willing to be interviewed for this research project    Yes  No 
            I would like to receive a summary of the research findings        Yes  No 
            Please provide your email address: _______________________  
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Appendix 7: Output of Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) 
KMO and Bartlett's Test 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy. .733 
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity 
Approx. Chi-Square 3664.687 
df 703 
Sig. .000 
 
Communalities 
 Initial Extraction 
CGT1 1.000 .698 
CGT2 1.000 .705 
ACM1 1.000 .789 
CGT3 1.000 .826 
CGT4 1.000 .581 
LAM1 1.000 .841 
LAM2 1.000 .864 
NBP1 1.000 .772 
ASC1 1.000 .725 
SHT1 1.000 .781 
SHT3 1.000 .772 
MDN1 1.000 .915 
MDN2 1.000 .932 
MDN3 1.000 .910 
MDN4 1.000 .924 
MDN5 1.000 .793 
BFT4 1.000 .797 
BFT5 1.000 .801 
BFT6 1.000 .715 
COF1 1.000 .850 
COF2 1.000 .887 
COF3 1.000 .807 
RSK1 1.000 .725 
RSK2 1.000 .693 
RSK3 1.000 .747 
SVF1 1.000 .595 
SVF2 1.000 .698 
SVF3 1.000 .782 
SVF4 1.000 .664 
SVF5 1.000 .633 
PSF1 1.000 .701 
PSF2 1.000 .703 
PSF3 1.000 .784 
ICR1 1.000 .715 
ICR2 1.000 .776 
ICR3 1.000 .569 
INT 1.000 .870 
RecodeInt2 1.000 .872 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
 
Total Variance Explained 
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Component Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings Rotation Sums 
of Squared 
Loadingsa 
Total % of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
Total % of 
Variance 
Cumulative % Total 
1 8.426 22.174 22.174 8.426 22.174 22.174 6.693 
2 3.378 8.889 31.063 3.378 8.889 31.063 5.624 
3 2.882 7.583 38.646 2.882 7.583 38.646 3.290 
4 2.662 7.006 45.652 2.662 7.006 45.652 4.269 
5 2.184 5.748 51.400 2.184 5.748 51.400 3.074 
6 1.968 5.179 56.580 1.968 5.179 56.580 3.432 
7 1.818 4.783 61.363 1.818 4.783 61.363 2.399 
8 1.709 4.498 65.860 1.709 4.498 65.860 3.345 
9 1.630 4.290 70.150 1.630 4.290 70.150 2.506 
10 1.297 3.412 73.562 1.297 3.412 73.562 1.973 
11 1.260 3.316 76.878 1.260 3.316 76.878 3.225 
12 .945 2.487 79.365     
13 .814 2.141 81.506     
14 .673 1.770 83.277     
15 .632 1.663 84.940     
16 .559 1.471 86.411     
17 .530 1.394 87.804     
18 .515 1.356 89.160     
19 .436 1.148 90.309     
20 .406 1.068 91.377     
21 .347 .912 92.289     
22 .339 .892 93.181     
23 .315 .830 94.011     
24 .294 .773 94.784     
25 .268 .706 95.490     
26 .257 .675 96.165     
27 .217 .572 96.737     
28 .188 .496 97.233     
29 .167 .439 97.672     
30 .157 .414 98.086     
31 .155 .408 98.495     
32 .131 .345 98.840     
33 .120 .317 99.157     
34 .101 .265 99.422     
35 .079 .207 99.629     
36 .058 .153 99.781     
37 .051 .134 99.916     
38 .032 .084 100.000     
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
a. When components are correlated, sums of squared loadings cannot be added to obtain a total variance. 
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Appendix 8: Result of PLS-Measurement Model-Theoretical 
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Appendix 9: Result of PLS Analysis –Measurement Model- Full model 
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Appendix 10: Result of PLS Analysis- Measurement Model-Control 
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Appendix 5: Result of PLS Analysis-Structural Model-Full 
 
